DISORDERS ENQUIRY COMMITTEE

1920

EVIDENCE

VOL 5

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VOLUME V.

GUJRANWALA, GUJRAT, LYALLPUR AND PUNJAB PROVINCIAL.

	Pages.
Part I.—Oral Evidence	1
Part II.—Written statements accepted without oral examination	185
Part III.—Written statements of witnesses subsequently examined orally	189
Part IV.—Martial Law notices and Instructions	249

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WITNESSES.

GUJRANWALA.

Serial No.	Name.	Oral evidence.	Written Statement.
		PAGE.	PAGE.
1	ABDUL KADIR, MUNSHI, Permanent Way Inspector, North Western Railway, Lyallpur.	128	222
2	ABDUR RAHIM KHAN of Zaida, Lieut. Khan, Cadet, Indian Army . . .	120	217
3	AMAR SINGH, Sardar Sahib, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sheikhupura . .	120	216
4	ARMSTRONG, Mr. A. R. B., Executive Engineer, Wazirabad	75	205
5	BOSWORTH-SMITH, Mr. B. N., I.C.S., Joint Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala District.	88	209
6	BUDH SINGH, BAWA, Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Provincial Division, Lyallpur.	125	219
7	CARBERRY, Captain D. H. M., Flight Commander, No. 31 Squadron, Royal Air Force.	38	194
8	CHATTERJEE, Mr. B. C., Head Master, Mission High School, and Member Municipal Committee, Gujranwala.	53	199
9	CHOPRA, Mr. R. C., Hafizabad	128	222
10	DEWAN CHAND, Babu, Sub-Permanent Way Inspector, North Western Railway, Lyallpur	126	221
11	DODKINS, Lieutenant L., Observer, Royal Air Force	41	195
12	DURAN KHAN, Khan, Honorary Civil Judge and Vice-President, Notified Area Committee, Sangla Hill, Sheikhupura.	126	221
13	EWING, Captain J. A. S., 19th Lancers	56	200
14	FLOWERDEW, Captain S. P., 1-24th North Western Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, Lahore.	118	216
15	GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN, Munshi, Retired Military Sub-Assistant Surgeon, Wazirabad	79	206
16	GHULAM RASUL, CHAUDHRI, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala . .	49	197
17	GHULAM HUSSAN, AGHA, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala . .	46	196
18	GODFREY, Captain W. E., I. A. R. O., Gujranwala	42	196
19	HARWOOD, Captain A., 1st Durham Light Infantry	56	201
20	IQBAL NARAIN, PANDIT, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala . .	67	203
21	JACOB, Mr. S. M., I.C.S., Director of Agriculture	71	204
22	KIRPA SINGH, MUNSHI, Tahsildar, Wazirabad	76	205
23	NEVILL, Mr. J. B., Assistant Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala . . .	61	202
24	NORRIS, Mr. T. H., Station Master, Wazirabad	88	208
25	O'BRIEN, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J., C.I.E., C.B.E., Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala.	1	189
26	PICKEN, Reverend S. C., of the American Mission, Sangla Hill, Sheikhupura	123	218
27	SHAW, Mr E. K., District Engineer, Gujranwala	53	199
28	SRI RAM SUD, Rai Sahib, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhupura.	100	213
29	SMITH, Mr. V. W., Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala	52	198

GUJRANWALA—*contd.*

Serial No.	Name.	Oral evidence.	Written Statement.
		PAGE.	PAGE.
30	SMITH, Major C. W. J., 2-54th Sikhs, F. F., Administrator, Martial Law, in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur.	82	207
31	SULTAN AHMAD, Khan Bahadur, Mirza, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala	33	193
32	SUNDAR SINGH, SARDAR, Honorary Secretary, Central Co-operative Bank, Gujranwala.	69	204
33	TATAM, Lieutenant, Military Grass Farm, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division . . .	117	215
	GUJRAT.		
1	ASAD JAN, SARDAR, Senior Sub-Judge, Gujrat	149	229
2	FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH, Sayad, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujrat . .	151	230
3	WILLIAMSON, Mr. H. S., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat	143	225
	LYALLPUR.		
1	AVATAR KISHEN KAUL, Pandit, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lyallpur . .	141	225
2	SMITH, Mr. V. W., Superintendent of Police, Lyallpur	133	224
	GURGAON.		
	TREVASKIS, Mr. H. K., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon	170	242
	ROHTAK.		
	BOLSTER, Mr. R. C., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak	171	242
	AMBALA.		
	WHITEHEAD, Mr. R. B., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Ambala . . .	172	244
	PROVINCIAL.		
1	BOALTH, Mr. V. H., Traffic Manager, North Western Railway, Lahore . .	153	231
2	BURLINGHAM, Mr. G., Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs, North Western Railway and Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway.	...	186
3	COODE, Mr. J. M., Director, Telegraph Engineering, Northern Circle . . .	...	185
4	FAZL-I-HUSSAIN, the Hon'ble Khan Bahadur, Mian Member, Punjab Legislative Council, Lahore.	157	241
5	TOMKINS, Mr. L. L., C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General of Police . . .	174	245
6	TOWNSEND, the Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H., I.C.S., Director of Civil Supplies in the Punjab.	179	246

NOTE.—The witnesses are shown under the districts to which their evidence primarily relates, but in several cases witnesses deposed to facts concerning other districts also. And of the Gujranwala witnesses, some relate to the district, some to the city, and others to both. An endeavour has been made in the page headings to indicate the tracts with which each witness dealt.

Volume V

PART I

Minutes of Evidence

At Lahore, Saturday, the 6th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.
Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.
Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN, C.I.E., C.B.E., Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. You were the Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala during the period of the disturbances ?

A. I went there on the 14th April. I was under orders of transfer to Ambala and I left on the evening of the 12th and was sent back by motor car on the 14th itself, and I got back.

Q. Where had you been previously ?

A. I was in Gujranwala.

Q. How long had you been at Gujranwala ?

A. I was there for nearly two years.

Q. In your statement here you give us a survey of the predisposing causes for the riots. What do you think was the principal cause that unsettled the people and caused disquiet ?

A. I do not know ; I think it was organized from outside.

Q. Was there a certain amount of unrest in Gujranwala because of the economic conditions ?

A. Not at all ; Gujranwala is a very rich place and growing in prosperity. It has got two big canals, of which the Upper Chenab is only just beginning to take full effect.

Q. So far as recruiting was concerned, was there any unrest caused by the methods of recruiting ?

A. No. Recruiting was almost confined to the agricultural classes and the townspeople did nothing ; and it was the townspeople who joined in these riots.

Q. Were the people in Gujranwala affected by the previous outbreaks in Delhi and Amritsar ?

A. Yes ; I understand that the occurrences of the 14th were entirely due to a meeting of the leaders in which it was decided to repeat the incidents of Amritsar and Lahore in order to discredit the Government. That is in the approver's statement.

Q. But so far as the leaders were concerned—and by the leaders I mean those who were politically minded—was not their idea the holding of *hartal ?* Or are you referring to anything more than the holding of a *hartal* so far as the leaders are concerned ?

A. I understand that it was intended to create mischief on the 14th.

Q. Were there not in Gujranwala some politically minded persons who wished to have a *hartal* as a demonstration against the Government measures in introducing the Rowlatt legislation ?

A. They had a *hartal* on the 6th.

Q. Subsequently was there a *hartal* in connection with Mr. Gandhi's arrest or after his arrest ?

A. It was on the 14th, after the Amritsar riots.

Q. What I really want to get at is this : you do not suggest, but you indicate as though the leaders were organizing ; and by that I suppose you mean the members of the pleader class ?

A. Certain pleaders were arrested.

Q. They intended that Delhi and Amritsar should be copied in the sense that riots should take place in Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. On what evidence did you come to that conclusion ?

A. I was told so by Mr. Heron, that he understood on the night of the 13th that there would be trouble the next morning.

Q. Who did you understand were causing the trouble ?

A. Certain of the pleaders who were arrested and convicted.

Q. In your statement you say that it had been resolved on the night of the 13th "to repeat the incidents of Lahore and Amritsar in order to discredit the Government and to show sympathy with the people of these places." What information did you receive ?

A. This is the evidence of one Bhagat in the Gujranwala Leaders' Case. He was a Barrister-at-Law.

Q. It was upon his information that you based your conclusion ?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you any other ground ?

A. Yes, one of the barristers met two or three of the leading conspirators and was telling them that they intended to create trouble.

Q. Who was it that told you ?

A. Abbas Ali.

Q. Was he the man who was sentenced ?

A. No, he went at once and told Mr. Heron about it.

(*Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate :*—He is a witness.)

Q. Who was the man that told him ?

A. Mr. Lal Singh and Mr. Amar Nath.

Q. Were these men tried then ?

A. They were tried and convicted.

Q. Of what ?

A. Waging war.

Q. Before the previous *hartal*, that is, the *hartal* of the 6th, a local meeting of the pleaders was held ?

A. Yes, there was a meeting on the 5th. There was a notice of the meeting printed and circulated all over the town calling the public to meet together and a number of pleaders and traders put their signatures to it.

Q. I think you saw the leaders ?

A. I called them and warned them that if any disorder took place I should hold them personally responsible.

Q. What did you mean by that intimation ? Did you mean that if the *hartal* took place and any violence resulted you would hold them responsible ?

A. That I should arrest them.

Q. Were you going to do that, apart from the question whether they had advocated violence or not ?

A. I made it clear to them that if violence followed it would be due to their preachings.

Q. Of course, it is one thing that violence should follow upon misunderstood advice and another thing that violence should follow without being encouraged ; is there any reason to suppose that in the meeting of the 5th April, the leaders incited them to violence ?

A. Not on that day.

Q. I think the resolutions that were passed at the meeting are the ones you set forth :—

(*i*) "That this meeting expresses its strong protest against the Rowlatt Bill and views with consternation and disapproval the manner in which it has been passed in the teeth of unanimous opposition and the considered judgment of the country as a whole.

(*ii*) This meeting expects that the 6th of April be observed as a national protest day and a fast of 24 hours be kept by all, and that all business in the town be suspended for the day.

(*iii*) That this meeting views with alarm the action of the Delhi authorities in firing upon the people of the city, which resulted in the deaths of so many citizens ; and urges on the Government the need of enquiring into responsibility for the said occurrence.

(*iv*) That a cable be despatched to the Secretary of State, etc., etc., conveying the purport of the resolutions."

The third resolution deals with matters I won't trouble you with. As regards the first two, was there anything wrong in either of these resolutions ?

A. Nothing in themselves.

Q. Then unless a speech was made in furtherance of the *hartal* or there was something said that incited them to violence, you have no necessity to condemn any meeting ?

A. I warned them to see that there was no trouble, and I took no further action.

Q. You suggest a reason in your statement for advocating trouble ?

A. I did suggest that it was possibly a trial of strength.

Q. What justification had you to suggest that ?

A. It is a matter of opinion.

Q. During this period, from the end of March to the 13th of April, were there rumours in Gujranwala as to the effect of the Rowlatt legislation ?

A. Rumours that Government were going to do this and do that were afloat.

Q. Were the rumours that were in circulation, within your knowledge, false rumours ?

A. Yes.

Q. Had the circulation of these rumours had a bad effect on the people, or a disquieting effect ?

A. I did not notice anything.

Q. Had people, in consequence of these rumours, not worked themselves up to excitement against the Rowlatt legislation ?

A. I did not notice any particular excitement before I left the district on the evening of the 12th.

Q. Then you left on the evening of the 12th ? When did you return ?

A. I returned by motor car on the 14th.

Q. At what time did you return ?

A. I just got to the edge of the civil station at quarter past 2. The motor car broke down and I had to walk. I had got to see where the ladies and children were.

Q. By the time the aeroplanes arrived, did you discover what took place that day ?

A. I saw the place burning and I met Mr. Heron, Mr. Nevill and other officers.

Q. What traces of damage did you see on your inspection ?

A. At that time, the buildings were all burning.

Q. Nobody extinguished the fire ?

A. It burnt all night.

Q. What other buildings ?

A. The station was burning the next morning.

Q. Did you ascertain that the earliest incident that had occurred in the course of the day was that of the calf being killed and hung up by the neck to the Katchi railway bridge ?

A. That was the first thing.

Q. Did you find rumours circulated as to who did it ?

A. Yes, that the police had done it. No true rumours.

Q. Were such rumours as that calculated to excite the feelings against the Hindus ?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as I know, no useful object was served by the circulation of such rumours ?

A. That is the one object.

Q. Then you mentioned about the station burning. Did you really see the bridge burning ?

A. I did not see at that time.

Q. Did you see it after ?

A. I did not.

Q. That bridge is not far from the station, I think ?

A. One bridge was on the west of the station and the other on the east.

Q. I think the first one that was burnt was the one on the west. This is described in your statement as a small bridge. That is inaccurate ?

A. Yes, it is the bridge of the railway.

Q. The sleepers of the bridge were all set on fire ?

A. Yes.

Q. All these sleepers were burnt by merely putting a match to them ?

A. No, by pouring kerosene oil and setting fire to it.

Q. After the kerosene oil burnt out, the sleepers caught fire ?

A. Yes.

Q. Had several of the sleepers been put on fire ?

A. I did not take notice.

Q. You went there the next day ?

A. I was doing many things next day.

Q. Had anything occurred to telegraph wires ?

A. They were all down.

Q. I think the telephone to Lahore was still open ?

A. It was open for a short time after the telegraph lines were cut.

Q. Communication was sent by telephone to Lahore as to the occurrences ?

A. One message was sent soon after the train started, then the next message had to be sent to the railway station at Eminabad which was sent off by mid-day.

Q. What was the attitude of the railway staff ?

A. They were hostile to Government.

Q. You mean that they did not assist ?

A. I was not there, a witness said they would in no way assist in keeping the station clear.

Q. You mean the report of Mr. Nevill ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was railway traffic interfered with in consequence of what had taken place ?

A. Yes.

Q. When was traffic over the bridge that was burnt running that side ?

A. I think it went on almost at once, but there was not sufficient damage done to the railway line to stop running of trains, for military purposes.

Q. The other bridge that was attempted to be set on fire was the Kachi bridge ; that was the bridge on which the corpse was hung. Was serious damage done to that bridge ?

A. No, it was checked.

Q. Is that bridge easy to set on fire ?

A. It can easily be done.

Q. You did not see any actual attacks by the mob ?

A. No.

Q. From what you saw at the time, what would have been the object of the mob in destroying the property in the way it was destroyed ?

A. It was hostility to British Government.

Q. Was large looting done in Gujranwala at the railway station ?

A. Yes. Once the goods shed was fired, a lot of the people who were working as porters ran away and the mob came and carried off the sacks that were lying there.

Q. Would the firing of the station or the destroying of the telephone wires in any way have aided them in merely looting ?

A. That was to interfere with the railway traffic.

Q. You think it was a different object and looting was subsidiary ?

A. The looting happened when they saw the goods shed was burning. They availed themselves of the opportunity.

Q. You referred to the arrival of the aeroplane. When did the aeroplane arrive ?

A. I got into the Treasury to see that the women and children were alright. At that time the aeroplane was hovering above head, just about 3 o'clock.

Q. Did any bomb fall where you were ? How many bombs were dropped ?

A. I understand six were dropped of which two took effect, just outside the goods sheds, opposite the two level crossings.

Q. What casualties were caused by it ?

A. I believe 11 deaths, all told, including those shot by the police, and 27 wounded, I think.

Q. I just want to know if you have got it from any witness ?

A. I understand that one bomb killed five men and wounded four and that another bomb killed one and wounded one ; what the others did I do not know.

Q. We were informed that two bombs were dropped on two villages in the neighbourhood of Gujranwala. What were the casualties caused by these bombs ?

A. One was caused.

Q. Did you include these casualties ? That includes the total number of casualties caused by aeroplanes and firing by the police in Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the morning of the 15th, you went round the city making a certain number of arrests ?

A. Yes.

Q. Whom did you arrest on that occasion ? You arrested 23 persons altogether ?

A. Yes. Probably all people who were said to be leaders and some others who were comprised in the mob.

Q. As regards the mob, I presume you arrested them because there was evidence connecting them with the actual acts of violence and destruction. Why did you arrest the leaders ?

A. Because all through the previous day, there had been meetings in the town at which mobs were excited by these leaders.

Q. By "excited" you mean "encouraged to do acts of violence ?"

A. Not exactly. One or two of the speakers spoke violently, but the majority confined themselves to preaching Hindu-Moslem unity and matters of that kind.

Q. Did you arrest those leaders who had confined themselves to preaching Hindu-Moslem unity ?

A. I arrested all those who I had reason to believe were stimulating an outbreak.

Q. Do you think any one had stimulated the outbreak who had spoken at the meeting ?

A. I do certainly.

Q. In making the arrests you proceeded on the assumption that everybody who had spoken had spoken at a previous meeting ?

A. On the 14th, there was a meeting, after meeting the mob would turn out and demonstrate outside the railway station and then would retire to the city again. And then another disorder, as a result of listening to the speeches of these leaders.

Q. Do you mean to say that it is after the listening to the discourses that they did violence in different parts of the city ?

A. It was after Mr. Heron was attacked on the railway lines and he fired and the police with him had fired, two wounded were taken to the assembly where a talk was going on, after that the people broke out and began to burn.

Q. In connection with the people you arrested, how many leaders did you arrest actually ?

A. I have not got the details here, I think about a dozen.

Q. Were all these men afterwards prosecuted ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were any of them convicted ?

A. One or two.

(*Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate* :—Four.)

Q. And those who were convicted, what were they convicted of ?

A. Two to sentence of death and two to transportation for life.

Q. What happened afterwards ?

A. Some of the sentences were reduced to two years and some to three years.

Q. As regards the two other prisoners, was the sentence carried out ?

A. The biggest sentence that remained in the end was three years, that is after the revision by the present Committee.

Q. How many Europeans are there in Gujranwala, many Europeans ?

A. No, it is a small station, and the American missionaries had gone away the night before in consequence of information given to them by the Indian Christians. They went away at midnight.

Q. Were there practically any Europeans ?

A. We had the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the Superintendent of Police and the Assistant Superintendent of Police, the District Engineer with wife and four children—Captain Godfrey had gone away on the 13th, the night before—and there was an European Permanent Way Inspector, with, I think, two ladies of his household.

Q. On the day of the outbreak, confining yourself to that day, were there many Europeans in Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. How many were there ?

A. I think in the Treasury there were eight men and nine women and children.

Q. Did they actually take refuge on that day ?

A. No.

Q. Where did they remain the whole day ?

A. Mr. Wace was away at Eminabad to superintend the annual Cattle Fair there. Mr. Nevill and Mr. Heron were taken up all the day in dealing with the riots. Mr. Shaw had been asked by Mr. Heron to watch his family and take refuge in the Treasury when things looked dangerous and he actually got into the Treasury ten minutes before the rioters attacked the Court House. Captain Godfrey had gone away and I was away too.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed over your district, I think, on the 16th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you consider it was necessary ?

A. Yes. We had outbreaks in 14 different places in the Gujranwala district as it was.

Q. About those places you have made a mention in your statement ?

A. Yes.

Q. What are they ? The first was Wazirabad ?

A. Yes, Wazirabad, Hafizabad, Ramnagar, Akalgarh, Chuharkana, Daman Singh, Moman, Sangla and Aulakh. I have not dealt in my report about Chuharkana because Mr. Bosworth-Smith was made responsible for that area.

Q. In your statement you are dealing with the area for which you were responsible and the first of these is Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. Just give shortly what occurred at Wazirabad. An attempt was made to force a *hartal* on the 6th but that there was no *hartal* ?

A. No.

Q. It was frustrated by the efforts of the Muhammadans ?

A. Yes, they were all pleased to do this.

Q. How did you come to know that. Did you make an investigation ?

A. They said there will be no *hartal* at Wazirabad, while there was a *hartal* at Gujranwala.

Q. Then on the 12th, it was decided to have a *hartal* on the 13th ?

A. Yes.

Q. That was postponed to the 15th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you suggest it was postponed because some of the traders might not lose their profits from the *Baisakhi* Fair ?

A. Yes, the 13th and 14th were the *Baisakhi* days and they postponed it so that they might not lose their profits.

Q. Then on the 14th, did they know of what had occurred at Gujranwala ?

A. Some of the people went from Gujranwala to Wazirabad that afternoon.

Q. How far is Wazirabad from Gujranwala ?

A. Twenty miles.

Q. Was there an agitation in favour of the *hartal* on the following day ?

A. Yes, they met in the mosque.

Q. During the afternoon a meeting was convened. Did groups march through the streets ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you say they were singing inflammatory songs?

A. Well, among other things they were saying that nobody was to give girls to the Wazirabad men because they had not had *hartal* so far.

Q. That sort of thing was said ?

A. Yes, unless Wazirabad took action they would be treated with contempt by the people.

Q. The people who said those things must have come from outside ?

A. Yes, from Gujranwala.

Q. Then on the 15th a *hartal* was held ?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened in the schools on the 15th at Wazirabad ?

A. Well, they first of all attacked the telegraph wires on both sides of the station and destroyed them. They attacked the distant signals and set fire to the bridge over the Palku close to the Chenab. Then there was a force of cavalry round the station so they could not do much. They went away to the Gujranwala side and burnt the house of Reverend Grahame Bailey, a Scotch missionary, living there for years and years.

Q. Unfortunately the Reverend Mr. Bailey was not in the house ?

A. No. All the Europeans had been away to Wazirabad itself.

Q. They burnt his house and looted all valuable things ?

A. Very valuable.

Q. Had the crowd any grievance against Reverend J. Bailey ?

A. No, it was purely because he had a white face. There were those who said that he ought to be let off because he was Irish but that was overruled.

Q. That is because he was a European ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is the place called Ghakhar ?

A. It is a station half-way between Gujranwala and Wazirabad.

Q. Was any attempt made there ?

A. Yes. Some *badmashes* of villages near by came and asked the people of Ghakhar to attack the line but the people of Ghakhar refused.

Q. I think on the 16th of April you with the Superintendent of Police visited Wazirabad and superintended the arrests of certain of the leaders ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were troops also sent to Wazirabad ?

A. Troops were already there and afterwards the General of the Sialkot Brigade moved his headquarters there.

Q. As regards Hafizabad what happened there ?

A. Well, there they damaged the signals and damaged the telegraph wire and the most serious thing they did was that they made an attack on Lieutenant Tatam who was travelling with a small boy. A large mob, as the train steamed in, rushed towards the station and he seeing the trouble shut up all the windows and shutters, the gauzes and the frames of every opening and locked the doors and hoped that the crowd would not notice him. However they broke right through with bolts and stones and did their best to kill him but fortunately a Sikh wedding party was in the train and mainly with their aid the guard was informed and the train was taken away. Ordinarily the stopping time of this train at Hafizabad was 20 minutes.

Q. That is how he and the small child with him were saved ?

A. Yes, and owing to one young Muhammadan.

Q. At that place there had been *hartal* for several days ?

A. Yes.

Q. Now coming to Akalgarh and Ramnagar, what happened there ?

A. Nothing very much serious happened at Akalgarh beyond speeches and small damage to telegraph wires but at Ramnagar they burnt the effigy of the King-Emperor on the banks of the Chenab and then proceeded to have a bath afterwards.

Q. On what date was that ?

A. That was on the 15th.

Q. Was a report as to what had occurred sent to you and did you investigate it ?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, after the bath did they return in triumph to the town ?

A. After having the bath they returned to the town shouting "George *mar gaya* (George is dead), George *ka siyapa*." (*Siyapa* is a funerâl).

Q. Where is Ramnagar ? How far is it from Wazirabad ?

A. Six miles from Akalgarh between it and Wazirabad, going through Hafizabad and Sangla.

Q. How are these different places situated from Gujranwala ?

A. Akalgarh is 16 miles from Wazirabad.

Q. How far is Wazirabad from Gujranwala ?

A. Twenty miles. It is difficult to get direct to Akalgarh. Ramnagar is six miles on the *pakka* road from Akalgarh.

Q. Did any incident take place at Aulakh ?

A. Yes, one incident that took place at Aulakh was that the zamindars burnt the *patwari's* papers at village Aulakh.

Q. On what date did that occur ?

A. On the 16th April. That was the only case in which zamindars took any action on my half of the district. On Mr. Bosworth-Smith's half there was trouble at Chuharkana.

Q. Would it have been much more serious if the zamindars had joined in the riots.

A. Much. I sent at once the Assistant Superintendent of Police and a British officer and a force of both soldiers and police was sent out in tum-tums .

Q. Do they constitute a warlike portion of the population ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think those who had been guilty of the act of burning these papers were arrested ?

A. Yes, eight of them were convicted.

Q. In connection with the measures adopted under martial law were troops despatched to different affected areas ?

A. All over the district very quickly.

Q. And I think the headquarters of the Sialkot Brigade were removed to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. And detachments were sent to Gujranwala, Hafizabad and Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. How many troops were altogether utilized in your area for maintaining order ?

A. I can give the figures. We had 90 men in Gujranwala. Later on they were reduced to 50. There were small detachments.

Q. Could you have carried on, in your opinion, and maintained law and order without the assistance of the military ?

A. No.

Q. I do not know whether we have gone through the Martial Law Orders of the Gujranwala District. Had you issued Martial Law Orders in the similar way just as they had at Lahore or were they different ?

A. I do not think they were on anything like such a scale. We enforced the Curfew Law to keep people indoors at night but we had to ease that off quickly because it interfered with the movements of carts and pack animals to market.

Q. Because you felt that it interfered with their movements ?

A. Yes, once we felt, there was no serious danger or more restrictions were not necessary.

Q. I think you had proclaimed an order as regards saluting the British Flag. That is Order No. 11, Gujranwala District.

A. Yes. It was found that agitation was going up and down the railway line.

Q. Were there many cases of flogging ?

A. I think 16. All spread over three or four places.

Q. Flogging sentence was pronounced by the Special Tribunals or by the Summary Courts ?

A. Four, I think, were pronounced by the Commissions in Lahore and the rest by Summary Courts and by the Area Officers.

Q. Did you try any of these cases yourself ?

A. No. Mr. Wace tried some and the others were dealt with by the Area Officers.

Q. Did flogging in any case take place in public ?

A. I think one took place in public, though I am not quite sure.

Q. Then after that one case, you stopped public flogging ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were instructions sent to you that flogging should not take place in public ?

A. Yes.

Q. These might have come from Local Government ?

A. I think so. They might have been issued by the General.

Q. As regards those who were flogged, were they youths or men ? Were there any old or feeble men that were flogged ?

A. I don't think so.

Q. In connection with the damage that was done, a very considerable number of claims had been made ?

A. Yes. They were as follows :—

	Rs.
Gujranwala	5,37,000
Wazirabad	69,000
Hafizabad	6,000
Akalgarh	1,000

But I think they were somewhat reduced. Gujranwala was reduced.

Q. Was any claim also put in by the North-Western Railway ?

A. They put it in first and then withdrew it.

Q. The damage to Railway as put in the claims was considerable ?

A. It was about eight lakhs damage. The damage to the railway buildings is included in the five lakhs. Rs. 8,20,000 gives the damage done by the mob but I think it was decided under section 82 that the claims of the damages done by the enemies of the King should not be recovered. I think that has been adhered to.

Q. In dealing with the question as to methods pursued by the mob you say here in your statement that " In Hafizabad on the 15th of April the cry of the leaders was 'See how, although the main line is stopped, troops are able to go round through Hafizabad towards Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi to fight against our brothers.' We should stop this line also."

A. Yes.

Q. Did you get information that such was the matter ?

A. I was told at Hafizabad.

Q. You were told at Hafizabad itself ?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were making an inquiry there ?

A. Yes. The main line was stopped but the mails went round *viâ* Sangla for a day or two. It was the passage of the mails that led Hafizabad people speaking in that way.

Q. In connection with the mobs, were there any violence or damages done by many students or school-boys ?

A. There was a very large proportion of youths and boys.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to how that came about ?

A. It struck me that they must have been taught before but that is only an opinion.

Q. You do not attribute to school-boys the plan of spoiling the railway or burning the railway bridges but it was the action of some of the older people ?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I want to see if I have outlines of the Gujranwala story rightly. After the *hartal* on the 6th and until the 13th there was no actual trouble in Gujranwala ?

A. No.

Q. Before the meeting which had been called for the 5th you warned the leaders ?

A. Yes, on the 5th itself.

Q. Of course at that time you did not know what the resolutions would be, but you thought it wise to give them a general warning ?

A. Yes, that if talk led to trouble they would be responsible.

Q. Now on the 13th itself as I understand, whatever meetings there had been before that, there were further meetings, as you have reason to believe, of all the people we will call for the present the leaders ?

A. Yes, the inner circle.

Q. Now your information with regard to that depends, first of all, I think, upon the evidence in the main Gujranwala conspiracy case ?

A. Yes.

Q. Secondly, upon the fact that on that evening the American missionaries received warning from the Indian Christians ; and thirdly, I think from another source, what was that ?

A. Yes, a Barrister, who was not in that circle met two of the inner circle who told him that the people were so excited that they were ready to kill Europeans and to elect their own Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police. That was what he said.

Q. Is this gentleman to whom that was said going to be called before us ?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards what you told us about this meeting of the 13th, those are the three sources of information or inference which we have to go upon, so far as you know ?

A. That there was going to be trouble next day. I should perhaps say that Mr. Heron went round to the missionaries at 9 o'clock at night, I think, and asked them to go, and they took counsel together and said no, they thought it would be all right, and it was later than that, about 10 or 11, that the Indian Christians came to them and said that they would be all right provided the white people went.

Q. Of course you had left on the 12th ?

A. I had left on the 12th.

Q. Now you yourself arrived on the 14th at Gujranwala just after the aeroplanes had arrived ?

A. When I was inside the Treasury asking people whether they were all right aeroplanes were overhead. I had not noticed them as I came along.

Q. I see from the War Diary that about 10 minutes past three in the afternoon the aeroplanes seemed to have sighted Gujranwala, and apart from what they did on surrounding villages, they seem to have dropped two bombs at 20 minutes to 4 according to the War Diary ?

A. Yes.

Q. And at that time you were in Gujranwala yourself ?

A. I was in Gujranwala myself.

Q. Now it is a little difficult to collect on how many occasions the police had to fire at Gujranwala. Could you from your information just summarise for me the occasions of firing on the 14th ?

A. There was no firing at all until the attack on Mr. Heron, which was at about 11 o'clock in the day. Till then there had been a lot of throwing of stones and marching and counter-marching and shouting, but Mr. Heron was himself very anxious and was persuaded by the magistrate with him to take no strong measures, that it was expected that the mob would settle down.

Q. That was at about 11 o'clock ; what was the next occasion of firing that you know of ?

A. Then there was no other firing until the news came that the mob had broken across the railway line and gone up to the courts and set them alight. On that Mr. Heron left the railway station with two parties, one going to one side and one to the other, and they fired long distance shots at people wherever they could see them.

Q. What time would this firing be, can you give it to me roughly according to your information and belief ?

A. I suppose it must have been about 2 o'clock, but Mr. Nevill would be able to tell you better.

Q. I just want to get a grasp of the sequence of events. After that firing, was there any other firing which you can mention to me ?

A. I believe the guard at the station fired. From that point Mr. Heron notes that wherever a mob was found it was fired on.

Q. Was there any occasion of outstanding importance that you can mention to me, giving me that time, or was it a question of what I may call scraps in the street after that ?

A. It was scraps up and down the civil station which is the other side of the railway.

Q. Apart from the fact that the thing had got to such a pass that the crowd was fired at whenever seen, those are the two occasions of firing, about 11 o'clock and 2 o'clock, that you know of ?

A. Yes.

Q. Now before 11 o'clock a good deal of damage had been done at the railway station, had it not ?

A. The first incident was the attack on the train, and then the cutting of the telegraph wires near the distant signal and the setting fire to the railway bridge west of the station.

Q. And before 11 o'clock what else had happened ?

A. After that telegraph wires on the Lahore side of the station were also cut.

Q. Apparently the railway station had been set on fire before 11 o'clock.

A. What Mr. Heron says is that at about 10-30 news was received that a mob had set fire to the *kutcha* railway bridge, that is on the east of the station, some 4 or 500 yards from the city on the Lahore side. A posse of police was sent to the spot and these dispersed the mob ; but the wooden planks of the bridge had been seriously damaged by fire, and it was later reported by the railway authorities that the bridge was rendered unsafe for the passage of trains. Several black flags were seen at various places. The crowd, however, kept moving in and out of the city. Some 20 or 30 minutes later he says he received information that the mob was damaging the railway line on the Lahore side of the station near the *kutcha* bridge, and taking a small force of constables he proceeded to the spot.

Q. I shall get all that from Mr. Heron ; I want you to summarise it for me quite roughly. Apart from this, the mob had attacked the railway near the distant signal before 11 o'clock ?

A. Yes.

Q. And the *kutcha* bridge was burning before that time ?

A. Yes.

Q. And can you tell me whether the Superintendent of Police had to use his revolver before 11 o'clock, or whether this 11 o'clock incident is the same incident as that in which he had to take part ?

A. When he came back from driving off the mob from breaking up the railway line, the men in that party went on to the Grand Trunk Road on the other side of the railway fencing and they were joined by others. After this the mob re-crossed on to the railway line and attacked Mr. Heron. They were armed with lathis, heavy iron hammers, crow-bars, etc., and the remainder were armed with stones which they continued throwing. Having been struck by three stones, one on the face and one on the shoulder, Mr. Heron gave his men orders to fire, and himself drew his revolver and fired a couple of shots. He says the man who attacked him was nearest to him and his hands were within a couple of inches of his neck.

Q. That was the firing at about 11 o'clock ?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the exact site of that firing ?

A. It was a couple of hundred yards down on the east side of the railway station.

Q. Then the firing at 2 o'clock, what was the spot at which that took place ?

A. Up and down the civil station.

Q. And after 2 o'clock the crowds had been dispersed in the civil station from time to time by being fired at whenever seen ?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you give me an idea of how long this state of affairs lasted during that day ?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. I do not think in Gujranwala itself there were in fact, as it happened, any cases of Europeans other than the officials on duty dealing with the mobs being attacked?

A. No.

Q. Can you tell me at about what time of day on the 14th according to your information, these people were collected into the Treasury or Tahsil ?

A. It was only Mr. Shaw and his family who actually went into the Treasury just before the mob arrived to burn it ; it must have been about 1.

Q. As regards the other people you have mentioned, the half-a-dozen European officials who had their families, I presume, in the civil station, were there any incidents throughout that day of particular houses being selected for attention by the mob ?

A. No. Mr. Buckley, the Permanent-Way Inspector, took refuge with an Indian Guard.

Q. About the buildings, which were attacked, first of all there was the railway station including the signals, shed, the goods shed, and other places ; there was the wire-cutting in connection with the railway station and the bridges that were attacked ?

A. Yes.

Q. Apart from that were the telegraph wires cut ?

A. The telegraph wires were cut on both sides.

Q. Is there any telephone in Gujranwala ?

A. There was a railway telephone.

Q. Was that cut ?

A. Yes.

Q. As I understand the District Court was set on fire ?

A. The central building of the District Court was burnt.

Q. And that is near the Tahsil ?

A. No, it is near the Treasury.

Q. Was the Post Office attacked ?

A. The Post Office was attacked and burnt.

Q. Was there any other public building burnt other than what I have mentioned ?

A. The Tahsil, and there was the Industrial School and the Church.

Q. Now this Industrial School, what sort of a school was that, was it a public institution ?

A. It was a District Board School.

Q. A public institution maintained by Government funds ?

A. I think Government may have subscribed something, but it was the District Board School.

Q. Is it a European Institution in any sense ?

A. No. And they burned the Dâk Bungalow.

Q. So that, looking broadly at the buildings that were attacked, they appear to have been, with the possible exception of the Church, public buildings, and in the case of the Church a more or less distinctively European building ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any private property attacked at all ?

A. None, except the looting in the goods shed.

Q. Now the railway in this part of the world, is that a Government affair ?

A. Yes, the railway is Government.

Q. Is it the case that aeroplanes were over Gujranwala and taking action both on the 14th and the 15th ?

A. I understand that a bomb was dropped on the 15th, why it was done I do not know.

Q. I understand that on the 15th at about 8-55 in the morning a gathering of about 20 in a field, one mile west of the town, was scattered with a Lewis Gun ?

A. It is the first time I have heard of it.

Q. That was a similar gathering outside a house in a village, half a mile to the west of the town, and a bomb was dropped which hit the adjoining house and blew the side in, in the morning just before 9 o'clock ?

A. I did not even know of that. I was thinking of the aeroplane which came out in the afternoon.

Q. On the 14th can you tell me whether, before 20 minutes to 4, any aeroplanes had taken action in Gujranwala itself ?

A. I do not know the exact course of events ; there was some machine gun firing and bombs were dropped, but which bomb was dropped on what spot I do not know.

Q. After the event I suppose you would have a look and see the places where the bombs had dropped. Did you examine the craters of these bombs ?

A. Personally I did not. All the first few days after that I was engaged in running round other parts of the district.

Q. I rather gather, as regards Gujranwala itself, from the War Diaries that the only bombs dropped in Gujranwala were two bombs which failed to explode, and that they were dropped at about 20 minutes to 4 on the afternoon of the 14th ?

A. No, there were six bombs dropped on the 14th.

Q. I am not speaking of the villages outside Gujranwala ?

A. There were two very good bombs from the point of view of my personal safety ; one bomb got on to the crowd by one level crossing and killed five and wounded four, and another only killed one man, a well known ruffian, and wounded another, close to the other level crossing. Those were the two bombs that really were of practical value.

Q. What about the other four ?

A. Well two or three were duds and practically all the four were dropped rather haphazardly. (Witness here showed the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin a map showing where bombs had been dropped.)

Q. You have in front of you two reports of aeroplane reconnaissances, one on the 14th and one on the 15th. If you will be good enough take the one of the 14th first. The one on the 14th gives an account of certain bombs dropped upon outlying villages and then towards the end it gives an account of what was done in Gujranwala itself. According to that report on the 14th there is mention of only two bombs all told as dropped in Gujranwala itself, is that so according to that report ?

A. No, it is not so ; it is known that bombs were dropped just opposite the level crossing and did go off.

Q. According to that report is there any mention of more than two bombs dropped in Gujranwala itself on the 14th ?

A. No.

Q. In fact you tell me there were six ?

A. I have always understood so.

Q. And you say that of those six, two of them which were very effectively dropped at places you have already told me, and there was a third, as I understand, almost in line with the other two on the same day ?

A. That is our information.

Q. Then at the same time there were three others, one of which was dropped on an outlying spot called the Khalsa Boarding House. Then there were two others which were dropped a little north-west of the first three you have spoken of ?

A. Yes, in the city.

Q. Can you give me any information about those two others, what they did, what their effect was, whether they exploded or not ?

A. The two bombs in the centre of the town failed to explode.

Q. Did they do any damage as duds ?

A. They did no damage.

Q. Can you give me any information as regards the occasions, the places and the effects of the fire from aeroplanes with machine guns ?

A. A sweet seller was hit with a machine gun bullet near the Khalsa School.

Q. Anything else ?

A. Some individuals were wounded by what seems to be machine gun bullets, but of course they themselves were extremely reticent.

Q. Did you find out in what part of the city they were when they were hit ?

A. I have got a list of the persons who were wounded and the places where they are said to be wounded.

Q. Where shall I find that ?

A. I have this list here.

Q. Is it a very long document ? Perhaps you could put it in ?

A. The majority of our wounded are noted as being wounded outside Chetty Singh's which is close to the main level crossing, west of the station. (Witness shows document to Mr. Justice Rankin.)

Q. I am speaking now only of people who were wounded with machine gun bullets.

A. There is no distinction drawn in this list.

Q. Then the information in your possession does not enable you to locate the spot upon which the machine gun fire from aeroplanes actually took place ?

A. No.

Q. Can you tell me whether there were any military in Gujranwala at this time ?

A. None.

Q. Can you give me any idea as to the number of inhabitants in Gujranwala proper ?

A. Of the town about thirty thousand.

Q. Can you give me any idea as to the number of police ?

A. Mr. Smith, Superintendent of Police, will appear before the Committee and he will be able to give you the numbers. On the 14th April the total strength of Gujranwala including the city and the office staff was one Inspector, six sub-inspectors, 22 head constables and 119 constables. This force was split up into three main guards, the line, the line reserve and the city reserve. At the most critical time the total number of men

available for the protection of the railway station and the civil station was only 3 sub-inspectors, 10 head constables and 61 constables.

Q. Can you tell me whether the railway station itself was policed by railway police in addition to those ?

A. No.

Q. Are the figures you have just given me of armed police ?

A. A good number of these must have been armed.

Q. From what you had been able to see had you any fault to find with the fidelity or loyalty of the police ?

A. Not on the whole. The situation appears to have been that they played up when they were with British officers and where they were not with a British officer they hesitated and waited for orders.

Q. Well, that is a different thing from lack of fidelity or loyalty—that would be a lack of initiative ?

A. On the whole they did very well. There were one or two who were dealt with for inaction.

Q. So broadly speaking the position was not complicated by any real trouble as regards the fidelity of the police ?

A. No; one sub-inspector was in a difficult position because one of the leaders of the mob was his brother.

Q. What was the number of military that arrived at night about 9 o'clock on the 14th ?

A. About 50.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 16th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was the Area Officer to begin with ?

A. Major Wheatly.

Q. And was he the Area Officer for long ?

A. Yes; quite a considerable time. He went away before Martial Law was ended.

Q. This would be the gentleman who had to dispose of the summary cases ?

A. Yes.

Q. The actual orders under Martial Law were of course issued by a superior officer, and he would be the gentleman who would try the offences ?

A. He disposed of a number of them. Mr. West, Assistant Commissioner, tried some of them.

Q. As regards the actual number of punishments of whipping, there seems to have been very few in Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you tell us that the majority of those persons were whipped for being caught out of their houses during Curfew hours ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have at the time any opportunity of judging how the Area Officer administered Martial Law punishments ? Whether they were administered beyond necessity or otherwise ?

A. I did not actually supervise any of his orders.

Q. I see there were five sentences of whipping passed by the Commissions and four by Summary Courts for minor offences between the 30th March and the date of the proclamation—so the sentences were passed after the proclamation of Martial Law ?

A. Yes. The first notification enforced Martial Law from a certain date, though after that date there were very few offences except petty ones and later on by another proclamation the courts were empowered to try offences that had taken place between the 30th March and 16th April.

Q. Did you have any reason to notice any special difficulty in connection with the saluting order in Gujranwala ?

A. No; I think it was generally accepted.

Q. The saluting order is No. 7 of that list. I think therefore by that order when an inhabitant met an officer he was required not merely to give him the ordinary salute, but, I think the salutation usually accorded to Indian gentlemen of high social position in accordance with the customs of India. That is to say persons riding on animals or on or in a wheeled conveyance will alight, persons carrying opened and raised umbrellas shall lower them and all persons shall salute or salaam with the hand. I would like to know whether that particular kind of salute, so far as you know, caused any particular difficulty or burden upon the inhabitants ?

A. No; I do not think so. It was generally accepted.

Q. I take it that any particular orders that were felt to be oppressive would be the subject of remarks of some of the inhabitants to you ?

A. I think the only order that the people came to complain about was the Curfew. They came to me and pointed out that on account of this order traffic was being impeded and that trade was being held up; so we relaxed this order as quickly as possible.

Q. In your statement I see you have pointed out the necessity for punishing a few individuals to remind people unaccustomed to discipline and the introduction of Martial Law enabled that necessity to be brought home to the people very much effectively than could have been done without it ?

A. Yes, that is so.

Q. Do you agree that the enforcement of the saluting order was a very good way to bring home to the civil population put under Martial Law that they now had a new master ?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to arrests—speaking of Gujranwala itself—could you tell me how many people were arrested and never brought to trial ?

A. I do not think the figures are here. After the cases had gone to the Commissions, and petty cases of people looting at the railway station and so on had been dealt with there was a residue of persons against whom sufficient evidence had not been collected. One or two were not produced for trial, because I found that they had already been wounded and I thought that there was no good sending them up as I considered they had already suffered. There was one young pleader also, who I thought had undoubtedly been concerned, but as there was not sufficient evidence against him to take it too seriously I thought it would be sufficient to warn him. On the whole I think there were very few of that kind.

Q. Can you give me any figures ? I can quite follow what you say about people being released on compassionate grounds and those being released because there was no actual charge against them, but I would like to have some figures ? Do you think there would be as many as fifty or twenty ?

A. I think sixteen would be nearer the mark.

Q. Can you tell me from your experience what was the longest time a man was kept in suspense without ever being brought to trial and ultimately released ?

A. The longest would have been from the date of his arrest which might have been anywhere in the first two weeks after the 14th of April up to the 9th June. On the 9th June Martial Law was taken off and all the summary cases ended and anybody who was left undealt with was released.

Q. Then I take it—correct me if I am wrong—that some of these sixteen may have been kept as long as about six weeks ?

A. Yes.

Q. During this time who was doing the investigation of cases ? Was it the Criminal Investigation Department or the police or.....

A. The ordinary police but strengthened by special officers sent from Lahore.

Q. Can you tell me whether during this time the ordinary system of remanding was being followed ?

A. No.

Q. People were not brought before Magistrates from time to time and remands taken ?

A. No. There were some who were arrested who were obviously going before the Lahore tribunals, and so we did not pay very strict attention to them.

Q. The system that was adopted was in fact this, that the investigation of each case was complete, and then the man was either sent up for trial or released, and in the

meantime until the investigation was complete he was not brought up and remands taken, as would have happened in the ordinary course under civil law ?

A. There was no time.

Q. Was there any case brought to your notice of real gross hardship in connection with that, were respectable persons kept as much as six weeks and then released ?

A. No, I think that those who got off were lucky to get off.

Q. Where did they spend those six weeks ?

A. Some were in Lahore and some in the jail at Gujranwala.

Q. Was there any provision made whereby these people could offer bail and were they informed that they had the right to ask for bail ?

A. So many were charged with non-bailable offences.

Q. Apart from the fact that many were lucky to get off and assuming that they were innocent, do you remember any cases of respectable persons being kept six weeks in jail and then let off and nothing said ?

A. No.

Q. What sort of persons were these sixteen ?

A. There was a retired lawyer who was sent to Lahore in the big conspiracy case. I do not know exactly how long he was kept when he was actually let go.

Q. If that is so, he would do more or less six weeks ?

A. It would have been a month or shorter. There was then another pleader who was let go about the same time.

Q. Was that the man who was hit ? Why was he let go ?

A. Because there was no case against him. He was a minor leader, and it did not seem worth while sending him for a case which might result in his death or transportation for life.

Q. Were there any other pleaders beside those you have mentioned who were arrested and then not sent up for trial ?

A. No.

Q. Were there any people who were arrested on the basis of their previous conduct, previous to the 13th, and who were not brought up ? People against whom there was evidence of participation in the riot ?

A. Those are the only two.

Q. Did you order the arrests yourself ?

A. Yes, the arrests of the first batch.

Q. When you ordered the arrests was there any information before you ?

A. I met Mr. Heron and all the various magistrates who had seen what was going on and listened to a number of different stories and the police put up a long list, out of whom we made a selection as to the persons who were almost certainly guilty and whose arrests would likely to have a good effect on quieting the people.

Q. Was this simply a list or was it in the nature of a deposition ?

A. No ; it was a list and I was assured that the case against them was bound to be sufficiently strong.

Q. I take it this was the combined knowledge of the officials present exchanged verbally between themselves and verbal information from the police and your knowledge of the people and other non-official witnesses ?

A. Yes.

Q. In what form was their evidence before you ?

A. It was verbal. I only had time to make a number of verbal enquiries, and on that I had to take action.

Q. About the attacks upon communications. As I gather from your diary of the district these attacks upon communications were very widespread and persistent ?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me broadly speaking then what time these attacks all took place ? Were there a great many of them on the 13th and 14th alone ?

A. Practically everything was on the 14th and 15th.

Q. So far as Gujranwala itself is concerned am I right in thinking that these attacks upon communications and telegraphs were one of the earliest manifestations of the trouble ?

A. Yes. That was the first thing that was thought of.

Q. Apart from any question of inference that there was a system behind all this, did you prosecute any enquiries to try and trace any organising hand in Gujranwala ?

A. No ; that would belong to the Central Government.

Q. Did you ever succeed in getting any information of individuals who might be behind the scenes in that matter ?

A. No.

Q. Then at Wazirabad as I understand it the rioting took a distinctly *anti*-European turn so much so that they burnt the house of Revd. Grahame Bailey. And the same kind of thing happened at Hafizabad when Lieutenant Tatam was attacked by the mob at the station ?

A. Yes, that is so.

Q. With regard to the incident of Ramnagar in connection with the burning of the effigy of the King-Emperor is the information in your statement based upon the trials that were held ?

A. Yes ; I tried the case myself.

Q. Can you, according to the best of your information, give me the approximate number of persons who were engaged in that insult to the King-Emperor ?

A. I think there were 28 tried, but of course there were a good many looking on and more people marched down the town shouting afterwards, but 28 were tried as being in the centre.

Q. Can you tell me what was the defence in that case—was it simply that they had not taken part in it ?

A. Almost all of them pleaded *alibis.* One man raised this point and said that nothing had happened.

Q. But I understand from what you say that you were satisfied that the incident had occurred ?

A. It was a natural thing to do for people of that type ?

Q. And you have no doubt that it occurred ?

A. I tried it judicially and found it so.

Q. I think you have said that you do not believe that the war loan and recruitment had very much to do with this excitement ?

A. No.

Q. Do you agree that the main excitement that led to these measures was the Rowlatt Act ?

A. Yes.

Q. And that excitement was heightened by the *hartal* ?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you also attribute the heightening of the excitement to the news of what had happened at Amritsar and Lahore ?

A. Yes, that is what led to action in Gujranwala and Wazirabad.

Q. Apart from any question whether there was an organised rebellion on the 14th, do you agree with the view that the explanation of all the trouble was due to the Rowlatt Act, heightened by the *hartal* and heightened by the example of what had happened at Amritsar and Lahore and other places ?

A. Yes.

Q. But in either case those are the three pre-disposing causes in your view ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the people in Gujranwala care much one way or the other about Amritsar persons like Kitchlew and Satyapal ?

A. Well, Satyapal came originally from Wazirabad. One of his relations was arrested in Wazirabad.

Q. In Gujranwala, do you think, whether he was deported or not on the 10th, they cared much for him ?

A. I would not put it that way. It is really certain things that had happened in Amritsar which they liked to copy.

Q. As far as you could tell from the cries of the mob, have you any reason to suppose that the mob at Gujranwala at any time went about crying out the names of Kitchlew and Satyapal, or making any other Amritsar cries ?

A. I am not sure on that point. I was not there.

Q. Well, let us keep to what you heard yourself. You were not there ?

A. I was not there.

Q. Martial Law in Gujranwala area, I rather gather, was relaxed much earlier than at any other place as regards Curfew orders ?

A. I think so.

Q. When did the relaxation come into operation apart from railways ?

A. The only point that we were interested in as far as Martial Law was concerned was in being able to get the cases tried by the summary courts, otherwise the actual Martial Law restrictions went off very quickly ?

Q. How long were the actual Martial Law restrictions in force ?

A. I could not say that, but they had to get passes, and that was because the railways could not carry them after a time.

Q. When do you say that Martial Law began to be relaxed apart from the Curfew in Gujranwala itself ? It started on the 16th April and it was finished for good on the 10th June. What is the date between those times that you would put as the watershed. When do you think Martial Law began to go downhill again ?

A. The restrictions as to railway traffic and orders for saluting went on till the end, but I take it that the most severe portion of it was the Curfew order.

Q. And that was relaxed when ? Can you give me the date ?

A. I could not give the dates. They were by separate notifications. There was correspondence with the General about it. I think we relaxed it in Gujranwala quicker than it was relaxed in Wazirabad.

Q. Well, I will get that from the proclamation. In your view was Martial Law in Gujranwala continued beyond what it was necessary ?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. You think that if on the 16th April you were furnished with the same number of troops to assist the civil authorities, the district could have been reduced to peace and order without the declaration of Martial Law ?

A. And the judicial arrangements.

Q. You think that Martial Law would have been necessary for the judicial arrangements ?

A. The courts were established under Martial Law.

Q. You think that Martial Law would have been necessary for that reason ?

A. Very necessary.

Q. Apart from that reason, do you think that simply the presence of the military in Gujranwala district without the declaration of Martial Law would have been sufficient not only to restore law and order, but to make a certainty of restoring law and order.

A. I think it was necessary. I think the effect was very great. If we merely had troops behind the civil authorities, I don't think the effect would have been the same.

Q. What is the earliest date you think it safe for a single European unarmed to have gone with complete safety to the bazar ? What is the earliest date that you can say of it after the 15th April ?

A. I should not like to give an opinion.

Q. Can you give me any idea at all ? If you cannot yourself give it, we will get it from somebody else.

A. I think he could have gone in the early part.

Q. And if Martial Law had not been proclaimed, do you think that state of things might have lasted longer than it did ?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. In your view the unrest in Gujranwala district was entirely political ?

A. Yes.

Q. You don't think that war weariness, high prices, income-tax enhancement and other things affected it ?

A. I don't think it affected Gujranwala in any way, as Gujranwala has done extremely well out of the war. I know there are different opinions, but I cannot agree that as far as Gujranwala is concerned these things affected it.

Q. We have been told with regard to every other place that war weariness, high prices, income-tax operations and all those things had a great deal to do with the unrest. You do not agree with that so far as Gujranwala district is concerned ?

A. I do not agree with that.

Q. You think that none of these things had anything to do with the unrest in Gujranwala ?

A. Gujranwala town had very little to do with war work, therefore there cannot be any war weariness.

Q. You say that the people of Gujranwala were not tired of the war ? They would have liked it if the war had continued ?

A. I don't say so, but they had not very much to do with the war activities.

Q. They were not tired of the war, were they ?

A. They were glad to have the war over.

Q. Were they not affected by the high prices consequent on the war ?

A. Not the trading classes of whom many were concerned in the riots. They had made large profits out of the conditions arising out of the war.

Q. They might have made large profits, but they might not like to pay high prices ?

A. As long as the profits remained in their pockets, they were all right.

Q. You don't think that the people were dissatisfied with the high prices in Gujranwala ?

A. I don't think so. I think the only people affected by the high prices were Government servants and other officials on fixed wages.

Q. Of course the fixed pay people were more hit but the whole population was certainly affected ?

A. The labouring classes in Gujranwala obtained high wages which entirely compensated for the high prices.

Q. You do not mean to suggest that the rise in wages was in any way proportionate to the rise in prices ?

A. Oh, yes, I have always understood so.

Q. What was the rise in wages, 300 or 400 per cent ?

A. I could not give exact figures, but I have always understood that the Kashmiri coolies and others obtained very large wages as compared to the pre-war wages.

Q. The wages increased everywhere, but the increase in prices was much more than the increase in wages ; in many places the prices of various necessities of life went up 300 to 400 per cent ?

A. No doubt they did.

Q. The rise in wages was certainly nothing proportionate ?

A. But certainly in proportion to the rise in the prices of commodities.

Q. If the rise in prices was much more than the rise in wages, it would certainly affect the labouring population. Would it not ?

A. Yes, if that is so.

Q. Now this unrest which, in your view, was entirely political, when did it first start in Gujranwala ?

A. The only manifestation we had of it was the *hartal* of the 6th and the troubles of the 14th.

Q. There was nothing there that came under your observation before the 6th April ?

A. No.

Q. Everything was quiet before that ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had nothing to complain of in the behaviour of the people before the 6th April ?

A. No.

Q. Everything was quiet and the people looked perfectly loyal ?

A. Yes.

Q. And before the 6th April had you ever noticed in Gujranwala any *anti*-Government or *anti*-British feeling ?

A. There were always a certain number of people who enjoyed reading about reverses to the British. That went on during the war. There was always a certain class which enjoyed reading stories that were unfavourable to the British.

Q. Did this come under your personal observation ?

A. I was told that there were people of that kind.

Q. You did not take any serious notice of it, did you ?

A. No.

Q. It must be a very small number of people who took that view, I mean it was not so marked as to attract attention ?

A. Certain newspapers especially from outside were very much enjoyed by certain classes.

Q. You think that was an indication of *anti*-British feeling ?

A. Well, if the papers were *anti*-British.

Q. Those papers were *anti*-British ?

A. Yes.

Q. In what sense ?

A. I did not read them myself, but this was the information I received.

Q. Had you ever read those newspapers that you refer to ?

A. I read copies of one paper which was sent up with a recommendation that it should be excluded. That I remember.

Q. That paper was *anti*-British ?

A. Yes.

Q. What did it say ? That the British Government should be turned out of India ?

A. I don't remember exactly what the words were.

Q. When was this ?

A. It was in 1918, I think.

Q. A good number of newspapers were prohibited entry in the Punjab by the Punjab Government ?

A. Yes.

Q. While other Governments had not taken any such action with regard to those newspapers ?

A. That is so.

Q. The Punjab Government was very singular in that way ?

A. Well, I suppose they thought that the Punjab was more inflammable.

Q. I thought, Colonel, that the Punjab was always represented to be and the Lieutenant-Governor had on many occasions said that it was, the most loyal province in India ?

A. That is true, certain classes at any rate.

Q. Not only the most loyal, but as possessing much more strong, common-sense than any other province in India ?

A. Yes, I am quite prepared to agree to that.

Q. Surely people who possess sturdy common-sense are not generally inflammable ?

A. No.

Q. You say this unrest was organised from outside. Where do you think this organization was ; was it outside the Punjab ?

A. I have no information on that point.

Q. Then on what do you base your statement ? You say here it was organized from outside. On what material do you base that statement ?

A. It is only a private opinion, it is my own opinion.

Q. Surely, Colonel when you arrive at an opinion you base that opinion on some foundation, on some material ?

A. Yes, I don't quite know what exactly to say. One reason I would suggest for arguing in that direction is the outbreaks on the railway at Kundian and Malakwal, both railway junctions of importance on the road to the frontier, whereas other places in the neighbourhood did not break out.

Q. What is the meaning of, it was organized from outside ? Do you mean outside Gujranwala or outside the Punjab province ?

A. I don't know what the organization was, but I don't think that Gujranwala by itself would have started off in that way. That is my point.

Q. That is not my question. My question is here you say, it was organized from outside. What do you mean by outside ? Do you mean outside Gujranwala or outside the Punjab province ?

A. I do not know. There were manifestations in Delhi and on the Bombay side.

Q. Surely, Colonel, you know what you mean by what you say here "it was organized from outside." I want to know when you framed that sentence what did you mean, whether outside Gujranwala or outside the Punjab ?

A. I certainly meant outside Gujranwala.

Q. So according to that the organization that you refer to was in the Punjab but outside Gujranwala ?

A. I don't say that. I say that it was certainly outside Gujranwala.

Q. Was it outside the Punjab or inside ?

A. That I cannot tell you.

Q. You cannot say where the organization was ?

A. No, I have no information.

Q. You do not know whether there was any organization at all ?

A. No.

Q. And then why do you say here "it was organized ..." when you never knew whether there was an organization at all or not ?

A. As I said, it was only my assumption. I don't think that the Gujranwala people would have started it off of their own accord, therefore I assumed that it must have come from outside.

Q. You assumed the existence of an organization without any evidence at all ? You never made any enquiries ?

A. It is not for me to take into consideration every individual thing outside my own district.

Q. Colonel, you have made a statement, and surely you must base that statement on some material ?

A. I am like our friend this morning. I did not expect to be cross-examined.

Q. Therefore you thought it did not matter if you made that statement and that it would not be challenged ?

A. I was asked to give my opinion by the Punjab Government and I gave it.

Q. Now the meeting of the 5th April that you refer to, that was openly called by a notice signed by various people and there was no secrecy about that meeting at all ?

A. No.

Q. And the resolutions that were passed at that meeting are those that you set out in Section III of your statement ?

A. Yes.

Q. There is nothing objectionable in them ?

A. No.

Q. Then the *hartal* that took place the next day, the 6th April, that you say in Section II was intended by the organizers to be peaceful ?

A. Yes, it was peaceful all over the province.

Q. But the point that I am now on is, you say that the organizers intended it to be peaceful ?

A. I think so.

Q. And it passed off also smoothly ?

A. Yes.

Q. So till the 6th April when the *hartal* was carried out, the intention of the people who were taking this action was that it was to be entirely peaceful ?

A. I take it so, yes.

Q. And that they never intended that any violence should be committed by any one ?

A. No.

Q. Therefore, I take it, Colonel that you do not impute any incitement to violence to them ?

A. Not on that day.

Q. You impute that after that day they changed their peaceful intentions and entertained the idea of inciting violence ?

A. That I do think, and that has been accepted by the tribunals.

Q. When did that change come over them, according to you ? On the 6th, 7th or later ?

A. I gathered that it took place on the 13th, but of course I was not in the counsels of those people.

Q. True, but you were the Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala, and holding that position you must have made enquiries ?

A. Actually I went away, I was not there on the 13th.

Q. Up to the 12th when you were there, had they changed their peaceful intentions and was there any visible sign of incitement to violence ?

A. There was no sign of anything at Gujranwala, or I should not have left and the Punjab Government would not have let me go.

Q. I take it, then, that till you left on the 12th, there were no visible signs of any intention on the part of these people to go from their peaceful intentions to incitement to violence ?

A. No visible signs.

Q. You attribute their change of intention to the events that took place actually on the 14th ?

A. Yes.

Q. You had no other tangible evidence ?

A. Yes, we have already had. There was sufficient in the air on the 13th to suggest that on the next day there would be trouble.

Q. True, I quite see that on the 13th there was sufficient unrest and something in the air, but was there anything to show on the 13th that these leaders who had called a meeting and carried out the peaceful *hartal* and intended to do so, had changed their intentions and that they meant to resort to violence ?

A. Well, you can gather something from the evidence of the informer, and the Indian Christians of whom I spoke.

Q. That is to be gathered from the evidence of the informer and from the Indian Christians who were going up and down the town, they must have gathered it from somewhere ? Did they suggest that these leaders organized a meeting..... ?

A. They did not mention leaders.

Q. Nobody disputes that there was violence on the 14th, no doubt Gujranwala people took part in it. But what I am now on is that the leaders had no intention..... ?

A. I think you may fairly assume that the crowd does not do things without being led.

Q. You attribute that intention to them because the crowd in fact committed violence and you assumed that they would not do it otherwise ? That is what it comes to ?

A. I think that is a reasonable assumption.

Q. Then you said that, you arrested the leaders on the 15th.

A. On the afternoon of the 15th.

Q. You have said that there were 11 leaders who were arrested, because they had held meetings, is that the fact ?

A. Yes. I would not say only because they had held meetings, but there were meetings in the town first at Amarnath's house, but then when the crowds became too big for the compound outside his house they moved off to a place outside called the Niyan. That was on the 14th.

Q. In the morning. ?

A. The first meetings were held at Amarnath's house in the morning and they must have been at the Niyan when the wounded man reached there at half-past eleven.

Q. You say that the majority of the leaders at this meeting had merely confined themselves to Hindu-Muhammadan unity. Is that a fact ? That is what you say ?

A. I was trying to find a report of the meetings. I have not got the reports of the meetings here.

Q. You say that the majority of the leaders at this meeting had merely confined themselves to Hindu-Muhammadan unity ?

A. No ; I would not say so.

Q. That is what you have said ?

A. I am trying to find the report of the meetings. I have not got the reports of the meetings here.

Q. You said in answer to Mr. Justice Rankin, I think (I have got a note of it) that the majority had merely confined themselves to Hindu-Muhammadan unity ?

A. Yes ; what exactly was said I cannot say. But I do not think any person in this crowd actually said 'Go and kill Europeans.'

Q. There was no incitement to violence preached at that meeting ?

A Not directly. I do not think so. I wish to speak subject to correction.

Q. If by referring to any document, you want to correct it, you can correct it later. But so far as you remember now, at that meeting they did not preach incitement to violence, but they confined themselves merely to Hindu-Muhammadan unity ?

A. As far as I remember there were no definite speeches saying 'you must go and do this and that.'

Q. In the speeches, there was no incitement to violence ?

A. I think it will be best to see the decision of the tribunal.

Q. What we are concerned with for the moment is the information that you had on the 15th, what you had before you on the 15th when you made arrests. You had no information that anything was said or done at that meeting inciting violence ?

A. I do not exactly know what had been said at these meetings.

Q. Then when you arrested them, you did not know what they had said ?

A. I merely knew that there had been a great deal of talk by the leaders and that in consequence there had been these riots.

Q. All that you knew at the time you arrested them was that there were meetings at which leaders had talked a good deal and you had the further fact that violence had been committed by the mob ?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you concluded that what the mob did must be the effect of those speeches. Is that what you mean ?

A. We had other information.

Q. I will come to the other information later. But so far as what happened at the meetings was concerned, this was your frame of mind ?

A. I think so ; I think that can be assumed.

Q. Then you say, Colonel, that one of the reasons why you made the arrests of those people was that such arrests are likely to have a very good moral effect. That also entered into your calculation ?

A. That is true.

Q. You thought that if the leaders were arrested, it would have a very great moral effect on the populace ?

A. Yes.

Q. And would to a certain extent terrorise them ?

A. Not so much that, but I thought it was the kindest thing to do.

Q. Kindest to whom ? to the populace ?

A. To the populace.

Q. Kindest in this way, I take it, that if the leaders were arrested, then the public would feel that big people have been arrested and they were very small people comparatively and unless they kept quiet, they would also be dealt with similarly ?

A. That is not the point at all.

Q. How was it then ? What effect was your action intended to have on the people ?

A. I understood that the populace did these various acts on the stimulus of the leaders and if the leaders were taken away, then the populace would not be likely to take any further action and further action by the people would only end in their being shot and killed.

Q. Then you decided upon the arrest of the leaders because you thought thereby the populace would be prevented from doing any further mischief ?

A. And suffering thereby. We know what they suffered elsewhere.

Q. Now, when you decided upon the arrests of these people, you yourself proceeded to make the arrests ?

A. Yes.

Q. You had with you a considerable police force and also soldiers ?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people had you ?

A. I do not know the exact number. We had about 35 soldiers and constables to make the arrests and guard prisoners.

Q. The soldiers moved with you. Were they armed with drawn bayonets ?

A. The soldiers were to prevent any opposition.

Q. True, that may be the object. Were they armed with bayonets and rifles ?

A. They certainly were armed with rifles and had bayonets, and they certainly had their ball ammunition with them, and also a Lewis gun. There was much discussion as to whether we were sufficiently strong.

Q. What is a Lewis gun ?

A. It is a portable machine-gun which can be worked by one man.

Q. Had you also an aeroplane helping you ?

A. An aeroplane came out at the same time.

Q. The aeroplane co-operated with you in these arrests ?

A. No.

Q. It was merely a coincidence ?

A. It was not. There was much discussion as to whether the force that we had there was sufficient to make the arrests, if the town turned out to oppose them.

Q. I forget the number of soldiers that were with you. How many did you say were with you ?

A. Thirty or 35, 50 all told ; a guard remained at the Treasury and I think there was another guard at the station.

Q. And you had a machine-gun ?

A. Yes, a machine-gun.

Q. That was not considered sufficient to make the arrests ?

A. It was considered sufficient.

Q. What about the aeroplane ?

A. My great object was not to have more slaughter, no more deaths, and the effect of the aeroplane on the previous day had been so great that I telephoned to the Chief Secretary and said that I was going to make the arrests between 3 and 4-30 and that it would be a good thing if an aeroplane happened to be going round at the same time.

Q. You telephoned to Lahore ?

A. I did and the aeroplane came at about 3-30.

Q. And the aeroplane preceded ?

A. It just went round. It was instructed not to do anything, unless it saw that there was any conflict going on.

Q. Then you went to one Hakim Rai ?

A. I did not go to Hakim Rai or Mela Ram. The civil station men were arrested while we were getting the police force ready.

Q. Anyway Hakim Rai was first arrested ?

A. Yes.

Q. And then Mela Ram was arrested ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that Mela Ram was undressed at that time ? He was in his house ?

A. I was not there ; I do not know.

Q. When you first saw him he was not dressed ?

A. I really do not know, he may or may not have been fully dressed.

Q. Was he bareheaded ?

A. I think he was.

Q. You know when Indians go out, they do not go bareheaded ? They have their turbans ?

A. People in those days were going about bareheaded.

Q. You do not mean to suggest that people in the position of barristers and pleaders were going out of their houses bareheaded ?

A. I think they were bareheaded on the 14th.

Q. I can perfectly understand that. The 14th or whatever the date was, was observed by them as a day of mourning.

A. Mela Ram might have gone on mourning.

Q. You know, Col. O'Brien, that the Indian custom is when one goes in a mourning procession one goes bareheaded ?

A. Yes.

Q. His going bareheaded on the 14th was it on that basis ?

A. Yes.

Q. Unless there is a mourning procession, ordinarily you are aware that nobody goes bareheaded ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you found Mela Ram was bareheaded ?

A. I noticed him bareheaded.

Q. Did it ever come to your knowledge that when he was arrested he was not dressed and when he was taken out of his house he was not allowed to put on his dress or his turban ?

A. I do not know anything about that. My great object at the time was to make the arrests as quickly as possible.

Q. Not to allow anyone a second to put on his turban ?

A. It was not the question at the time. It was a question of going a considerable distance to the town and getting the men off to Lahore that day. It was also arranged for sending prisoners to Lahore. It was arranged by me for fear that there might be an attempt at rescue from the Jail, if I had all the local leaders in the local jail. Not having very strong guards everywhere, I thought there might be attempts at rescue. Therefore it was arranged to send them to Lahore, where the strength was greater.

Q. I quite agree that it had to be done quickly ; but would there have been any appreciable delay if they had been allowed to put on their turbans ?

A. I daresay not. I was not there at the moment.

Q. Then the next man that was arrested was Labh Singh ?

A. That is quite correct.

Q. He is a Barrister-at-Law and Municipal Commissioner ?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time you had three men, you had Hakim Rai, Mela Ram and Labh Singh. Were they all handcuffed and chained to each other ?

A. Yes, they were handcuffed.

Q. And chained ?

A. Yes.

Q. Having handcuffed and chained those three people you proceeded to arrest Diwan Mangal Sen ?

A. Yes.

Q. Diwan Mangal Sen is a man of considerable position in Gujranwala ?

A. No ; I should not say so.

Q. You would not say so ?

A. He is an entirely self-made man.

Q. Is that a reproach ?

A. No. The way in which he obtained his money is not perhaps creditable to him.

Q. Are you, Col. O'Brien, making a charge against that man that he got his wealth by improper means ?

A. Perhaps I had better drop that, but I would not put him as a man of great status.

Q. He is a man of no status at all ?

A. He is a man of no great status.

Q. Is he not a very prominent man in Gujranwala and other places for his religious and social activities ? Is he not a well-known figure among the leaders of social activity ? Are you aware of that ?

A. No.

Q. Are you aware that he is the person who founded the King George Hindu School and endowed for that nearly a lakh of rupees ?

A. I know he started the Hindu School, but I do not know where he got the funds for that.

Q. We are not concerned about the way in which he got the money. You are very anxious to bring a charge against him ?

A. I do not know how the institution was endowed.

Q. I am simply asking you whether you are aware of the fact that he started the school called King George Hindu School and endowed it, in honour of the visit of the King. Don't you know that he founded that school in memory of the visit of the King ? Are you not aware of that ?

A. I believe so.

Q. You are also aware that he was Secretary of what is called the District Imperial War Relief Fund ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. And that he also considerably helped the authorities in obtaining recruits in your district ?

A. Certainly not. He did nothing to my knowledge.

Q. Are you aware that his own relations are serving in the army and with regard to recruiting he has been awarded a special certificate of merit? You are not aware of that?

A. Not in my time; I was there for two years.

Q. When you arrested this man, Mangal Sen, was he also bareheaded and undressed?

A. As I said, I was not there.

Q. When you saw him, he was undressed?

A. I understand he was.

Q. He was also handcuffed and chained?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you arrested Hakim Rai?

A. Hakim Rai was not arrested in the civil station. Hakim Rai and Amar Nath were actually discussing at Mangal Sen's house.

Q. Hakim Rai and Amar Nath were in the house of Mangal Sen?

A. Yes.

Q. They were all arrested there?

A. Yes.

Q. Handcuffed and chained?

A. Yes.

Q. Were all of them taken to the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. How many were taken to the railway station like that?

A. I think there were five that reached the railway station.

Q. How many people did you take to the railway station like that? Were they five or six?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. I understood you to say that 21 or 18 persons were arrested?

A. Twenty-three or 24.

Q. You had other people like Hussain Bakhsh?

A. Yes. When we went down from the railway station we went round the town proper and then these arrests were made in the civil station.

Q. Five or six were first taken to the station?

A. These arrests were made at the civil station and then we went round the town proper.

Q. You first took five or six people to the railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. They were made to sit at the railway station?

A. I do not know what happened to them. I went to the city to see the Municipal Commissioners, who were, by previous arrangement, waiting outside the main gate of the town. And I arranged for two of them to go in front and warn the people that there should be no opposition, because if there was opposition, they might come to grief.

Q. When you reached the station, one Ralla Ram alighted there?

A. He was there. We tried to arrest him opposite the Gurukul, but we did not find him there.

Q. And you found him at the station? He arrived by some train?

A. He was at the station: he was sitting there, I understand, with the Municipal Commissioners.

Q. He was at the station?

A. He was at or near the station.

Q. His son was there who is a railway official?

A. Yes.

Q. His son is the Assistant Traffic Superintendent?

A. Yes.

Q. This Ralla Ram is a man of about 65 years?

A. No; I think he calls himself 54. I have had various petitions from him and his relations stating that he was 54, but I am not sure. He is an elderly man.

Q. And he was arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. Then he and the other people who had already been arrested were taken through the city?

A. Yes.

Q. They were brought from their homes to the railway station handcuffed and chained?

A. Yes.

Q. Then Ralla Ram was added to the party?

A. As a matter of fact, I do not know. I only heard of his arrest when I got back to the station.

Q. Those that were arrested including him were all marched through the city handcuffed and chained?

A. Yes; that is correct.

Q. And they were so marched for a distance of about two miles?

A. It was a long distance; we all had to walk on foot.

Q. That may be. What I want to know is, is it a fact that they were marched, handcuffed and chained for about two miles?

A. I would not say it is two miles.

Q. Less than two miles?

A. Yes.

Q. Then they were marched back again like that to the railway station by the same route?

A. By another route.

Q. They were marched like that through the city first by one route and then by another?

A. We made the arrests as we went along.

Q. Then when you arrived back at the railway station, by that time the other people had also been arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. And the whole party when you returned to the station came to about 20 or 21?

A. Twenty-three is the figure here.

Q. About that number?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were these people so marched through the city twice? Is it true that the manner in which they were chained was that a Hindu and a Muhammadan were chained together?

A. No. They remained in the positions in which they were.

Q. It is not true that Hindus and Muhammadans were chained together?

A. No. First of all I do not think we had 12 Muhammadans to chain to 12 Hindus.

Q. You may not have the full number, but as far as you could, was it done?

A. No; it was not so. We went on arresting and therefore Hussain Bukhsh might have been handcuffed to a Hindu, because there was a Hindu who had not a pair.

Q. Then there is no truth in the suggestion that Hindus and Muhammadans were so chained in order to show that this was the result of Hindu-Muhammadan unity?

A. There was nothing of that kind.

Q. Then after they were brought to the station like that, they were all put in a coal truck?

A. It is called a coal truck. I do not know why. It was an open truck; I do not think it was a coal truck.

Q. Open goods truck, not a passenger carriage?

A. I had asked for something to fetch them to Lahore; when I got there I found they had sent such trucks from Lahore.

Q. What did you ask them to send?

A. I had asked them to send something to fetch them.

Q. They sent a truck?

A. Yes, with some British soldiers on it.

Q. And how long were they kept in that truck? The whole night?

A. They went off at once, because I had arranged to complete the arrests by 4-30 and it was 4-45 before we got back to the station; as the traffic was very much impeded, they naturally wanted to get them back into Lahore by dark.

Q. So they were taken away almost at once?

A. Yes.

Q. Then they were brought to Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. When they were brought to Lahore, were they put in solitary cells?

A. I do not know what happened after that.

Q. Some authority in Lahore will be able to tell us about that?

A. Yes.

Q. They were so kept in Lahore for a period of a fortnight ?

A. They then went to the central jail in Lahore.

Q. They remained in Lahore for about a fortnight and then they were taken back to Gujranwala. Were they taken again in a coal truck ?

A. I do not know.

Q. When they were so taken back to Gujranwala, they were marched through Lahore city ?

A. I do not at all know what happened in Lahore.

Q. Handcuffed and chained ?

A. Probably.

Q. And how far distant by rail is Gujranwala from here ? About 40 miles ?

A. Forty-two miles.

Q. Ordinarily what time does it take for the railway journey ?

A. It depends upon whether it is a mail train or a slow train.

Q. Ordinary mail train ?

A. One hour and 20 minutes.

Q. Slow train takes a little longer ?

A. About two hours.

Q. Is it true that when they were brought from Lahore, the journey took 15 hours ?

A. I cannot tell you that. I never heard of that.

Q. You do not think it can be correct ?

A. I do not know about it. They might have found difficulty in getting the train made up at the Lahore station. But I do not know anything about it.

Q. Possibly they might have been detained at the station ?

A. I think so. I do not know anything about it.

Q. Then when they were so brought back to Gujranwala, they were kept there for about a fortnight and then again brought back to Lahore ?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were they brought to Gujranwala like that ?

A. We got them back to aid in the investigation. They went away as I told you originally because we feared that their presence in the local jail might lead to rescue and further bloodshed. I was very anxious to avoid that.

Q. After these two or three journeys backwards and forwards from Lahore, they were kept in jail handcuffed ?

A. Yes.

Q. When they were sent back to Lahore again, they reached Lahore sometime during the night ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Are you aware that they were kept at the station lock-up in a very small room without any food at all ?

A. I do not know anything about it.

Q. Somebody in charge of them will be able to tell us ?

A. I do not know myself.

Q. What officer was in charge on that day ? Can you tell us ?

A. I suppose the police arranged for the escort to take the men.

Q. They were taken in the morning to Lahore to the Martial Law Commissioners ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you on the 19th April make certain arrests at Sheikhupura ?

A. Yes.

Q. How far is that from Gujranwala ?

A. I came to Lahore on the night of the 18th and telegraphed to the railway to prepare a train, and I went out with the same train next morning, 42 miles into Lahore and then 21 miles out again next morning.

Q. At Sheikhupura you arrested about 10 persons ?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Four pleaders and one retired Inspector of Police were arrested ?

A. I do not think so. I do not remember. The arrests were very few.

Q. Among them was one Gohur Singh ?

A. Yes.

Q. A man of 60 years ?

A. Yes.

Q. Gohur Singh was arrested as a hostage for his 2 or 3 sons who were wanted ?

A. That is right.

Q. And he himself had committed no offence ?

A. No.

Q. As the sons were wanted by the police and they were not forthcoming, that was why the father, Gohur Singh, was arrested, though he had committed no offence ? There was no charge against him ?

A. He would not tell us where the sons had gone to. My information was that he had seen us coming and had sent them off.

Q. He said that he did not do that. I suppose he did not know where they were ?

A. Yes.

Q. However, you arrested him and you also passed an order confiscating his property ?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you produce that order ?

A. I have not got it here.

Q. It must be available somewhere in the records ?

A. I daresay it can be produced.

Q. Kindly have it produced. In the meantime, I will read to you from a copy I have got; you passed this order ?*

A. Yes.

Q. You thought you had authority to pass that order against this man, arresting him and confiscating his property, saying that any one touching his property or cutting the produce will be shot. On what authority did you pass that order ?

A. I do not know that I passed the last sentence. I won't guarantee that.

Q. I want to know on what authority you passed that order ?

A. I assumed that under Martial Law one can take strong action, more strong action than one can otherwise do. Under Martial Law the courts assist us to defend the right of the people as quickly as possible.

Q. When Martial Law was proclaimed, were you given any instructions as to what things you could do under it ?

A. No.

Q. Did the General Officer Commanding issue any general instructions ?

A. I was not acting in communication with the General at that time.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 16th ?

A. Yes.

Q. And this order was passed on the 19th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Till then you had received no instructions either verbally or in writing as to your powers under the Martial Law ?

A. No, I had conversation with the Chief Secretary from which I was given to understand that probably if I have to take certain action hurriedly, it will be legalised afterwards, if it is proved to be in good faith.

Q. You saw Mr. Thompson, the Chief Secretary ?

A. I telephoned.

Q. You telephoned to Mr. Thompson, the Chief Secretary, on the 15th; that was before declaration of Martial Law, and you telephoned to him to say that you have to take various means, and that he should see to its being legalised afterwards ?

A. Yes; provided it was in good faith.

Q. And he gave you a blank cheque ?

A. Of course I should be using my discretion.

Q. That was before the declaration of Martial Law. Martial Law was declared on the 16th. After that did you receive any instruction from any authority ?

A. No. Not with reference to this particular point.

Q. When you passed this order on the 19th did you think that you were covered by this assurance of Mr. Thompson ?

* Neither order nor copy were available at the time of printing.

A. I thought if I achieved my object, that is, the arrest of these two men, nobody would seriously suffer, and I got the men arrested.

Q. You thought under Martial Law you had authority to make this order or any other order to secure the arrests of these people. That is what you thought ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then, during the administration of Martial Law, you issued various notifications ?

A. I did not.

Q. The notifications in the book ?

A. They are issued by the Brigadier-General.

Q. You are not responsible for these notifications ?

A. No.

Q. Were they issued on your recommendation ?

A. Some at my suggestion.

Q. This No. 7 ? Was this your suggestion ?

A. I do not know; I am not sure. I certainly remember discussing it with the General; but whether it was my suggestion or on agreement with his suggestion I cannot remember. I am quite prepared to identify myself with that order.

Q. You quite approved of it or more likely you made that suggestion to the General. If you did discuss it with him he must have expressed his personal opinion on your suggested order. Under this order persons meeting any European gazetted or commissioned, civil and military officer were to alight from wheeled conveyances, etc. ?

A. I do not remember discussing that at all.

Q. You do not remember discussing that part of your order ?

A. I do not remember. My general impression is that people in authority should be saluted.

Q. Did you approve of that order, that people riding in wheeled conveyances, if they met a gazetted European officer, must alight and salute him ?

A. I think it is hardly in accordance with the customs of India at the present time, but still it was your custom.

Q. Did you approve of it or not ?

A. I am prepared to say I approved of it.

Q. You admit that it is not in accordance with the existing Indian custom ?

A. I think that the Indian custom is.....

Q. The Indian custom is not that. It is not the existing Indian custom for people when they meet any person of high social position to alight from their conveyance and *salaam* him ?

A. Well, I do not know; I have noticed several friends of mine who have alighted from their conveyance and shaken hands.

Q. That is different. If you meet a friend who is walking you sometimes alight and shake hands with him. You are here dealing with mark of respect to a person without either knowing the man previously or even being on speaking terms with him. Have you ever seen any Indian doing that merely because the person he meets is in a high position ?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Do you approve of it still ?

A. It was to accentuate the saluting order.

Q. Is it not enforcing humiliation on Indian people, to make them alight from their carriages to *salaam* an European officer ? Does it not savour of that ?

A. You perhaps put the other way. It is rather this way. I go to the other extreme in insisting on the ordinary salutations being paid.

Q. It was necessary to go to the other extreme ?

A. Perhaps so.

Q. For what purpose ? What was the necessity for going to the other extreme and making this order ?

A. The tendency of the present day is to abolish respectfulness. An Indian father will tell you that sons are not respectful even to their parents.

Q. The Indian young men are not following the ways of respectfulness, and you therefore thought you would improve them by going to the other extreme and enforcing this order ?

A. I say I did not pass this order. I generally agreed.

Q. That is the ground on which you defend it ? I put it to you: if an order of this sort is in force would it not create considerable resentment and bitterness among the people, and would not they feel humiliated ?

A. I do not know. The feeling of bitterness already existed.

Q. You thought there was bitterness sufficient, and therefore any order of humiliation could not add to the bitterness ?

A. I did not think its effect would be much.

Q. You think that bitterness was quite enough and nothing that you did, however unreasonable, would add to it ?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Then about umbrellas ? Is that an Indian custom at present ? Have you met men paying respects in that way ?

A. Umbrellas are now used by the million and are not the insignia of royalty.

Q. Then it is not the Indian custom to shut an umbrella when they meet one in a high social position ?

A. I think it is going out.

Q. Have you ever seen it ?

A. I think I have; I have seen men closing umbrellas, when they meet.

Q. When they meet you or meet whom?

A. When they meet me.

Q. When was that ? Was that during Martial Law ?

A. No, I have seen it. I think it is going out; practically gone out.

Q. Why was that selected, that umbrellas should be closed ?

A. It is a sort of showing respect; it is a relic of the old ideas.

Q. Oh ! You are reviving the old customs of India ?

A. I was not doing anything.

Q. This order you did enforce, did you not, in Gujranwala ?

A. I found it acted upon.

Q. There was only one alternative; if they had not obeyed they would have been flogged?

A. I never personally hauled up anybody or ordered him to be flogged.

Q. The order was in force ?

A. I found it in force. I myself was busy with more important things.

Q. You observed it ?

A. I observed it as I went along.

Q. May I know, Colonel, why this particular form of saluting was in force only in the case of European officers ?

A. It is shown that they have already accorded the same salutation to Indian gentlemen of high social position.

Q. So far as the Indian officers are concerned, it was thought they would in the ordinary course *salaam* them by getting out of their conveyances or closing their umbrellas. It was necessary to enforce it in the case of European officers. Was that the idea ?

A. I say it is not my order at all.

Q. You are standing by it Colonel and defending it ?

A. You ask me why it was confined to Europeans. Because the same people would be according similar salutation to Indian gentlemen of high position.

Q. That is exactly what I am saying ?

A. Therefore it was not necessary to pass an order saying that people must salute Indian Commissioners, and others if you like.

Q. It was not necessary in the case of Indian officers because they would be *salaamed* and respected in this peculiar manner in the ordinary course ? Only a few minutes back you told me that these forms are dying out ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then every one will not ordinarily show this mark of respect to Indian officers ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then why was it necessary to make that order in the case of European officers ? You say in that order...

A. For the wording of it I am not responsible. It is assumed that such respect mentioned therein would ordinarily be paid to Indian gentlemen of position.

Q. You admit on your own showing that it is a wrong assumption ?

A. I am not responsible for the order; I am only responsible for the general agreement.

Q. Now as to the aeroplanes that were brought on the 14th and 15th, how many were there ?

A. Three aeroplanes; on the 14th only one dropped bombs.

Q. On the 15th, how many ?

A. On the 15th, one dropped one bomb.

Q. You asked for these aeroplanes to be sent ?

A. No; I was on the road coming from Lahore in a motor-car. Mr. Heron himself was attacked. As the state of affairs was serious, he despatched two telegrams, one from Eminabad station to Lahore and one from the Rahwali station to Sialkot. These went off about 12. I do not know when they got to Lahore and when to Sialkot.

Q. Did they by telegram ask for aeroplanes ?

A. They said 'Send military; police force not sufficient' or something of that kind.

Q. And I understand that this officer realising that no military could arrive in the very short notice hit upon the idea of asking for aeroplanes. The military in fact arrived at 9 o'clock at night ?

A. They could not get a train, and they did not turn up till night; and the aeroplanes arrived at 3 or 3-30.

Q. When the aeroplanes arrived, where was the bomb dropped ? Was that on the concourse of people there ?

A. All I know is that two bombs took effect on two known rioters.

Q. I want to know who directed the aeroplanes, where the bombs were to be dropped.

A. Nobody directed. We have no means of communicating with aeroplanes.

Q. Did they drop the bombs at random ?

A. They dropped on where they saw mobs outside the station.

Q. Outside the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Merely they saw people assembled and they dropped bombs. How long did aeroplanes hover over Gujranwala ?

A. They circled round and round at 3-50. The people of course all scattered. When the machines left Gujranwala no Indians could be seen in the streets.

Q. The aeroplane that came next day, was that also sent by the Punjab Government ?

A. One that hovered over while we were making arrests was asked for by me. As to the one that arrived at 8-55, I know nothing about it.

Q. You have no connection with that ?

A. No. I asked for aeroplane only as a matter of protection.

At Lahore, Monday, the 8th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K. C.M.G.
The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.
Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.
Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

MR. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary.*

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN—*continued.*

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. You said that when the mob was going to attack Mr. Shaw's house they discussed for about ten minutes whether they should attack *it* or not because he was an Irishman ?

A. That was when they went to attack Rev. Bailey's house at Wazirabad.

Q. I want to know whether you had some reliable evidence in connection with this or whether it was merely a rumour ?

A. No ; I don't think so. It was told me as a good story.

Q. What I ask you is this : Was it a fact and would it show a certain amount of deliberation and method in the proceedings of the crowd or was it nothing more than a rumour ?

A. I think it was quite a definite thing. It did happen, but I do not know whether it is in evidence anywhere.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Leaving aside the consideration that it was an organized thing or that it happened owing to outside influence, would you or would you not agree with me that taken by itself what happened at Gujranwala and in the surrounding villages, and taking into consideration also the fact that no arms were used and none of the crowds was armed, was it not clearly to you a ridiculous sort of rebellion ?

A. Well, it was in a way ridiculous.

Q. You left Gujranwala on the 12th. Now, had you known that any such serious things would happen, you would not have left Gujranwala ?

A. No.

Q. Therefore at the time you left Gujranwala there was no information in your possession that any serious thing was under contemplation ?

A. No.

Q. Then you arrived in Gujranwala on the 14th and from your statement I gather it was at about 3 o'clock ?

A. I arrived in the outskirts at about 2-20 and reached the Treasury at about 3.

Q. Before reaching the Treasury am I right in saying that either by chance or intentionally you met Iqbal Narain, the Municipal Secretary ?

A. I do not remember. On my way I passed his house.

Q. Now on the outskirts did you see anything or did you meet any crowds of rioters ?

A. No, I saw them dispersing from the Dâk Bungalow. I came up by the side road.

Q. And you were all alone ?

A. No, we were four in our party in a motor. I picked up half of the guard that I found at the Sadar *thana.*

Q. Up to the Sadar *thana* you were only four ?

A. Yes, we were four in the motor.

Q. Was any assault or demonstration made on the motor ?

A. There was nobody but ordinary wayfarers on the road.

Q. Then the Sadar *thana* is inside the civil lines ?

A. No, it is on the other side of the railway near the Government High School.

Q. That is, you don't cross the railway at all but come first to the *thana* ?

A. Yes.

Q. When you reached the Sadar *thana*, so far as the civil station is concerned, there were no crowds ?

A. When I reached the civil station there was no crowd till I was there. I met Mr. Nevill near the *Kutchery* while passing ; he had been dispersing the mob in the public gardens.

Q. Now in answer to a certain question put to you on the last occasion you said that your justification for arresting the 22 or 23 persons, whom you arrested on the 15th, was based firstly on the statement of the approver, secondly on the statement of Abbas Ali, Barrister-at-Law, and thirdly on the statement of certain Christians ?

A. No, I did not say that I arrested them for those reasons.

Q. There was information in your possession when you arrested them ?

A. I arrested them under section 12 of the Defence of India Act and not for any definite offences but as a protective measure.

Q. Therefore up to that time you did not arrest them for having committed any offences in connection with these riots ?

A. Well, I thought that the probability was that they would be charged under offences in connection with the riots and I also did it as a protective measure.

Q. Up to that time there was no information in your possession ?

A. There was plenty.

Q. On the 15th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore I ask you what information was in your possession.

A. I do not quite know how to put it. I had a great deal of information in my possession that they were the leaders of the mob. I had made various inquiries from various persons and I had previous knowledge also.

Q. You had previous knowledge before the 12th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then I would like to know the source of that information. Who gave you further information about the 13th and 14th ?

A. I cannot tell you that. There were various people who spoke to me. I did not record the statements then as there was no time.

Q. Those various people did verify. They were either at the railway station or before the post office or near the Court or they were there at the time when the railway bridge was burnt. I am talking of these places and I want to know whether any of them made any statement before you that these pleaders were either at the railway station or that they were with the mob ?

A. In some instances they were of course definitely with the mob.

Q. At the railway station when all these things were happening ?

A. Yes.

Q. These pleaders ?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean B. B. Bhagat ?

A. B. B. Bhagat was one and Abdur Rahman was another.

Q. Only two were named, B. B. Bhagat and Abdur Rahman ?

A. I think Hussain Bakhsh was also there. I really can't remember the details.

Q. This man B. B. Bhagat was pardoned with your permission ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you must have seen his statement or confession ?

A. I did not record it. I asked Mr. Wace to record it.

Q. Though it was recorded by Mr. Wace, you must have seen it ?

A. I don't remember what he actually deposed to.

Q. In your statement on the last occasion and also in your report you based certain conclusions on the statement of the approver ?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore I take it that you made yourself familiar with that statement and that you must have seen it ?

A. I must have seen it some time, but I do not remember it now.

Q. I want to ask you one question. Did the statement of the approver in any way indicate or support your conclusions that it was a premeditated thing or that it was engineered by some outside agency ? Am I right in thinking that, so far as the statement of the approver was concerned, upon whose evidence they were convicted, it did not show that it was an organized thing or that some outside influence was brought to bear upon those pleaders to commit such offences ?

A. I am not sure on that point.

Q. If you kindly make yourself sure, I will just give you a brief skeleton. He says that after the 6th he went to Lahore, that he was conducted there through the city and that he could come back again up to the 12th, that no meeting was held on the 12th, that there was a meeting of the District Congress Committee, annual meeting, at the house of Lala Amar Nath, pleader. Somebody suggested that there should be a *hartal*. This proposition was opposed; nothing was decided on the 13th. No meeting was held between him and Din Muhammad. A meeting was held and in the evening it was decided that a *hartal* should be held on the 14th. Therefore what I want to know is this; is it or is it not true that so far as the statement of this approver was concerned, upon whose evidence these pleaders were convicted, he might be wrong or right, it did not give any indication that there was any previous conspiracy or that any outside influence was brought to bear upon the people of Gujranwala or on these leaders ?

A. Well, take the statement about Chuni Lal, Manchanda, who came from Delhi. He said that he had intended to set fire to the Kangniwala railway bridge, so that the trains would not be able to pass with troops for some time to shoot down "our brothers." Another passage says that some persons cut the telegraph wires.

Q. This is the talk which took place on the 13th. So far as the statement of the approver is concerned, am I right in thinking that there was no conspiracy in fact either in Gujranwala or outside the Punjab that influenced the people of Gujranwala ? I know those passages; they do not help us. They say that this was suggested and I am not taking it in that light. Am I right, so far as the information given by Mr. Bhagat was concerned, that it was not a premediated thing or that there was not any conspiracy outside the Punjab, which could have influenced these people to commit all these acts ?

A. Well it depends on how this opinion reads. We also discussed the Amritsar incidents that happened there on the 10th, and thought if the same incidents happened here it would be a fine thing.

Q. It was on the morning of the 13th at 11 o'clock. How do you answer my question ?

A. I have already said in my statement that it was an organized thing. It is only an opinion. I gather when one opinion is built up it has effect for a number of days. If you take each thing separately and say that it is justified for this and it is justified for that, it is difficult.

Q. I want to know so far as Bhagat's statement is concerned, whether it did not support that opinion of yours. If it did, you might have good reasons ?

A. I did not state that, but I said that this was my opinion.

Q. So far as your knowledge goes it did not lead you to the inference that any outside influence was brought to bear upon these people ?

A. I am not prepared to say that.

Q. His statement does contain those facts ?

A. There are facts but it is not that statement alone which helped me to form that opinion.

Q. Did he not state that nothing was settled up to the 13th, that nothing was decided on the 14th or on the evening of the 12th ?

A. I understand they had a *hartal* on the 15th originally.

Q. Is there even the least indication in the whole statement of Mr. Bhagat that they were going to hold a *hartal* on the 15th ?

A. I don't know.

Q. So far as his statement is concerned, there is not the remotest indication that the *hartal* was going to be held on the 15th ?

A. Well, I have not studied this.

Q. According to his statement, the suggested *hartal* was going to be held on the 13th and it was suggested that this being the Fair day, the pleaders would not have to suffer anything while the shop-keepers would have to suffer a loss, and therefore it was postponed for a day ?

A. I do not see that anywhere.

Q. So far as your memory goes, was there anything in the statement of B. B. Bhagat which would show that the *hartal* was going to be held on the 15th ?

A. I do not remember his statement.

Q. Is it not correct, according to B. B. Bhagat's statement, that the *hartal* was not decided on the night of the 12th ?

A. I do not know about that.

Q. You can look at it; you remember he said that a District Congress Committee meeting was held casually and this matter was brought before the committee; that two or three persons opposed it and subsequently the matter was not decided ?

A. 'Someone suggested a *hartal* but nothing was decided that day.' It does not say someone suggested a *hartal* on any particular date. 'Someone suggested a *hartal* but nothing was decided that day, it being arranged that a meeting should be held at the house of Diwan Mangal Sen on the evening of the 13th of April.' And further on we have 'we too decided there should be a *hartal* on the 14th of April.'

Q. See page 5 of his printed statement. He clearly says there, beginning at the bottom of page 4,—'Diwan Sarab Dial and Mr. Labh Singh told me that there would be a meeting of the District Congress Committee that night at the house of Lala Amar Nath, pleader. In the Bar-room pleaders asked me what I had seen at Lahore, and I gave them a brief account of what I had seen. That evening we met at Lala Amar Nath's house,' and he gives the names of those who were present, and says that Mr. Mati Ullah and Mr. Labh Singh were elected as joint secretaries. Then he says: 'There was discussion about subscription which lasted a long time, and after discussing other matters the meeting came to a close. An informal discussion was introduced by Lala Amar Nath, pleader, as regards the arrest of the leaders, and

someone suggested a *hartal.* Diwan Labh Chand opposed it, saying that this was opposed to Mr. Gandhi's views, moreover, his message was that we should not protest against his arrest. He was, supported by a few others. On this Sarab Diyal said that by protest we do not express the feelings of our leaders, but our own feelings in regard to our leaders.' The three men from the *Mandi* said the *hartal* should not be on a holiday, as the Pleaders then lost nothing; all should have like treatment." Nothing was decided, and the meeting came to a close.'

A. I have not got it here.

Q. Therefore my point is, you agree with me that, so far as the meeting of the 12th was concerned, nothing was decided about a *hartal* ?

A. I did not study the thing. He came and said he would make a statement.

Q. You have made three statements before this committee based on the statement of this approver. First of all you said it was decided to hold a *hartal* on the 15th and there was a design or something else to give a surprise ?

A. I did not say I got that from the approver.

Q. When you made that statement, the evidence your had was the evidence of the approver, on the basis of whose evidence everybody was convicted ?

A. Oh, no.

Q. And your second statement was that at that meeting they plotted and it was decided that they should have recourse to the same things as happened at Amritsar ?

A. That I have read out.

Q. And there is a third statement; this man was the witness upon whose evidence all the leaders have been convicted; therefore I want to know, so far as your statement was based on the evidence of the approver, whether these conclusions were supported by his evidence or not ?

A. Some of the conclusions may have been. I am perfectly sure that I never stated that I obtained the information only from him, or from him.

Q. Except this witness, has there been produced by you any witness in the conspiracy case to depose to the facts as to what happened on the 12th and 13th ?

A. I did not produce witnesses in the conspiracy case.

Q. You were in charge of the case ?

A. Not at all; the police were in charge of the case.

Q. The investigation was made by the police and the police were under you ?

A. Yes.

Q. The investigation of this case was not made by the Martial Law authorities; it was made by the police who are under you ?

A. They were not under me for that purpose.

Q. When this man made his deposition on the 21st it must have been produced before you in order that you might judge whether a pardon should be granted to him or not ?

A. I had a general idea of what he said; I do not remember every detail of it.

Q. You had a general idea of what he said and after you have refreshed your memory from the document that was before you when you suggested the grant of a pardon to the approver, I want to know whether, so far as his statement was concerned, it did not suggest that any *hartal* was going to be held on the 15th ?

A. I don't remember where I obtained that particular information from.

Q. My only question is whether you did not obtain that information from his statement ?

A. It is not in the written statement; he may have said it verbally.

Q. This information is not contained in the statement of the approvers ?

A. So I gather.

Q. What other information did you have to the effect that it was decided to hold a meeting on the 15th ?

A. Various people told me so.

Q. Can you give us the names of any of the persons ?

A. I cannot remember now.

Q. And these people must have attended these meetings of the 12th and 13th ?

A. Possibly; possibly they may have heard of it; news goes round very rapidly.

Q. And would you believe those rumours against this statement of the approver ?

A. I do not see the point.

Q. Here is the approver who has been granted a pardon in the conspiracy case itself. When he does not make that statement would you be prepared to believe those rumours ?

A. Because a person does not make a statement, it does not prove that that statement is non-existent.

Q. When you stated that it was decided that the Amritsar incidents would be repeated on the 14th, did you mean by that that they intended to kill Europeans ?

A. The Commission can come to its own conclusion surely. I think it suggests that they did intend to kill Europeans.

Q. You will find in the confession of the approver upon which you based that conclusion it is clearly stated that the incidents at Amritsar should be repeated, " that is, the cutting of wires, damaging of railways in order to annoy the authorities."

A. It is not in here.

Q. It is in here on page 5; I am referring to the confession that was recorded before you.

A. This report that I made up was written after I had had all the information; it was written after the decision of the cases.

Q. And you can take it from me that, except this witness, no one else could have given any information, or did give any information to the court that it was plotted that the Amritsar incidents be repeated on the 14th. He himself makes that statement, " the cutting of wires and damaging of railways in order to annoy the authorities."

A. That is in the original confession.

Q. And therefore will I be right in supposing that when this statement was made by the approver, the killing of Europeans was not contemplated ?

A. I do not know; it depends on how you read the words " to repeat the incidents."

Q. There it is followed by the sentence, " that is, the cutting of wires, damaging of railways in order to annoy the authorities."

A. That goes on, " the plan is decided on where to do so and so ;" that may be my expression.

Q. These are the words of the approver himself, that the Amritsar incidents be repeated on the 14th, and he says " that is, the cutting of wires, damaging of railways in order to annoy the authorities."

A. I have not got that before me; I don't remember it any way.

Q. Will you kindly see page 5; this document was before you when you suggested the pardon.

A. I do not remember it at all. He came to me and said he was ready to make a confession. Mr. Wace recorded the confession and I gathered the general impression of what he was going to depose about, but I do not remember the details of what he deposed.

Q. You could refresh your memory ?

A. I have not got it. I do not in any case see what the point is.

Q. In your statement you say it was plotted on the night of the 13th that the incidents of Amritsar be repeated. I say this statement is based on the statement of the approver, but the statement of the approver is not only this much that the incidents of Amritsar be repeated, but it is followed by the words, " that is, the cutting of wires, damaging of railways in order to annoy the authorities."

A. The statement is a general statement; I do not remember the details of it. Before the judicial tribunal he was definitely asked and he said he knew then that Europeans had been killed in Amritsar in return for Indians who had been shot.

Q. That is a different matter; that has nothing to do with what was decided on the night of the 13th ?

A. Yes, in this statement it is so.

Q. No European was assaulted up to about 11 A.M. on that day ?

A. There were only two there.

Q. No one was assaulted ?

A. No.

Q. And if the intention of the mob was to assault Europeans would it have been very difficult for them to go to the civil station and to destroy their property and to assault them ?

A. There was a strong guard of police out.

Q. Is it not a fact that up to 11 A.M. Mr. Heron was in the midst of this crowd very often ?

A. He had his police with him.

Q. The police he had with him were very few ?

A. I do not know, I was not there.

Q. You do not know what was their number ?

A. No.

Q. Therefore supposing that Mr. Heron had very few police with him and that up to 11 o'clock there were many opportunities for the crowd to commit a murderous assault upon him, if that assault was not committed, how do you account for it ?

A. I can give no opinion on that.

Q. You also referred to one Abbas Ali, a barrister; was he a witness in the conspiracy case ?

A. No, he was acting as Public Prosecutor in Sheikhupura.

Q. Would he not have been a very important witness in the conspiracy case if he were in possession of those facts ?

A. Well we thought of putting him in but then we thought the evidence was sufficient, and he was engaged in other work and was himself not anxious to go in.

Q. He was appointed Public Prosecutor by you ?

A. No, Mr. Bosworth-Smith appointed him during the Martial Law period to prosecute Martial Law cases.

Q. Before that he was not a Public Prosecutor ?

A. No, we never had one.

Q. And after the Martial Law period he ceased to be a Public Prosecutor ?

A. Yes, when the work was over.

Q. You know subsequently he was summoned as a defence witness in the conspiracy case ?

A. I did not know that.

Q. The statement you have made about people saying they would have their own Deputy Commissioner and other statements similar to that, are based on information given by him ?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you aware that these statements were not made by him when he was examined as a witness ?

A. No, I do not know what he said then.

Q. You arrested certain persons on the 15th, and you said there were the magistrate and the police there. Was Abbas Ali there also ?

A. No.

Q. Did he or did he not see you between your arrival and your arresting these men ?

A. Yes, I think I saw him either on the 14th evening or 15th morning.

Q. And did he give you any list of names of persons to be arrested ?

A. No, he did not give me any names. He made a statement of what he knew.

Q. Did he make a statement that he saw with his own eyes any people exciting the crowd ?

A. I do not remember at all what he said.

Q. Was any list of persons placed before you by the police on the morning of the 15th ?

A. I think so, I think a long list was produced.

Q. How many names were there in that list ?

A. I do not remember; we made a selection, a reduced number.

Q. And the police suggested that all those persons were in the mob ?

A. Some down for one thing and some for another—I do not remember.

Q. Would that list be in existence or is it destroyed ?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Was it a casual sort of list or was it a document which was produced before you as a superior officer ?

A. I do not remember. I asked Mr. Heron to make up a list and I do not know what happened to it afterwards.

Q. Did any of these police authorities, who produced that list before you, go before the conspiracy trial and identify any of these pleaders ?

A. I do not know what witnesses were produced before the tribunal.

Q. Did they inform you that that list was prepared by them from their own personal knowledge ?

A. Some got the information from one place and some from another. I do not know how they got their information.

Q. Do I understand that between 3-30 P. M. on the 14th and the morning of the 15th any statements were recorded by the police ?

A. No, I should think probably not.

Q. About this information given by the Indian Christians, is it not a fact that, even before you left Gujranwala, you and Mr. Heron persuaded these missionaries to leave the station ?

A. No, I think that is not correct. I remember asking Mr. Wace to go round and ask the missionaries whether they thought it would be advisable to send their womenfolk away after the Amritsar affairs. I did not go round to the missionaries myself.

Q. Am I right in supposing that before the 14th the talk that did take place between you and Mr. Heron and Mr. Wace about removing the missionaries was due to what had taken place at Amritsar.?

A. Yes, I think that is fairly reasonable, up to the 12th.

Q. Am I right in saying that some missionaries were reluctant to leave because they were anxious about their flock ? They did not want to leave the Indian Christians alone ?

A. I believe that is what they said to Mr. Heron in the first instance.

Q. Did they tell you or Mr. Heron that "you all do not care for us, we will be all right"?

A. Oh no, I think a missionary is coming to give evidence on this point.

Q. You do not know exactly what was the answer given to this question ?

A. The fact remains that they all left in the middle of the night.

Q. Was that information referred to by you about Indian Christians, written information or oral ?

A. It was an explanation for their departure.

Q. The statement of the approver did not come into existence up to the 26th of April ?

A. Possibly.

Q. The statement of the Indian Christians referred to by you comes to this, that when you wanted an explanation as to why the missionaries left something was told you ?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not remember what that something was ?

A. I have already stated it.

Q. What was the information ?

A. I said the missionaries had gone because the Indian Christians warned them to go.

Q. The information was that they left the place because the Indian Christians wanted them to go and the next thing was that you and Ashraf Ali had some conversation, either on the evening of the 14th or morning of the 15th, the purport of which you do not remember ?

A. No.

Q. Did you go to Sheikhupura on the 19th ?

A. Yes.

Q. You also went to Wazirabad on the 16th ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you also went to Akalgarh ?

A. I did not go then till much later.

Q. When you went to Wazirabad on the 16th and Sheikhupura on the 19th you arrested certain persons there ?

A. Yes.

Q. In none of these cases were warrants issued for the arrests ?

A. No ; I sent them direct to Lahore.

Q. And probably they were all arrested under the Defence of India Act and not for any particular offence ?

A. Yes ; that is right.

Q. It appears to me from your statement and also from seeing the list of the persons against whom suits were filed that you were against Arya Samajists and the pleader class ?

A. I was not against them.

Q. Did you consider the Arya Samajists and the pleaders a bad lot ?

A. No, it so happened that they were concerned. Our information was that those particular people that I arrested were concerned. I did not make arrests because they were pleaders or Arya Samajists.

Q. Is it not a fact that the arrests that you made at Wazirabad and Sheikhupura were made on the ground that those men had taken part in the *hartal* and at that time there was no other definite information before you ?

A. The arrests at Sheikhupura were all made at the request of an Indian magistrate.

Q. On the ground that they had taken part in the *hartal* ?

A. Oh no ; there were other grounds also.

Q. And at Wazirabad ?

A. At Wazirabad I examined large number of people before I made arrests.

Q. You examined a large number of persons ?

A. At least I enquired from them.

Q. And their statements were that they had actually taken part in the commission of the offences ?

A. Some were accused of one thing and some of another.

Q. The only information that was in your possession at Wazirabad was that these persons joined in the *hartal* or that they had attended meetings ?

A. There were various reasons. I cannot give them now.

Q. Can you give me any other facts against them ? I take it that on the 16th, when you arrested a large number of persons at Wazirabad, the only information upon which you arrested them was that they either joined in the *hartal* or attended meetings.

A. As I have said before there were several reasons.

Q. What were those reasons ?

A. I cannot remember details of each of them. I found sufficient ground for making arrests and I made them.

Q. Therefore there is no information now available which would show on what information you arrested them. It was only on certain things said to you by those people. Do you remember the names of those persons ?

A. Some were officials, some non-officials, some were Hindus and some Muhammadans.

Q. You don't remember their names ?

A. No.

Q. Do you think any of those persons with whom you had a talk were produced as witnesses when the case was tried ?

A. I expect some of them were. I am not sure. I do not remember who were produced as witnesses—that was done by the police.

Q. Did you consider the Arya Samajists taken by themselves seditionists ?

A. People have different opinions.

Q. What is your opinion ?

A. Well, the majority of the persons who were prominent belonged to the Arya Samaj class.

Q. Apart from the result of the trials, what is your opinion ? Did you consider them as a class by themselves to be seditionists ?

A. Well, I do not wish to answer this question.

Q. I will now take one or two passages from your statement. In paragraph 1 you say " as it is known, a very intensive campaign took place in a district not previously accustomed to recruiting from November 1917 to the end of the war ;" is that true ?

A. Yes.

Q. You admit that at least in one of the places in the neighbourhood of Chuharkana the people showed great reluctance to recruit ?

A. The reluctance was due to the fact that a number of them belonged to regiments which had suffered very severely.

Q. As far as Chuharkana was concerned there was great reluctance ?

A. Yes.

Q. Talking of the meeting which was held on the 6th, you say no attempt was made to explain the Bill ? A particularly objectionable speech was delivered by one Mangal Sen. I hope the proceedings of these meetings were placed before you by the police ?

A. I was informed of them.

Q. We have got a copy of the proceedings before us. This man is not coming as a witness so I will read out one or two passages. These are the proceedings that must have been submitted to you as a District Magistrate as to what happened in that meeting. " Lala Mela Ram after reading the above resolution explained in brief the procedure of the Rowlatt Act, saying that the Viceroy will first announce the application of the Act to the Punjab. The C. I. D. will bring a complaint against an accused to the Chief Justice stating the blame upon him and the evidence that will support the blame. The officer's deposition will thus be recorded and notice issued to the accused. A jury of 3 judges will then hear the case, the accused will be asked as to whether he will give his statement on oath or without oath. The accused will then be given 14 days to produce his defence after which the case will be decided. The accused will have no chance of appeal. He termed the Act with the words herein there is no *dalil* (grounds), no vakil and no appeal. He further said that the time, state of the country and the maintenance of peace in the country did not necessitate the passing of the Bill." This is the speech that was made at the meeting. You do not think that was explaining very fairly the procedure adopted ?

A. I have not that paper before me.

Q. I am reading out of a document which has been supplied to us ; you can take it as true. I want to know whether this fact was before you or not ?

A. I suppose it must have been.

Q. What was the worst thing that was delivered at that meeting ?

A. I am afraid I do not remember.

Q. Do you know that the following is the well-known couplet of Sheikh Sadi ? " The King-Emperor is like the branches of a tree and the subjects are like the roots, and if the roots are rotten the tree is bound to fall down " ?

A. Yes.

Q. I will now read out to you another speech which you say was the most objectionable ? It is this : " We have been helping the Government throughout and expected that our status will now be raised, and we shall be given a place and the result has come to light that this Black Bill is passed. We are not disloyal, Vedas, Shastras and Kuran Sharif all teach us to be Loyal." Is that the speech which you describe as the most objectionable in your statement ?

A. Yes.

Q. The most objectionable speech was made by one Mangal Sen which I have read out ?

A. Yes.

Q. Now with regard to the calf affair. Was any investigation made as to who did this ?

A. Yes ; but it was never found out.

Q. Now as far as this calf affair is concerned has it not come to your notice as a district officer that this is not a very solitary instance, and that incidents like this have happened ere now in many places in India, and

these incidents usually lead to rioting between Hindus and Muhammadans ?

A. Yes, I have heard about this, and the trouble it caused.

Q. I do not think that you believe that this calf was killed by the Hindus and Muhammadans there ?

A. I have no information on this point.

Q. Who do you think would do it ? Either some Hindu has done it or some Muhammadan has done it, or it was done by someone who was against Hindu and Muhammadan unity ?

A. As I have said before I have no information.

Q. Don't you think that an act like this would bring about a breach in the Hindu and Muhammadan unity ?

A. It does not quite follow.

Q. If it was done by a Muhammadan what would be his object ?

A. I cannot give an opinion on this subject.

Q. Do you think that a Hindu would do it ?

A. I think it would be very difficult for him to do it with his own hand.

Q. Therefore I suggest to you that the object of this calf affair was to bring about disunion between Muhammadans and Hindus ?

A. I do not agree.

Q. What was the object in your opinion ?

A. I can give no opinion.

Q. You have read the statement of the approver ?

A. Yes.

Q. By the evidence of the approver and by the speeches that were made it was at once said that this calf incident had been the work of the police, and that an attempt was made to bring about a rupture between the Hindus and Muhammadans ?

A. It is quite likely that the calf was killed for that purpose.

Q. So far as that meeting, held on the morning of the 14th, is concerned according to the evidence of the approver, the impression created was that the object of this was to bring about disunion between Muhammadans and Hindus, and therefore speeches were made preaching Hindu and Muhammadan unity ?

A. I do not follow that.

Q. I will read it out to you. This is the version given by the approver, he says : " When I went there, Lala Amar Nath was speaking, addressing the meeting ; he was reading from a paper Mr. Ghandi's message, and was exhorting the public not to commit any acts of vandalism ; that Mr. Ghandi's mission was *Satyagraha*, that they should sit at home and remain inactive. Lala Amar Nath was followed by Mati Ullah who started with the word '*ham*,' as far as I could hear spoke on the unity of Hindus and Muhammadans. He was followed by M. Lal Khan. I couldn't hear much of his speech, as I was at a distance and people were coming in and out, but he also spoke on the unity of Hindus and Muhammadans. The next speaker was M. Din Mohammad who before going in, spoke to me to try to turn the people to the meeting, and not let them go out of the town as there had been trouble near the station. I was collecting people for the meeting, and therefore could not hear what he said in his speech." Was it not mentioned by them that this is the work of the police, we should not mind it ?

A. That might have been arranged.

Q. Your second suggestion is that this might have been arranged ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the bare chance that the matter will be attributed to the police and that there will be no disunion ?

A. The suggestion is that it was intended to excite the crowd against the police.

Q. Anyhow from what I have read out to you so far as that meeting was concerned it did not take it in that light ?

A. The meeting seems to have taken it very calmly.

Q. Because of the speeches that were made ?

A. They would not have taken it so calmly in the ordinary way.

Q. Now please refer to paragraph 4 of your statement where it says " it was afterwards found that they were led away to listen to further inflammatory speeches." Have you any record of those speeches ?

A. No.

Q. May I know on whose evidence you came to the conclusion that the speeches that were made were inflammatory ?

A. I cannot give that.

Q. Can you give me any other names of witnesses that were produced before the tribunals or anything in the statement of the approver where it is said an inflammatory speech was made ?

A. I cannot remember the grounds on which these people were convicted by the tribunals.

Q. Therefore you base your opinion upon the statement of the approver and on those persons who were produced before the tribunals ?

A. No. On general information that I received.

Q. And the witnesses who informed you that inflammatory speeches were made were not produced before the Commission ?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. Has it come to your knowledge that before all these public buildings were burnt and after the mob was fired upon by Mr. Heron after the assault, it was brought to the notice of the authorities that the liquor shops should be closed because the mob was getting out of hand ?

A. I think Din Muhammad spoke to that effect to Mr. Heron.

Q. About Wazirabad, you mention in your statement that some secret meetings were held. Is there any record of these meetings or is it only your hearsay knowledge ?

A. I have not got the information here on which I wrote that sentence.

Q. Was it based on some oral information that was given to you or is there any record of that meeting or any such thing ? Will that be forthcoming ?

A. I do not know whether it was put in evidence at all before the tribunal.

Q. That is not the point. The point is whether your statement of fact that certain secret meetings were held at Wazirabad is based on any report ?

A. My information is only general knowledge.

Q. With regard to Hafizabad you say " a secret meeting of the leading local agitators was held at the house of Ram Sahai, soda-water manufacturer, to discuss the measures of passive resistance." Is that also based on general information ? You cannot give any record of evidence ?

A. I cannot say whether it was put in evidence.

Q. It may not have been put in evidence, but it can be produced now. When you say that a secret meeting of the local agitators was held at the house of Ram Sahai, soda-water manufacturer, to discuss measures of passive resistance, is that information based on any verbal or written report ?

A. I cannot say where that information came from.

Q. You do not remember. You cannot say whether it was based on any police report or any police diary or anything of that sort ?

A. If it is a secret meeting, probably the police were not there ; they may have got it from somebody else.

Q. You do not remember what is the source of your information ?

A. No.

Q. Therefore practically you have no record, not even shorthand notes or anything of that sort as to what happened there ?

A. I have no record of that kind.

Q. You informed this committee on the last occasion that certain *anti*-Government papers were being read by citizens of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know who the subscribers were and how many papers were there ?

A. No. I cannot tell you.

Q. You do not know who were the subscribers ?

A. I did not make any lists of subscribers.

Q. You do not know as to how many such papers came to Gujranwala ?

A. I had certainly information about that.

Q. You say one paper was not allowed to come inside, and you recommended that one should not be allowed. What are the names of these papers which you call objectionable papers, except the one that was proscribed on your recommendation ?

A. I cannot remember the names at present.

Q. You can't remember the names of even one or two ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. What was the name of the paper that was proscribed ?

A. I think that was *Naqqash*, and its successor *Rahbar*. I am not sure. There were two. *Naqqash* was proscribed first and then it appeared in the form of *Rahbar*.

Q. That would be an Urdu paper ?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood that you meant to say that they were English papers ?

A. I do not think they were English papers. I said papers.

Q. Therefore you cannot give me any other names, except *Naqqash* and its successor *Rahbar ?*

A. No.

Q. They were one and the same thing ?

A. Yes.

Q. Further on you say that some of these people were inflamed by the speeches delivered by the mob orators. I think you refer to what was happening before the house of Amar Nath. You are referring to that same meeting ?

A. At Niyain, the second meeting.

Q. What I read to you was about the second meeting at Niyain.

A. Yes.

Q. The description of the meeting by the approver is this. The overflow of the meeting which went from the front of Amar Nath's held a meeting in the open air. You refer to this Niyain meeting ?

A. It is referred to by the approver.

Q. And you have no record of this Niyain meeting ? No police record ?

A. I am not sure.

Q. I will ask one or two questions about recruiting. Are you aware that for the previous 3½ years during the war the number of recruits from Gujranwala was about 4,000, and that during the course of the last six months or 4 months you raised 5,000 ?

A. Yes.

Q. The previous record of 3½ years was 4,000 and during the last 4 months of this recruiting you raised 5,000 ?

A. Not the last four months.

Q. During the period, and about 4 or 5 months before the armistice ?

A. That is not right.

Q. What is the period during which you recruited 5,000 ?

A. December 1917, January, February and March 1918.

Q. During the last four months, December to April ?

A. To the end of March.

Q. And *quota* system was enforced in Gujranwala ?

A. It tended to achieve it.

Q. During the period 1917-18, were any prosecutions under the Defence of India Act instituted by you with reference to recruitment ?

A. Yes ; there were one or two people who definitely took action to discourage recruiting.

Q. And you prosecuted them under the Defence of India Act ?

A. Yes ; I think so.

Q. Is it not a fact that a large number of *zaildars, lambardars,* etc., were fined, dismissed and suspended for failure to supply the requisite quota ?

A. A good number was fined and punished in that way for failing to act up to their duties.

Q. So far as licensing of arms was concerned, were any orders issued that only those applicants who furnished two recruits in the case of licenses for sport and one recruit in the case of licenses for protection would be given licenses and no others ?

A. Some such order of that kind was passed.

Q. Were you informed that the price of recruits in your district went up from Rs. 800 to Rs. 1,000 ?

A. No.

Q. What was the price of recruits under your jurisdiction ?

A. The inducements for which recruits went were different.

Q. I am referring to the practice of purchasing. There may be other methods of inducement, but I now refer to the practice of purchasing. What was the price of recruits, if supposing I, living in Gujranwala, wanted to purchase a recruit ?

A. I cannot tell ; I remember one *lambardar* was murdered because he did not pay Rs. 200 that he promised. I remember that, but I cannot tell the exact sum.

Q. Was any *zaildar* in Shahpur, Imam Din, murdered within your jurisdiction on account of his methods of recruiting ?

A. He was murdered, but I do not think it was because of his methods of recruiting. He was murdered by a fanatic who gave out that nobody should assist Government in recruiting ; it was not because he had done anything special.

Q. You know that you arrested one Bugga at Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you know that articles and letters have appeared in the papers against you in reference to that matter ?

A. I never had them sent to me.

Q. He was arrested by you on the 16th ?

A. No ; he absconded.

Q. Is it true that you, accompanied by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and some men, went to the town and there arrested a number of respectable men on the 16th ?

A. We arrested in the same way as we did in Gujranwala.

Q. Then you went to the shop of this man to arrest him ?

A. Yes.

Q. The city sub-inspector of police, one Bahadur Shah, was with you ?

A. He must have been there also ; I do not know his name.

Q. You were informed by his son that Jamiat Singh was not in the house ?

A. That is what he said.

Q. This man's name is Purushotham Singh ?

A. That may be ; I do not know.

Q. Then you were informed that he had gone to Jammu State ?

A. No ; I was not informed ; he was in the town at the time.

Q. So far as his son was concerned, did he not tell you that he went to Jammu State ?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Then you did not believe that he was not there and the house was searched ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you went again on the 21st April to Wazirabad ?

A. Possibly ; I do not know.

Q. And then you went there and ordered that the whole property of Bugga be confiscated ?

A. Yes.

Q. And after pronouncing this order, you deputed two men to turn out the men of the house in the Jallianwala Lane and to take possession of the inmates' property ?

A. Yes ; arrangements were made.

Q. You know that in that house there were 4 females and 6 infants ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Did you not know that the wife of this man and the mother of these men were there ?

A. I presume they would be able to make arrangements for them ; they have lots of friends.

Q. And all these females and children were turned out from the house and the house was taken possession of under your orders ?

A. Yes ; that is right.

Q. And further even these women were not allowed to wear shoes ?

A. I know nothing about it.

Q. Except the dress that was on their shoulders, these 4 females and children were not allowed to take anything from inside the house ?

A. I was not there personally.

Q. Was that your order ?

A. No.

Q. Were they allowed to take anything ? Did you give any order of that kind ?

A. I did not give any orders to take any such action.

Q. You ordered these two men to go and take possession of the property ?

A. That is right.

Q. Did you give any instructions to the two men whom you deputed that the people should be allowed to take some property with them from the house ?

A. I did not give any special order.

Q. Your order was to take possession of the property of Jamiat Singh ?

A. Yes.

Q. You know that one of the buffaloes was also locked up with the property and died in the house ?

A. I do not know that.

Q. Apart from what you did, Colonel, during these riots it is quite possible that he was a guilty person and that he was properly punished ; I am not questioning that ; being the head of the district, before what happened on the 6th or 14th, you knew that he was a respectable and prominent citizen of Wazirabad ?

A. He was.

Q. He was paying Rs. 2,000 in the shape of income-tax ?

A. He paid a good deal of income-tax.

Q. He was the President of the local *Singh Sabha ?*

A. I do not know that.

Q. He subscribed Rs. 7,000 to the war loan, the largest amount that was received by you from Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then he also subscribed to the Red Cross Society started by you ?

A. The subscriptions to the Red Cross Society were before my time.

Q. He was also helping you in recruiting, and on your recommendation he was given a *Sanad ?*

A. I do not think he did any recruiting.

Q. Was it not that on your recommendation a silver mounted cane was given to him ?

A. Yes ; that is right.

Q. When you started a District War League, he was a member of the District War League ?

A. He was.

Q. Then hearing of this confiscation order, after a few days, Jamiat Singh surrendered himself to you ?

A. That was the object of the order.

Q. Then he was handcuffed and sent to jail ?

A. Yes.

Q. Although this Jamiat Singh surrendered himself to you on the 26th April, his property was not released up to the 4th May 1919 ?

A. That I cannot tell you.

Q. Was not a petition put before you by his son praying that the property which had been confiscated should be released, and nothing was done for some time ?

A. I do not think so. Directly I got the man I ordered the release of his property. That is my recollection. There might have been a delay of a day or two.

Q. The property was not released until his son put in an application ?

A. No.

Q. Did you release the property on the date the application was put before you ?

A. I do not know. That may be correct.

Q. He says " till the time I put my application before the District Magistrate, my property was not released."

A. It may have been due to oversight.

Q. Quite possible. You do not say from your memory that it is false ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Then from the 26th April up to the 1st June, this man remained in jail, and he was neither brought to trial nor sent anywhere else ?

A. It is probably true.

Q. What is your explanation ?

A. The question was whether he should be sent before the tribunal on the bigger charge or be dealt with by the local summary court. He was sent to Lahore, as the Legal Remembrancer sent the case back.

Q. On the 1st of June with 8 others he was sent to Lahore to be tried under section 121 of the Indian Penal Code ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Legal Remembrancer say that he could not go on, and did he send back the case ?

A. He said that it was not sufficiently serious to be tried by one of the big tribunals. We disagreed very strongly with that opinion.

Q. Then on the 4th June, he was brought back to Gujranwala ?

A. That is right.

Q. He was again sent to jail ?

A. I suppose so.

Q. And when going and coming he was always handcuffed ?

A. I know nothing about it ; I suppose he was.

Q. And this man again came before you on the 5th June ?

A. I cannot tell dates.

Q. The point is this. Was it not on the 5th June for the first time that Jamiat Singh was informed about giving the list of witnesses, and that he was going to be tried before you ?

A. It would have been about that date after he got back to Lahore.

Q. Even then he was not informed as to what was the charge against him ? Is it true that even up to the 5th June he was not informed as to what was the charge against him, and that for the first time on the 5th June he was asked under your orders to give a list of defence witnesses ?

A. He must have been told with what he was charged.

Q. He must have been ? Was there any such record ?

A. Surely as you find in the other Martial Law trials, he must have been informed .

Q. I want to know whether you ever informed Jamiat Singh as to what was the charge against him or not ?

A. Presumably he must have been informed

Q. On what date ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Probably on the 5th June ; that was the day on which he was brought before you.

A. Because he had been to Lahore ?

Q. Then on the day he was brought for the charge to be framed, Mr. Anant Ram, B.A., LL.B., pleader, who wanted to appear with him, was not allowed. He wanted to see the file and the file was not given to him, although an application was put before you ?

A. No ; there were various pleaders in these cases ; I do not remember Anant Ram.

Q. So far as Jamiat Singh is concerned, was any application put before you with a request that he may be allowed to see the file of Jamiat Singh and was that application refused ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. His son makes that allegation. May I understand that you say it is a false allegation ?

A. Presumably pleaders did appear in these cases. I do not remember every particular case.

Q. This is the allegation: "Our counsel, Mr. Anant Ram, pleader of Sheikhupura, was not allowed to appear along with him, nor he was given the file to see, although he had put in application for the purpose."

A. I should think it is wrong, but I cannot remember.

Q. 19th June was fixed for the hearing of this case?

A. Yes.

Q. And the case was tried at Wazirabad?

A. Yes.

Q. Were all the witnesses named by him summoned? Was it not a general practice that whenever a list of witnesses was placed before you, you ordered all the local witnesses to be summoned, but if any witnesses were living outside, their names were cut out?

A. No.

Q. Therefore were all these witnesses summoned by you?

A. That I cannot say. These cases were conducted before the military tribunals and summary courts, and the defence were responsible for the production of their witnesses.

Q. Was there an allegation that not a single witness from outside the station was summoned?

A. I do not know. In many cases people put up appeal proceedings and such witnesses were in many cases cut down.

Q. On the 9th, this case was finished in one hour?

A. I do not know.

Q. What time did you take?

A. I think Mr. Wace tried it.

Q. And then he (accused) was given 18 months' rigorous imprisonment and fined Rs. 1,000?

A. That may be so.

Q. And this sum was realised from the son?

A. I do not know; I am sure I did not try it.

Q. Then you remember that you have realised about Rs. 1,300 from this man as his share of the amount of damage done to railway property?

A. I do not know that. Rs. 16,000 have to be collected.

Q. Rs. 30 for the maintenance of the military force quartered in Wazirabad?

A. I do not know anything about it.

Q. Now, about this Curfew order and *salaaming* order, was it brought to your notice that within your district any persons were shot. Is there any truth in the allegation that 2 or 3 persons were shot, I do not say deliberately? Were the facts brought to your notice of any persons being shot accidentally on account of the breach of Curfew order?

A. No persons were shot. There was a report that one man was found dead in the street in Gujranwala at night. He was examined and he was found out to have no marks of injury on him; probably he had gone out of his house and fallen in a fit; that is the only foundation to that rumour at all.

Q. Any case in any of the surrounding villages?

A. No.

Q. I will take up the Ramnagar case where the effigy of the King-Emperor was burnt. Is it not a fact that in the first report that was submitted by the police there was no allegation of the burning of the effigy of the King Emperor and the only report was that there was a *hartal*?

A. Yes; that was the report.

Q. There was no allegation of the burning of the effigy?

A. The head constable did not report that.

Q. Subsequently, do you remember that any representation was made to you that the effigy was burnt and about 5 maunds of firewood were used in the burning?

A. No; I have not heard of it.

Q. You tried this case?

A. Yes.

Q. May I know what time you put in to try this case?

A. I began in the morning and went on all day, and I think, to part of the next day. At any rate I pronounced the judgment the next day.

Q. It was finished in one day?

A. I think I worked from 6 A.M. to 6 P.M. I cannot remember.

Q. So it was finished in about one day?

A. Yes.

Q. Then, in this case, you examined about 105 defence witnesses?

A. I cannot say how many there were.

Q. Were not they more than 100?

A. There were a great many.

Q. I want to know whether, to the best of your recollection, there were more than 100?

A. I cannot remember that.

Q. But there were about 10 or 11 prosecution witnesses?

A. May be correct.

Q. And every one of these accused got the full sentences which you can award?

A. They were all convicted.

Q. Was it not the case that a sergeant of police, one of your subordinates, was produced as a defence witness, and he said that he never heard any such thing on the day of *hartal*?

A. He said he was in the town. He has, I understand, been punished.

Q. Subsequently, for giving that evidence?

A. For his trying to hush up the affair.

Q. Certainly you gave some time to these men to take their food during the day while you yourself went and took your lunch?

A. I worked very hard and took very little time off.

Q. If I say that the case was commenced after 9 and finished about 5 with an interval for lunch will it be wrong?

A. I cannot remember details.

Q. And having regard to the number of witnesses, you think you gave them a fair trial?

A. Yes.

Q. Ordinarily, from what time to what time would you take up these cases?

A. Whenever possibly I could find time. I worked in the morning, in the middle of the day, and I worked in the night.

Q. Up to what time did you try your cases on the 9th June?

A. Up to 6-30.

Q. You did not try any case at night?

A. Up to the time when the lamps were beginning to be lit.

Q. Not till 12 o'clock?

A. No.

Q. When were you informed that Martial Law was going to be taken off?

A. On the 8th. Not before that.

Q. Were all the cases that were tried by you on the 9th originally fixed for the 9th?

A. I think they were all fixed for the 9th. I cannot remember.

Q. There were no such cases tried by you on the 9th on the ground that the Martial Law was going to be taken off in the night? You made no hurry because the Martial Law was giong to be taken off between 9 and 10 o'clock that night?

A. I worked hard to finish as many cases as possible.

Q. Where were the people who were arrested at Ramnagar? Were they arrested and warrants issued afterwards or were warrants issued and then they were arrested?

A. I cannot tell you. They might have been issued by the Magistrate.

Q. Had not four persons from Ramnagar sent you a wire saying that the case had been fabricated against them?

A. I do not remember. It is a common practice.

Q. You know, after they had sent this wire, they were arrested, and after 4 or 5 days they were let off.

A. No persons were let off that I know of.

Q. These 4 persons who sent the wire ?

A. I do not know.

Q. You remember one Fazl Din, a *lambardar ?*

A. Yes.

Q. Did you dismiss him because he appeared as a defence witness in the Martial Law case ?

A. He was dismissed.

Q. His fault was that he appeared as a defence witness in this Martial Law case ?

A. Yes. It was on the ground that he had given false evidence.

Q. You thought that he gave false evidence ?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you be surprised to learn from me that the whole of his evidence was that "I know this accused, and he has lived for 2 years in such and such place" and nothing more ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was similarly another man dismissed by you because he stood surety for one of these accused persons ?

A. I do not know. They were all convicted.

Q. Were you ever informed by Captain Denning that the police were fabricating and making persons give false evidence ? Was this matter reported to you by Captain Denning ?

A. Yes.

Q. There was a well-to-do man who was mentioned by some of the witnesses as concerned in a case. The two witnesses were Atar Singh and Soab Sal whose depositions were sent to you with their thumb impressions, namely, that the police were forcing them to implicate one Jagannatham, and this matter was brought to your notice by Captain Denning ?

A. Yes.

Q. And these are the two witnesses on whose evidence a number of the leaders were convicted ?

A. I do not remember. It was a question whether Jagannatham should be included or not. He went and made himself useful to the military.

Q. Have you got that report, sent to you by Captain Denning, with the statement of these 2 witnesses ?

A. I do not know where it is. I am not Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala now.

Q. I should like to get hold of it.

A. Jagannatham did complain to him and Captain Denning sent it to me with his opinion.

Q. Now, questions were asked of you and you answered them about one Gohar Singh ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it a fact that he was taken as a hostage for his 2 sons, that his property was confiscated, and during the time of confiscation his family was turned out ?

A. I think he had no house.

Q. Are you quite sure ?

A. I think so.

Q. His family was turned out of the house in which they were living ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then subsequently you dismissed him from the *lambardarship* and he forfeited his pension ?

A. He had no pension.

Q. Was he dismissed from the *lambardarship* ?

A. If he was a *lambardar*, he probably was.

Q. Simply because his sons were not forthcoming on the day that you wanted them to appear ; knowing that ought not to be the reason ; they were already convicted of dacoity or robbery and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment ?

A. They were alleged to be concerned in the trouble at Sheikhupura.

Q. Now, has it ever come to your knowledge that one Shain Singh was wanted by you, and because he was not forthcoming his wife was arrested by the police ?

A. No ; I have never heard of that.

Q. It was in Sheikhupura.

A. I had been never there except one day.

Q. Then you do not know how many days after he was arrested and how many days he was in the lock-up ?

A. I do not know anything.

Q. I presume you tried this case, if I mistake not ?

A. Tried whom ?

Q. Did you order the arrest ?

A. No ; I cannot remember. Where was it : in Sheikhupura ?

Q. You were in Sheikhupura on the 19th April ?

A. On the 19th April I passed through; I was there for a very short time.

Q. I will just read the order to you and refresh your memory—

> "I reached Sheikhupura where I met . . . . . who were organisers and participators in the *hartal* or connected with the cutting of wires. I arrested 4 pleaders, 1 petition-writer . . ."

This was on the 19th April 1919. Was no such order known to you ? These were the very words of your order ?

A. I think so.

Q. And these are the reasons for your making the arrest at Sheikhupura of these 6 or 7 persons ?

A. Yes.

Q. You remained there for not more than 50 minutes or an hour ?

A. For a very short time.

Q. And you thought that what you have put down here was a sufficient justification for arresting these men ?

A. There was the senior Magistrate ; I could not make the arrests without his motion.

Q. Is it a fact that all these men, all these four pleaders, after a detention of 40 days in solitary cells, were released without being put on trial ?

A. I did hear they got off without trial.

Q. You made 20 arrests at Sheikhupura. What was the total number of arrests that you made in passing through ?

A. I do not remember. Many arrests were made at different places.

Q. Now, up to that date, as District Magistrate, from the 30th March or 6th April, did you hear any complaints against these pleaders made by any of your subordinates ?

A. I knew very little about Sheikhupura. It is a subdivision, another senior magistrate is in charge, and I knew very little about it. Gujranwala is an enormous district, and it has been divided since I left.

Q. Were any persons flogged for not *salaaming ?*

A. I know nothing about that.

Q. As District Magistrate, you must have heard about that ?

A. No ; I heard nothing. There were 16 cases ; I do not know what the details are.

Q. Do you know one Ram Singh, son of Lal Ram, an iron merchant ?

A. I do not.

Q. Do you know of any Government College student being flogged ?

A. No ; I do not.

Q. Do you remember Luxman Das, servant and shopkeeper ? Was he found dead in front of the shop ?

A. He was an old Hindu, I think. I can't remember.

Q. You went during this court martial to Akalgarh ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the day you went, did you order the people of Akalgarh to metal the road, and was not a subscription of Rs. 2,000 made for the metalling of the road ?

A. The road was made up. There was a path from the canal bank ; we had to go about at a quick pace in motor cars, and I ordered that road to be levelled.

Q. But was it paid from Municipal funds or Government funds, or were the people ordered to raise a subscription ?

A. I do not know how it was met.

Q. You have not yourself paid a single pie for it ?

A. I have not.

Q. Is it not a fact that the inhabitants of Akalgarh were made to make that road ?

A. Very often zamindars are turned out to level a piece of road. It has been done before.

Q. You have fined certain villages and towns during the Martial Law period. May I know on what basis ?

A. These fines were imposed under a different law.

Q. Apart from that, any other fines ?

A. I do not know ; what are they ? Can you remind me ?

Q. Take the Rs. 1,000. Was it not levied because a complaint was made by some department ?

A. No, the Telegraph department put in a bill.

Q. So far as these places were concerned, was there any other damage than the breaking of one telegraph wire ?

A. The Telegraph department sent me a bill for so many thousands, and I sent it back telling them to break it up.

Q. May I take it that Rs. 1,000 was the compensation for damage done to that wire ?

A. I cannot say what it was. It was on the application of some department.

Q. Surely you know what damage was caused ?

A. It was on the application of some department.

Q. It is quite possible that it may be something more ?

A. For the Government Telegraph department it was Rs. 1,000 and for the Railway it was Re. 1.

Q. Was there any cost for the Telegraph Department ?

A. They sent me a consolidated bill, and I said that they should break it up.

Q. What was the cost of the telegraph wire there ?

A. This I can't remember at this moment. There was a lot of trouble.

Q. Take for instance, another thing. Unfortunately the Rev. Bailey's bungalow was burnt and compensation had been ordered to be levied for that. Is it not a fact that in that case the people of Viroke and Nizamabad were convicted for burning down Rev. Bailey's bungalow ?

A. Some of them were convicted for looting.

Q. People of Viroke and Nizamabad ? I may be wrong it may be Viroke or Bairoke ?

A. I understand there were people of Viroke and Nizamabad who were convicted.

Q. This compensation was levied from Wazirabad ?

A. I think from Wazirabad and Nizamabad.

Q. Were they combined ? I think it was Wazirabad alone.

A. In any case Wazirabad because they went to the Rev. Bailey's house. These Viroke and other people simply joined in the riots. It was distributed between Wazirabad and Nizamabad.

Q. What is the amount for Wazirabad and for Nizamabad ?

A. It is not there.

Q. Then I want to know why no compensation was given to those persons whose goods were burnt in the goods sheds ?

A. That is a case in which the Railway department said that they were not liable under the Railway Act.

Q. I thought you stated that any damage that was done by the King's enemies could not be recovered ?

A. It is like this. A claim was put in by the Railway department to me for Rs. 8,20,000 which was their estimate of the goods that had been damaged. It was a rough estimate because they could not make up the accounts. The accounts had been burnt and a rough estimate was made. Then the individuals put in claims of only Rs. 60,000 odd. Well as regards all the remainder the Railway said that they were not responsible for it. Therefore there was no claim against the locality.

Q. That is, the Railway department said that there was no claim under section 82 of the Railway Act ?

A. Yes.

Q. Because the damage was done by the King's enemies ?

A. Yes, because it was the act of the King's enemies.

Q. Was not the other damage done by the King's enemies ?

A. The Act is a special thing. There is a protective clause in the Railway Act for that purpose.

Q. That may be a very technical ground, but I do not see a difficulty about it.

A. No.

Q. You know that all the boys of the schools at Wazirabad were ordered to go out and salute the Flag ?

A. It was ordered by the military.

Q Were all the boys in Wazirabad ordered ?

A. I don't know whether all the boys were ordered, but the bigger boys were so ordered.

Q. Was it brought to your notice or not that in the months of May and June when these boys were parading in the sun for the purpose, some of them fainted ?

A. One day when I was there I found that the officer made a delay in coming and the mass was detained and one boy fainted. I told them to dismiss the parade.

Q. Do you know that from the next day the parade was held thrice a day, though before it used to be held twice a day ?

A. I don't.

Q. Don't you think if it were done three times a day instead of twice a day as before, it was very hard for the boys to come out and parade in the months of May and June ?

A. I don't think so. It was hard if they were kept too long in the sun, otherwise not. On my suggestion the midday parade was given up.

Q. And in your opinion a large number of boys and young men were in the front in all these disturbances because it was deliberately so planned ?

A. I think I said that is an opinion.

Q. The leaders had said that they should take part ?

A. Yes, that is my opinion.

Q. You must have been informed that during the second week of April a strike was contemplated, and it was only by chance that the strike did not come off ?

A. That, I understand, is so.

Q. Then during Martial Law after these disturbances you deprived the Gujranwala Municipality of their election ?

A. Yes, I reported to Government.

Q. Do you think it was necessary ?

A. I think so.

Q. Apart from the property that was damaged at Gujranwala there were many other Government buildings in Gujranwala which had not been burnt ?

A. Yes.

Q. Apart from any other reason, don't you think it would not be a good reason if you say that the bridge was not burnt because the calf was hanging there ? Were you aware whether there was an allegation in the approver's statement that two calves were hanging on the two bridges ?

A. That is in the approver's statement.

Q. When the allegation was that somebody came and informed the crowd that a calf was hanging on the bridge, don't you think that the natural explanation was that because the calves were hanging on these bridges they were not burnt ?

A. No. I cannot give that opinion.

Q. Then that question again ; there were other buildings at Gujranwala which were not damaged, or was every one of the Government buildings burnt ?

A. Several Government buildings were not burnt.

Q. There were several Government buildings in which Europeans lived. For instance, Mr. Shaw's family lived in a Government building ?

A. No, they lived in a private house.

Q. There was no building inside the Court compound where any Europeans lived ?

A. No.

Q. Were you informed that bombs were thrown in the compound of the Khalsa High School ?

A. Yes. It was regrettable.

Q. The number of these persons who were mentioned as having been affected by these bombs was 62 ?

A. I don't know,

Q. A large number of students lived there ?

A. Yes.

Q. It was a residential school ?

A. A boarding house.

Q. Similarly a bomb was thrown in the *mandi* inside the city ?

A. I believe it was thrown in the *mandi* opposite the Town Hall.

Q. You received no report about any persons being shot during the Martial Law time at Nizamabad for breach of any Martial Law orders ?

A. No.

Q. Am I right in supposing that on the night of the 15th or on the morning of the 16th or 17th you informed the military authorities that you thought that the 50 soldiers that had been supplied to you were quite sufficient for the purposes of Gujranwala ?

A. For Gujranwala city, you mean ?

Q. Yes.

A. I may have, I don't know.

Q. You also know Muhammad Hussain and Arur Chand of Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. When you reached Wazirabad, you sent for these men at the Dak bungalow and arrested them ?

A. I sent for all the municipal commissioners.

Q. Is Arur Chand a municipal commissioner ? You arrested them there ?

A. Yes.

Q. You arrested them because there was evidence against them ?

A. Very likely.

Q. Had you held any investigation about the casualties ? Was there anything on paper or was any investigation made about the bombs ?

A. A list of the persons killed and wounded was made up. An attempt was also made to calculate whether they were wounded by the police or the bombs.

Q. What about the outlying villages ? How many bombs were thrown on the 15th ?

A. We have got a record of it.

Q. Also of the number of bombs that was thrown on the 15th ?

A. I don't know whether it was on the 14th or the 15th. I have not got a separate record.

Q. Bombs were thrown on two days and the casualties were on the 15th ?

A. I learnt first on the 15th.

Q. Therefore you could not possibly have ordered an inquiry ?

A. All those who were injured were injured at one time.

Q. You further say in your statement that this mob had also an intention to loot wealthy merchants of the town. That is your opinion ?

A. I was informed so.

Q. Your superior officer was Mr. Kitchin ?

A. Yes, he is Commissioner.

Q. Gujranwala was within his jurisdiction ?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore his evidence would cover Gujranwala, Lahore and Amritsar ; all these three places ?

A. Yes, if he gave evidence about Gujranwala.

Q. I thought I could give you that name. His name was Ram Saran Das, Sarbarah Lambardar, who furnished bail and was dismissed. Do you remember him ?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember the case of one Doctor Daulat Singh at Wazirabad ?

A. No.

Q. Is it not a fact that he was arrested because he was the Secretary of the Arya Samaj ?

A. Nobody could have arrested him for that reason. The Secretary of the Arya Samaj might have been concerned.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. How long have you been connected with the Punjab Commission ?

A. Since 1896.

Q. And you have been probably in the course of that long period in many districts in the Punjab ?

A. Yes.

Q. So I may take it that you are fairly acquainted with the conditions in the province ?

A. Especially on the western side.

Q. During all this period what is your experience about the attitude of the people ? Were they loyal to Government or disaffected ?

A. The people on the whole were distinctly loyal.

Q. You mean to say that they remained thoroughly loyal during the Great War ?

A. Speaking as a whole.

Q. They made great efforts for the cause of the Empire ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then to what do you attribute the sudden outburst in these various places ?

A. I can understand it. I cannot give any opinion.

Q. Surely there was no organized movement with the object of overthrowing the Government, in the Punjab or, in your opinion, anywhere else ?

A. I cannot give an opinion.

Q. Still you are an experienced officer who has been so long in the Punjab and you must know it ?

A. In my statement I have put that there was some organized movement somewhere.

Q. Somewhere in the Punjab or outside it ?

A. There were manifestations and it looked as if it were a premeditated thing.

Q. I want to know, in the Punjab or outside it ?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. From these occurrences there you thought that there must be some organized movement ?

A. Yes, from the way it went up along the railway.

Q. May I take it that if there was anything of that sort behind it in the western districts of the Punjab, it would have come to your notice ?

A. No, I don't think it would. We would have been taken by surprise. It came to us as a great shock.

Q. As a District officer would you not know it ?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Is it not a fact that it is the district officer to whom Government looks for such information ?

A. There were many district officers who were taken by surprise.

Q. The explanation is simple. Is it not that you did not know because there was nothing ?

A. It is possible.

Q. Do you think it was likely ?

A. I have committed myself to my opinion.

Q. I know that opinion, but what I want to know is whether in the opinion of an officer of your standing it was likely ?

A. I don't think it was likely.

Q. Then what you mean to say is that it was not likely that there should be such a thing ?

A. No. I say it could be done without our knowledge.

Q. Was it likely that officers of all grades, from top to bottom, should be ignorant of the movement which was of not less a character than to overthrow the Government, a movement of that magnitude, yet everybody, police, C.I.D., and district officers, should be absolutely ignorant of this everywhere ?

A. I really cannot speak on this.

Q. Don't you think it was very unlikely ?

A. The whole thing was so surprising.

Q. You call it a rebellion ?

A. It has been held so judicially.

Q. I am not concerned with those judicial proceedings but here I want to know from you, as an experienced district officer of long standing, whether there was anything like a rebellion meant to overthrow Government or if there was anything behind the movement of no less a character than to overthrow the British Government in India, and you were absolutely ignorant of that movement. May I suppose that officers were so ignorant in their various districts that they did not take a note of what was going on ?

A. I am prepared to admit that.

Q. Then it seems to be true that either the officers were ignorant of what was going on or the thing did not really exist. My own conclusion is that the thing really did not exist. Would you not agree with me ?

A. I am not prepared to give an opinion in that way.

Q. Do you not think that the causes of these disturbances lie in the fact that *hartal* was proclaimed by Mr. Gandhi and that when these *hartals* took place in the Punjab, the disturbances in Amritsar, the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, and the arrest of Amritsar and other people caused disturbances in Gujranwala. Don't you think it was so ?

A. I don't think so. Why did they cause disturbances in Kundian and Malakwal ? When they caused disturbances in these places why did they cause them in places all of which were not railway junctions ?

Q. If the organizers of the movement, as you seem to think, wanted to have a rebellion in the Punjab or in parts of the Punjab, would they not try to get hold of more warlike people, *i.e.*, villagers and cultivators throughout the province, in order to effect their object ?

A. Yes, they could.

Q. Don't you think it likely, supposing you are of opinion that there was an organized movement ?

A. I cannot give any advice on the subject.

Q. I am just putting it to you as a matter of ordinary common sense whether anybody, who started with that object in his view, would not have attempted to have on his side or whether that organization have attempted to have on their side the more warlike population of the Punjab villages to carry out their object. This seems to be a very obvious thing ?

A. I don't think they were available if it was organised.

Q. You think it was not very well organised because the village people were not on their side ?

A. I don't want to say any more about that.

Q. But you have expressed an opinion that it was a rebellion ?

A. Because that is a judicial decision.

Q. My question is whether it was a rebellion or not. I just want to know the grounds on which you formed that opinion ?

A. For that purpose I consider that the judicial decision is sufficient.

Q. Because a certain Court has given a decision. That is your only reason. You have no independent knowledge outside that decision ?

A. Apart from that it is merely a question of opinion.

Q. But have you any opinion outside that decision or is your opinion immediately founded on that decision ?

A. I have got my own opinion.

Q. That is, you are of opinion, independently of that decision, that there was a rebellion ?

A. Yes.

Q. May I know the grounds on which you base that opinion ?

A. I do not think I could express them.

Q. You cannot express them because you have not got any grounds ?

A. Partly I do not wish to do it and partly there is a difficulty about it.

Q. Difficulty in what way ?

A. Difficulty to form reasons.

Q. Of course you had them. You had reasons already in your mind and it is not a question of finding them and of afterwards forming an opinion.

A. The main reason for my opinion is the judicial decision.

Q. Then there is something which you don't wish to express and something which you find it difficult to express ?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, so I take it that, broadly speaking, you have not got anything beyond the judicial decision to go upon ?

A. Not very much.

Q. Well, you say in your statement relating to the immediate causes of the outbreak that " In Delhi, when the mob came into conflict with the police, no action was taken against the organisers. Consequently it was decided to push a *hartal* in as many places in the Punjab as possible."

A. Yes.

Q. What kind of action do you think should have been taken against these leaders of Delhi ?

A. I don't think I am called upon to give my opinion on what occurred in other places. I said certain consequences followed because no action was taken.

Q. What action did you think should be taken ?

A. I am not prepared to tell you what should have been done in another province.

Q. Here you have stated that no action was taken. You must have had some sort of idea in your mind ?

A. Everybody has some sort of idea as to how they would deal with an emergency of this kind.

Q. You think it would have been better if Martial Law had been proclaimed in Delhi and similar procedure adopted ?

A. I do not like to express an opinion of that sort.

Q. But you have expressed an opinion ?

A. I made a statement but it is merely my opinion.

Q. And certain consequences followed, because no action was taken ?

A. It is not for a mere Deputy Commissioner to criticise another government.

Q. But you have criticised another Government ?

A. As I said before, I was not prepared to be cross-examined.

Q. It is not cross-examination, I simply want to understand.

A. This was my opinion given to the Punjab Government, but I am not prepared to say what should have been done in Delhi and what should have been done in Bombay and other places.

Q. May I take it you gave your opinion to the Punjab Government without deliberating on what you were saying ?

A. No, I cannot admit that.

Q. You have some ground for what you have said here ?

A. I took certain action in Gujranwala ; other people took different action in Amritsar, but which is right and which is wrong and what should have been done is another thing.

Q. In your opinion if similar action had been taken elsewhere against organisers as you took against organisers in Gujranwala, that would have been appropriate action to take ?

A. No, I cannot say what I would have done if I had been in Delhi.

Q. Very well, you do not wish to say ?

A. No.

Q. You said in regard to the notices that were printed for the meeting of the 5th, that no Gujranwala press would undertake the work ; why ?

A. They disapproved of it.

Q. They disapproved of the meeting ?

A. They were not going to commit themselves to it.

Q. In this statement you have said that one Chuni Lal, Manchanda, spoke as an eye-witness of the incidents in Delhi and alleged that the official account was incorrect ?

A. Yes.

Q. You mention it as if to say that the official account was alleged to be something bad. Is it not possible for official accounts to be incorrect ?

A. I understand that he gave a garbled version of the same affair.

Q. You say that Chuni Lal, Manchanda, spoke as an eye-witness and alleged that the official account was incorrect. You do not say that the account he gave was incorrect, but you say he alleged that the official account was incorrect ? Is it adduced in such a manner as to suggest it was something very serious for him to have said that ?

A. I suppose there is something in that.

Q. Is it an offence or something very bad to say that a certain official statement is not quite accurate ?

A. I understand it misled the public.

Q. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the official report is not very accurate, if anybody says that would it be far wrong ?

A. It is not taken like that.

Q. It would not be wrong ?

A. It is not taken like that.

Q. Further on you say about the *hartal* of the 6th, that it passed off peacefully as its organisers intended. So I take it that the people in the town were entirely in the hands of these organisers. They simply followed their advice.

A. The organisers did not stimulate trouble for that particular day, and people just had a holiday.

Q. Because it was not their intention that there should be any trouble, they must have told the people that there must be no trouble and the people abstained from causing any trouble ?

A. No; I take it the other way; there would have been trouble if the organisers had stimulated trouble.

Q. That is what I am suggesting. It was in their hands to cause trouble or not ?

A. I do not think it is surprising that townspeople did break down as they did; I do not think they would have done anything without stimulation.

Q. This indicates that it depended upon the intentions of the organisers. There may have been stimulus and they were excited and in that excitement committed disturbances. I can see that. Here you say that it depended upon the intention whether there should be trouble or not ?

A. That is my suggestion.

Q. Then the mob in the town was entirely in the hands of these organisers. They can make them do as they like ?

A. I think without stimulus the mob would not cause or make trouble. That is my point.

Q. Then in Section II you say "This description has been introduced to show how unreal the first demonstration was; and it was this very unreality which had the effect of obscuring the real danger which lay behind it." Which demonstration do you refer to ? Was it the one on the 6th of April ?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you mean by saying that it was unreal ? In what sense ?

A. I mean that the *hartal* passed off so peacefully that officials were lulled into the idea that trouble was not likely to occur.

Q. In what sense was it unreal ? Why should it be unreal ?

A. Perhaps the wording is not very good, but that is my meaning.

Q. Do you mean to imply that if subsequent to the 6th April nothing had happened on the 10th at Amritsar or Lahore or if Mr. Gandhi had not been arrested, there was not going to be some trouble in Gujranwala after the 6th ? Is that what you mean ?

A. On that point, I cannot give an opinion.

Q. Because here you say "and it was this very unreality which had the effect of obscuring the real danger which lay behind it."

A. Yes.

Q. Behind the demonstration ?

A. Yes, behind the demonstration.

Q. What was that danger which you are suggesting here ?

A. I take it this way, that it was so surprising that the organisers of the *hartal* were able to enforce the *hartal*. I was assured on the 5th by a number of the better people in the town that there would be no *hartal* and yet, to my surprise, the next morning it had been sprung upon the people. That is my point.

Q. I do not quite follow you, because you said you are referring to some danger which you say lay behind it ?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the danger ?

A. The danger that lay behind it was that certain people who were able to organise the *hartal* were able to organise worse things later.

Q. Is that all ?

A. That is my suggestion.

Q. Was there possibility of organising something worse later ? Was that the danger ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that everybody has that potentiality of doing wrong, everybody in the world, if he wishes to do so ?

A. But not necessarily of stirring up a mob of people to do wrong.

Q. Here I understand you are referring to some definite danger that you thought was behind, and not to a mere possibility of anybody organising something wrong; that everybody is likely to do ?

A. I think my meaning is fairly clear.

Q. I do not understand you. That is why I put you that question that if on the 10th April no disturbance had taken place either at Amritsar or Lahore or if Mr. Gandhi had not been arrested, do you think that nothing was going to happen in Gujranwala ?

A. I do not know what would have happened on any other day. There were a lot of movements which might have tended to make trouble.

Q. What were they ?

A. You say that Mr. Gandhi's arrest and turning back to Bombay stirred up things. Possibly if he had stayed for some time in the Punjab that might have stirred up trouble. There are many possibilities that might have happened. I am only suggesting it.

Q. That is all ?

A. I think so.

Q. Nothing outside that ? Your reference is merely to a possibility ?

A. I suggested that there were possibilities of danger.

Q. Danger of what sort ? Danger of riot or rebellion ? What is the kind of danger ? That is my point.

A. It is very difficult to give an opinion on what may happen.

Q. What sort of danger were you thinking of ?

A. Certain things did follow and from that we made certain deductions.

Q. Did that not follow on account of what happened in Lahore and Amritsar on the 10th ? When you are referring to the question of *hartal* on the 6th, it is quite possible that it might have happened on the 10th ?

A. Yes.

Q. It could not be said as regards the 6th, that there was some real danger lying behind the unreal demonstration ?

A. From the results there appeared to have been some organization that arranged the first *hartal* and stimulated further trouble.

Q. What was the object of the organization ?

A. That I cannot tell you.

Q. You have said that "the American missionaries received a warning late at night from the Indian Christians that it would be as well for them to leave." That was on the night of the 13th ?

A. Yes, I understand it was at about 11 o'clock in the night.

Q. Did I understand you correctly to say that they had been warned before you left Gujranwala ?

A. They were warned on account of what happened at Amritsar. Simply we thought that the men would be better without womenfolk.

Q. Do you not think that their going away on the night of the 13th was due to that warning ?

A. It was not, because I told you Mr. Heron went and tried to persuade them to go previously before the warning of the Indian Christians and they would not go.

Q. They might have thought better of it afterwards ?

A. I think you will get evidence on that point.

Q. If they received any information through some Indian Christians on the night of the 13th, that something was growing in Gujranwala, would they not inform the authorities before leaving Gujranwala ?

A. That is an unfortunate thing that we cannot quite explain. They went off and sent a verbal message to Mr. Heron and that verbal message never reached.

Q. Was that a verbal message to Mr. Heron ?

A. Yes ; it was a verbal message to Mr. Heron to be told the next morning. Mr. Heron must have been out before the messenger came to him and he never got the message. It was one of his great troubles. He thought that these men, women and young girls were still in the station.

Q. How far is the mission house from Mr. Heron's bungalow in Gujranwala ?

A. It is about a quarter or one-third of a mile. They ought to have told him.

Q. It would have been the easiest thing if they apprehended such a serious thing ?

A. They ought to have done it and put it in writing.

Q. What information had you to enable you to say that most people who were leaders were legal practitioners ?

A. It was merely because the legal practitioners were mostly concerned.

Q. What sort of relations are there between the executive officers and the legal practitioners in the Punjab in your experience ? Are they very cordial or not ?

A. As far as I am concerned, they have always been very cordial.

Q. And they are generally a law-abiding and loyal class of people in your experience ?

A. A great number of them are.

Q. And the same may be said of the members of the bar in Gujranwala ?

A. A large number of the members were not in the least concerned in this affair.

Q. At Wazirabad the mob also set fire to a gang hut ?

A. Yes ; I think in fact they went about burning anything they could come across.

Q. Relating to the events of the 14th April at Hafizabad, you refer to a crowd being addressed by some people. "Speeches were made in the neighbourhood of the goods shed, openly advising rebellion."

A. Yes.

Q. What was said in the speeches ?

A. I do not know what was said at the time. This is an abstract of my information.

Q. That is merely a conclusion drawn by somebody that it was open rebellion ?

A. Yes.

Q. He did not say what was said in the speeches ?

A. I have not got the report. I do not know whether it is available.

Q. Don't you think it is a serious allegation to make against anybody ?

A. I think it has got to be accepted as true.

Q. There must have been an account somewhere ?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you before you the speeches ?

A. No.

Q. You did not have the speeches before you ?

A. I have had reports of the speeches.

Q. Have you any recollection as to what sort of thing was preached ? Could you constitute that as open rebellion ?

A. On the morning of the 14th one or two meetings were held near the railway station and after the leaders had incited the crowd to take immediate steps to overthrow the Government by raising as much opposition to it as possible, some of the leading participants called attention to the fact that the train was coming in.

Q. This is found by the tribunal ?

A. Yes.

Q. You had no information about it ?

A. I must have had similar information too.

Q. Did you have it ?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to know according to your information, what was stated in the speeches ?

A. I have not got the statement.

Q. Nor can you give us anything from your recollection ?

A. No ; I cannot remember.

Q. Then under the heading "Methods adopted by rebels and disturbers of the peace" you say "As directed by Mr. Gandhi, the rebels organized a test *hartal* on the 6th of April." Who are these people whom you call rebels ?

A. People who were convicted as such. Certainly some of them escaped notice.

Q. That is founded upon the conviction of the tribunals ?

A. I think it is.

Q. And not on your information ?

A. I had very much the same information as that which was put before the tribunals.

Q. You also had the same information ?

A. Most of the information that was placed before the tribunal was also the information that I received.

Q. What was that information on which you founded the conviction ?

A. I cannot give every bit of that. I think it is sufficient to say that the tribunal held that they were rebels.

Q. I think it is not sufficient evidence.

A. But for the purpose of my writing this report, it might have been sufficient.

Q. Then may I take it that the tribunal said that ?

A. Yes.

Q. And nothing beyond that ?

A. I do not want to be too precise in that way. I do not say that I had no information that was not other than that which was put before the tribunals.

Q. You have ?

A. I may have. I am not prepared to be as precise in that way.

Q. My difficulty is this : here so many people are called rebels ?

A. Yes. It is sufficient that the tribunal held them to be so.

Q. I simply wanted to know whether you have found this merely upon the fact that the tribunals have called these rebels and convicted them as such or whether you had some information before you concluded that they were rebels ?

A. I do not know ; it is very difficult to answer.

Q. It is a very simple question. Either you have founded your opinion upon that or on something else. You must know on what you founded your opinion.

A. I was there all that time and received all kinds of information and from that I formed my opinion.

Q. You had some information to go upon independent of the conclusion arrived at by the tribunals ?

A. I had information which was also put before the tribunals.

Q. I want to know what that information was ?

A. I cannot remember it all now.

Q. You have no recollection of that at all ?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. I do not want you to remember everything absolutely ; but don't you remember it at all ?

A. I had a very hard time of it. My memory is very vague, distinctly vague. I had a lot of work to do.

Q. Was the passing of the Rowlatt Act causing a disturbance or excitement in Gujranwala District ?

A. I did not notice anything very definite.

Q. You have said that the crowd does not do anything unless they are led. Do you mean by that that the leaders were all there on the scene leading them to all that destruction or were the leaders inciting them to cause destruction ?

A. I meant 'stimulated.' Some stimulated them in one way and some in another way ; some actually went with them and some did not.

Q. I simply want to know which sort of leaders were they who were just leading them to destroy them, or who incited them by speeches to commit action ? Which leaders are you referring to ?

A. May be those leading on the spur of the moment ; it might be both.

Q. You also referred to bitterness of feeling existing I think on the 21st the feeling existed already ?

A. It was natural that there must be some bitterness of feeling or they would not have gone and caused so much damage.

Q. Bitterness of feeling between whom and whom ?

A. Between a certain portion of the public and the Government.

Q. Government or Government officials ?

A. I saw bitterness of feeling in the hearts of certain people ; that is what I am referring to.

Q. Certain members of the public and the Government. Can you assign any reason for it ?

A. I simply say there was bitterness ; else they would not have done so much damage.

Q. Why was there bitterness at all ?

A. I do not know. It came quite as a surprise to me. It was a shock to me.

Q. About the arrest of some people, I think you said that you arrested them under the Defence of India Act. Are you empowered to do that ?

A. Yes ; all District Magistrates were empowered.

Q. Without reference to the Local Government ?

A. Any way, I am empowered, I know.

Q. Does it not require the previous sanction of the Local Government ?

A. I do not know ; I am not sure. In any case, I have made arrests whether I was empowered or not.

Q. That is better.

A. I was made to do certain things to suppress the trouble.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. You were asked certain questions regarding the temper of the mob at Gujranwala on the 14th April as against Europeans. Why did you form the opinion from your enquiries that it was against Europeans ?

A. It was distinctly the desire of the mob to murder Mr. Heron.

Q. I understand that Mr. Heron was knocked down on one occasion ?

A. He was not knocked down. He was just reached by an attacking mob when he drew his pistol and fired ; and the men with him fired too.

Q. Did they display murderous intentions by words or signs ?

A. They had already stoned him and they had in their hands hammers and crowbars.

Q. Did they use any actual threats against him ?

A. Yes. They called out 'Kill him' and words of that kind. I forget the exact words.

Q. Then as regards the missionaries, do you agree that the Indian Christians, on the night of the 13th, not only knew that there would be an outbreak next morning but knew also that they being Indians were not in danger, the threat being against Europeans ?

A. Yes.

Q. That being known to the Indian Christians, can you tell me, was any similar warning given during the night of the 13th to any officer of Government by any of the so-called leaders of Gujranwala ?

A. No.

Q. Then whatever may have been the reason, Government and its officers did not in fact receive from the leaders the assistance which the missionaries got from their Indian comrades.

A. Yes.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. You were questioned about the pleaders and Arya Samajists. Can you tell me of the 16 persons sent up for trial, how many were released ?

A. About eight.

Q. How many Arya Samajists ?

A. I do not remember ; some of them leading Arya Samajists ; half a dozen or so.

Q. You were questioned about Mangal Sen ; it was said that he was a prominent official and a philanthrophist and that they acted very improperly in arresting this man and handcuffing him. Is it not a fact that this man was sent for trial before a Judge of the High Court and was sentenced to transportation for life ?

A. Yes.

Q. You were questioned about Gohur Singh, Lambardar, and it was suggested that he committed no offence whatever, and that you improperly arrested him for helping his sons to escape. Is it not a fact that he was liable to be punished under the sections of the Indian Penal Code for so helping his sons, who were wanted by the police ?

A. Yes.

Q. About certain compensation from villages and individuals, that is a compensation under the bye-laws of the Act and not under Martial Law ?

A. Yes.

Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Did you act as Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, for a few days ?

A. Only for a day and half.

Q. On the 13th you heard that there would be a *hartal* in Gujranwala ?

A. I was informed by the Superintendent of Police on the evening of the 13th that there would be a *hartal* in Gujranwala and it would last as long as the *hartal* at Lahore lasted.

Q. About 7 o'clock on the 14th, did you go towards the city ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you, on your way, hear that certain occurrences were happening at the station ?

A. I heard that the railway train which had reached Gujranwala from the Lahore side was attacked by the people and the people were stopping those who wanted to go to attend the *Baisakhi* Fair.

Q. Then did you go personally to the railway station ?

A. I proceeded at once to the railway station and I found several of the passengers standing there and I also saw the train at the station.

Q. Did you know that the railway bridge had been burnt ?

A. I came to know at the railway station that the Gurukul bridge had been burnt.

Q. I think the Superintendent of Police proceeded in that direction and you went towards the city ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you went towards the city, did you find that the shops were all closed and people were going to and fro ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they shouting ?

A. Yes, Sir. They were shouting and they were crying "we won't accept the Rowlatt Bill" and some were crying "*Hai hai* Rowlatt Bill."

Q. Were they hurrying to the place where they were being addressed by the leaders ?

A. Some were sitting there and others were proceeding to the place which was appointed for the meeting.

Q. And did you yourself return to the railway station ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you hear reports of shots being fired ?

A. When I reached the railway station, I heard shots and also came to know that Mr. Heron was assaulted by a man who flew at his throat and then he gave orders to shoot at the mob.

Q. Then the shots were fired by Mr. Heron and some who were with him, I suppose ?

A. The constables who accompanied him.

Q. Had the firing the effect of quietening the people or what effect had it ?

A. People were all the more excited by this firing.

Q. What casualties were caused by this firing ?

A. Two were wounded by this firing; nobody died.

Q. Were the wounded carried away by the mob ?

A. One of the wounded was carried to the place of the meeting and there they made an exaggerated statement "here is one of the wounded and there are many others who have been wounded."

Q. Was the mob in a very enraged condition ?

A. They were very enraged and they said they would kill Mr. Heron and avenge themselves.

Q. Did you dread their doing destruction to property, as well as killing Mr. Heron ?

A. I was not very apprehensive about property, but I did fear that Mr. Heron would come to grief.

Q. Did you think it necessary to have assistance ?

A. There were only 70 constables in all and they were all scattered. There were 25 at the railway station. At that time we considered help necessary and wired to Lahore for military assistance.

Q. Were you able to send off the telegram from the station ?

A. There was great difficulty, because the telegraph wire was cut at two places, so the Superintendent of Police despatched two men, one to Rahwali and the other to Eminadad, and the telegram was despatched from those two places.

Q. Meantime did the mob repair to the railway station again ?

A. They advanced to the railway station.

Q. Did they collect in front of the gates ?

A. At the back of the station.

Q. Were there many boys among this crowd ?

A. About 40 or 35 per cent. of the crowd was composed of boys.

Q. Was the crowd using fiery language ?

A. They abused in Punjabee and used very fiery language.

Q. Where were the Superintendent of Police and his constables at this time ?

A. They were standing in front of the station on one side of the city.

Q. Did the mob address any language to the Superintendent of Police ?

A. They were addressing all these things to him.

Q. What are "these things" ?

A. Some asked him to put off his hat; some asked him to go away.

Q. Did you go towards the mob and endeavour to get them to go away ?

A. Yes, Sir. I tried and about 300 or 400 men went with me towards the city; we went for a distance of 400 paces and then I came back and then they also returned.

Q. When you returned to the city did you see that the Post Office was ablaze ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were the mob, at the time you left, attempting to burn the railway station ?

A. The crowd was divided into two parts; one was on the side of the city and the other nearing the railway station. It was the party that was near the railway station that tried to burn the station.

Q. You saw the mob in the city ?

A. Outside the city.

Q. Had you to consider the question whether it was essential to fire upon them in order to disperse them or not ?

A. The point was considered at that time, but because the front portion of the crowd was mainly composed of boys, neither my conscience allowed me nor was it the opinion of the Superintendent of Police that we should fire at that time.

Q. Had you ultimately to fire on the mob ?

A. In my presence I never saw any firing but I have already mentioned about the firing at the Kachi bridge by the Superintendent of Police, Mr. Heron, and then I saw another mob while I was proceeding to the *kutcheri* and it was composed of boys mainly. I asked them to go away and said that if they did not disperse we would have to fire. They then moved away, so there was no occasion for firing.

Q. Some time after this did you find other places in the city which they had set fire to ?

A. The places that had been burnt are situated outside the city. At 1 o'clock I came to know that the *kutcheri*, dâk bungalow and the tahsil had been burnt.

Q. Well, don't you think that if the crowd had been fired on sooner they would have dispersed without doing the damage that was done ?

A. But I think that if those boys had been fired upon they would not have dispersed.

Q. I don't quite follow what you mean.

A. I mean that the crowd at the railway station was a mixed crowd and the majority of that crowd consisted of boys. Had those boys been shot at people would have been enraged and excited. Then there had been more trouble.

Q. How do you account for the mob setting fire to all these different places all these times ?

A. The main reasons of this excitement, which I give, are three: firstly, that they had heard some true or untrue facts about the Rowlatt Act, secondly, about the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, and thirdly, they had heard strange rumours from people coming from Amritsar.

Q. Is it true that they had gone out that morning bent upon destroying all these places ?

A. Before the police or the authorities were informed or had gathered at that spot the people had already done two things; first, they had burnt the Gurukul bridge and the other thing they had done was that they had stopped the train. They might have come to these conclusions on the previous night or at the spur of the moment they had thought of it and done it.

Q. Before they started on their acts of incendiarism had there been anything which might have provoked them ?

A. Nothing, Sir.

Q. Well, I think at 3 o'clock in the afternoon Colonel O'Brien arrived and took over from you ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was not there some firing in the city and was it not by the police ?

A. No.

Q. Did not Mr. Nevill order firing in the city ?

A. I had not heard of it.

Q. Did you not know that Mr. Nevill had authorised the police constables to fire ?

A. I am not aware of that.

By the Honble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Khan Bahadur Sahib, can you tell me as nearly as you know at what time in the morning the Gurukul bridge was set on fire ?

A. As far as I can surmise it must be about 6 or 6-30 in the morning.

Q. So that the mob, who did that act, must have got up early in the morning and must have determined to make an attack on the Government property ?

A. I cannot say anything about their intentions.

Q. Would you just tell me if in order to get that bridge burnt they had to fetch oil and put it on the sleepers ?

A. I was informed that they got this oil from the railway station and some straw from there.

Q. You know the places where the bombs were dropped ?

A. I don't know them as I had left.

Q. Have you not since seen the places upon which the bombs were dropped ?

A. I never went to Gujranwala again. I went to Muridke.

Q. Were you anywhere near the spots where the bombs were thrown ?

A. When the bombs dropped I was in the District Court.

Q. Where is that ?

A. It is about half a mile distant from the places where the bombs were thrown.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Khan Bahadur, for how many years have you been in Gujranwala ?

A. From the 28th July 1917.

Q. Before that were you in some other district or were you formerly also in that district ?

A. I was at Jhelum.

Q. During your tenure of office in Gujranwala did you find the people law-abiding or disloyal ?

A. I was not stationed at Gujranwala. I was at Sharakpur, 20 or 25 miles away ; but as far as I know about the people of Gujranwala nothing against them was reported to me.

Q. Do you hold the same opinion about the Sharakpur people ?

A. Exactly the same.

Q. Was there any anti-Government feeling before April 1919 brought to your notice ?

A. I never heard of anything against Government but there were many meetings in favour of Government.

Q. Was that when the war broke out ?

A. Since my arrival in 1917 up to the end of 1918 these meetings were held.

Q. Meetings by the public to assist Government in recruiting and in War Loan ?

A. Some were concerned with recruitment and some with the War Loan and some with the War League.

Q. And so far as recruiting was concerned Gujranwala made a very good response ?

A. You mean Gujranwala proper or villages in the Gujranwala District ?

Q. I mean the villages in that district.

A. Agriculturist classes in the Gujranwala District provided a great number of recruits. Gujranwala itself did not do anything except giving 8 or 9 recruits.

Q. And were the events in April 1919 surprising to you ?

A. We had no idea of these things till the 13th. When these things happened on the 14th, we were absolutely surprised.

Q. The meeting that was held on the 14th, was mainly to oppose the Rowlatt Bill ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When was the news of the arrest of Mr. Gandhi received in Gujranwala ?

A. As far as I remember the news reached Gujranwala on the 12th or 13th.

Q. In your view was that news the cause of what took place on the 14th ?

A. This news had also its share in those incidents.

Q. On the 14th the crowd before they came to the railway station they passed through the city ?

A. I was not in the city and am not aware of that.

Q. They must have passed through the city ?

A. They have to pass through the city.

Q. On their way to the railway station they did not destroy any property ?

A. There is no other Government building or property on the way before the railway station and the Post Office.

Q. But the Courts, Tahsil and other offices were burnt subsequently. Where are they situated ?

A. They have to pass the railway station and the Post Office to reach *kutchery*.

Q. They are outside the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. At the railway station when Girdhari Lal, you say, attacked the Superintendent of Police, firing had to be resorted to ?

A. There is a bridge called *Kachchi* bridge at a distance of about 200 or 250 paces, from the railway station. There this Girdhari Lal caught the Superintendent of Police by the throat ; therefore he had to resort to firing.

Q. What I want to know is was the railway station attacked after this firing and not before that ?

A. It was after this firing incident took place there that the railway station was attacked, and in my opinion these things would not have happened had firing at the railway station not taken place, and had Girdhari Lal not attacked the Superintendent of Police there would have been no firing.

Q. The railway bridge near Gurukul was set on fire before this firing ?

A. That was put on fire before even I or the Superintendent of Police or any constable or any other person reached the bridge.

Q. Then you cannot say that the destruction of property followed the firing by the Superintendent of Police ?

A. The bridge near Gurukul was put on fire and the train was stopped from moving in order to make the railway people or passengers in the train share in the *hartal* because they were themselves in *hartal*. When the bridge was put on fire then they let the train move onward.

Q. In your view, was the bridge attacked for the purposes of making the railway people join in the *hartal ?*

A. That is what I think.

Q. Had the mob come to the railway station for the purposes of making the railway people join in the *hartal ?*

A. The people who stopped the train were those who were proceeding towards Amritsar for the *Baisakhi* Fair. Several of them had got into the train while others came out and said that as at Amritsar certain incidents had taken place it did not behove them to proceed to Amritsar for this fair.

Q. Had they then come to prevent the people who were going by that train to Amritsar ?

A. These people went to the station to catch the train for Wazirabad. When they reached the station they heard from the passengers of that train that at Amritsar certain incidents had taken place. They said all this to the people who were proceeding to Wazirabad.

Q. People had gone to the station to go to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes, the first part of the mob.

Q. You mean to say that people who came to the station, had come for the purposes of proceeding to Wazirabad by train ?

A. Yes.

Q. They heard from the passengers that events had happened at Amritsar ?

A. Yes.

Q. Upon that they made up their minds not to go to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. Having made up their minds not to go, they stopped the train ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then further people came from the town ?

A. Yes.

Q. And then after that when they were joined by the further crowd, did they then proceed to attack the station ?

A. They were seen standing outside the railway fencing and they were only crying and shouting " *Hai hai* Rowlatt Bill." The Superintendent of Police preceded me and then those people tried to assault in our absence but they were dispersed. We did not resort to firing because there were many boys there.

Q. Till the Superintendent of Police arrived they had not begun to attack the station ?

A. The bridge had already been burnt. When we went there they only used bad language and were only crying.

Q. Then you asked them to disperse ?

A. I proceeded to the city.

Q. What did you do when this crowd, which was at the railway station, was threatening or crying ?

A. I took about 300 or 400 people along with me from the railway station. After making the things known to them I told them to give in writing whatever complaint they had to make.

Q. You talked with them and you took away with you 400 or 500 people ?

A. After having talked with them I told them that if they had any complaint they should make it in writing.

I also told them that if Girdhari Lal had not made an attack upon the Superintendent of Police then this firing would not have taken place.

Q. They were excited over this firing ? You tried to persuade them to go away because it was owing to Girdhari Lal ?

A. Yes, the same thing was told.

Q. And when you tried to pursuade them like this, were they pacified ?

A. We were talking with them and giving this as an argument that now everything had happened. If they were opposed to the Rowlatt Bill they must give it in writing and then we would submit it to Government. I was there for one day. There were some other people with me, therefore I persuaded about 400 or 500 people who came along with me.

Q. Did you take them with you. Where did you take them ?

A. I took them towards the city to a place called Chah Beriwala.

Q. What did you do there ?

A. We asked them to go towards their homes and not to return because it was not the proper thing.

Q. Did they accept your suggestion ?

A. Some of them really departed homewards and some other mischief-mongers came back.

Q. Where did you go ?

A. I returned to the railway station.

Q. When you returned to the railway station, was it on fire ?

A. When I returned to the railway station, I noticed that the Post Office was on fire.

Q. Was there a crowd in front of the Post Office ?

A. There was a crowd there.

Q. What measures did you take ?

A. We tried to persuade them again. Some began to move to and fro, and some of them who were bent upon mischief came to the railway station and some of them entered the railway station.

Q. What measures did you then take to deal with the mob that had already set fire to the Post Office ? You saw the post office burning and they were threatening at the railway station. What measures did you then take at the time ?

A. It was 1 o'clock when I noticed the Post Office on fire. But at the same time exactly a constable came running and informed us that the mob had set fire to the district court and tahsil. So instantly we went to the district court.

Q. When you went there what measures did you take ?

A. When we went there, we saw that the district courts, the honorary magistrates' courts and the dâk bungalow were all on fire. There was no man to be found there.

Q. The mob was not there at all ? Where did they disappear ?

A. Some went to that side and some to this side.

Q. When you came to the Post Office which was burning, there was a large crowd in front of it ?

A. Yes.

Q. There was also a large crowd in front of the railway station ?

A. Yes.

Q. What measures did you take then under those circumstances to disperse them ?

A. When I went there and saw the mob, exactly at that time a constable came and informed me, and because it was the question of *kutcheri* and other places more important, I went straight to that place and left *Lala Amar Nath here.*

Q. When you went to the kutcheri you found nobody *there ?*

A. None.

Q. Then did you come back to the railway station *and the Post Office or what did you do ?*

A. I was there at the kutcheri up to 3 o'clock.

Q. You remained at the *kutcheri* from 1 o'clock to 3 o'clock when there was no crowd there at all, and there were no people doing anything there at all ?

A. We went to the *kutcheri* on foot and we reached the *kutcheri* at about 1-30 and there we were trying to save the Government papers, etc.

Q. What measures did you take to see that no further mischief was done by the mob either at the railway station or anywhere else ?

A. I was met by a mob of about 200 persons in the Company gardens which are situated on the way to the district court. When I met that mob there, I asked them to disperse, because I had not known to what degree the district courts had already been burnt and if they did not disperse, I told them they would be fired upon. I ordered my constables to be prepared, and when they raised the guns they dispersed.

Q. At what time did the aeroplanes arrive ?

A. At about 3 o'clock.

Q. And dropped bombs ?

A. I only heard the noise; I do not know whether they were dropping bombs.

Q. Where were you at the time ?

A. I was at the district court.

Q. Was the mob still there at the railway station or near the *kutcheri* when aeroplanes came there ?

A. I was not present near the Post Office or the station, but I heard that crowds were moving there in groups.

Q. There was no crowd near the *kutcheri ?*

A. No.

Q. After the aeroplanes had dropped bombs, did you see what happened, in what places bombs were dropped, and did you make any enquiries ?

A. I had already given over charge.

Q. You had nothing further to do then ?

A. Nothing.

Q. You were not concerned with the arrest made on the 15th at Gujranwala ?

A. I do not know anything further about those arrests, because I went to Muridke.

Q. Nor had you anything to do with the arrests at Sheikhupura ?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. On the 14th, you left your house at 7 A.M. ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you went to the city. How far were you away ?

A. I was going to the city, but hearing the incidents at the railway station, I took my route to the railway station outside the city.

Q. How far were you from the railway station when this news reached you ?

A. I was living outside the city at a distance of about half a mile or a bit less.

Q. The news that was received by you was that the train had already arrived at the station ?

A. That the train had been stopped at the railway station.

Q. That train was one hour late that day ? According to your statement it had arrived at the station at about 8 A.M. ?

A. It was due at Gujranwala at 7 in the evening and it arrived at 8 A.M. I might say that it was late by one full night and one hour.

Q. At the time of its arrival it was 8 A.M.

A. It was 7 o'clock.

Q. In paragraph 7 of your statement you say "I was told that Sialkot train which was late that day reached here at 8 A.M." Is that incorrect ?

A. There is no mention of 8 o'clock in the vernacular statement which I submitted.

Q. However, you reached the station at about 8 A.M.

A. Yes.

Q. Then at the railway station you found that passengers were on the platform ?

A. Some of the passengers were in the train; others were on the platform and some had already departed.

Q. And the train was standing ?

A. It was standing without an engine.

Q. And the Superintendent of Police with some constables was standing there ?

A. Yes.

Q. How many constables were with the Superintendent of Police there ?

A. About 25 or 26.

Q. At this stage you received information that the Gurukul bridge had been burnt ?

A. I was informed by the Superintendent of Police about the Gurukul bridge.

Q. As soon as you received this news, the Superintendent went towards the bridge ?

A. I cannot say if he went as soon as he received the news, but he went in my presence.

Q. Why do you say that the Gurukul bridge was burnt at 6-30 ?

A. I only heard so.

Q. Were you informed that a calf was hanging on any of these bridges ?

A. I was not informed during that period, but after 14 days when I arrived back on private business, I was informed about this.

Q. Supposing a calf was hanging from that bridge, would that be any cause of provocation to burn that bridge ?

A. Evidently it is quite sufficient.

Q. Therefore when you said in answer to the President that there was no cause for provocation, you were not aware of this fact; you did not take this fact into consideration ?

A. No.

Q. From the gala dress of the first crowd that was at the station, could you or could you not make out that they were going towards Wazirabad and Gujranwala ?

A. Crowds had already mixed before I reached the railway station.

Q. You were present on the morning of the 15th at Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you gave over charge to Colonel O'Brien at about 4 P.M. on the 14th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you give to Colonel O'Brien any list of respectable persons as having taken part in these disturbances ?

A. I was not familiar with Gujranwala before this, because I had only come there for one day and my knowledge was limited.

Q. Was any list given to Colonel O'Brien in your presence by anybody else ?

A. No.

Q. Neither was a list given by your Extra Assistant Commissioner or by any police officer so far as your knowledge goes ?

A. I have not heard of any list being given, not to my knowledge.

Q. You left in the evening of the 15th ?

A. I was ordered at about 1 by the Deputy Commissioner to proceed to Muridke and I proceeded towards Muridke on the morning of the 16th.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. Khan Bahadur, have you ever had any experience of any disturbances before ?

A. Disturbances with me or with Government ?

Q. In your official capacity had you experience of any riot before ?

A. I have only heard that such a thing happened in Multan in 1884. I have not had to deal with any riot.

Q. So far as acting as Deputy Commissioner is concerned, you have told us that you acted as Deputy Commissioner for one day and a half. Have you ever had an opportunity of officiating as a Deputy Commissioner before ?

A. I even repent this one opportunity.

Q. Are you now in service or have you retired ?

A. I should have retired on the 28th September, but I was given an extension.

Q. You have suggested that so far as the stopping of the train or the burning of the bridge was concerned, the reason why people did so might be that they wanted to include the railway in the strike. May I know what was the reason of the cutting of the wires which you have mentioned ?

A. Evidently it was done in order to stop communications.

At Lahore, Thursday, the 11th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.
Sir C. H. SETALVAD, KT.
Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary.*

Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY, M.C., D.F.C., Flight Commander, No. 31 Squadron, Royal Air Force.

By the President—

Q. Are you the Flight Commander of No. 31 Squadron ?

A. I was the Commander of No. 31 Squadron.

Q. On the afternoon of the 14th April 1919 did you receive verbal instructions from Lieutenant-Colonel Minchin ?

A. Yes.

Q. As to proceeding to Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. I see that Lieutenant-Colonel Minchin's orders were :—

(1) That the native city was not to be bombed.
(2) That crowds were to be bombed if in the open.
(3) That gatherings near the local villages were to be dispersed if coming or going from Gujranwala.

Were those the instructions you received ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you carry out those instructions ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you arrived at Gujranwala at 3-10 P.M. ?

A. Yes, about 3 o'clock.

Q. When you arrived at Gujranwala what did you observe ?

A. When I arrived there I found that the railway station was burning and that all the goods in the goods shed were also burning. The station was crowded with people. There was a train on the Up line which appeared to be on fire as well.

Q. Did you notice the English church and four houses in civil lines burning ?

A. The English church and four houses in civil lines on the east of the railway were also burning.

Q. At what height were you flying from the ground ?

A. About 500 feet.

Q. Did you reconnoitre the situation before you took any action ?

A. I flew over Gujranwala and the neighbouring villages. I satisfied myself before I did anything.

Q. Was the course of your flight over the neighbouring villages also ?

A. I flew over the town and the neighbouring villages within an area of three miles from Gujranwala.

Q. Then after that did you take action ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you consider that the situation was such as justified you to take action in accordance with the instructions you had received ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think the action you took appears from the report annexed to your statement ?

A. Yes.

Q. From that report I see that the first bombs you dropped were the three bombs that you dropped on a party of natives 150 strong outside a village about two miles north-west of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were these natives apparently making for Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. In your report I see that you say one bomb failed to explode and that the others fell near the party which scattered ?

A. Yes.

Q. You also add that three casualties were seen. Were you able to satisfy yourself as to the number of casualties ?

A. I saw three men dropping.

Q. When you say so do you mean they were wounded or killed ?

A. I could not say that.

Q. You fired a number of machine-gun rounds into these villages ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether they caused any casualties ?

A. I could not say.

Q. Then do you know which of the villages it was where you dropped three bombs ?

A. I don't know the name of the village. I had not the map which could show the village.

Q. You give it as about two miles north-west of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then a few minutes later did you drop two bombs on a group of 50 natives outside a village a mile south of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did both these bombs explode or only one ?

A. Only one exploded.

Q. That bomb burst within ten yards of a party ?

A. Yes, it burst quite near the party. It did not cause any casualties as far as I could see.

Q. Did you fire some rounds from the machine gun near the village ?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you say if that firing caused any casualties ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Then a few minutes later did you fire again upon a number of natives in a field near a large red building on the north-west outskirts of the town ?

A. Yes.

Q. About 200 natives were there ?

A. Yes, I should think about 200.

Q. Was it on a building or upon a group of natives that you fired ?

A. I fired at a group of natives.

Q. What was the group of natives doing ?

A. There was a crowd of natives.

Q. They appeared to be making for the city of Gujranwala ?

A. I could not form an opinion.

Q. I think one of the bombs dropped burst in the court-yard of the building ?

A. Yes.

Q. And several people appeared to be wounded ?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you fire some rounds from your machine gun into a party who took shelter in the house ?

A. Yes.

Q. A few minutes later did you drop two bombs in the centre of the town ?

A. They were dropped on a large crowd of natives near the centre of the town. I cannot tell you the exact place.

Q. But they dropped in the town ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they explode ?

A. No, Sir. Neither of the bombs burst. I did not see them hit the ground.

Q. So that they could not have caused any casualties ?

A. That is so, Sir.

Q. Did you fire your machine gun ?

A. I fired 150 rounds machine gun into parties of natives in the streets. These parties were coming from the railway station and going to the civil lines.

Q. About ten minutes to four did you leave for Lahore ?

A. Yes.

Q. Altogether you were something under an hour, between half an hour and three-quarters of an hour in Gujranwala ?

A. I was there for about three-quarters of an hour.

Q. At the time when you left for Lahore could you see whether the police held the station and no crowd was moving in the city ?

A. Yes, I reported that.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Just one thing I would like you to explain to me about the first incident at the village two miles north-west of Gujranwala. Was it the first time you dropped any bombs ?

A. Yes.

Q. You dropped them on a party of natives 150 strong?

A. Yes.

Q. It is very difficult to estimate from the aeroplane the number of people in the crowd on the ground ?

A. You can estimate from the size of the crowd that were there.

Q. Then one bomb failed to explode and the others that fell near the party scattered it. After that I understand you fired 50 rounds of machine gun into the village. Was that simply fired at the houses or at the people in the streets or how did you fire into the village ?

A. I fired at the crowd that ran into the village.

Q. You followed up the crowd with the machine gun into the village ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then in Gujranwala itself you fired a hundred rounds at the people in the streets and those people were coming in crowd from the railway station. Did you see them going towards the Civil Lines ?

A. They were running away. As soon as I started firing, they began to disperse near the railway station and people also started to come away from the Civil Lines.

Q. When you fired near the railway station the people stopped from collecting round the station ?

A. Yes, Sir.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. I understand that you first went to Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. But you did not do anything at first there ?

A. No.

Q. Then you went to neighbouring villages ?

A. That is right.

Q. You went to one village two miles from Gujranwala and you first dropped two bombs ?

A. No, three.

Q. Those bombs you dropped on particular crowds that you saw there ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was this crowd. in the streets or outside the village ?

A. They were on the road outside the village.

Q. That crowd consisted of how many people ?

A. I reported 150. I cannot tell you exactly.

Q. How many miles was this village from Gujranwala ?

A. About two miles north-west of Gujranwala.

Q. What was this crowd doing ?

A. They were going towards Gujranwala.

Q. How were you able to ascertain that they were going to Gujranwala ?

A. They were walking in the direction of Gujranwala.

Q. And you dropped three bombs on them ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you say in your report that you fired your machine gun into the village itself ?

A. Yes.

Q. That firing was not at any particular crowd ?

A. It was at the people on whom I dropped the bombs and who ran back to the village.

Q. When you first dropped bombs on a party of 150 strong they began to run away into the village ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you fired the machine gun into the village also ?

A. Yes.

Q. That was over the houses in the village ?

A. I suppose some of the shots hit the houses.

Q. You say that the people when they were fired at began to run away, *i.e.*, after you dropped the bombs they began to disperse and got into some of the houses; That is what they attempted to do ?

A. Yes.

Q. You fired machine gun rounds into the village and threw bombs on those people who took shelter in the houses but there were other innocent people in those houses ?

A. I could not discriminate between innocent and other people who were, I think, doing damage or were going to do damage.

Q. You say that on 150 people, that were seen there, you dropped three bombs with the result that they dispersed and ran into the village. Was not your object accomplished ? Was there any further need of firing the machine gun ?

A. The machine gun was not fired indiscriminately. It was fired on the people who were running away.

Q. You fired the machine gun into the village ?

A. I said the crowd scattered and ran back into the village and I have said that 50 rounds machine gun were fired into the village. I fired at the men.

Q. When the crowd split up they must be running away and entering the houses ; then you fired machine gun rounds into the village which hit the houses in which there were perfectly innocent people ?

A. I was at a height of 200 feet. I could see perfectly well and I did not see anybody in the village at all who was innocent.

Q. What I mean is this. When you threw the bombs on them they began to run away. Was not your object really accomplished ?

A. No.

Q. What was the further need of machine-gunning them and killing them. Your object was to disperse the crowds that had assembled and that were attempting to proceed to Gujranwala. The throwing of bombs must have resulted in some casualties. Was there any further need of machine gun fire ?

A. Yes, to do more damage.

Q. But then the object seemed to be to hit or kill more people in that crowd, although they had begun to disperse and were running away after the bombs had been thrown on them ?

A. I was trying to do this in their own interests. If I killed a few people, they would not gather and come to Gujranwala to do damage.

Q. Do I take it then, although by the first throwing of the bombs they began to disperse and run away, you still machine-gunned them in order to prevent the possibility of their re-assembling, the idea being to produce a sort of moral effect upon them ?

A. Yes. Quite right.

Q. Then you went to another village after that ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you fired your machine gun into that village ?

A. Yes.

Q. Not on any particular crowd ?

A. Oh yes; a party of 50 natives outside the village. About 50 people were seen returning to this village, having come from Gujranwala.

Q. How did you know they had come from Gujranwala ?

A. They were coming on the road from Gujranwala. There is no other place between this village and Gujranwala

Q They might be coming from places beyond that ?

A. But they had come through Gujranwala.

Q. And you saw these 50 people going into this village or on the way to this village ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you machine-gunned them ?

A. That is right.

Q. How many people were killed ?

A. I did not see any casualties.

Q. It did not take effect ?

A. No.

Q. Then you came back to Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the first occasion you went over Gujranwala you took no action at all, but when you went to these villages you did take action ?

A. I was doing reconnaissance first.

Q. For that purpose you had to go over other villages also ?

A. Yes.

Q. You generally tried to sum up the situation as to what was happening all round the district ?

A. Yes. I went round to find out the situation in Gujranwala and the neighbouring villages.

Q. Then when you came back to Gujranwala you found about 200 Indians in a field ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was this field ?

A. It was on the north-west outskirts of the town.

Q. Outside the town ?

A. Yes.

Q. What were these 200 people doing ?

A. I could not tell you what they were doing.

Q. Then why did you conclude that they were the rioters ?

A. It was a large crowd of people who should not have been there.

Q. You could not make out what they were doing ?

A. I have told you I could not make out.

Q. You dropped two bombs on them ?

A. I think I dropped only one.

Q. Then after that you fired 150 rounds with a machine gun into the town itself ?

A. Yes.

Q. That was aimed at no particular crowd ?

A. It was aimed at the whole place. There was a crowd.

Q. That is true. But as you threw one bomb at 200 people that had assembled, was it not sufficient ? Then I understand you fired about 150 rounds machine gun, were they not aimed at them ? Was a particular congregation fired at or the whole town itself ?

A. At people who were collecting round the station and who were running away from the station when I started firing. When they heard my firing the crowds were trying to get away.

Q. You fired the rounds into the town and not at any particular congregation ?

A. Not at the town, but at the people who were in the streets and were trying to run away.

Q. There might be peaceful people in the streets ?

A. No, they should not be in the streets.

Q. They should not be in the streets ?

A. No.

Q. You thought that anybody, who was in the streets of Gujranwala, had no business to be there at all the whole day ?

A. I saw these people. I could discriminate between people who had come out on business and the people who were trying to get shelter in the city.

Q. I don't follow you. Did you aim at any particular crowd ?

A. I can give you answer by reading out my report.

Q. The words there are "I fired about 150 rounds machine gun, into the native city, causing casualties." You say "coming back to Gujranwala I noticed a party of about 200 natives in a field near a large red building on the north-west outskirts of town"....."I fired about 150 rounds machine gun into the native city."

After dropping one bomb you dropped two more bombs on the crowd of people who were moving into the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. You dealt with that crowd which was running away from the station into the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. In addition to that you say in your report "I fired about 150 rounds machine gun into the native city" ?

A. You must understand that it was no good my firing at the houses in the native city.

Q. At first you fired one bomb and then you dropped two bombs which you fired at particular crowds, then in the third place you fired about 150 rounds into the native city ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 15th did you go with the aeroplane ?

A. No, I did not go to Gujranwala.

By Major General Sir George Barrow—

Q. How many bombs did you drop ?

A. Only eight.

Q. How many failed to explode ?

A. I did not see. Four, I think, exploded. Two I saw did not explode. The others I did not see.

Q. They were dud bombs ?

A Yes.

Q. What was their weight ?

A. 20 lbs.

Q. In your statement I see that you did exactly what you were ordered to do. You were ordered that the native city was not to be bombed; that crowds were to be bombed if in the open; and that gatherings near the local villages were to be dispersed if coming or going from Gujranwala. Those were the orders for you ?

A. Yes.

Q. Well then you could not possibly tell whether the people at whom you threw the bombs were the innocent people or the guilty people ? It was quite impossible for you to say ?

A. Yes.

Q. You could only carry out your instructions ?

A. Yes.

Q. One bomb failed, but your object was to disperse the people. I take it that you had to carry out your orders. You had no occasion to fail in your duty ?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. It took you only 20 minutes to do all this firing. You mention from 15-20 to 15-40 in the report ?

A. I don't know the exact time.

Q. It is given in your first report of the 14th April that on your return you submitted the bombing report ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think your memory was then more fresh than it is now ?

A. Yes.

Q. It took you only 20 minutes to do all this ?

A. Yes.

Q. No orders were given to you that the native city or the local villages should be bombed.

A. No.

Q. With regard to the fact as to whether the crowd was going from Gujranwala or coming to Gujranwala,

you decided all that within those 20 minutes. You had to do it, I mean to say, practically in those 20 minutes ?

A. Yes.

Q. You mean the fact as to whether they were going from Gujranwala or coming to Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. And whatever may be the reason, the fact that the crowd was going from Gujranwala or coming to Gujranwala does not find place in your bombing report. Was it not necessary for you to mention this fact in your report ?

A. Yes.

Q. Am I right in saying that that fact should have found place in your bombing report ?

A. I have not got my bombing report here.

Q. Will you kindly see it in General Beynon's report. There may be good reasons but I want to know why this fact is not mentioned in your bombing report ?

A. It is not mentioned there.

Q. And you were flying at a height of from 100 to 700 feet over Gujranwala and neighbouring villages ?

A. That is right.

Q. Then how many aeroplanes were there besides yours ?

A. There were two others.

Q. And in one of them was Lieutenant Kirby ?

A. Lieutenant Kirby was flying in a machine from Lahore to Risalpur. He flew over Gujranwala on his way to Risalpur.

Q. He also fired at the crowd ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Had you been to Gujranwala before that date ?

A. No, I had never been there.

Q. Have you ever been there since ?

A. I have flown over Gujranwala several times since.

Q. I take it then that your object was to disperse the crowd ?

A. My object was to stop the crowd from doing damage.

Q. That crowd was doing no damage but you thought the crowd in the villages was going to do so ?

A. I stopped them from going to do any damage.

Q. Therefore your object was to stop them from going to Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. When they were dispersed they would go to their own village ?

A. Yes.

Q. And when that object was achieved, *i.e.*, when you dispersed the crowd, instead of going to Gujranwala they went inside the village. What was the need of machine-gunning them ? Practically you fired on all that were inside the village. Was there any need of machine-gunning them ?

A. I have answered that question before.

Q. Then are you sure that there was only one road which led from that village to Gujranwala and that they could not have gone to any other place ?

A. They could not have gone anywhere else across the fields.

Q. Where were these fields ? Was there any well defined road there ?

A. There was a well defined road between these villages and Gujranwala. From memory I can tell you that there were straight roads between these two villages and Gujranwala and the people were on the road between the villages and Gujranwala, outside the village.

Q. And if a bomb explodes within ten yards of a crowd of 200 persons, ordinarily how many casualties would it cause ?

A. It might not cause any at all.

Lieutenant L. DODKINS, Observer, Royal Air Force.

By the President—

Q. Did you receive instructions on the morning of the 15th April last to make an aeroplane reconnaissance in the region of Gujranwala ?

A. My orders were to make a route reconnaissance over the railway between Lahore and Gujranwala and to ascertain if the railway had been destroyed or the route cut in any way and also to make a reconnaissance of Gujranwala and report on the general situation and take offensive action on any large gathering of people.

Q. Who had given you those instructions ?

A. I had received them in the usual way from the Adjutant.

Q. And then I gather from the War Diary* of the 16th (Indian) Division, last entry (P. 4), that you must have received the instructions at about 8-15, if these instructions referred to you ?

A. My reconnaissance started at 7-50.

Q. Then you must have received your instructions earlier ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then I see you arrived in Gujranwala at 8-30 ?

A. Yes.

Q. You state there you found the main line railway culvert about 300 yards south of the main station partly demolished but under repair ?

A. As far as I could ascertain the railway was distinctly broken and the culvert was blown in but I could not say how it was destroyed. Certainly there was a party of about ten or a dozen men there who were to all intents and purposes repairing the culvert.

Q. Is the culvert the same thing as the bridge ?

A. The culvert is the bridge itself and on this side of Gujranwala.

Q. There are bridges on both sides of Gujranwala and then there is the Gurukul bridge ?

A. This was a little culvert over a *nala* about ten feet wide.

Q. You refer to the bridge. It is a culvert over which the railway is carried over the sleepers. I now understand that. It was still burning ?

A. There was no suggestion of setting fire to it, as far as I could see.

Q. You go on to say that no other damage to the railway permanent way was noticed between Lahore and three miles north of Gujranwala.

A. That is right. On the other side of Gujranwala there is a large bridge.

Q. That bridge is the Kachchi bridge ?

A. I took my reconnaissance as far as that bridge.

Q. "Much rolling stock in station but no activity. Two trucks of goods train in station detached, one burning house on main road opposite station almost burnt out, still burning slightly." Was that the Post Office ?

A. Yes.

Q. "No large congregations of people." Did you after 8-30 circle round Gujranwala ?

A. Gujranwala and the country on all sides to a depth of 2 or 3 miles.

Q. "At 8-55 a gathering of about 20 noticed in field about 1 mile west of town, scattered with Lewis Gun." How many rounds did you fire ?

A. One belt containing 148 rounds were fired.

Q. Were any casualties caused ?

A. Whether it caused any casualties or not, I did not definitely aim my gun at the crowd. My instructions were to disperse the crowd.

Q. At 9-5 you report "Truck still burning strongly and deadstock on adjoining platform. Main station building demolished. Church and large house near demolished, but no fire. Station occupied by armed native police and a few British ranks. Working parties busy on permanent way" ?

* Not reproduced.

A. Yes.

Q. There was an entry previous to this. You report at 8-58 "Similar gathering outside house in village ½ mile west of town; on approaching them they entered house. One bomb dropped which hit adjoining house and blew side in." Was that the only bomb you dropped?

A. Yes, that was the only bomb.

Q. In dropping the bomb you carried out the instructions you had received?

A. Yes.

Q. You dropped that bomb on the crowd or at the house?

A. There was a crowd as given in my report of 8-55 hours. To make a rough estimate it was between 30 and 50 men and had made a semi-circle at the door of a house. One man was standing at the door who was obviously addressing the crowd and when the bomb dropped everybody went inside the house.

Q. So far as you were able to ascertain that bomb caused no damage to any individual?

A. That I could not say, Sir.

Q. Then you left Gujranwala about 9-30?

A. At 9-30, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. I take it as regards the second crowd, after they went into the house, to drop the bomb was the only effective way to break up the crowd?

A. My object was to disperse the crowd that was still inside the house.

Q. Then it was no good firing a machine gun?

A. No.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. This gathering that you saw of about 20 people in a field near Gujranwala, did you observe what were they doing?

A. That was a difficult matter to do. It was certainly not a normal agricultural party of people.

Q. How did you conclude that?

A. Personally I have never seen any agricultural party gathered in this way in a few yards. As far as I could ascertain from the aeroplane it was an abnormal crowd.

Q. Was not March and April the crop gathering season in this part of the country?

A. That I could not say.

Q. These people were not on any road?

A. They were in a field.

Q. That field was not abutting on any road at all?

A. My memory is not sufficiently reliable to say, but some of them may have been within 200 or 300 yards of the road.

Q. Were they armed with sticks?

A. No.

Q. Or you could not observe anything?

A. No.

Q. They might have been engaged ordinarily in gathering crops in those fields?

A. They were obviously an abnormal crowd. They had gathered together in a very small space indeed. They were doing no work, standing and talking to one another.

Q. Do you think any people in a field, who were talking to each other, were doing anything unlawful?

A. My orders were to disperse any crowd and that gathering of 20 people was a crowd, and so I dispersed them.

Q. Then you say you saw a similar gathering outside a house in the village?

A. Yes.

Q. They had assembled in front of a house?

A. Yes.

Q. You could not well observe what they were doing?

A. I could well observe.

Q. What were they doing then?

A. They were listening to the man who was speaking at the door of the house. I have absolutely no doubt as to what they were doing. My idea was it was a meeting.

Q. The man who was speaking was standing at the door of the house?

A. In front of the house at the door step.

Q. And the other people were also on the steps?

A. On the road assembled to listen.

Q. They might have gathered there for any other purpose, on a marriage occasion or for a funeral purpose?

A. Do these ceremonies take place at 8-30 in the morning?

Q. Zamindars might have come to the person living in that house for business?

A. As 20 or 30 people had gathered oustide the house in my mind at that moment there was no doubt as to why they were there or as to what they were doing.

Captain W. E. GODFREY, I.A.R.O., Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. I think you were at Gujranwala on the 11th, 12th and 13th of April?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. What was your position?

A. At that time I was demobilised from the Army and was hoping to move to Gojra in the following week to take up my work as a Missionary of the Church Missionary Society there.

Q. On the evening of Friday, the 11th April, did anything occur to you at the railway station?

A. Not on the evening of Friday.

Q. On Friday you went to the railway station?

A. I went to the railway station to make arrangements for sending off my furniture to Gojra.

Q. What happened there?

A. When I reached the station platform, I noticed a small group of young men standing talking, and this of course was nothing unusual. But as I went, on my turning the corner straight towards the station master's office, they all turned and looked at me and one of them said something and made an action of throat cutting or of the slipping on of a noose at which the others all laughed. It was a deliberate action.

Q. By his action was it obvious to you that he either meant to cut your throat or nose?

A. One or the other was certainly meant.

Q. Was the action deliberate?

A. A very deliberate action.

Q. Did you say anything to them?

A. No, my Lord. I took a step or two towards him as if to ask him what he meant, but I immediately changed my mind and continued my way straight to the station master's office.

Q. Had you to go to the station again on Saturday about your furniture?

A. Yes, I had again to go to the railway station to complete arrangements about my furniture on Saturday, the 12th.

Q. In what condition did you find the railway staff?

A. I found them very rude. First of all they would not answer my question. There was a man speaking at the telephone and they did not greet me in the usual manner on that day; I noticed this particularly as during my six months' recruiting duty when I had much to do with them they were always on good terms with me and I always found them polite and obliging. I had to meet these people almost every day in connection with my sending recruits to the depôt and they were always ready to meet me cheerfully and used to chat with me very nicely, but on that morning I noticed a distinct change in them.

Q. Had you conversation with the goods clerks about sending off the children's donkey to Gojra ?

A. Yes, I went down to the goods office which is further down the line a little way. I was just merely asking a question. I meant to send away the donkey and I asked the price, as if it was heavy I would not make up my mind to find it worth while to send it. When this talk was going on one of them said " Sir, I would not send the donkey by rail if I were you." I asked him why. He replied it would be too hot. I did not pay any great attention to it at the moment and thought it was a joke about the donkey, but afterwards remembered the others laughed at the remark.

Q. Later on the same day what happened ?

A. Having fixed up for bullock carts to convey this furniture to the station, I went again myself to see it loaded. I left the yard and went to the passenger platform, and was talking to some of the railway staff outside the parcel office when I just chatted to one of them who said to me " Sir, do you think you will see your furniture again ? " I replied ," Yes, of course. Why do you ask ? " He said " Oh there is going to be a very big railway strike." I was beginning to wonder at what they said, but did not wish to appear alarmed before them so I said laughingly, " *Achchha, kismat* " at which they all laughed. Then I went home.

Q. Later in the day did you see Dr. Charles of Gujranwala ?

A. Later in the day he came to me and he said that all sorts of things were happening in the city. He came to me and asked me as a missionary officer to ascertain what arrangements would be made for the safety of the Indian Christians in the event of anything happening.

Q. Did he say anything particular as regards the Indian Christians ?

A. No. He took me to Mr. Heron, and Mr. Heron heard what he had to say, asked certain questions as to whether he had any definite information, and said 'I advise you all, if you do hear anything further, to gather in the Treasury.'

Q. On Sunday morning, did Mr. Heron call to see you and advise you as to the safety of your wife and children ?

A. On Sunday, Mr. Heron called very early ; he asked me to come out to the verandah. I went and there we discussed the situation. Eventually he said he did not want to hear what my wife had got to say.

Q. He strongly advised you to make arrangements for going away ?

A. Yes : I said, " these rumours are going about ; but I am going on Tuesday or Wednesday." I was thinking then that these rumours were about the *hartal* which was to be on Tuesday. It is the custom there for American missionaries to have classes out in the open, and we were all there ; while we were talking the Sabbath school broke up. I called Rev. Dr. MacConnelee and another and they all came and sat on my verandah and my wife also came, and we all discussed the situation. While we were discussing, Dr. Charles passed on his bicycle. He was going to the missionaries. We called Dr. Charles again and we continued to discuss the situation. The question arose whether it would be necessary for the ladies to go away. Dr. McConnelee said 'ladies won't take my advice in the matter.' I went with Dr. McConnelee to his house and all the missionaries were then present. The custom was for the missionaries to open their talk with a prayer. We had a prayer first. At that time, the single ladies said : " We cannot desert the Indian Christians." One of them said she would rather die with them rather than have it said that she went away leaving them.

Q. I think later they were assured by the Indian Christians they would be safe if the European Christians left ?

A. I believe that was so. I should like to say here that Colonel O'Brien has rather misunderstood the situation as far as missionaries were concerned ; the missionaries had no definite information at all. Nobody knew at that time whether it was merely a *hartal* or whether there was the possibility of something happening after the *Baisakhi* fair at Eminabad. That was the situation at the time.

Q. Anyhow, after discussing the situation with Mr. Heron, did you resolve to leave ?

A. Not at that time. Mr. Heron came back later on that day, somewhere between 1 and 2 o'clock, and called me again and said : " Mr. Godfrey, I have heard something which compels me to urge you to leave by the Bombay mail to-night " and we scrambled about and got ready. The ayah went away and it struck me extraordinary at the time ; I have come to know of its significance only in the light of the subsequent events. Mr. Heron practically insisted that I should take my family away by the Bombay mail. So we hurried with the packing. Then I sent my servants after tongas. The servants came back saying that the tonga-walas would not come to a *sahib.* They *were getting more money from the bazar people. I am quite prepared to say that I sent a note to Mr. Heron and he sent two* constables with tongas and we went to the station preparatory to departure.

Q. I think when you left the station you intended to return to Gujranwala the next day ?

A. It was like this ; I did not know whether he was beginning to feel somewhat nervous. He said " Mr. Godfrey. Come back to-morrow. One white man with a revolver would be very useful." I promised I would come back.

Q. Next morning, did you endeavour to get there ?

A. I went to Lahore station and heard that the line was cut.

Q. So you could not get back ?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You left Gujranwala by 4-30 P.M. on Sunday, the 13th ?

A. By the Bombay mail ; it was to leave at 6 but it actually left at 7-15.

Q. Do you know whether later that evening the Indian Christians approached the European Christians, and discussed the situation with them ?

A. Not from my personal knowledge ; I know they did.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Captain Godfrey, you said you were also a Missionary before ?

A. I was a Missionary before. I felt it my duty early in the War to offer my services and accept a Commission in the Indian Army and I stayed in the Army until I made an application for demobilisation early this year. I was actually demobilised on February 28th and I stayed in Gujranwala where I left my family. I had not received my orders from the Church Missionsionary Society then. I received definite orders on the 1st April. So I was making arrangements for going to Gojra to take up Missionary work. I have re-started my work.

Q. Are you still in the army ?

A. I am in the army again. I was recalled afterwards.

Q. Before you joined the army you were in Missionary work ?

A. I was doing missionary work.

Q. For how many years ?

A. Three years.

Q. When did you come to Gujranwala ?

A. I came in June 1918.

Q. With regard to your army duties, in June 1918, you were posted there ?

A. I was sent in command of the recruiting depôt.

Q. Since then you remained in Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. From June 1918 ?

A. Yes.

Q. From June 1918 when you came to Gujranwala up to April 1919 what was the state of Gujranwala? Did you observe anything unusual?

A. Nothing unusual until the Rowlatt Act began to be talked about.

Q. After the Rowlatt Act was passed or rather, after the Bill was introduced, there appeared to be unrest in Gujranwala?

A. Personally I was not prepared to say 'unrest.' I tried to see the best side of these people.

Q. As a missionary, you were mixing more freely with the population than other Europeans?

A. People would come to me more often.

Q. They were talking to you more in confidence?

A. Yes.

Q. You talked more familiarly with them than did the officials?

A. Yes, may be.

Q. Did you find the people of Gujranwala on the whole loyal and law-abiding?

A. Yes. They were quiet at any rate.

Q. Before April 1919, did you observe any anti-British feeling?

A. No.

Q. Or anti-Government feeling in the sense that they wanted to turn out the British Government from India?

A. No.

Q. Did the subsequent happenings come upon you as a surprise?

A. Not altogether as a surprise, I told you. I did not object to a certain amount of political agitation myself. I did not see any harm at the time. At the same time we had been discussing the thing with other officials but I never saw eye to eye with them. I suppose they were sometimes keen on proving their point. Mr. Heron told me things which I had to admit with a certain amount of reservation.

Q. How do you account for the sudden change in the attitude of the Gujranwala people generally?

A. I believe it was due to the rumours about the Rowlatt Act. The rumours of course were followed by happenings in other places.

Q. You attribute that to rumours about the Rowlatt Act?

A. Primarily; and then to what happened at Amritsar and other places. That is my personal opinion.

Q. Then you think that threw the people into a state of excitement?

A. I think so. They practically lost their heads. I think some of the people would not have done those things in ordinary times.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. It appears to me that the Deputy Commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien was aware of the fears entertained by you and the Missionaries on the 11th?

A. About the coming *hartal*?

Q. Yes.

A. Colonel O'Brien had not my experience.

Q. That it was possible that something serious might happen?

A. Possibly, no.

Q. There was no definite knowledge in the possession of anybody?

A. I do not think so.

Q. So much so, in order to avoid that possibility, it was considered necessary that some of the Europeans should go armed to attend the meetings of that darbar?

A. We decided to go armed.

Q. Possibly in view of what happened at Amritsar?

A. I do not think that Colonel O'Brien went armed. But I was armed.

Q. It appears from your statement that you thought that the *hartal* would come off on the 15th?

A. Yes; I thought so.

Q. You had constant conversation with Dr. Charles on the 11th and 12th?

A. Yes.

Q. I will just read to you what he says. There was one *hartal* on the 6th and there was going to be a subsequent *hartal*. He says:—"The second *hartal* was intended to be held on the 13th, but the *halwais* petitioned for a day's delay to enable them to sell off the stocks of sweets they had got ready for the *Baisakhi fair* day. In the evening of the 13th, sweets were selling at 2½ to 3 seers per rupee instead of the usual one seer per rupee." According to my information, the second *hartal* was going to be held on the 13th, but as the sweet sellers said that they had a lot of *mithai* which they would not be able to sell, it was postponed?

A. I was not told these things; I clearly remember many other things I heard.

Q. Here is one point. It was said that the *hartal* was already arranged for the 15th and, on the 14th, it was deliberately held either to surprise the authorities or for some other purpose. Therefore I placed before you the statement by Dr. Charles.

A. Don't make me responsible for it.

Q. I thought you had a conversation with him?

A. I cannot say; I do not remember that.

Q. I take it that when you heard that the *hartal* was being held on the 15th, you depended on the information given by Mr. Heron?

A. No; it was commonly said that it was going to be on the 15th; probably my servant told me.

Q. Is it a fact that sweet-meats were being sold off on the 13th?

A. I do not know. I did not buy any.

Q. If that be a fact, then certainly the *hartal* should have been held on the 14th?

A. I do not know.

Q. The Deputy Commissioner was himself cognisant of this fact and was aware of this danger, because, as a matter of fact, he had sent you to Rev. McConnelee to be prepared for any emergency, should anything happen on the day of *hartal*?

A. I never said so; he never saw me at all.

Q. Did you see Rev. McConnelee on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner?

A. No. I might have probably said "Dr. McConnelee might have spoken to Mr. Heron and the Assistant Commissioner" I might have used the words.

Q. I read from Rev. Dr. McConnelee's statement, He says....."when Captain Godfrey came to my bungalow, having been sent by the Deputy Commissioner to tell us to be ready with food and clothing to go to the Treasury on short notice in case of a riot"

A. I did not say that Colonel O'Brien gave me any instructions. No. There must be a mistake.

Q. The arrangements which he was trying to make, to have food and clothing ready so that there might not be any inconvenience at the time of the *hartal*....?

A. No, not on account of the *hartal* at all.

Q. Here is my point: in case the *hartal* was held?

A. In either case, we had to fly to the Treasury.

Q. That is quite a different thing altogether. It appears to me that at least it was understood that the *hartal* might be on Tuesday or Wednesday, 14th or the 15th?

A. I do not remember about the 14th. I remember about the 15th. Somebody did suggest that they might do anything after the *Baisakhi* fair.

Q. Then it was intended to have the provisions ready in the Treasury 2 or 3 days before, and Mr. Heron said that it might arouse suspicions?

A. I believe so. I personally thought of it. I said it would be quite a good idea. I advised the ladies to get the provisions collected together.

Q. Now, with regard to the railway staff, you know that a strike was contemplated and did come into effect in certain stations and it subsided because the military were there. At least, on one occasion, one of the staff had clearly informed you of the strike as when he asked you "Are you sure you would get your furniture again?" That clearly shows that had there been any conspiracy he would not have mentioned the fact at all?

A. I am not sure. I thought he was particularly impolite to me. That might be due to the fact that he was a member of the conspiracy.

Q. What I am saying is: You cannot say he was a member of the conspiracy and he was divulging to you the secrets of that conspiracy. I am saying all along that the strike was going to be held and probably he was giving you that information?

A. Yes; he must have known it.

Q. I want to know, whether by your statement you conceived that the strike was a sort of conspiracy or was openly contemplated. He gave you that information?

A. I rather fancy so.

Q. So far as the information given by the Indian Christians is concerned, I find that the only evidence that is before the committee is this, that the European missionaries were not prepared to leave the Indian Christians; they wanted to share their fate?

A. The ladies were more kind than the men.

Q. It was only one person Lakuram Lab Ram who came to you?

A. He never came to me.

Q. Not to you? You said that native Christians gave certain information?

A. I never said they gave any information; they came and asked the missionaries to go away.

Q. That is my point. They did not say anything else?

A. The missionaries received no definite information whatever.

Q. No information was received by them that any attempt was being made to kill or loot or anything of that sort?

A. No such information.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Just referring to the incident that you have related, you said that when you went there some people were standing there?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people were there?

A. About 6 or 7; no more.

Q. What class of people?

A. Rather respectable people, judging from their appearance.

Q. And they were on the platform?

A. Yes.

Q. In a group or line?

A. In a group, talking together.

Q. You went past them?

A. I went past them eventually.

Q. When did you notice the lads?

A. As I was approaching them.

Q. And in front of you one made that sign?

A. It was deliberately done.

Q. How far were you from the man?

A. 4 or 5 yards.

Q. In front of him?

A. On one side.

Q. You cannot say whether he made signs like this or that, whether he passed his fingers round his whole neck or only a portion of it?

A. No, I cannot say; they all meant the cutting of my throat.

Q. That is your inference?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he refer to any portion of your neck?

A. I cannot say exactly what part of my neck he wanted to cut.

Q. If you had seen properly, would you not have been able to say? Your attention was not arrested?

A. I did not look for it.

Q. Supposing he had scratched his neck?

A. Oh, no. He was moving his fingers round his neck.

Q. How many fingers?

A. I do not know whether he used one or two fingers.

Q. I want you to let me know how far you saw him properly That was my object.

A. I noticed it because his laugh drew my attention.

Q. We will come to the laugh afterwards. You cannot say whether he moved one finger or two? You could not say that?

A. No.

Q. And then afterwards, did they laugh?

A. They laughed again.

Q. What do you mean by 'again'?

A. They laughed; they said something first and then they laughed; and then this particular man made an action like that and I saw it and took a step. I was going to ask him what he meant; they laughed again.

Q. Anything else to make him laugh, except this?

A. Somebody said something.

Q. You thought they were against you?

A. I was singled out for this particular purpose.

Q. How?

A. Because, as I came through the door, first of all, they were in a group; only one or two facing me saw me. One of the persons said something to the group; then they all laughed; and one of the number did that.

Q. You cannot say exactly that they made a gesture of finishing you off?

A. No.

Q. You did not hear anything of what they uttered?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Nor your name mentioned?

A. They did not know me.

Q. They did not know you?

A. I do not know these particular people.

Q. Nor was any reference to a *sahib* made? You heard nothing?

A. Nothing at all.

Q. You say "my change of mind made them laugh again." Did they read your thoughts?

A. I was walking in that direction and saw their action. I just took one or two steps and stopped.

Q. You were making this statement "My change of mind made them laugh again."

A. The laugh coincided with my action.

Q. Exactly. You took it as their intention?

A. Yes.

Q. They might have meant something else? Evidently they were talking of a very serious matter.

A. May be.

Q. Did you make mention of this to anybody, because you thought that some trouble was brewing, something in the air?

A. I was looking for the cause of the trouble.

Q. And so you went armed to the garden party?

A. I probably got information of the Amritsar incident later in the day.

Q. Then this incident would have been recalled to your mind at the station?

A. Yes; the accumulation of these incidents.

Q. Did you mention this to the Deputy Commissioner or any of the officials?

A. I have talked about this to the Deputy Commissioner, Colonel O'Brien. I thought I mentioned this to the Deputy Commissioner. He distinctly says: "I did not say," I must leave it at that.

Q. Here it is in your statement?

A. He distinctly says "You never mentioned it." I am prepared to leave it to him.

Q. Did you mention it to Mr. Heron?

A. Yes. That day or next day. I should think that day. I am not sure. I was not gathering facts.

Q. I am asking you what you did. Did you mention it to any of the missionaries in Gujranwala?

A. No.

Q. You didn't. It seems you had some sort of conference with the missionaries in Gujranwala about these rumours. Did they tell you of any incidents that happened to any of them from which they thought trouble was coming on?

A. I cannot remember them saying anything.

Q. Their duties took them every day to the town?

A. Yes; at the workshops and at a place 2 miles out of the town.

Q. The missionary ladies?

A. I should say they go most days.

Q. They did continue to go to the town as usual?

A. I do not know; ladies do not come reporting to me.

Q. Did you enquire whether the ladies were going to the town?

A. I did not.

Q. Was it not best to enquire from them whether they met anything unusual?

A. No, they probably discussed it among themselves. They probably heard things which they never told me.

Q. What I wish to know is this: You were discussing with the missionaries the situation in Gujranwala, about the rumours and certain incidents that occurred. The natural thing would be to enquire whether the missionary ladies had been visiting Gujranwala as usual and whether they had noticed anything unusual. Would it not?

A. Yes, it would be the natural thing.

Q. Did you do it?

A. I do not remember it.

Q. If you did, you would remember it?

A. If I am asked for a definite purpose, I would.

Q. Because you do not remember it, you are ready in your inference? Neither any of these missionaries told you that the missionary ladies had been visiting the town and had noticed anything unusual?

A. The ladies told me nothing.

Q. This Dr. Charles is also a missionary in Gujranwala?

A. Dr. Charles is not a missionary.

Q. Is he a surgeon or what?

A. He is a private practitioner in Gujranwala.

Q. He came to you and told you of these rumours, about the *hartal* and about the things that were being talked about. He never distinctly said what these things were? He generally said that all sorts of things were happening in the town?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you inquire about them?

A. I probably asked him. We thought it might lead to unpleasant results.

Q. Here you say: "Dr. Charles of Gujranwala came to me and said all sorts of things happening." That relates to the events of the 12th; so it was nothing beyond the *hartal* that you are referring to?

A. We were thinking of the *hartal* on Saturday; we knew what it was, and people in the town knew what had happened in Amritsar. We all knew and we all thought of the possibilities.

Q. Here you say: "He came to me and said all sorts of things were happening in the city of Gujranwala." What sort of happenings?

A. I think he referred to meetings and the people saying all sorts of things?

Q. What things.

A. I do not know distinctly.

Q. What sort of things? Were they saying "we are going to have our meal; we are going to drink water" and things of that sort?

A. For instance there was one of the servants; she was going about and singing 'we will all become rajas' she was humming and singing all the while. But I did not hear it; it was hearsay.

Q. Dr. Charles said that?

A. No; my wife heard it.

Q. He simply referred to the meetings in the city and the talk about the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. He told you nothing more?

A. He said "I do not like the attitude of the people."

Q. Do you know of any specific instances of rumours? He gave no specific instances of rumours from which you inferred there was a change of attitude?

A. I cannot remember anything.

Q. He merely made a statement?

A. Yes; that all sorts of things are happening. I could have kept a diary if I had known these things were coming on. I did not know before about it. I am giving you a summary as it came to me.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Captain Godfrey, you referred just now to rumours connected with the Rowlatt Act. Can you kindly give us a little more information about these rumours, as far as you can, in your own experience? Have you heard them yourself?

A. They came to me and asked me "Is it a fact that we cannot go in a party? Is it true that if there is a funeral we cannot mourn together? Is it true that if 5 men were talking together they would be immediately arrested?" and so on.

Q. Did you make the acquaintance in Gujranwala of any other people who have been described as political leaders?

A. Quite a few.

Q. Did you talk with them about the Rowlatt Act?

A. I asked them why they did not try to put these things before the people in a clear light and remove their misapprehensions.

Q. What did they say?

A. Many of them said: "We were trying to do that; these poor ignorant people won't listen to us" On the other hand, it all depends on the state of their mind at the time.

Q. What is your own belief about their attitude? Were they spreading contradictory rumours?

A. I think some did; some have not been credited with them.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Did you contemplate taking that *ayah* with you or leaving her behind?

A. The *ayah* would not come.

Q. You went away and she remained at Gujranwala?

A. Yes; she would not come.

AGHA GHULAM HASSAN, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. On the 14th April, about 6 o'clock in the morning, did the officiating Deputy Commissioner's *chaprasi* come to your house?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did he give you a note asking that you should go to the house of the officiating Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you accordingly proceed to his house?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On your way did you see some one riding a horse?

A. Yes; Mohan Lal.

Q. In what condition was he?

A. He was bare-headed.

Q. Was he talking with the people?

A. Yes.

Q. A number of people were around him?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they doing anything?

A. They were just talking.

Q. Had your presence any effect on them?

A. When I reached them, they became silent and they passed on.

Q. On reaching the house of the officiating Deputy Commissioner, what report did you receive as to what was occurring and what you were to do?

A. He ordered me to go and stay at the city *thana*.

Q. Did he inform you that all the municipal commis-

sioners had been called out by him the previous night and asked to use their influence in stopping the *hartal* ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. As you went towards the *thana*, did you find that all the shops were shut in the bazaar ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you notice any people near the railway station ?

A. Yes, Sir. I was going by the telegraph office and found the people there in the railway station. The mob was coming from the railway station towards the city. There were some boys and they were shouting "*Hindu Musalman ki jai, hai Rowlatt Act.*"

Q. What time was this ?

A. I believe it was 7-30 or about that.

Q. At that time was any damage done to the station ?

A. Not at all, at that time.

Q. At that time was damage done to a bridge near the station ?

A. Yes.; Kahcchi bridge. At the city police *thana* we were informed that a mob had gone to the distant signal and they wanted to damage it.

Q. You went with Mr. Heron ?

A. I went with Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul and some constables from the city *thana* to that place. Before our arrival Mr. Heron and Rai Bahadur Ganga Ram and Lala Amar Nath were there.

Q. What had happened to the bridge ?

A. From where we stood, the bridge was about 2 furlongs off.....

Q. From the Kachchi bridge ?

A. Kachchi bridge is six furlongs from the railway station and the place where we stood is four furlongs from the railway station.

Q. When you stood there what did you see ?

A. I saw the mob standing outside the wire fencing and I asked them to disperse ; but they did not. They eventually came over to us and one of the men assaulted Mr. Heron.

Q. In what way did he do that ?

A. He came forward and wanted to seize him.

Q. Was he on horseback or on foot ?

A. No ; all were standing on the railway line.

Q. What happened to this man when he wanted to assault Mr. Heron ?

A. He was repulsed and afterwards Mr. Heron ordered firing.

Q. Before firing was ordered, had stones been thrown by the mob ?

A. Yes, Sir. I was also hit on the right shoulder.

Q. What is your opinion at the time as to the intention of the assault on Mr. Heron ? Did the man intend to do serious bodily damage to Mr. Heron ?

A. I think so.

Q. What was the attitude of the mob ?

A. They were in great excitement.

Q. At this time, did you know whether damage was done to the station or any other building in the town ?

A. Before this time, when this assault was made, two bridges were burnt, one on the Gurukul side and the other on the Lahore side, the Kachchi bridge.

Q. When the firing took place, what happened ? Did the mob disperse ?

A. The mob dispersed. They went away from the railway line.

Q. Were there many casualties ?

A. No. Only one man, Kishan Chand, was seriously injured and 2 or 3 slightly injured. I was told afterwards that buck-shot was used by the constables.

Q. Was the officiating Deputy Commissioner there ?

A. He came after the firing.

Q. When he came, was there a question of continuing firing on the mob or of further firing ?

A. No. There was only one firing, and the mob dispersed.

Q. Then were people sent to extinguish the fire at the railway bridge ?

A. I remember that we sent some persons to extinguish the fire.

Q. Did one of the pleaders ask at the time that the liquor shops in the city should be closed ?

A. Messrs. Din Muhammad, Bhagat and Narain came to the spot and Din Muhammad told us that these mob people came after taking liquor and so were excited, and therefore all the liquor shops should be closed.

Q. Did one of the pleaders you mentioned ask the mob to disperse ?

A. Yes.

Q. The mob followed his advice ?

A. No.

Q. When the mob dispersed in consequence of the firing, did you go then towards the post office or the railway station ?

A. Railway station.

Q. That is near the post office ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you arrived at the railway station, what did you find ?

A. We were informed that the post office was set on fire.

Q. Did you see the fire ?

A. The post office was behind the railway station.

Q. What happened at the railway station itself ? Was it set on fire ?

A. It was not set fire to at that time.

Q. Did you want the municipal water engine to extinguish the flames ?

A. Yes ; they cried for help. I was told that people would not let the fire engine come.

Q. Did you yourself go into the room of the postmaster and take out some of the furniture ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You set one of the constables to work at the adjoining well ?

A. Yes ; there is a well adjoining the post office. I put him on the work. He was bringing the water and I was pouring it on the postmaster's room.

Q. Did you yourself pour water with a bucket ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Could you get sufficient water to extinguish the flames ?

A. Certainly.

Q. With what materials had the post office been set on fire ?

A. I did not notice it, because I was in a great hurry,

Q. After extinguishing the fire at the post office, did you go back to the railway station ?

A. Yes ; it is only 2 or 3 steps from the post office to the railway station ; we all went there ; we were guarding the railway station there.

Q. At this stage, did Mr. Din Muhammad, a pleader, come and assist you in dispersing the crowd ?

A. Yes, Sir. He was asking the people to disperse. There were other pleaders too.

Q. Were a number of the mob taken away from the station ?

A. Yes, he took a number of them to the city.

Q. About this time, did you receive any information ?

A. I received information that the *tahsil* was set on fire and also the honorary magistrates' office.

Q. When you received that information, did you leave the station and go to it ?

A. Yes ; I was ordered by Mr. Heron to go and he sent with me Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul and some constables and we went there.

Q. On your way did you find the *dâk* bungalow on fire ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think the doors of the bungalow were closed ?

A. Yes, all the doors were closed. Nobody was there.

Q. Nobody was inside ?

A. No.

Q. You broke open the door and saved some furniture ?

A. Yes ; saved some of the furniture and the luggage of the junior Sub-Judge who was putting up there.

Q. Meantime did Mr. Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul return ?

A. He returned from the *tahsil* and said 'let us go to the railway station.'

Q. Had a big mob again gathered at the railway station ?

A. Yes.

Q. About what time was this ?

A. I believe it was 12 o'clock.

Q. So, you went towards the railway station ?

A. Yes, Sir ; and there I was informed that the mob had gone to the treasury.

Q. What did you find at the railway station ?

A. A mob was there ; and I heard that another mob had gone to the treasury. As I was in charge of the treasury I hastened to that place. I went alone.

Q. After having been at the railway station, you went back to the treasury ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there a rumour that the treasury would be set fire to ?

A. Somebody informed me that the mob had gone to the treasury.

Q. You did not find the mob there ?

A. No, Sir. The report was that the kotwali was set on fire.

Q. There you saw the District Engineer, Mr. Shaw ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you give any orders for dispersing any crowd that might be coming to the treasury ?

A. Yes ; I told the head constable that if anybody came that side he might fire on them.

Q. Did you go then to the *kutcheri* buildings ?

A. The treasury and the *kutcheri* buildings are adjoining each other.

Q. Had it been set on fire ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did you do ?

A. I broke open the door of the Superintendent's room and brought out one confidential almirah and certain other things and after that I went to the treasury office. Since the entrance door was set fire to from the window I went into the room and removed the books, balance sheets, cash accounts and those things, and then afterwards from the back window a man, Fazil Ilahi, was sent in and he removed some books from the treasury office.

Q. Was the treasury office also set fire to ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had it been on fire when you had gone to the *kutcheri* buildings ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. At the same time ?

A. The buildings are adjoining each other. The building at the treasury office was also set on fire.

Q. Was that also done before you went ?

A. Yes, Sir. As far as I enquired fire was set to the additional district magistrate's room and from there the fire spread to the other room ; they are adjoining each other.

Q. Did you take any steps to extinguish it ?

A. There was no use ; the wind was blowing very heavily. We removed some records from the office.

Q. Did Mr. Heron come up to the buildings when you were there ?

A. Yes, Sir, when we were getting out. He said that he received a report that the mob had gone to the police lines.

Q. When you reached the police lines did you find a large mob ?

A. A large mob was standing outside the police lines. The police lines are adjoining the jail. The mob proposed after setting fire to the police lines to go to the jail.

Q. To let the prisoners out ?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you to fire on that mob ?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave the orders to fire ?

A. Mr. Heron. He was on a horse and I was on foot. He ordered it from a distance.

Q. Was it necessary to fire at the time ?

A. Yes, Sir ; otherwise the mob would have gone to the police lines.

Q. When did you notice that the railway station had been set on fire ?

A. This was after we dispersed the mob ; it was perhaps 3 o'clock.

Q. Cases of incendiarism had been going on from the early morning until 3 o'clock in the afternoon ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were all these buildings that were set on fire Government property ?

A. Yes ; the district court, railway station, *tahsil dak* and bungalow are the property of Government.

Q. How do you account for the mob having burnt Government property situated in different places of the town ?

A. The mobs were in different places.

Q. How do you account for their having selected Government property ?

A. Because they are used by Government.

Q. You take it that the action of the mob was against Government ?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many years have you been at Gujranwala as Extra Assistant Commissioner ?

A. Since September 1918. Before that I was Munsif there for two years.

Q. You knew Gujranwala for a considerable time ?

A. Yes.

Q. Before you come to April 1919 was there *anti*-Government or *anti*-British feeling observable ?

A. No.

Q. Was the behaviour of the people to April 1919 perfectly loyal ?

A. I think so.

Q. What was the reason in your view of this sudden outburst in April ?

A. I think the Rowlatt Act, Mr. Gandhi's arrest and the news which people brought from Lahore and Amritsar caused this outburst.

Q. That created this outburst ?

A. Yes.

Q. And before the 14th had you any information or any apprehension that these things were going to happen ?

A. I am afraid I knew nothing of these things because I was in charge of the *kutcheri*.

Q. When you first went to the station, was there a large crowd there ?

A. Yes ; the mob was going from the railway station to the city ; it consisted of more than a hundred people.

Q. Then the crowd first went from the city to the railway station ?

A. I saw them returning from the railway station to the city.

Q. It was perhaps early in the morning when they came to the station ?

A. That I do not know.

Q. The fire that had taken place took place after that ?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Is Mr. Heron a big strong man ?

A. Yes.

Q. If the man had succeeded in throwing Mr. Heron down, would Mr. Heron's life have been in danger ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then the mob was fired at ?

A. Yes.

Q. Who ordered it ?

A. Mr. Heron.

Q. Did you order it ?

A. No, but he can order that under section 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Q. Did Mr. Heron on that day get any authority from any magistrate to fire on the mob ?

A. He spoke with the Deputy Commissioner on the railway platform but whether he was given orders or not I cannot say.

CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Are you Deputy Superintendent of Police at Gujranwala ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You have been in charge of Gujranwala since January 1918 ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I don't think I need trouble you about rumours and so on. I will come at once to what occurred on the 14th. You were informed I think that there was to be a *hartal* on the 13th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you put on duty in the city of Gujranwala for the 14th ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you reach the police station about 7 in the morning ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On your way to the police station did you notice anything ?

A. A man was coming riding in a khaki uniform. He was Mohan Lal.

Q. How was he in khaki ?

A. He was wearing a hockey shirt, and knickers and stockings.

Q. You do not mean he had uniform on ?

A. No. He had nothing on his head.

Q. Were there any people accompanying him ?

A. He was alone.

Q. Did you hear about this time that a calf was hanging from a bridge ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Can you give us the exact time that you heard that ?

A. It was about 7 A.M.

Q. Did you instruct sub-inspector Ghulam Rasul to go to the spot and ascertain if the rumour was correct ?

A. He told me that it was there and that he had taken it down.

Q. Did you go to the spot yourself ?

Q. I rode there and had the calf buried at about two hundred yards from that place.

Q. At what time did you have the calf buried ?

A. I think it was 7-30 or a bit after that.

Q. Do you know who had hung up the calf on this bridge ?

A. I could not say.

Q. Was the suggestion made that it was done by the police ?

A. That was later on.

Q. Up to that time there was no such suggestion ?

A. No.

Q. Was there any truth in the suggestion that the police had anything to do with the hanging of the calf ?

A. Not in the least.

Q. And as soon as you ascertained that the calf was there you had it buried at once ?

A. Yes, I had it buried at once.

Q. Did you realise that a thing like that would cause trouble ?

A. Yes, that is why I had it buried and after having it buried I went to report the matter to the Superintendent of Police.

Q. What time did you reach his bungalow ?

A. At about 8 A.M.

Q. Did you see any crowd at that time ?

A. I saw a crowd of men collected and a railway train standing near the Gurukul railway bridge.

Q. Did you know why the train was stationary ?

A. I was ordered by the Superintendent of Police to proceed to where the train was standing with a police guard which I did.

Q. When you went to the railway bridge what did you find ?

A. I did not go as far as the bridge. I went as far as the train. When I arrived there the people were collecting but when they saw me with the guard they dispersed,

Q. Had anything happened to the bridge ?

A. The bridge was burning and the people were running from that direction to the city.

Q. That is a bridge over a *nullah* on the top of which the railway runs—is it composed of heavy sleepers ?

A. Yes.

Q. Are not these difficult things to set on fire ?

A. Yes.

Q. I don't suppose you could set the sleepers on fire with matches ? Did you find that the wood and the sleepers were soaked in oil before the firing took place ?

A. I do not know about that.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to why the bridge had been set on fire ?

A. To follow the example of Amritsar and Lahore. The telegraph wires were also cut. After that the other bridge was also set on fire.

Q. Were you told then to go to the police station ?

A. Mr. Heron came up then. I was bringing back the train to the railway station because it could not go further on account of the burning of the bridge. There were no passengers in the train. He took charge of the train and told me to go to the city police station with half the men.

Q. When you were at the town did you see a mob coming from the Sialkot gate ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What were they doing ?

A. They only passed by us.

Q. Did information reach you that the mob had gone towards the Kachchi bridge side ?

A. Yes, after that.

Q. You sent information to the Superintendent of Police ?

A. Yes, Sir, the people began to disperse when they saw the guard coming and when I arrived the bridge was already on fire.

Q. Did that bridge have iron girders ?

A. Yes, Sir, and there was also timber above.

Q. Did you extinguish the fire ?

A. I sent a man to the police station to bring the fire engine, but it could not come. I put a guard there of one head constable and eight constables and told them that if any man came there, they would have to fire on him.

Q. Just as you reached the bridge sub-inspector Ghulam Rasul arrived. He was going to Kachchi bridge. Did you post a guard at the bridge ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you notice that the sub-inspector was surrounded by a mob ?

A. Further on about four hundred yards from me I saw him and hurried to the spot and the mob on seeing me dispersed.

Q. What time would that be ?

A. It was before 9.

Q. Did you proceed after that to the city police station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did news reach you that a mob of rioters were going to dismantle the distant signal on the Lahore side ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you proceed to that spot ?

A. I proceeded to the spot with Agha Ghulam Hassan.

Q. I think you met the Superintendent of Police and the other people ?

A. They were there already.

Q. Just explain in your own words what occurred when you got there.

A. It was a big mob which was on the Grand Trunk Road and I was with Mr. Heron, Ghulam Hassan and Lala Amar Nath and the police guard of about twenty men. We were on the railway line proper and the crowd were apparently discussing the uprooting of the rails before I reached them. They came near the railway

fencing and some of the crowd asked Mr. Heron to take off his hat—at least we received a message from Bhagat to the effect that they wanted Mr. Heron to take off his hat and salute them. Of course he did not do that. We asked them to disperse and there was a military officer who also tried to disperse them but they would not. We remonstrated with them to go away and one of them actually rushed at the Superintendent of Police. I then heard some firing and I saw the man who had assaulted Mr. Heron running. On the firing the crowd went out of the fencing.

Q. Before Mr. Heron had fired he had been assaulted—at any rate were stones thrown ?

A. The stones were thrown and the assault was made at the same time.

Q. Where were you hit ?

A. I received them in the back.

Q. Then after the firing did the mob disperse ?

A. The mob only dispersed in so far as they went outside the railway fencing. We returned to the railway station and some of the mob began to throw stones at us again.

Q. What casualties had you caused by that first fire ?

A. One man was seriously injured and about two or three were wounded.

Q. So far as you could judge the firing had very little effect ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You say the mob came up again at the railway station ?

A. We were going on the railway line and the mob was also going there. They were parallel to us and they were throwing stones at the police guard and Mr. Heron. I was asked by Mr. Heron to stop there with a few men and he himself proceeded to the railway station.

Q. Did you hear the people threatening to do anything to Mr. Heron ?

A. When we were at the platform many people came and on being asked to disperse they refused to do so. One of them said that he would kill Mr. Heron. So we turned him out and more men came in. I told Mr. Heron that we might have to fire on these people. Just as we were falling in we heard that the post office was on fire.

Q. Did you remain long at the post office ?

A. I think it was more than an hour.

Q. Did the crowd in the meantime go to some other place ?

A. There were many crowds.

Q. Did you hear that the *tahsil* was on fire ?

A. We heard that the *dâk* bungalow and *tahsil* were on fire. I was ordered to proceed there with a police force but when I reached the *tahsil* it was ablaze. I went there at about 1 P.M.

Q. Did you make arrangements to put the fire out ?

A. We could not make arrangements as we could not get water and the engine could not come as the mob would not allow it.

In my opinion had we fired at the post office the position would have been in hand.

Q. Why didn't you fire at the post office ?

A. I suggested this to Mr. Heron but he gave no orders.

Q. Do you know why he was averse to firing ?

A. Some pleaders came and told us that they would try to persuade the people to go away. They tried to do this but the mob paid no attention to them.

Q. Did the Deputy Commissioner refuse to give liberty to fire ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was he in charge of the situation ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After being at the *tahsil* and *dâk* bungalow which were ablaze did you go back again to the railway station ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you came back to the railway station what did you find there ?

A. We were all there—Mr. Heron and Mr. Nevill—and while there we heard that the treasury and the jail were threatened.

Q. Then did you leave for those places ?

A. Mr. Nevill and I left for those places with a body of men.

Q. When you went to the jail did you find that it was safe ?

A. The jail was safe but the *kutcheri* was burning.

Q. A little after this Mr. Heron arrived at the treasury ?

A. Yes, he sent me as he heard that the treasury had been threatened.

Q. Were you afraid yourself that the mob would commit violence there ?

A. I went there but no mob turned up.

Q. Meantime did aeroplanes come ?

A. Yes, Sir. After this Mr. Heron and I came back into the city.

Q. Did you see any bombs being thrown from the aeroplanes or shots from the machine gun of an aeroplane ?

A. We could not see but we heard them.

Q. What was the effect of the aeroplane's action ?

A. The people ran into the city to take shelter. After this all was quiet.

Q. But for that aeroplane's action would violence have gone on ?

A. The violence would not have gone on if we had fired at the post office and I think we would have saved the situation.

Q. You suggest that if you killed about twenty people you might have saved the situation ?

A. The aeroplane firing did not kill nearly as many as twenty.

Q. So that in fact the aeroplane just did what you think the police should have done earlier ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And if that previous action had been taken resulting in practically the same loss of life there would not have been the same amount of destruction to property ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether the attitude of the crowd was anti-British ?

A. It was anti-British and anti-Government, because they attacked Mr. Heron particularly. I was in the mob myself at about 9-30 when they assaulted him, but they did nothing to me or my men.

Q. You found that the property that was set on fire was Government property ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. From that you gathered that the mob was against the Government ?

A. Yes, it was against the Government.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many years have you been in Gujranwala ?

A. Two years.

Q. As Deputy Superintendent of Police ?

A. Yes.

Q. Before April 1919 did you observe any anti-Government or anti-British feeling in Gujranwala ?

A. No.

Q. You found that the people were very quiet and loyal ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then this sudden outburst, which took place on the 14th April, was caused by what happened at Amritsar and other places ?

A. First the Rowlatt Act was the cause of it, as the people were under the impression that it was a very bad legislation ; that it did not allow two or three persons to sit together ; and that the police had unlimited powers, etc.

Q. Owing to various rumours regarding the provisions of the Rowlatt Act, and the disturbances from Amritsar and Lahore and the arrests of Gandhi, Kitchlew and Satyapal the people were thrown into a turmoil ?

A. Yes, and the local pleaders arranged a meeting

Q. Then a meeting was held on the 5th April, and at that meeting a resolution was passed, and that resolution has been placed before the committee by Colonel O'Brien ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 15th April after these events various arrests were made in Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take part in them ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you with Colonel O'Brien ?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. About twenty people or more were arrested ?

A. Yes.

Q. And prominent pleaders were arrested ?

A. Yes. Lal Singh was the only barrister.

Q. When the British troops and Colonel O'Brien and you went to each individual, you first went to one man and arrested him, you went to the second and third man, and so on. When you arrested these pleaders you marched them off as you found them in the house ; you did not allow them to dress ; they were taken bare-headed and undressed ?

A. All of them were not bare-headed ; one or two may have been bare-headed.

Q. Did you allow them to put on their clothes and get dressed ?

A. Only in one or two cases were the people undressed.

Q. Were the others dressed awaiting your arrival ?

A. They were generally all dressed.

Q. What time of the day was this ?

A. After 2 P.M.

Q. And those you found undressed were marched off like that ?

A. Yes.

Q. You arrested them and handcuffed them and chained them together ?

A. Yes.

Q. As you arrested further persons they were also treated in the same way, handcuffed and chained and taken through the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you took them to the railway station ?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were put in a goods truck ?

A. Yes.

Q. How many did you put in that truck ?

A. All of them ; about twenty-two.

Q. What was this truck ?

A. It was an open truck.

Q. Was this a coal truck ?

A. No, it was not exactly a coal truck as the sides were very low. The sides of a coal truck are usually high.

Q. They were all chained together and put in that truck?

A. Yes.

Q. What hour of the day was that when you put them in that truck ?

A. It was about 5 o'clock. It may be earlier, between 4 and 5.

Q. How long were they kept in the truck before the train started ?

A. For a few minutes.

Q. What arrangements were made about their getting food or going to attend the call of nature ?

A. I do not know.

Q. You say that they were all chained together. Then how would those who wanted to attend the call of nature do so ?

A. I know nothing about that.

Q. When you put them in the truck, did you provide any food for them ?

A. I know nothing about those arrangements, as I was not in charge.

Q. You were with Colonel O'Brien when you arrested all these men, and you took them to the railway station and put them in the truck, chained and handcuffed. Was there any provision made for them ?

A. I saw no provision made.

Q. Did the train take them to Lahore ?

A. Yes.

Q. After about a fortnight they were brought back to Gujranwala. Probably you are aware of that ?

A. I think they were brought back, but I did not see them.

Q. When they were brought back were you in charge of them ?

A. No, they were taken to jail.

Q. Did you have anything further to do with them ?

A. We held identification parades.

Q. Did you go to the station to meet them ?

A. No.

Q. And when they arrived, what did you do with them afterwards ?

A. They were taken to the jail.

Q. What part did you take in it ?

A. I took no part. All we did was to hold identification parades, as the investigation was going on.

Q. They were kept about a fortnight in Gujranwala ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did you know that they were taken again to Lahore ?

A. I did not know.

Q. On the first occasion, when you put them in the truck you personally had nothing further to do with them ?

A. No.

Q. You did not go personally and take any part in dealing with them ?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Was a meeting held on the 6th ?

A. A meeting was held on the 5th.

Q. And in consequence of that meeting, was there a *hartal* on the 6th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is Bela Ram your subordinate ?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he submit the report of that meeting ?

A. Yes.

Q. Kindly look at Exhibit 7* where the proceedings of that meeting are given. It is signed by Pars Ram sub-inspector and also by Mr. Heron. The President of that meeting was Lala Hakim Rai and speeches were given by Lala Mela Ram, Lala Amar Nath and Diwan Sarb Dayal and those proceedings contain the substance of the speeches that were given ?

A. Yes.

Q. Beyond this you have no other definite knowledge as to what were the speeches given ?

A. Yes.

Q. I take it that you rely mainly upon this ?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the distance between the city police station and the Kachchi bridge ?

A. About a mile.

Q. And what is the distance between the Kachchi bridge and the bungalow of Mr. Heron ?

A. One mile.

Q. Was this information about the calf given to you when you were on the way to the city police station ?

A. Yes. It was about 7 A.M. when I got the information.

Q. Up to the time you reached the Kachchi bridge and up to the time when you gave this information to Mr. Heron was the other bridge burning ?

A. At the time when I went to him, the bridge was burning.

Q At the time you took down the calf, did you see the bridge burning ?

A. I could not see from that distance, as it was more than a mile.

Q. At what time was the Gurukula bridge burning ?

A. It was burning before I reached there.

Q. It was at about 8—at the time when the calf was taken down by you was the Gurukula bridge burning or not ?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Do you know that there was a meeting going on that day in front of Amar Nath's house ?

* This refers to the Gujranwala Leader's case (Crown *vs.* Amarnath, etc.) The exhibit is not reproduced.

A. I heard about this later on.

Q. Were you informed that the matter about the calf was mentioned there?

A. No.

Q. Did you or did you not inform the Deputy Superintendent of Police that this matter was mentioned at that meeting?

A. It was not mentioned.

Q. Probably you know something of the statement of the approver?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not find anything about this calf being mentioned at that meeting?

A. It was not mentioned at the meeting but in the procession.

Q. In the statement of the approver, there is no mention that the question of the calf was being discussed?

A. It was not mentioned at the meeting.

Q. Then where was it mentioned?

A. When the procession was going in the streets.

Q. Therefore I take it that your knowledge is that this fact about the calf was mentioned either in the procession or at the meeting?

A. I think it was mentioned in the procession.

Q. And do you know that it was then and there said that this was the work of the C. I. D.?

A. Yes, it was said so.

Q. Therefore you are probably incorrect in your impression when you investigated the matter that this allegation was made on the 14th?

A. No, this allegation was made on the 14th.

Q. As Deputy Superintendent of Police do you know that on the 13th pork was found and this matter was brought to your notice.

A. It was not pork.

Q. In your investigation have you been able to ascertain who was responsible for the hanging of this calf?

A. No.

Q. At the time when Mr. Heron was assaulted I think there were about 25 constables with him with fixed bayonets?

A. Yes, they were standing on the line.

Q. Were they behind him?

A. Yes.

Q. The man who assaulted Mr. Heron was Behari Lal and he had no arms with him—not even a stick and as a matter of fact he was not able to touch the body of Mr. Heron?

A. I think he did touch his body.

Q. You have said that some persons were saying that they would kill Mr. Heron, and the person who said this stated that as Mr. Heron has killed his brother, he would kill him?

A. That is so.

Q. At the Kachchi bridge, what was the number of the crowd?

A. About four or five hundred.

Q. How many police were there?

A. Twenty.

Q. I am not talking of the railway station, I am talking of the Kachchi bridge.

A. It was about 200 yards from there.

Q. Mr. Heron also went to the Gurukula bridge?

A. Yes, he did, but I was not there at the time.

Q. Do I understand that from 8 o'clock up to 12 o'clock there were always 20 policemen with him?

A. I do not know as I was not with Mr. Heron from 8 o'clock to 12 o'clock.

Q. At the time that the aeroplanes arrived it was raining in Gujranwala?

A. It was a small shower of rain.

Q. How long did it last?

A. About three or four minutes.

Q. Were you present at the meeting of the 5th which was convened by the Deputy Commissioner?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Did you see any respectable people of the city in the crowd on that day anywhere, either at the post office or kutcheri?

A. Yes, Lala Singh, Mela Ram, Abdul Aziz and Khan Chand were there.

Q. Where?

A. Near the post office after it was set on fire.

Q. Were any of them with the crowd when the post office was burnt or did they come subsequently?

A. We did not see the post office being set on fire.

Q. So far as your knowledge goes were any of them burning the post office or did they come afterwards?

A. I think they came afterwards. We were there when they came.

Q. And you asked them to persuade the crowd to disperse but whether it was a genuine attempt on their part to do so you cannot say?

A. I do not know whether they made any attempt. They said to us do not fire—we will try to get the people to go away.'

Q. Did they make an attempt to persuade them?

A. I do not know.

Q. What is your conclusion?

A. They might have told them the contrary.

Q. Have you any reason to believe that they did not ask the crowd to disperse?

A. I have no reason.

Q. I am talking of the crowd before the post office—how far was this crowd from you all?

A. About 30 or 40 yards.

Q. Therefore you could not hear what was being said from within 30 or 40 yards?

A. No.

Q. Can you tell me where the bombs were thrown inside the city?

A. I know nothing about this.

Q. Not even up to this time?

A. Yes.

Q. You are a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala, and you know nothing about this?

A. This matter did not concern me and I had nothing to do with the investigation.

Q. And do you know where the other bombs fell?

A. No, I never cared to find out.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. About this truck—I understand it was on the 15th April at about sunset when these people were sent to Lahore from Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any special hardship in making a short railway journey in the hot weather at about sunset?

A. I do not think so.

Mr. V. W. SMITH, Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Smith, you are a Superintendent of Police?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At the outbreak of these riots, what was the general condition of the police force throughout Gujranwala and the neighbouring parts of the Punjab? Was the police force depleted?

A. It suffered from under-recruitment, partly due to economic conditions and also on account of having supplied nearly 2,000 men for the two police battalions, and all those vacancies had not been filled up.

Q. You have handed in a detailed statement to us as to the strength of the police force in Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. And I take it that that statement you have handed to us is accurate?

A. There is only one point in which I should make a correction. In the first paragraph it is stated that 23

constables were brought in from punitive posts. The actual number should be 17.

Q. In your statement, I think, you also state as to the strength of the police in the neighbouring places in Gujranwala ?

A. This only refers to the district of Gujranwala itself.

Q. Can you say with reference to the neighbouring districts of the Punjab as to the strength of the police force ?

A. I was in Lyallpur myself, which is a neighbouring district; and there we were slightly under strength, almost normal.

Q. Do you know anything about other districts ?

A. No, Sir. I cannot say.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were you in the first week of May at Gujranwala ?

A. I was at Lyallpur.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Of the 119 constables at Gujranwala, how many were armed ?

A. All with the exception of 30 or 40.

Q. What about Wazirabad, Hafizabad and Sheikhupura ?

A. At Wazirabad, the total number of muskets was six at the city police station, six at the Sadar police station and five at the Treasury guard.

Q. At Hafizabad ?

A. There were only six at the police station and five at the Treasury guard.

Q. At Sheikhupura ?

A. Eleven.

Q. Chuharkana ?

A. There was none.

Q. At Sangla ?

A. Six.

Mr. E. K. SHAW, District Engineer, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Are you District Engineer at Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the morning of the 14th April last, Mr. Heron, Superintendent of Police, came to you ?

A. He came to my bungalow.

Q. Did he give you some warning ?

A. He warned me to be prepared for all emergencies, as the riot had started.

Q. Did he say whether anything had been done at that hour ?

A. They were burning the bridge north of the station.

Q. Did he leave some policemen as a guard at your bungalow ?

A. Yes, four men and a sergeant, five all told.

Q. Was any arrangement made as to what you should do with your wife and children ?

A. He told me, should matters become dangerous he would send word and I was then to take them to the Treasury.

Q. Did you receive word ?

A. Yes, I received word at about 12 noon.

Q. And in consequence of that word, did you take your wife and children to the Treasury ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think it is a square walled enclosure rising about 25 feet from the plain ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you on entering the enclosure mount the bastion to the north-east ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it a position that enabled you to see anyone approaching ?

A. Yes, not from a long distance though.

Q. What was the distance you could see ?

A. About 150 yards.

Q. Could you also obtain a good view of the road leading to the railway station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was riot going on there ?

A. From the noise I could imagine there was riot.

Q. I think the Treasury is about 250 yards from your bungalow, and the court-house about 50 yards closer ?

A. Yes.

Q. Shortly after your arrival did some of the rioters come from the direction of the railway station ?

A. Yes, about 20 or 25.

Q. Did they do anything ?

A. They broke into the interior of the court-house and set it on fire.

Q. That was 50 yards away from you ?

A. The end they started on was much closer.

Q. How many men were there in that mob ?

A. There were six men, and the remainder boys, about 20 or 25 all told.

Q. What material did they use for the purpose ?

A. Some were carrying canes and some had what I took to be sticks, but from the rapidity with which flames reached the clerestory windows, I was forced to the conclusion that the canes had some inflammable liquid and possibly their sticks were squirts.

Q. Was the crowd entirely out of hand ?

A. I do not know that they were out of hand, but they seemed to be working on a method, as if they had been previously trained.

Q. You know all the other acts of the incendiarism that were committed during the course of that day ?

A. I heard of them afterwards, not at that time.

Q. Did you know of the arrival of an aeroplane ?

A. Yes; it came when the court-house was burning.

Q. What was the effect of the action taken ?

A. My firm belief is that if the aeroplane had not taken action, probably the whole of the civil lines would have been destroyed. The arrival of the aeroplane was the saving of the place.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. The age of those boys was from 12 to 14 years ?

A. About that.

Q. The warning that was received by you was at about 12 noon ?

A. Yes, about 12 noon.

Q. Up to 12 noon, you had not seen any portion of the crowd ?

A. No.

Q. Up to 12 noon, there was no demonstration against or about your bungalow ?

A. I did not see any.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. How far is your bungalow from the city ?

A. About half a mile from the front of the city.

Q. How far is it from the station ?

A. It is less than half a mile from the station.

Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE, Head Master, Mission High School, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Chatterjee, you are the Headmaster of the Mission High School and a member of the Municipal Committee, Gujranwala ?

A. Yes, My Lord.

Q. On the morning of the 14th April, did you go to the school at about 7 o'clock ?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. I think that was a holiday, but you had gone to see about something ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is your school ?

A. The school is outside the city, not very far off from it, just opposite to the *tahsil.*

Q. Were you told anything as to the occurrences in the city ?

A. I was told by one of the *chaprasis* of the school that there was some noise and uproar in the city.

Q. As you were going home, did you hear the same thing from your friends ?

A. Yes, I met them on the road.

Q. Was your wife very nervous as to what had occurred ?

A. Yes, she was, because she was very sick at the time.

Q. I think you heard about the railway bridges being set on fire ?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did the Reverend Jiwan Mal come to your house ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it appear to you that things were assuming a dangerous aspect ?

A. Yes, when I heard of these things, it did so appear to me.

Q. Did you hear people shouting ?

A. I heard a noise.

Q. Could you distinguish what the shouts were ?

A. It was a general kind of noise, I could not distinguish very much.

Q. You say you heard that people were shouting *Hindu-Musalman ki jai* and *Hai Hai George mar gaya hai* ?

A. That is what I heard from the Reverend Jiwan Mal. I did not hear it myself.

Q. Did you advise the Reverend Jiwan Mal to bring his wife and children to your boarding house ?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Was that in order that you might be together ?

A. Yes and to be safe in the boarding house.

Q. By the time he reached his house, the crowd had greatly increased ?

A. He did not come to the boarding house.

Q. Did he find that the crowd was so great that he could not come ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is his house on the other side of the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the noise increasing from 9 to 11 A.M. ?

A. Yes, it went on increasing.

Q. Could you hear it distinctly ?

A. Yes.

Q. At about 11, did the crowd march towards the post office ?

A. It did.

Q. And, I think, the post office was set on fire ?

A. Yes.

Q. Coming to the civil lines, did the crowd burn the Casson Industrial School, and then the *dak* bungalow and then the *tahsil* ?

A. Yes.

Q. Going into the city and then coming back again to the civil lines ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then did they set fire to the district court ?

A. Yes, when they came back.

Q. Was the station church then set on fire ?

A. After the district court was set on fire, the crowd went towards the station church and that was set fire too.

Q. After that, was the goods shed set on fire ?

A. Yes.

Q. Just about the time that the goods shed was set on fire, did you hear aeroplanes overhead ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the crowd still setting fire to buildings ?

A. No they had just set on fire the goods shed.

Q. Did you hear bombs dropped by the aeroplane ?

A. I heard a noise, I did not know what it was.

Q. What was the effect of the presence of the aeroplane and the dropping of bombs ?

Q. The aeroplanes dispersed the crowd and of course people were in a dreadful suspense for fear of the crowd previous to that. They were to a certain extent relieved of that fear. That was the effect.

Q. Had you before this occurrence heard any rumour of action being taken against Christians ?

A. No, My Lord.

Q. In your statement, you say "Hearing a rumour in the evening that the houses of Christians would be burnt during the night, I with my wife, who could hardly move on account of sickness, took shelter for the night in the Treasury." Was that on the night of the 14th ?

A. Yes.

Q. So that even after the aeroplanes had appeared and relieved the situation, you were in dread of a recurrence ?

A. Yes, there was the fear of houses being burnt in the night.

Q. Were you sent the next day to Lahore ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that for the purpose of safety ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you remain there for some days ?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Chatterjee, how many years have you been in Gujranwala ?

A. For 30 years now.

Q. And therefore you are intimately acquainted with the people ?

A. Yes, very intimately.

Q. During all this time that you were with them, what did you find the people to be ? Were they quiet and loyal people ?

A. Quiet, loyal and peace-loving.

Q. Did you notice all these years any *anti*-British or *anti*-English feeling among them ?

A. Only of late to a certain extent, but not during those years.

Q. Before April 1919, was there any *anti*-British feeling ?

A. I did not know of any.

Q. What do you attribute the sudden outburst in Gujranwala to ?

A. The immediate cause was the Rowlatt Act, I think.

Q. In what manner ?

A. People got excited over this Act, as I mentioned in my statement. There were misrepresentations made of the provisions of the Act, and on account of these misrepresentations people got excited, and their feelings underwent a change.

Q. When did these misrepresentations first come to your notice in Gujranwala ?

A. I could not give the exact date, but about the end of March I think.

Q. Who spread these misrepresentations, so far as you know ?

A. I could not tell.

Q. Did you attend any of the meetings about the Rowlatt Act ?

A. No.

Q. One of the causes according to you is that the misrepresentations regarding the provisions of the Rowlatt Act had excited the people ? Was there anything else ?

A. There might have been, but none came to my knowledge in a definite way.

Q. Was there general unrest owing to economic causes, high prices and things of that kind ?

A. There might have been.

Q. What was your observation ?

A. I did not investigate these things. I am not in a position to say anything very definitely.

Q. Did the outburst of the 14th April come upon you as a great surprise ?

A. Yes, it did.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Did you come back in the month of May ?

A. No.

Q. You were in Gujranwala in the month of May ?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. You know that some railway restrictions were placed on the travelling public of Gujranwala and they were removed before the 9th of May ?

A. Restrictions were put on.

Q. And they were removed before the 9th of May ?

A. I do not remember the exact date.

Q. Subsequently these restrictions were reimposed again ?

A. Very likely ; I had not much travelling to do, so I do not know.

Q. Was there a large exodus of women from Gujranwala in the first week of May ?

A. I do not quite understand.

Q. Did a large number of women leave Gujranwala after the railway restrictions were removed ?

A. I have no knowledge of it.

By Sahibzada Sardar Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Do I understand that the first manifestation of any unrest made itself clear in Gujranwala in the month of March or before that ?

A. I do not know about the previous happenings. But I heard certain things. There might have been causes ; I only heard certain things.

Q. I am not asking about causes ; I want to know facts about unrest. There was no show of unrest previous to that ?

A. The only thing I know definitely about is the misrepresentations of the provisions of the Rowlatt Act.

Q. I want to know whether you came to know of any feelings of resentment or unrest or protest against the authorities at all ?

A. Not before the 5th or 6th April, when some meetings were held.

Q. Do I understand that the object of those meetings was to protest against the Rowlatt legislation, as a sort of expression of annoyance at the authorities having passed that ?

A. That is what I understood, because I have not attended meetings.

Q. There was no *anti*-British feeling ?

A. There was *anti*-British feeling.

Q. In what way ? What makes you say that ?

A. From what the mob tried to do.

Q. You deduce that from the action of the mob, but I am asking you whether there was anything before these protest meetings on the 14th April ?

A. Nothing came to my knowledge.

Q. So far as you are aware, you know of no *anti*-British feeling before the 14th April ?

A. None whatever.

Q. Among either the better or lower class of people ?

A. No.

Q. Then your statement that there was *anti*-British feeling is merely based upon the facts of the 14th, the burning of the railway station, of the court house, and so on ?

A. Certain rumours came to my knowledge, but there was nothing definite.

Q. What was the source of your rumours ?

A. Common people saying things.

Q. Common people came to you about it ?

A. I heard from different persons.

Q. You must have heard from somebody ?

A. From common people in the villages and towns.

Q. Did they come to see you on the 14th ?

A. No, not on the 14th.

Q. I understood from you that before the 14th there was no manifestation to your knowledge ?

A. I said except the rumours that came to my notice.

Q. How long before the 14th did you hear ?

A. I could not definitely say.

Q. I do not want the exact date. Was it 10 days, or 15 days, or one or two weeks ?

A. It may be about two weeks.

Q. What were the rumours that you heard ? Was it that the Rowlatt legislation was harsh ?

A. It was harsh as they understood the provisions. The provisions were understood to be that there would be a levy of fees on marriages, on the birth of children, Government taking half the produce, and so on.

Q. Is that all you heard ?

A. Yes.

Q. From that you conclude that there was *anti*-British feeling ?

A. Yes.

Q. Your conclusion is based on that ?

A. Yes.

Q. On that you have based your conclusion that there was *anti*-British feeling ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there anything beyond that ?

A. No.

At Lahore, Friday, the 12th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.
Sir C. H. SETALVAD, KT.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Captain J. A. S. EWING, 19th Lancers.

By the President—

Q. Captain Ewing, you were in charge of the movable column in the Sialkot Area during the Punjab disturbances?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you submitted to us a statement as to your movements on the different dates. May I take it that that statement is accurate?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think we may accept that then as part of your evidence. What were the instructions you received before you started on your tour?

A. I was originally told to march through a certain area of country doing what they call "showing the flag."

Q. What exactly is that?

A. It was to show the villagers in the outlying parts of the country who had never seen troops, that we could move troops quickly about in the area and that sort of thing.

Q. And you visited a number of places as shown in your report?

A. Yes, in company with the Deputy Commissioner practically always.

Q. During the course of your tour did you do any propaganda work?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What sort of work was that?

A. We had a written statement to read out to the people and at one particular place, Sheikhupura, we gave a demonstration of motor machine gun firing and Lewis gun firing at a range there, and Raja Fateh Singh of Sheikhupura arranged that there should be a large number of people called there to see the demonstration.

Q. In addition to that were there lectures delivered?

A. Yes, Sir, at these places we generally got some Indian to read out the lecture in the vernacular, both in Urdu and in Gurmukhi.

Q. And what was the lecture about?

A. It was partially describing the Rowlatt Act, telling them that they were wrong about lots of things they had heard. It was chiefly trying to alter the opinion they had got about various things, contradicting statements that had got about among the Indians.

Q. At different places in your report I see you assisted in connection with the arrests of suspected people; will you just explain how assistance was given?

A. The Deputy Commissioner, Mr. deMontmorency, of Lyallpur, had certain names of villagers. How he got the names I do not know, but he had these names and I went out with the cavalry by night and completely surrounded the village, and then he called out the lambardar and told him to produce the men that were required; in practically all cases they were produced.

Q. And I take it in your statement there is an accurate account of the different arrests that were made?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. So far as you are concerned, I suppose you were not in any way responsible for the selection of the people arrested?

A. Not in any way.

Captain A. HARWOOD, 1st Durham Light Infantry.

By the President—

Q. Captain Harwood, were you, on 15th April, detailed to command a detachment of 25 non-commissioned officers and men?

A. There is a mistake there; it should be 14th April.

Q. That was early on the morning of the 14th?

A. No, Sir, I was detailed at about a quarter past twelve in the afternoon.

Q. And were you instructed to proceed to Gujranwala?

A. Those were the instructions I was given, Sir.

Q. Where were you stationed at the time you received these instructions?

A. Rawalpindi, Sir.

Q. I think you entrained your party by the Bombay Mail at about 1 o'clock?

A. About 1 o'clock. The train was detained for a few minutes to allow the troops to get down there.

Q. What is the distance from Rawalpindi to Gujranwala?

A. About 140 miles roughly.

Q. And you proceeded by the Bombay Mail?

A. As far as Wazirabad.

Q. At Wazirabad you transferred your party to another train?

A. To a special train, Sir.

Q. Were you reinforced there?

A. Yes, Sir, by 50 men of the South Lancashire Regiment.

Q. I think there was also a railway breakdown gang?

A. A railway breakdown gang under Mr. Sims.

Q. You proceeded in your special train to Gujranwala?

A. We proceeded to Rahwali. The station master there stopped us and said we could not go further, but my instructions were to go to Gujranwala, so we proceeded along dead slow till we came to the bridge reported as being burnt.

Q. What time did you arrive?

A. At about 8-30 P.M.

Q. Had the bridge been repaired by the time you arrived?

A. No, Sir. The Railway Engineer examined the bridge and the damage was very slight and he thought it could stand the train running over it.

Q. The damage had been in the nature of burning the sleepers ?

A. Burning the sleepers, and they had interfered with the brickwork underneath.

Q. When you arrived were any buildings still blazing ?

A. Yes, everything was blazing, the station, the goods yard, post office and the church. That was as far as I could see at that time. They were absolutely gutted ; it was quite impossible to save them as they had been burning for a number of hours.

Q. You sent to obtain information about the civil population and I think learnt that they were in the Treasury ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you then go to investigate the damage that had been done to the telegraph lines ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You walked about two miles back along the line till you came to the end of the break ? What did you find had occurred as regards the telegraph system ?

A. Practically all the wires along the railway right in front of the native city were cut, the wires were flat on the ground and absolutely destroyed. We got the telephone wire which had just been installed and I tapped in on the telephone and obtained communication with Rawalpindi.

Q. I think you asked that troops should be sent to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes, Sir. On coming through Wazirabad, when picked up the detachment of South Lancashires, there was the Railway Transport Officer there who had only about a dozen rifles, and whether it was instinct or something, but I did not like the state of affairs at Wazirabad so I warned the Division.

Q. I think you sent your communication to Rawalpindi because you would not communicate with Sialkot ?

A. I could not communicate with Sialkot ; the telephone wire only runs between Rawalpindi and Lahore.

Q. I think you sent back the engine with orders ?

A. As soon as I got the information from the General Staff Officer to order the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot, to send down 50 ranks, that was my only means of communication with Wazirabad, so I took the engine off the train.

Q. I think you asked for a special train ?

A. I asked Rawalpindi as well for that, but I knew there were rolling stock and engines at Wazirabad, so I sent to the Railway Transport Officer, Wazirabad, to send them down.

Q. And that train arrived early next morning ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the women and children evacuated ?

A. They were evacuated next morning.

Q. I think about half past eight next morning certain repairs were done on the telegraph lines ?

A. I had a brigade signal section with me and we bridged the gap by means of a heavy cable laid on the ground. There were two important wires joined up.

Q. That is a temporary repair ?

A. A temporary repair.

Q. Over what length ?

A. I should say over three or four miles there was a break altogether.

Q. Repairs were done to the railway bridge on the Lahore side of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes, Sir. That had been more seriously damaged than the other one, and the breakdown gang went out early that morning and commenced repairs and two or three new sleepers were put in.

Q. Did you investigate the damage done to the town ?

A. I went round the civil part of the town. I went across to the post office first. It was absolutely gutted ; there was nothing left of it. And I went as to the Church and from there into the town to interview the Deputy Commissioner, and saw the damage done to the law courts.

Q. And was the damage very extensive ?

A. Yes, Sir, everything was completely gutted.

Q. I think in addition to the places you have mentioned, the *dâk* bungalow and the goods shed and the Church were also damaged ?

A. Absolutely gutted.

Q. About half past ten that morning did you try to get into communication by telephone with Rawalpindi ?

A. With Rawalpindi again. I went back to the instrument that had been put on the wire. It had been brought closer to the station. Mr. Langdon had been speaking to Rawalpindi previously, but I could not get into communication when I got there.

Q. Mr. Langdon, as you mentioned in a previous part of your statement, is the Superintendent of Telegraphs ?

A. He is the Engineering Superintendent.

Q. Work was commenced, I think, early in the morning on these telegraph lines and temporary repairs completed next day ? Was that the 16th ?

A. The 16th.

Q. Then on the 15th Colonel O'Brien had decided to make certain arrests in Gujranwala city ?

A. That is right, Sir.

Q. Was he escorted by a force that you gave him ?

A. He was escorted by a force under the command of Lieutenant Burghope who took about 25 men into the city.

Q. Did you post pickets on the railway line ?

A. I was instructed to post pickets on the railway line.

Q. That line divides the native part of the city from the civil lines ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you give the picket instructions to prevent any person leaving the city ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In all 22 arrests were made by Colonel O'Brien ?

A. About 22.

Q. And these people were sent to Lahore by special train the same afternoon ?

A. There was a special train sent to Lahore with a detachment of 25 men of the 2-6th Sussex Regiment.

Q. Did you see the accommodation provided for them ?

A. Yes, Sir, the accommodation was, I think, an open truck.

Q. Is that quite a usual way in such an emergency ?

A. I think they were very short of rolling stock at the time. I had the utmost difficulty. My men were all in 3rd class carriages. It was with the utmost difficulty that I managed to get 3rd class carriages for them.

Q. The journey from Gujranwala to Lahore did not take very long, did it ?

A. It is only about 40 miles and takes a little over an hour usually.

Q. I am told on this occasion the journey took a great deal longer, can you say whether this was so or not ?

A. I cannot say. After they left Gujranwala I never heard anything more of them.

Q. Then I think you provided, as you said, a number of British troops ; was that in connection with the trains which took the prisoners ?

A. No, Sir. The railway service from Gujranwala had started and passenger trains were passing through. One train, I remember, had a number of ladies on board and had absolutely no protection, so I supplied a guard for that train to go to Lahore.

Q. And I think Mr. Langdon proceeded to Lahore to get telegraphic stores and rations for the men of the detachment ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you receive any communication early on the 16th as to the state of the permanent way near Wazirabad ?

A. I received a message sent in by runner from the station master of one of the stations on the Wazirabad side of the line saying the whole permanent way was ablaze. I immediately detached the engine and one truck from my train and sent Mr. Sims with the railway breakdown gang and a non-commissioned officer and 10 rifles to find out what had been done. They reported late that evening that a determined attempt had been made to burn through the sleepers and to wreck a bridge on the line just by a village called Nizamabad.

Q. Can you tell me whether burning the sleepers of a bridge is an easy operation ?

A. It is not.

Q. What is required ?

A. They must have oil or petrol to set them alight first.

Q. It is not a thing which can be done by a man taking it into his head to put a match to the wood ?

A. Absolutely impossible, Sir.

Q. Then you yourself went to Wazirabad ?

A. Next day, Sir. When we finished the repairs at Gujranwala Mr. Langdon decided to supervise all repairs and I proceeded to Wazirabad.

Q. What time did you arrive at Wazirabad ?

A. I left Gujranwala at about 1 o'clock and arrived there between 2 and half past, or perhaps a little bit later.

Q. That was on the afternoon of the 16th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you informed by your repair parties as to the reception they got when they were affecting their repairs from a passing train ?

A. Before I left Gujranwala, as the Government Telegraph men were out on the wires, I had to post pickets to protect them in case they were rushed. A train came through from Lahore and two of my men came back with one of the sub-inspectors of the Telegraph Department and reported that they had been jeered at and there were shouts of "*Gandhi ki jai*" from this train as they passed. They located the carriage as the rear carriage of the train. I spoke to Mr. Langdon and I decided to investigate it, so I detained the train at the station and it contained a number of young sepoys, and for precaution I took them from the train and detained them in Lahore jail. I reported the matter to Colonel O'Brien, and I believe he investigated the case a few days later.

Q. Were these sepoys who jeered at the party and whom you arrested armed ?

A. No, Sir, they were returning from leave.

Q. When you arrived at Wazirabad what damage did you find had been done ?

A. First of all when we came to Wazirabad (there is a village called Nizamabad there) where there was a break which extended roughly over a mile to a mile and-a-half.

Q. Will you explain what the nature of the break was ?

A. Practically all the wires were down on the ground. The whole lot were cut and they were down on the ground. At Wazirabad it was particularly bad, the poles had been broken down there.

Q. Then how far did the break extend at Wazirabad ?

A. At Wazirabad it extended altogether to about three miles. It crossed right over the river on the other side of Wazirabad.

Q. Speaking generally, was the damage very extensive ?

A. It was very extensive. It took two days to repair before any special could pass.

Q. I think in consequence of the extent of the damage done Mr. Langdon decided to push on towards Lala Musa ?

A. That is right.

Q. What was the advantage of that step ?

A. If there were any small breaks, he could join up and prevent them from being cut off.

Q. Then were there a number of minor breaks ?

A. Single wires were cut, I think.

Q. How far is Lala Musa from Wazirabad ?

A. Roughly speaking about 40 or 50 miles.

Q. Then is Gujrat on the way ?

A. Gujrat is between, half way.

Q. Did you find any damage done at Gujrat ?

A. I found at Gujrat a very big crowd at the platform waiting for the train. The telegraph instruments in the railway station had been damaged. I cleared the crowd out of the railway station and inquired from the station master what damage had been done. The Deputy Commissioner of Gujrat was himself on the platform, and he told me that he had managed to collect a few police, but the instrument was out of order.

Q. Then I think the Deputy Commissioner of Gujrat accompanied you and Mr. Langdon to Lala Musa ?

A. Yes, to Lala Musa.

Q. You left Mr. Langdon at Lala Musa and returned to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes, I left Mr. Langdon at Lala Musa.

Q. And temporary repairs were commenced on the lines there that night ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you leave an escort with the working party and then return to Lala Musa ?

A. I left for Lala Musa that night.

Q. You arrived there at 11-30 in the night ?

A. It was quite late in the night.

Q. Was anything done to the telephone line to Rawalpindi ?

A. It was tapped. The telephone line is on the same poles as the telegraph lines. They are the two bottom wires. When I got back I reported the damage again.

Q. I think on the 17th April, early in the morning, you received a report from the telegraphist on duty that interruptions were occurring on the line ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you make a test ?

A. The tests were made and the fault was located at Gujar Khan.

Q. Where is Gujar Khan ?

A. It is well up the line half way between Lala Musa and Rawalpindi.

Q. Did Mr. Langdon decide to make further investigation ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think the train left Lala Musa at 6-45 ?

A. Yes.

Q. On arrival at Gujar Khan you found that a detachment of troops under a British officer had arrived ?

A. Yes.

Q. They arrived a little earlier ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the station master make any report ?

A. He made a report that there had been an interruption. He gave me no definite statement.

Q. Then did you run the train to Rawalpindi ?

A. Yes, to Rawalpindi.

Q. Why was that done ?

A. I left in such a hurry that I had no kits and rations for the men of my detachment. I also required telegraphic stores.

Q. I think you made a personal report at Divisional headquarters ?

A. Yes, I made a report.

Q. On the 17th April about 3-30 did you return to Lala Musa ?

A. Yes, the same day.

Q. And you picked up your reinforcements there ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you get two Lewis guns there ?

A. Two Lewis guns and 15 men.

Q. During the journey were you detained anywhere ?

A. After crossing the bridge at Serai Alam Gir station. After waiting for about quarter of an hour I ordered the train to draw into the station. There was absolutely no necessity to stop. I immediately made an inquiry there from the station master, but did not get a satisfactory reply. When I asked him why had he detained the train outside, he gave no clear answer to me. I

then asked him for a line clear, and he then went to his table and wrote out a line clear to the next station. The driver of my train at once pointed out to me that the line clear was not correct as the duplicate in the book had not been filled in and the station master had not wired to the next station for the line clear. He then wired to the next station and was given a reply that the line was clear. He then had to fill in the counter-foil of the line clear. I verified this with one of the Government telegraphists with me.

Q. He had not done that before ?

A. No.

Q. And that caused you to suspect him ?

A. Yes. If the line was not clear, the station master at the other end of the line would have distinctly wired this. It was a single line and such action on his part was liable to cause a collision.

Q. Did you take any action then ?

A. I arrested the station master and took him to Lala Musa.

Q. You handed him over to the Officer Commanding troops at Lala Musa ?

A. Yes, I took him with me in the train.

Q. Was that case reported to the Traffic Manager, Railway ?

A. It was reported, Sir.

Q. On the morning of the 18th April were temporary repairs commenced near the village of Nizamabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. During the effecting of these repairs did you place pickets round the village in order to prevent anybody from leaving the village ?

A. Yes.

Q. What was your reason for taking that step ?

A. Nizamabad is famous for iron-works where cutting tools, hammers, chisels, etc., are manufactured. This led us to suspect that some of the bad characters might be harbouring there, and that same evening again an attempt was made to burn the bridge. Mr. Langdon wanted to get information as to who had wrecked the telegraph line. I posted pickets round the village.

Q. Did you see the *lambardar* of the village ?

A. I saw the *lambardar* of the village. I was taken to his house.

Q. You had some difficulty in getting information from him ?

A. I had some difficulty in getting information from him. We knocked at his door and remained there for quarter of an hour.

Q. What prevented him from giving information ?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did you question him as to whether he had informed the authorities at Wazirabad ?

A. I questioned him first of all as to whether he knew who had cut the telegraph wires and burnt the bridge. At first he made no statement, but eventually I spoke to him in Hindustani, as I could speak a little myself and the Sub-Inspector of Telegraphs was acting as an interpreter—he said that he knew who was responsible for the damage done. I then inquired if he had reported the matter at Wazirabad, and he said "No." I then arrested him on suspicion.

Q. I think the damage, that ought to have been reported, was done four days previously ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was a student from Gujranwala also arrested ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What had he been doing there ?

A. I came out to the village and I saw Mr. Langdon talking to this man and found that he had been asking him who he was. He was insolently staring and looking at Mr. Langdon and was leaning up against a wall. I asked him where he had come from and what was he doing in the village, but he could give no satisfactory reply. The people were standing beside him, and I asked them if they knew anything about him. He said he had come to visit his brother-in-law. Then I asked the village people if that was true, but they said they knew absolutely nothing about him and nobody could recognise him as an inhabitant of the village. I then decided to arrest him as well.

Q. Did you consider that you were justified in a critical state to take such an action ?

A. Yes.

Q. Just before leaving the village you received a report that one of the pickets had been compelled to fire at a man who was attempting to leave the village ?

A. I was actually myself in the village when one of these pickets was compelled to fire. When I came I could not find the man.

Q. Could you get any information regarding him ?

A. I could get no information. I inquired again two or three days later, but could get no information whatsoever regarding him.

Q. You reported the case to the Officer Commanding troops at Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. And also by telephone to 2nd Divisional Head-Quarters, Rawalpindi ?

A. Yes, I also reported that case to Colonel O'Brien at Sangla Hill that afternoon.

Q. On the afternoon of the 18th were temporary repairs carried out on the Wazirabad-Sialkot telegraph lines ?

A. Yes, for about a mile the damage was done in a sort of triangle there.

Q. You completed your temporary repairs at Wazirabad early on the morning of the 19th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then repairs were commenced on the Wazirabad Sangla Hill and Lahore lines ?

A. On the Sangla Hill branch extensive damage was done and a couple of stations were burnt down there. An attempt was also made to burn the bridge over the canal near Chuharkana and two sleepers were burnt right through.

Q. That action was a matter which required considerable preparation ?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did those repairs occupy ?

A. The preparation for burning the bridge must have taken time. We carried out the repairs, and we worked till dark that night. We finished well after dark about 8 o'clock, and I then ran towards Lahore and the remaining repairs were carried out by the two Telegraph Specials.

Q. On arrival at Wazirabad on the 21st you returned the Brigade Signal Section to Rawalpindi ?

A. As we found them of no further use.

Q. From the 21st to the 27th April were permanent repairs carried out on certain lines ? You might mention them ?

A. Yes, Wazirabad to Shorkot Road, then Wazirabad to Sialkot and Wazirabad to Gujranwala and on the Pindi side.

Q. And breaks round Wazirabad were also permanently repaired ?

A. It took us a week to complete permanent repairs.

Q. Did you assist the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur District to make a number of arrests at the village of Gojra about the 23rd April ?

A. I was coming from Shorkot. I had to wait at Gojra, and I found that the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. deMontmorency, had come to make certain arrests at Gojra, and he asked me for ten men as a guard.

Q. I think in connection with the working parties on the line military escorts were provided ?

A. Always, Sir.

Q. Was that essential in the circumstances ?

A. As a precautionary measure.

Q. And your detachment returned to Rawalpindi at 1 o'clock on the 28th April ?

A. That is right, Sir.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Captain Harwood, you assisted in the arrests made on the 15th at Gujranwala ?

A. Yes, I assisted. I was simply putting pickets along the railway line.

Q. You did not go in the city ?

A. Naturally I did not go in the city.

Q. You did not carry out arrests yourself ?

A. No.

Q. You were at the railway station ?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw them brought to the railway station ?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw some men brought to the railway station and then taken again to the town ?

A. I saw one arrest made at the railway station.

Q. Along with the other people he was taken into the town ?

A. Some of them were taken into the town and they were brought back with further arrested people.

Q. What time of the day were the arrests finished ?

A. I should say about 3-30, but I cannot say for certain ; it was in the afternoon.

Q. Was the whole lot brought there ?

A. Yes.

Q. They were all handcuffed and chained together ?

A. Yes.

Q. And at what time did the train taking them leave ?

A. The train left practically immediately after the arrests were completed. The train was ready waiting for them.

Q. The train consisted of goods trucks and an engine ?

A. Yes.

Q. There were several trucks ?

A. Two trucks ; I cannot say for certain.

Q. In one truck there were only the troops ?

A. The troops were with the arrested people. They split up in two parts ; some of the arrested people and some troops were in one truck and some of the troops and some arrested people in the other truck.

Q. They were at once taken away ?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did the journey take ?

A. I cannot say.

Q. After that how long did you remain there ?

A. Next day till 1 P.M.

Q. You don't know what subsequently happened at Gujranwala ?

A. No.

Q. Now about that incident you spoke of, that there were some Sikh soldiers jeering at some of the telegraph repairing parties. Where was this ?

A. This was at Gujranwala.

Q. On what date ?

A. On the morning of the 16th.

Q. At that time you were at the station ?

A. My train was at the station.

Q. You were leaving that day ?

A. I was just preparing to leave Gujranwala.

Q. You got into the train ?

A. I was standing on the platform and waiting for that train to leave first. I had to get in to the train behind.

Q. Your train was yet to arrive ?

A. My train was on the platform.

Q. The train they were in was a passenger train going towards Wazirabad. Were both the trains in the station?

A Yes. I was in the centre one. There is a centre line.

Q. Both the trains were going in the same direction ?

A. Yes.

Q. The passenger train was to start first ?

A. Yes. I was waiting for my repairing party.

Q. Your train was a special train ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where had these Sikhs come from ?

A. From Amritsar.

Q. Were there any other passengers ?

A. The majority were of Sikhs.

Q. How many were they in one compartment ?

A. About 30 ; it was a bogie carriage.

Q. Were you near their carriage when they jeered ?

A. I was a mile away.

Q. Some body reported to you ?

A. Two of my own men came back.

Q. Who were they ?

A. Two private soldiers.

Q. Were they British soldiers ?

A. Yes.

Q. They came and reported to you ?

A. They came and reported to me along with the sub-inspector of Telegraphs.

Q. You went and investigated the case ?

A. Yes.

Q. What were they doing then ?

A. They were all sitting very quietly.

Q. They did nothing in your presence ?

A. No.

Q. Did you question them ?

A. Yes, they made some reply that they were singing.

Q. That is possible ?

A. Yes, that was possible.

Q. You had no reason to disbelieve them ?

A. They were shouting *Gandhi ki jai* and were jeering at the soldiers. I think the soldiers could understand when they were jeering at them.

Q. In what language were they shouting ?

A. In Hindustani.

Q. Did your men understand Hindustani ?

A. They can understand *Gandhi ki jai*. The Telegraph sub-inspector, who came along with them, could understand Hindustani.

Q. They said they were singing ?

A. They told me that they were singing.

Q. What did you do then ?

A. I immediately emptied the carriage and detained them at Gujranwala and reported the matter.

Q. You arrested them there ?

A. Yes, I arrested them.

Q. Where did you send them ?

A. I sent them to the local jail.

Q. All of them ?

A. The whole lot.

Q. What ultimately happened to them ?

A. I do not know. About three days later I saw Colonel O'Brien. He tried the case and dismissed it.

Q. He allowed them to proceed ?

A. Yes.

Q. He did not inflict any punishment whatsoever ?

A. No, he did not.

Q. They were allowed to proceed as there was nothing against them ?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. What is the distance between Wazirabad and Gujranwala ?

A. I should say 20 or 25 miles.

Q. What was the train composed of, railway breakdown gang trucks ?

A. An engine, a long open truck containing breakdown material and Mr. Sims had his own private carriage.

Q. You gave them an escort ?

A. Yes, in the truck.

Q. You gave them the same accommodation as you gave to the prisoners ?

A. Yes.

Q. I don't think you were committing an improper act.

A. It was a matter of emergency.

Mr. J. B. NEVILL, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Are you Assistant Superintendent of Police at Gujranwala ?

A. I was, Sir.

Q. During the period of disturbances you were there ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you hear a *hartal* was proposed for the 15th April ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think there had been one on the 5th previously ?

A. I think it was on the 6th.

Q. This was a second *hartal ?*

A. Yes.

Q. Was the date suddenly changed ?

A. We only heard on the night of the 13th.

Q. It was changed from the 15th to the 14th ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think the Deputy Commissioner, Colonel O'Brien had left Gujranwala on the 13th.

A. Yes.

Q. On the evening of the 13th did you apprehend that you would have serious trouble on the 14th ?

A. No, we did not think very much would happen

Q. Because the previous *hartal* had not led to an serious result ?

A. Not at all.

Q. But as a precautionary measure, all available police were called into headquarters ?

A. Yes.

Q. The changing of the date somewhat dislocated the police arrangements ?

A. Yes.

Q. With the result that the number of police available as a striking force was small ?

A. Yes.

Q. How many were they ?

A. They were about 50.

Q. I think we have got your statement as to the complete figures ?

A. Yes.

Q. In your statement you say that "this changing of the date was deliberate on the part of the leaders in order to foil the arrangements of the authorities for preserving order ? "

A. Yes.

Q. On what do you base that statement ?

A. It was well known that we had very few police. It was also on that day that lots of the local people had gone to attend a durbar held by the Lieutenant-Governor at Lahore. We were all told that this was deliberately done by the leaders.

Q. Coming now to the 14th, would you tell me what was the first incident that came under your notice on that date ?

A. I was living with the Superintendent of Police, Mr. Heron, in his bungalow. We saw a crowd collected near the Gurukul bridge. We sent down our servant. The train was standing by the bridge.

Q. Was that at the Gurukul bridge ?

A. Yes, right in front of the bungalow.

Q. What time was this ?

A. I am not quite clear as to the time, but it must have been about 7 in the morning.

Q. Well, then, when you got that information what did you do ?

A. I was ordered to disperse the mob because the servant told me that the crowd was doing damage to the railway line and the bridge. I had a guard with me to do that.

Q. As I understand the crowd had started to destroy the line before the police appeared on the scene at all ?

A. When I got there, there were two great heaps of wood burning on the line and the bridge was blazing.

Q. I think you say the train was stopped at the distant signal and damaged. Was that the early morning train ?

A. Yes, that was the early morning train going to Wazirabad.

Q. Had that train to pass over the bridge ?

A. Yes.

Q. What damage had been done to the Gurukul bridge ?

A. It was blazing at the time.

Q. In your statement here you say "Early on the morning of the 14th a calf was found hanging to a railway bridge." Was not that the Gurukul bridge ?

A. That was the Kachchi bridge.

Q. Was there any calf seen hanging on the Gurukul bridge ?

A. I had not heard of any.

Q. You had with you a guard of one head constable and six foot constables ?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you manage at that time to disperse the crowd ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you put out the fire with small damage to the bridge ?

A. Yes, we put down the fire.

Q. In setting fire to that bridge had they used any inflammable material ?

A. The wood they used was dry and they also got petroleum.

Q. Were the sleepers of the bridge themselves burning as well as the wood that had been brought from outside ?

A. There was a pile of wood and we poured water on it from the top.

Q. Were you not in a position to see whether the sleepers were charred ?

A. They were certainly charred.

Q. Were they actually blazing at the time at all ?

A. They were.

Q. Can you tell me that you could not set fire to these sleepers unless you used oil or petroleum ?

A. They had a great pile of wood blazing about 4 feet high.

Q. Could you say of your own knowledge whether there was oil on the sleepers or not ?

A. No. I was told that they had used oil.

Q. Well then, the train was taken back to the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think that instructions had been given to all the guards at the Treasury, etc., to be alert ?

A. Yes, that was done by the Superintendent of Police.

Q. Then the reserve was taken to the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Here the railway premises and the line were cleared of the crowd ?

A. The Superintendent of Police cleared them off.

Q. What time ?

A. It must have been 7-30 or 8.

Q. In connection with that work of clearing the station and the line was any assistance rendered by the railway staff ?

A. I was not at the spot myself.

Q. Then why do you say in your statement "It may be mentioned here that the railway officials gave no assistance at all, showing passive, if not active, sympathy with the crowd "?

A. That refers to later events. I mean to say that the railway staff gave me no help when I was putting out the fire at the bridge.

Q. Is that a matter where they might easily give help ?

A. Certainly they knew that the bridge was burning.

Q. A considerable part of the crowd that had collected was induced to go back from the station by Din Muhammad, pleader ?

A. Yes.

Q. And the police consolidated their position along the railway line ?

A. Yes, we held the railway line.

Q. Did you stay beside the Gurukul bridge ?

A. Yes.

Q. As you remained there, portions of the crowd kept coming there ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then did you form any opinion as to their intent ?

A. They were obviously bent on mischief. Directly they saw me with a guard, they turned back.

Q. How long did you remain so with your guard ?

A. Probably for an hour.

Q. Then you went back to the railway station ?

A. After I heard firing.

Q. When you got to the railway station what did you find there ?

A. I found the post office just burnt up.

Q. Was there a large crowd there ?

A. A huge crowd which had just gone back to the city because the bazar is quite near the post office.

Q. But did you see that they rushed in the direction of of the city ?

A. I saw them all scattering.

Q. Were they waving anything ?

A. Then they came back after that.

Q. They were waving black flags ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they throwing anything ?

A. They were hurling bricks.

Q. On any one ?

A. Chiefly on the Superintendent of Police and on any body they came across.

Q. The police were generally endeavouring to keep the crowd in check ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Mr. Heron struck several times ?

A. Yes, very often.

Q. Was it a trying experience for the police force ?

A. Yes, very trying.

Q. Why was the mob not fired at the post office when they set ablaze the post office or showed utter defiance to the police ?

A. Well, the Superintendent of Police did not order to fire. He was advised by the Deputy Commissioner not to do this. He was there and he could give the orders to fire but he did not.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to whether it would have been better in the interests of the maintenance of order to fire at the mob at this stage ?

A. Well, it was very difficult to form an opinion at the time. Afterwards it might appear to have been better but it was difficult to form an opinion at that time.

Q. Did you at that time notice smoke coming out from the civil lines ?

A. Yes, while we were in front of the station.

Q. Did you send some police there ?

A. Yes, I was sent round.

Q. Were you soon followed by the Superintendent of Police ?

A. Yes, he came. He had stayed to post a guard at the railway station.

Q. When you reached the civil lines what did you find ?

A. We came through the public gardens. There the mob had scattered all over the place. They were burning down any building they came across. The police then fired at the mob but most of the Government buildings had been burnt. The mob had made preparations and within ten minutes they finished the firing of buildings. We fired and drove them beyond the railway line.

Q. What damage had they done before you fired ?

A. They had practically burnt everything, Civil Magistrates' Courts, Church, etc.

Q. And were they attempting to set the jail on fire also ?

A. Yes, of course, they attempted to set fire to the Jail and the police lines.

Q. When the mob fled did they collect again ?

A. They were all round, many thousand people, and there were very few police.

Q. Had the firing the effect of frightening them off ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the mob in a very dangerous mood ?

A. Yes, they were in a most dangerous mood.

Q. Did you hear them making any shouts ?

A. Yes, they were calling out that they would certainly kill Mr. Heron and all British Officers and they were talking all sorts of nonsense.

Q. Did they say anything about burning buildings ?

A No, I did not hear them personally.

Q. Well in your statement you say "They were calling out that they would kill all British officers and burn all Government buildings." What is the foundation for that part of your statement ?

A. This happened later, while we were chasing them. They said they would burn down all the Government buildings and that is why we chased them in the public gardens.

Q. Did they say all buildings or Government buildings ?

A. Government buildings only.

Q. About what time did they began to shout ?

A. At about the time when we caught them in the public gardens and drove them across the railway line. Then they began to shout that they had finished the business.

Q. They were coming back and shouting that they had finished the business ?

A. Yes.

Q. You refer to the firing by the police ?

A. As far as I was concerned by the Superintendent of Police.

Q. Who had instructed to fire ?

A. Mr. Heron.

Q. Mr. Heron had instructed ?

A. Yes.

Q. How many shots were fired ?

A. A very few. The total number of rounds fired during the whole day was, I believe, 20 or 30.

Q. And the casualties were caused by this firing ?

A. I don't think they ever caused any casualties. We never found out that any of the firing had caused any casualties. Casualties were shown to be due to the aeroplanes.

Q. So there were no casualties ?

A. Some were wounded.

Q. The police was at this time pretty well exhausted ?

A. They were very much exhausted by the end of the day.

Q. When did the aeroplanes arrive ?

A. As far as I remember they arrived at about 3.

Q. A little after 3 ?

A. Yes.

Q. At the time the aeroplanes arrived what was the condition ?

A. We just pushed them across the railway line.

Q. Still the buildings were blazing at the time ?

A. They were blazing.

Q. What was the last building that had been set on fire ?

A. The church.

Q. When it was set fire to, it was just before the aeroplanes arrived ?

A. It must have been within ten minutes or quarter of an hour of their arrival.

Q. What was the effect of the action taken by the aeroplanes ?

A. After that the crowd all dispersed and they went to their homes and there was no more trouble.

Q. Could the police have dispersed the crowd ?

A. I should not think so.

Q. And at the time when the aeroplanes arrived ?

A. Certainly they could have done it.

Q. If the police could have done it, then in your opinion, they would have dispersed the people without doing more casualties than the aeroplanes did ?

A. In my opinion it is very doubtful if they could have have done it.

Q. Then the action taken by the aeroplanes was a relief to the police ?

A. Most decidedly.

Q. It was also a sort of relief to the peaceful citizens ?

A. The men that were with us were very much pleased when the aeroplanes arrived.

Q. Then Colonel O'Brien arrived the same time as the aeroplanes ?

A. Yes, a little while after.

Q. Next day certain arrests were made. Were you present when those arrests were made ?

A. I was with the police.

Q. Then Martial Law was proclaimed on the 16th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Prior to the proclamation of the Martial Law was the disorder spreading ?

A. We were getting reports from all over the district that various outbreaks had occurred. In Aulakh a *Patwarkhana* was burnt.

Q. What is a *Patwarkhana* ?

(*Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate*):—It is the official residence of the village Patwari.

Q. On the 18th you and a party of British troops under Captain Wheatly went there and arrested the culprits ?

A. Captain Wheatly and the party came with me.

Q. What was the effect of Martial Law ?

A. Directly we got Martial Law everything came to its normal condition, as far as I think.

Q. On the 21st were you sent down to Chuharkana to supervise the investigations in the Sheikhupura Sub-Division ?

A. Yes.

Q. What were the centres of agitation there ?

A. Sheikhupura, Chuharkana and Sangla.

Q. *Hartal* had been held at all these places ?

A. Yes.

Q. There was not much violence at Sheikhupura ?

A. Yes, not at Sheikhupura.

Q. What had occurred at other places ?

A. At Chuharkana there was a tremendous upset. They had broken the railway line and cut telegraph wires and all over the line they had burnt all the stations except one. They had also burnt the bridges.

Q. At Sangla what had happened ?

A. There they had not burnt anything but wires were all round cut and they stoned the train. They also rescued a military deserter who was being taken to Rawalpindi. They also attacked the telegraph inspector.

Q. Did they burn the station next to Sangla ?

A. Yes, they burnt the station next to Sangla.

Q. Who were active in the rising at Sangla ?

A. At Sangla there were four or five Kuka Sikhs and the rest were the people of the town.

Q. Were they openly saying anything as to British power ?

A. Yes, their cry was that the British *Raj* was finished and they would have their own *Raj* in a few days and even if the British *Raj* returned, the Sikhs ruled that day. That was the common cry when I got there.

Q. You are speaking with reference to your own station ?

A. I am speaking about the time when I went down there on the 21st.

Q. Were the population still very truculent and stubborn ?

A. Yes, especially at Dhaban Singh.

Q. And it was even after the declaration of Martial Law ?

A. Yes, when I got down there, *i.e.*, on the 21st.

Q. Do you think you could have taken action but for the existence of the Martial Law ?

A. I don't think so; we would have been in very difficult situation without the Martial Law.

Q. Was investigation a difficult matter in these Sub-Divisions ?

A. It was to begin with.

Q. What rendered it difficult ?

A. The people would not come forward; they were very truculent with the subordinates and it was very difficult to get information to begin with.

Q. What was the effect of setting up Summary Courts and the rapid trials by them ?

A. At the trials people saw that they would be immediately punished if they did anything. So they stopped and nothing further occurred.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Nevill, you say that the *hartal* which was arranged for the 15th was suddenly altered to the 14th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Now what is there to show that the 15th was originally fixed at all ?

A. Because of the information that I had. It was chiefly given to me by the Superintendent of Police.

Q. Wherefrom did you get that information ?

A. I was given it by the Superintendent of Police.

Q. When ?

A. Probably on the 11th or 12th.

Q. You were told on the 11th or 12th that the 15th had been fixed ?

A. Yes; I cannot tell you definitely that I knew that the 15th had been fixed; but this was the general impression that 15th was the day.

Q. You were told before the 14th in any event ?

A. Yes.

Q. That was probably on the 11th or the 12th ?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Now were you surprised to find that the approver, who gave evidence about this, did not say that the 15th was ever fixed ?

A. Well, I am afraid I was not deeply interested in that. That would not affect my opinion at all.

Q. What I mean to ask is, was there any tangible evidence before you to show that the 15th was originally fixed at all and then altered to 14th ?

A. I was told this by the Superintendent of Police.

Q. That is all the material you had ?

A. That was sufficient at the time. I had my own ideas too.

Q. Now you say that one pleader, Din Muhammad, took the crowd back to the city ?

A. Yes.

Q. When was this ?

A. That was when the crowd was in front of the post office, *i.e.*, before the post office was burnt.

Q. Before they set fire to the post office ?

A. Practically at the same time.

Q. You say he took the crowd to the city ?

A. Not all the crowd but he took a portion of the crowd. There were many thousands of people there.

Q. The portion that remained, set fire to the post office ?

A. I don't know about that.

Q. Were you there at the time when the pleader took the crowd to the city ?

A. I was just coming up about that time.

Q. Did other pleaders also assist in driving the crowd away ?

A. There were a couple of pleaders with the Superintendent of Police.

Q. Were they assisting the authorities ?

A. I am not quite sure as to what were they doing but they were talking with the Superintendent of Police.

Q. That is what you believed at the time ?

A. That is the impression they gave me at the time.

Q. This pleader, Din Muhammad, was arrested ?

A. I believe so.

Q. Ultimately, he was let off ?

A. I have no personal knowledge about it. I heard of it.

Q. He was kept under arrest for a considerable time ?

A. I do not know anything about it because I have no personal knowledge.

Q. You say that the aeroplanes arrived when they were with you; you mean the townspeople ?

A. Yes; non-official people; there were a few magistrates and municipal commissioners.

Q. They were with you ?

A. Yes.

Q. They throughout assisted the authorities or did their best to assist ?

A. They were going and coming. There were a lot of people going and coming.

Q. I want to know whether there were a lot of people who assisted you ?

A. Certainly.

Q. And they were the respectable class of people ?

A. I cannot say.

Q. I mean people of some position in the town, were assisting you ?

A. Yes.

Q. The mob consisted of the lower classes of people ?

A. It would be very hard to say. There were thousands of people. Some were of the lower classes; some of them hooligans.

Q. Did this crowd loot any property in Gujranwala ?

A. Possibly they looted at the station.

Q. In the town was there any loot ?

A. It never came to my notice.

Q. You can speak of certain things about the villages of Sheikhupura, Sangla and Chuharkana ?

A. Yes.

Q. You went to these villages, on the 21st ?

A. Yes.

Q. When you speak about the cries regarding the British *Raj*, etc., did you hear them yourself or were you told of them when you went there ?

A. That was what I found out. They were told by the people.

Q. And all this happened before you arrived ?

A. Certainly.

By Major-General Sir George Barrow—

Q. If those aeroplanes had not arrived just at that time do you think there would have been killing by the mob ?

A. Yes; I think so.

Q. You consider that it was Martial Law which prevented the spreading of disorder to certain other parts of the district ? You say here "up to the time of proclaiming Martial Law the disorder was rapidly spreading to the villages....."?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. It is your opinion that Martial Law did stop the spreading of disorder ?

A. I think so.

Q. Further on you say "it was obviously only the fear of Martial Law that kept them (those in Sangla and its neighbourhood) from resisting"?

A. Yes.

Q. And the application of Martial Law and trial by Summary Courts enabled the authorities to get the malcontents in hand ?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you asked the military to assist the civil authorities, would the results be the same as the introduction of the Martial Law ?

A. I cannot offer an opinion on that.

Q. You have expressed an opinion here ?

A. What I meant by that was that certain steps were taken by the authorities to suppress disorder and without those steps it would be difficult to carry on. As regards those steps, I have no opinion to offer.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Have you or your subordinates any record of any private meeting being held between the 6th and 16th ?

A. I believe there is one.

Q. There is a report that a private meeting was held between the 11th and 12th at Gujranwala ?

A. I understand so; I was told so, at any rate.

Q. Have you seen it ?

A. I have not seen it.

Q. Were you informed as to where this meeting was held ?

A. No.

Q. Were you informed as to who were the persons that held it ?

A. No.

Q. You have never seen any report of what was said at these meetings ?

A. It did not concern me at all.

Q. You said 'no very great apprehension was felt on the evening of the 13th.' Do you know that the authorities knew on the 11th and 12th that a *hartal* was going to take place ? Are you aware that all Europeans at Gujranwala and all the officers knew that a *hartal* was going to take place and this information was in their possession on the 11th and 12th ?

A. I do not know quite about the date; I think that is the date.

Q. On what date was the farewell durbar of Colonel O'Brien ?

A. 11th.

Q. Are you aware that the Europeans were so apprehensive that they went with revolvers in their pockets ?

A. I was not aware of it. I also attended.

Q. Are you aware that on the 11th and 12th arrangements were made to remove the missionary and European ladies from Gujranwala ?

A. I do not think there were any.

Q. No meetings about it ?

A. I was not present there.

Q. Supposing these things happened, still you would say there was no apprehension on the 11th, 12th or 13th as to what would happen ?

A. There was a possibility that there would be no violance at all.

Q. On the 11th and 12th, were any special arrangements made by the police ?

A. I do not know.

Q. What effort would you have made if you had known on the 12th that the meeting was going to take place ?

A. I was the Assistant Superintendent of Police; I simply carried out orders.

Q. Therefore you could suggest what the Superintendent would not have done ?

A. No.

Q. You are aware that the train which arrived at Gujranwala on the morning of the 14th was 14 hours late ?

A. I was aware of it.

Q. You are aware that this was the first train which arrived from Amritsar between the 13th and 14th ?

A. I found it out afterwards.

Q. That was the first train after what happened at Amritsar ?

A. I was told so.

Q. You are also aware that 13th and 14th are *Baisakhi* fair days ?

A. Yes.

Q. And this train was proceeding to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you know, apart from what happened on the 14th, normally a very large number of people would go by the morning train ?

A. I understand so.

Q. Was booking stopped on the 14th morning at Gujranwala, for Wazirabad ?

A. I do not know anything about it.

Q. Were you informed that a very large number of the crowd were either on the foot-boards of the train, or running with the train ?

A. I heard there was an excited crowd round the train.

Q. The real point is whether or not a large crowd was standing on the foot-boards ?

A. I have not heard anything.

Q. How long did you remain at the Gurukul bridge ?

A. It was probably an hour. I had no watch.

Q. You know that this Gurukul bridge was surrounded by 5 or 6 temples, 2 Jain temples, 2 Sikh temples and 2 Hindu temples ?

A. I do not know.

Q. I want to know whether I am right in supposing that at least 5 or 6 temples are within an easy radius of this bridge.

A. It depends on what idea one has of the place.

Q. Is it 6 furlongs off, 3 furlongs off or what ?

A. There is nothing near it, except a Gurukul.

Q. I want to know whether there are 5 or 6 temples within easy reach ?

A. I do not know.

Q. You do not know ?

A. There is a temple behind it.

Q. This is the nearest bridge to the railway station, this Gurukul bridge ? The Kachehi bridge is far off ?

A. Yes ; on the other side.

Q. The Gurukul bridge is nearer to the station than the Kachi bridge ?

A. I could not tell without referring to the map. They are both quite near the station.

Q. And from the Gurukul bridge, could you see what was happening at the railway station ?

A. I should not think so.

Q. You did not go to the Kachchi bridge at all ?

A. No ; not till after the fire.

Q. You were not there when Mr. Heron was assaulted ?

A. No.

Q. Were you informed that on that very day, the C. I. D. and the Police were accused of having some connection with the calf affair.

A. No ; certainly not.

Q. Subsequently ?

A. I heard it a very long time afterwards.

Q. An investigation was started ?

A. Not so far as I know.

Q. Were you informed that certain pleaders who wanted to take away the mob and who were very zealous that no injury should be done, informed the authorities that the liquor shops should be closed ?

A. I have no personal knowledge. I heard it afterwards.

Q. You heard afterwards that such a representation was made to Mr. Heron ?

A. Yes.

Q. Even in ordinary times, I think as a superior officer of Police you would know, hanging a calf in a public place or throwing it inside a mosque would lead to a very big riot ?

A. Yes ; I think so. It depends on circumstances.

Q. You were there at that bridge with 2 or 3 constables for one hour ?

A. With 6 constables and 1 head constable.

Q. And except yourself and Mr. Heron, there were no Europeans inside the civil lines that day ?

A. Mr. Shaw was there guarding the Treasury.

Q. Except you and Mr. Heron and Mr. Shaw, there were no other Europeans.

A. There was also a railway official.

Q. The first thing that was burnt was the Gurukul bridge ?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was about 8 A.M.?

A. I should say before that.

Q. Practically sometime between 7-45 and 8 ?

A. Yes.

Q. And the Kachchi bridge ? It was about 9 ?

A. It was afterwards.

Q. I cannot understand from what you say whether the things that were done were done by this mob or whether they were done by portions of the same mob, different groups doing different things, independently ?

A. The mob was a huge one of tremendous size.

Q. People were on one side ; some of them went to the Kachchi bridge and some went to post office. That is your impression ?

A. Yes ; that is my impression.

Q. Now, about these British officers, am I not right in supposing that instead of the mob saying it there was a particular man who was actually there saying that "Mr. Heron has killed my brother and I would kill him ?"

A. It was a general cry.

Q. It was after some persons of the mob had been wounded, this cry was heard by you ? After certain persons had been killed and some wounded ?

A. They had been wounded at the Kachchi bridge before.

Q. It was after the shooting that some of the mob raised this cry ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were not certain Government buildings inside the city also ?

A. I do not quite know about it. There are certain Government buildings ; there are certain Municipal buildings.

Q. So far as the Gurukul bridge is concerned, I think it was burnt up by placing 2 or 3 pieces of wood, binding them together by a wire and placing them on the bridge and lighting it ?

A. No ; there was a heap of 20 logs, one on the top of another.

Q. It was placed on the bridge and the pile was set on fire ?

A. It was put on the top of the line.

Q. That is on the top of the wooden sleepers of the line ? The wood was collected and placed there and fired.

A. The big logs were there.

Q. Practically this wood that was placed on the sleepers was also part of the bridge ?

A. Yes ; it was fixed.

Q. Have you seen this *Patwarkhana*, which is described in your statement ?

A. Yes ; I made investigations there.

Q. Was it a private house or a Government house ?

A. I think it is a Government house.

Q. Had these people any grudge against the *Patwari* ?

A. I think not.

Q. What was the object of burning the *Patwarkhana* ?

A. To burn the land records kept there.

Q. They are kept there ?

A. The current one is kept there.

Q. The current one is personally with the *Patwari* as in the case of *Jamabandi* and other accounts ? It was kept in the house ; and they wanted to burn it ?

A. Yes.

Q. There were two small books which were with the *Patwari* ?

A. There were lots of other papers.

Q. Is it a fact that Colonel O'Brien arrived before the arrival of the aeroplanes ?

A. No ; my information is that the aeroplanes arrived about quarter of an hour before Colonel O'Brien arrived.

Q. Is it not a fact that when Colonel O'Brien arrived, he started through the civil lines and went to the Treasury, and there were no crowds when he arrived ? Are you aware that when Colonel O'Brien passed through the civil lines there was no crowd then ?

A. There was no crowd then.

Q. Did he see any persons when he was going to the Treasury, any of the persons of Gujranwala ? The Municipal Secretary, Pandit Iqbal Narain or any other ? Did he speak to the Pandit ?

A. He did speak at one place ; I do not know whose house it is.

Q. One of your witnesses, Barrister Abbas Ali, did he go on a visit to the Deputy Commissioner ?

A. I could not tell.

Q. Did you take any steps to inform the authorities as to what you knew about Din Muhammad ? He was practically all the time there. Did you take steps to inform the authorities as to the part he took at that time ?

A. Certainly, I informed the authorities.

Q. And notwithstanding that he was kept in jail ?

A. I am not sure about that point.

Q. You have said (I have taken down your words ; if you want to modify them, you may do so.) "That these villagers would not come forward and it was very difficult to get information from them, but that when the Martial Law was introduced the task was rendered easier."

May I understand that you meant to convey the idea that the introduction of Martial Law helped you in getting evidence ?

A. It made our work of investigation much easier and I considered that without Martial Law it would have been impossible.

Q. Your normal and usual investigation is much more difficult than the investigation you were holding during Martial Law times ?

A. No ; about the same.

Q. The difficulties you meet with in your ordinary police investigation were absent in the investigations held during the Martial Law days ?

A. No; after the first few days, I found them practically the same.

Q. Martial Law had no effect ?

A. Afterwards.

Q. In the first week ?

A. It made it possible to investigate.

Q. These are your words. 'People are not coming forward to give evidence ; it is difficult to get information.' How did the Martial Law help you to get information ?

A. There was no attempt to oppose authority or do anything of that sort after Martial Law had been imposed. We were able to get in touch with the people.

Q. You did not mean to say that in any way Martial Law made them come forward ?

A. Certainly not. It enabled them to come forward.

Q. So far as these villages were concerned, how did Martial Law help you to investigate these matters except that it allowed you to arrest anybody and everybody on the faintest breath of suspicion ?

A. I do not agree with that at all. I never arrested anybody unless I had very convincing evidence that he was guilty.

Q. How did it help you ?

A. Under Martial Law, they made no attempts to resist us, they helped us. There was a change in their demeanour.

Q. Martial Law brought them to their senses ?

A. That is my meaning.

Q. Do you mean to say that these landlords, these *lambardars*, every one of them was in the know ?

A. What is the meaning.

Q. You sent for the *lambardars* ; they refused to give information saying 'we know nothing.' Did you suppose that they were in the know as to who committed all these offences ?

A. Yes, some of them knew ?

Q. Were any of these *lambardars chàllaned* or convicted ?

A. I could not tell you offhand. I can tell you from the records. I believe one *lambardar* was convicted.

Q. What difference would you make between Martial Law and Military aid ? You were in charge of a subdivision of the district as a superior police officer. What I say is : You take away the Martial Law regulations and you get all the help from the Military; what difference would it make to you ?

A. I could not tell you ; I have no experience.

Q. You had no previous experience of any Martial Law ?

A. No.

Q. Therefore my point is : Supposing these regulations that people should *salaam* the officers, attend the parades and all that . . .

A. That hardly concerns me. I have no opinion to offer.

Q. So far as you were concerned, I quite understand that military aid was necessary; but when you say that Martial Law instead of military aid is necessary, my difficulty comes in. You were not concerned with any of these regulations that were passed by the Martial Law authorities : you were only concerned with the help that you received from the mobile columns and the military escorts . . .

A. I am concerned with the actual points. Martial Law has practically enabled me to investigate.

Q. I want to know whether you are prepared to say that in your investigation you were practically helped by the Martial Law regulation that was passed by the Martial Law authorities ?

A. I am not concerned with these things. I can tell you about the result.

Q. There are different parts of Martial Law; the first is passing certain regulations ; the second is giving you military help and the third trying certain persons in a different way. There are 3 parts of the Martial Law so far as I understand. There were certain regulations passed, there was certain military help given to the civil authorities, and there were some distinct tribunals. So far as Part I was concerned, did it give you any help in your investigations and getting your cases easily and rapidly finished ?

A. Yes.

Q. I am talking of the first portion. I can concede that the military help you got for arresting people certainly helped you in your investigations. You may contend there were established summary courts, and that the accused people were quickly punished before these courts and that there was no appeal or pleader or anything of that sort, and that people liked it. I want to know whether in the first statement, in your opinion, all these regulations helped you in carrying on your investigation ?

A. I have no very intimate knowledge of what was done.

Q. If you have no very intimate knowledge of what was done, you could not possibly speak about the effect ?

A. It was Martial Law that enabled me to carry out my investigation. I have no information about details.

Q. Martial Law on the whole brought about this result. I say Martial Law concerns the 2nd and 3rd parts. I want to know what result the other part of the Martial Law has brought about ?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. So far as your sub-division was concerned and so far as your jurisdiction extended, you never heard of any cases where this mob was armed with fire-arms or swords or anything of that sort and nothing was recovered from them ?

A. Lathis were recovered.

Q. Did I speak of *lathis* ?

A. Lathi is a distinct arm.

Q. Except *lathis*, nothing else ?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Am I not right in supposing that the post office was burnt after the return of Mr. Heron from the Kachi bridge ?

A. Yes, it is so.

Q. You say : aeroplanes came and dropped bombs and machine-gunned the crowd, first of all they came, went back and then came again ?

A. I did not pay much attention to the aeroplanes There was a great crowd. My impression is that they circled round for a considerable time first.

Q. And even their circling round over the station and over that road did not have the effect of dispersing the crowd until they began to bomb and fire upon the mob ?

A. I think so.

Q. That is, before the actual bombing had taken place, the mob must have been aware of the fact that 3 aeroplanes were hovering over their heads ?

A. Yes.

Q. And there were 3 aeroplanes, and you saw the 3 aeroplanes ?

A. I think 3 ; I could verify from my note.

Q. Did you, as the head of the Gujranwala district Police Department make any order to investigate as to whether any houses were hit or not ?

A. I was Assistant there. I had nothing to do with that.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q You said in your statement that the firing at the Kachchi bridge was the result of an assault on the

Superintendent of Police. What is yur authority for saying that Mr. Heron was badly hurt ?o

A. I saw him ; his face was very bad with bruises.

Q. Do you mean to say that the mob assaulted him before they were fired on ?

A. Certainly.

Q. You said in reply to a question that the cries you heard of the mob intending to kill the British officers were all after the mob had been fired on at Kachchi bridge. Do you mean to infer that this violent intention was the result of their having been fired at ?

A. No ; I was not at the Kachchi bridge. I was at the Gurukul bridge, and there was the Superintendent of police who said that all this took place before they fired on the mob.

PANDIT IQBAL NARAIN, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Are you the Secretary, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 14th April last, did you go to the railway station early in the morning ?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time did you arrive there ?

A. It was 6-30 or 7.

Q. At that time, did the train come in from Amritsar ?

A. No.

Q. Were you there when it arrived ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. What did you see at the station ?

A. There was a crowd of about 1,000 people, most of them bareheaded.

Q. What were they doing ?

A. They were telling the people not to go to Wazirabad.

Q. Did the mob do anything to the property of the station at that time ?

A. No.

Q. How long were you at the station ?

A. For about 15 minutes. I then went back to my house.

Q. On your way back to the house did you see anything ?

A. I did not notice anything.

Q. When did you first see anything of the incendiarism that took place that day ?

A. I saw the Kachchi bridge burning.

Q. At what time did you see it burning ?

A. That was about 8-30 or so.

Q. Where were you when you saw the burning bridge ?

A. I was on the railway line.

Q. Had you gone from your house again ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How far from the Kachchi bridge is it ?

A. About 100 yards.

Q. You were there when Mr. Heron, the Superintendent of Police, was there ?

A. I was not there.

Q. Did you see Mr. Heron that morning ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Where was he ?

A. I saw him first at the railway station. I saw him afterwards near the Kachchi bridge, near the railway quarters.

Q. That is the place I wanted to ask you about. When you saw him there were a number of people surrounding him ?

A. About 500.

Q. What was happening ?

A. They were all armed and they were all threatening.

Q. What were they armed with ?

A. With crowbars, hammers, *lathis* and railway implements.

Q. Did you notice whether Mr. Heron was attacked by any one ?

A. Not in my presence.

Q. Were you there when the mob was fired on ?

A. I went there five minutes after that.

Q. When you went there, was the mob dispersing in consequence of the firing.

A. There were still 5 or 6 hundred there.

Q. They were still threatening ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the position a critical one ?

A. Very critical.

Q. Were the people in mob throwing anything ?

A. Yes ; they were throwing stones.

Q. At whom ?

A. At where Mr. Heron was standing.

Q. Did you see any of the stones strike him ?

A. Not in my presence.

Q. Then a large number of the mob collected at the railway station ?

A. Yes ; afterwards.

Q. Did you see it ?

A. I was there.

Q. What occurred in your presence there ?

A. The post office was burnt ; afterwards the *dâk* bungalow was burnt, the *tahsil* was burnt and other buildings.

Q. What led to the burning of these buildings ?

A. People burnt the buildings, that is all I know.

Q. With what material did they burn the buildings ?

A. I did not notice any materials.

Q. Did you form any opinion as to what the intention of the mob was in burning these public buildings ?

A. Just to damage Government property.

Q. The mob also attempted to set the jail on fire. Did you see that ?

A. I saw them going there and heard them saying so.

Q. What did you hear them saying ?

A. " Now, we shall get to the jail, break it open and burn it."

Q. Were they saying anything as to who were in power that day ?

A. They thought themselves to be in power.

Q. And were acting in complete defiance of the authorities ?

A. Certainly.

Q. You remember when the aeroplanes arrived ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was happening about the time they came ?

A. They were burning the Industrial School at that time.

Q. But for the arrival of the aeroplanes, would more damage have been done than was done ?

A. I think so.

Q. I think some bombs were dropped and shots were fired ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What in your opinion was the effect of the action taken by the aeroplane ?

A. The mob dispersed.

Q. But for the presence of the aeroplanes would the mob in your opinion have dispersed ?

A. Not at the time.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice G. C. Rankin—

Q. Were you in the street when the aeroplanes arrived or in some building ?

A. I was outside on the road.

Q. Did you see 3 aeroplanes ?

A. I saw more than one. May be 2 or 3.

Q. Were you near the people at any time when they were fired upon by the machine gun from the aeroplane ?

A. No.

Q. You did not see ?

A. No.

Q. Can you locate where any bombs have been dropped ?

A. I know all the places.

Q. Just tell me on what places ? There were 3 in a line. Do you remember that ?

A. On the Grand Trunk road.

Q. One of them was not effective and did not explode ?

A. No.

Q. The other two did ?

A. Yes.

Q. You cannot say whether that road was full of people or not at that time ?

A. I did not see.

Q. You saw the mob.

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Have you seen the places where these bombs fell inside the *mandi* ?

A. Yes.

Q. It is a very populated portion of the city surrounded by houses ?

A. Yes.

Q. One of the bombs fell in the courtyard of the school ?

A. Yes.

Q. How far is the *mandi* from the railway line ? More than 2 miles ?

A. It is about a mile.

Q. I believe that Colonel O'Brien arrived before the aeroplanes ?

A. Just by that time.

Q. He has told us that he heard of the arrival of the aeroplanes when he was in the Treasury.

A. Yes.

Q. And he came and first saw you ?

A. No.

Q. Did he not see you ?

A. I saw him afterwards.

Q. Before going to the Treasury or after ?

A. He came to Gujranwala ; he went to my place ; I was not there.

Q. Because he had gone to your place, so you went and saw him ?

A. I do not know. I was there outside in the civil station ; he called me and I joined him.

Q. At the time there were no crowds ?

A. Not in the civil station.

Q. You know Mr. Abbas Ali ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he go to see him that evening ?

A. I saw him there.

Q. Where the Deputy Commissioner was ?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you been able to find out whether any of the houses in Gujranwala were damaged by any of these bombs ? A three-storeyed building or any other building ?

A. I do not know.

Q. This map which was placed before you was made with your assistance ?

A. On my orders.

By the President—

Q. The map showing the places where the bombs had fallen ?

A. No ; I prepared a map of the town showing the civil station and not the places where the bombs fell.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. I am only asking you about those places. You know Mr. Din Muhammad ?

A. I know him very well.

Q. He and you were together 3 or 4 times on that day ?

A. Yes.

Q. On every occasion you saw him, as a matter of fact, helping the authorities, by pacifying the crowd, by going to the places of meeting, and so on ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know how many days he was under arrest ?

A. It was more than a month.

Q. You also know that on one or two occasions he did this at the request of Mr. Heron himself ? When you and he were together he asked him to remove the crowd and pacify them, and the crowd was taken away ?

A. I do not know. I was not at that time with Mr. Din Muhammad.

Q. This train was one hour late that day ?

A. It was 13 hours late.

Q. No morning train comes from Amritsar to Wazirabad ?

A. This train was due at Gujranwala at 7-30, but it came on the 14th morning.

Q. And the first time you went there to the station, this train was being boarded by a large number of persons bound for Wazirabad ?

A. There was no train when I went there.

Q. What time did you go to the station ?

A. I went the second time at about 8 o'clock.

Q You went at 7 A.M.

A. First time.

Q. Then the train was an hour late ?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you seen the damage done to the Gurukul bridge with your own eyes ?

A. Long afterwards.

Q. What was the damage done ? Only one sleeper damaged ?

A. Something like that.

Q. There is a black circular mark in one sleeper ; that is the only damage done ?

A. That is all I could say.

By the President—

Q. You saw it after repair ?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Did you see what damage was done to the Kachchi bridge ?

A. I saw that bridge afterwards, Sir.

Q. You did not see the Kachchi bridge that day ? How long afterwards ?

A. I cannot say ; may be a month afterwards.

Q. And Gurukul ?

A. Same time.

Q. After a month ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see Mr. B. B. Bhagat there ?

A. I saw him once.

Q. At the time when any of the bridges was burning, did you see Din Muhammad putting out the fire, or any of the pleaders ?

A. I was not there when the bridge was set on fire.

Q. Were you informed by Din Muhammad ?

A. Yes ; he told me.

Q. On the 14th ?

A. Yes.

Q. He was extinguishing the fire ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you remember that in your presence a representation was made by Din Muhammad that the people are getting out of hand because the liquor shops were open ?

A. He and I both made it.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. How long have you been at Gujranwala ?

A. For the last 3 years.

Q. Do you know the legal practitioners there very well ?

A. I know all of them practically.

Q. Prior to the 14th, what was their attitude towards Government ?

A. Defiant attitude.

Q. Were you present at any of the meetings they held ?

A. I was hearing what they were talking.

Q. Were you present on the meeting of the 5th ?

A. Yes.

Q. What attitude did they display there ?

A. Some of them talked about the Rowlatt Act and others about the Delhi incidents. In my opinion they misrepresented the Rowlatt Act.

SARDAR SUNDAR SINGH, B.A., LL.B., M.B.E., Honorary Secretary, Central Co-operative Bank, Gujranwala.

By the President—

Q. Were you at Gujranwala on the 14th April last ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You heard of the trouble in the morning, I think ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you proceed to the railway station and put your services at the disposal of Mr. Heron, Superintendent of Police ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You saw the situation was a serious one, I suppose ?

A. Yes ; I thought so.

Q. After certain consultation with the Superintendent of Police, did you make a round of the civil lines ?

A. Yes, I made a round in the civil lines and passing by the Court and other Government buildings, I went to the Government High School.

Q. At that time, these buildings were quite safe ?

A. Yes, quite safe.

Q. On the way, did you see crowds in the street ?

A. Yes, Sir. Outside the Sardar Mahon Singh's garden I met the crowd.

Q. Were they excited ?

A. They were quite excited.

Q. And shouting ?

A. They shouted '*Rowlatt Bill hai hai.*'

Q. In what direction were they proceeding ?

A. To the railway station.

Q. What time ?

A. It was about 10 o'clock.

Q. Did you see anything happening to the telegraph wires ?

A. I saw near the distant signal on the Lahore side, men climbing up the posts and cutting the wires.

Q. What were they cutting the wires with ?

A. Iron instruments.

Q. Were these the members of the mob that were doing that ?

A. Certainly.

Q. Did that cutting of the wires stop communication to Lahore ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At that time was the situation very grave ?

A. I think it passed out of the control of the civil authorities there.

Q. We heard from a large number of the other witnesses of the firing of the different buildings. I do not think I need trouble you with details. Of course you saw the different buildings that were burnt ?

A. Yes, Sir. I saw the post office.

Q. And you remember the aeroplanes came about 3 o'clock in the afternoon ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the result of the action taken by the aeroplanes ? Was it beneficial in the sense that it restored order ?

A. That is my view.

Q. But for that action (I think it unfortunately resulted in considerable casualties) what would have happened ?

A. I think the rest of the buildings would have been burnt. The Treasury might have been looted possibly.

Q. I think you are the Honorary Secretary of the Central Co-operative Bank in Gujranwala ? Where are your premises ?

A. In the heart of the town.

Q. Was any attempt made to set your premises on fire ?

A. I was told so.

Q. Did you succeed in trying to persuade the mob not to destroy the building ? What persuaded the mob not to burn the building ?

A. Because it was not a Government building.

Q. Was the mob at that time out to destroy everything that belonged to Government ?

A. That is my idea.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You are a prominent resident of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You practise there as a pleader ?

A. Yes.

Q. You also take interest in the co-operative movement ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now, before April 1919, were the people of Gujranwala as far as you know them, loyal and law abiding ?

A. I think they were.

Q. Before you come to April 1919, was there any *anti*-Government or *anti*-British feeling visible among the people ?

A. I do not know anything about it.

Q. You never saw that ?

A. No.

Q. What do you think is the reason for this sudden change that came over them in April 1919 ?

A. My view is it was due to the agitation about the Rowlatt Act and then the agitation on account of grievances at Lahore and Amritsar.

Q. The Rowlatt Act agitation threw them into excitement ?

A. Yes, Sir. That excitement was heightened by *hartal*, because people were thrown out of business.

Q. The excitement was caused by the Rowlatt Act agitation followed by the *hartal* and by people remaining idle. Then came the news of the happenings at Amritsar and Lahore ?

A. Yes.

Q. That had the effect of making the unruly elements in society prominent ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a considerable portion of the population of Gujranwala who did not sympathize with the hooligans ?

A. Yes ; I think so. I suppose they were terrorised by what the hooligans were doing. Most of the people who were terrorised remained in their houses.

Q. It was really the hooligans and the unruly element in Gujranwala that took hold of the situation and did what they did ?

A. Yes, but I cannot say whether there was any organization behind. I think all the rowdy people were doing the mischief.

Q. Have you any personal knowledge of any organization behind ?

A. No ; I have no personal knowledge.

Q. Was not dissatisfaction also caused by the high prices that were obtaining ?

A. To some extent, yes, but in Gujranwala it was due to political agitation. The element of high prices was not very important.

Q. Why do you say so ?

A. High prices were only a minor cause.

Q. Now with regard to recruiting I understand that in the beginning Gujranwala was not very successful ?

A. Recruiting was very slack in the beginning.

Q. Did the recruting campaign become very intensified after Colonel O'Brien took charge as Deputy Commissioner ?

A. The recruiting campaign was more properly organized.

Q. It was after Colonel O'Brien came that recruiting went on briskly ?

A. That is because he adopted some systematic means.

Q. Did it happen that there was considerable pressure exercised upon people to recruit ?

A. I am afraid I cannot say about that. No pressure was brought to bear in my presence.

Q. Do you know of cases where pressure was brought to bear, where people were brought up from villages and.....

A. When they were brought to the recruiting office they asked whether they were willing to join and if they were not they used to be sent back.

Q. But were not unwilling people brought up from villages ?

A. They might have been.

Q. They were brought up to Gujranwala from various villages ?

A. They were possibly brought up by some zealous individuals.

Q. Some over-zealous individuals did impress people who were unwilling ?

A. It was not the policy of the authorities.

Q. In some cases in fact it did happen and would this not cause discontent ? Will you agree that if in fact this did take place it would cause some dissatisfaction ?

A. You must also take into consideration that when they were let off this caused satisfaction to their friends.

Q. The very fact of people from various villages being so impressed and brought to Gujranwala, though ultimately let off, would to a certain extent cause discontent ?

A. I have no personal knowledge about this.

Q. Do you admit the fact that this happened ?

A. I saw only two cases where they were allowed to go back.

Q. You saw two cases where people were unwilling and were allowed to go back—if you were connected with the recruiting committee you must have come to know of other cases though you may not have seen them yourself. I understand that certain over-zealous officials had impressed unwilling people ?

A. I never said over-zealous officials. I said individuals.

Q. Individuals had so impressed people against their will ?

A. Yes, individuals impressed some for their individual benefit.

Q. There may have been various motives for doing so but in fact they did it ?

A. Yes ; I think so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were you staying in Gujranwala during the month of May ?

A. I think so.

Q. Are you aware that during the last week of April an order was issued restricting the right to travel to and from Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. And that this restriction was taken away in the first week of May ?

A. I cannot give the exact date.

Q. Are you aware that after a few weeks this restriction was removed ?

A. Yes ; I think so.

Q. Is it not a fact that two or three days after removing this restriction, this restriction was re-imposed again as a punishment on the citizens of Gujranwala ?

A. I will not say as a punishment but I think it was again imposed.

Q. Can you give me any reason why it was imposed ?

A. Because the railway authorities could not supply accommodation to the other people. There were very few trains running.

Q. If I inform you that the military authorities who were responsible for this order imposed it as a punishment will you be prepared to modify your statement ?

A. I cannot say much about this. I have given you my own reason.

Q. Was there any large exodus of women in the second week of May in Gujranwala ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was this matter brought to the notice of the military authorities ?

A. I do not know.

Q. At what time did you reach the railway station ?

A. I reached the railway station at half-past eight.

Q. I think the Kachchi bridge affair was over by that time. I want to know as to whether what happened at Kachchi bridge happened after you and your party arrived there or did it happen before your arrival ?

A. I heard about this at the railway station.

Q. It must have happened before your arrival ?

A. Certainly. I heard about this affair after I arrived at the railway station, therefore, it must have happened before my arrival at the railway station.

Q. I want to know whether this happened before you reached the station.

A. It might have.

Q. When you reached the station you say in your statement that you met the Superintendent of Police and so long as you were able to see, Mr. Heron was not assaulted ?

A. He was assaulted afterwards at about 11 o'clock.

Q. I am referring to the assault made upon him at the Kachchi bridge ?

A. I know nothing of the assault at Kachchi bridge.

Q. Did you hear about it ?

A. I heard later on.

Q. You never came to know about it till the 14th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it not a fact that sweetmeat sellers sold their sweets very cheap on the evening of the 13th ?

A. I never came to the town on the 13th.

Q. May I take it that you know only what happened at the railway station ?

A. I never came to the town on the 13th.

Q. Were you there on the 11th and 12th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you informed that after the 6th a second *hartal* was going to take place ?

A. No, I never knew about it.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. About those cases where you said over-zealous individuals went too far in their method of getting recruits, were these cases numerous ?

A. There were very few.

Q. Whenever a man was brought in, was he allowed to go back again ?

A. There were two cases where they were allowed to go back.

Q. Did you suppose that as a result of such methods any individual was ever actually enrolled in the army against his will ?

A. I do not know of any such cases.

Mr. S. M. JACOB, I.C.S., Director of Agriculture.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Jacob did you get instructions from the Punjab Government to leave Lahore with a mobile column at 3 A.M. on the 20th April ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was the object of your going with the mobile column ?

A. I have put all that down in my statement. I went to investigate and punish offenders for cutting the telegraph wires at mile 254 at Kamoke.

Q. On your arrival there did you call for the *lambardar* ?

A. I told some villagers to fetch the *lambardar*.

Q. Did you get him ?

A. Well I had to wait a long time and eventually one or two *lambardars* rolled up. One man Bhagwan Singh refused for a long time to come so I went to his house and got him myself.

Q. What happened when you saw him ?

A. I found him at his house. He was standing there with folded arms and he was very indifferent to any instruction that I gave him. I told him to get the other *lambardars* and the villagers together. He practically paid no attention to what I said and eventually I told him that if he did not do what I wanted he would have to be punished ; but he still continued to be very indifferent to what I asked him to do, so I held a summary court-martial on him and sentenced him to fifteen strokes of whipping and a fine of Rs. 200.

Q. Under what authority were you acting when you took that course ?

A. Under the authority given to me under Martial Law.

Q. What was your position under Martial Law ?

A. I was given power to try offences summarily.

Q. I see that in an other place you took some hostages —what exactly did you do in connection with the taking of hostages ?

A. I had collected a number of villagers together and we had several men of respectability there and after discussing the situation with them they could not or would not tell me what they knew about the cutting of the wire, so I simply selected six men.

Q. What did you do with them ?

A. Put them under arrest and sent them to the nearest *thana*.

Q. What happened to them after that ?

A. I do not know as I was only temporarily employed on this duty.

Q. Were you also with a mobile column under the command of Colonel Smithers ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What object had that mobile column in view ?

A. I think it was partly by way of demonstration and also if we found any organised resistance to deal with it. I could not tell you what Colonel Smithers' orders were.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. On the 20th April were your instructions from the Punjab Government given to you in writing ?

A. Yes ; they were instructions in writing. I think my instructions were to report myself at 2 A.M. at cantonments to accompany the mobile column. The detailed instructions were given to Major Brade who was commanding the column.

Q. Was it the act of the military commander or was it your act when you took those hostages ?

A. We both discussed it together. I do not know what the technical position would be.

Q. Can you tell me whether it was a part of his orders to take hostages ?

A. The idea of taking hostages did not originate with me or with him.

Q. Your nomination to exercise power under General Beynon's proclamation—is that in writing ?

A. I was gazetted as a Magistrate with summary powers by the Local Government.

Q. So you were entitled under Martial Law as constituted to hold a summary court ?

A. I am not sure about the dates. I certainly was empowered but I am not certain as to whether the authorisation was subsequent to the date of this—20th April.

Q. It may have been retrospective ?

A. I rather think it was before that.

Q. Can you tell me seeing that the general proclamation regularising the procedure afterwards adopted for Martial Law was dated the 19th April. Had you a copy of that with you at the time ?

A. Probably not.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. What position were you occupying in April ?

A. I was Director of Agriculture.

Q. And when were you put on to duties relating to the disturbances ?

A. I happened to be at Amritsar on the 13th and I was asked to take in a despatch to Lahore from the Deputy Commissioner which I did. But that was purely a private matter.

Q. When were you put on regular duty in connection with these disturbances ?

A. I think it was about the 15th or 16th. I then took a despatch to the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade.

Q. Did the local Government take you away from your ordinary duties as Director of Agriculture and clothe you with some other function ?

A. They gave me powers under Martial Law but I still had to carry on my duties as Director of Agriculture.

Q. Was that appointment made by the local Government or by the military authorities ?

A. I believe by the local Government.

Q. Your appointment as you describe it in your statement was to punish offenders for cutting telegraph wires—was that by the local Government or by the military authorities ?

A. As I have said just now the actual detailed instructions were given to Major Brade who was commanding the column.

Q. Who gave those orders to Major Brade ?

A. Those as far as I remember were Brigade orders.

Q. Then what did the Punjab Government do ? You say that under instructions from the Punjab Government you left Lahore to investigate and punish offenders for....

A. The Punjab Government gave me instructions to accompany the column.

Q. Who was to investigate and punish offenders—Major Brade or you ?

A. I imagine it was myself. That is how I interpreted my orders.

Q. Were these orders given to you by the Punjab Government or by the military authorities ?

A. By the Punjab Government.

Q. Have you that order in writing ?

A. I have not got that with me.

Q. Where can it be had ?

A. I could not say. It was delivered to me at about 11-30 P.M. and I had to leave at 3 A.M. in the morning.

Q. There must be a copy of it ?

A. Yes, there must be.

Mr. Herbert.—General Beynon appointed certain military officers to try cases summarily and he asked the Punjab Government to depute civil officers similarly.

Sir C. H. Setalvad.—Have you that letter of General Beynon to the Punjab Government ?

Mr. Herbert.—Yes.

Sir C. H. Setalvad.—The orders to Major Brade as to what was to be done—they must also be in writing ?

Witness.—Those were typewritten instructions.

Q. There must be some office copy available ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were your orders merely to report yourself to the military authorities and take instructions from them or were you definitely given instructions by the local Government to investigate and punish offenders for cutting the wires ?

A. I could not tell you. I cannot remember whether the words to investigate and punish were instructions to me. They were certainly Major Brade's instructions.

Q. Then when you went to this village and found the *lambardar* as you say obstructive what did you actually do ? Did you hold an investigation or did you summarily proceed to punish him ?

A. Well I warned him that I wanted him to understand that he had to listen to me.

Q. Was Major Brade with you ?

A. Major Brade was with me.

Q. When the *lambardar* did not come you went to his house ?

A. We both went with four or five soldiers and they were there with fixed bayonets but the *lambardar* was absolutely indifferent to the presence of those armed men, and I was rather surprised at that.

Q. Was he not terrified ?

A. No, I was rather surprised at this. When these armed men came round he seemed to be rather more inclined to be insolent than before.

Q. What did he actually do when you asked him to go with you ?

A. I first of all asked him why he did not come. Then as I have said he only smirked.

Q. Then when the soldiers came what did he do ?

A. He stayed where he was and I told him to pull himself together and get the villagers.

Q. In what language did you speak to him ?

A. Punjabi.

Q. Could he understand you ?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he move at all ?

A. No, he did not move at all. So I told him that he must come with me and the soldiers formed a guard round him. They did not lay hands on him and he began to move and they followed behind.

Q. When did you inflict this punishment ?

A. After reaching my camp. We were on the main road holding an enquiry; and he continued to adopt his same attitude of insolence and obstruction.

Q. How did he show his insolence ?

A. When I got to the main road where I was holding an enquiry I asked him to get the villagers together and to give me some information about the cutting of the wires.

Q. What did he say ?

A. Eventually I found out that he had no information.

Q. He had information as to the fact of the cutting of the wires—the same information that you had ?

A. Yes, but that was of no use. We wanted the details as to the cutting of the wire.

Q. What do you mean by details ?

A. Who cut, how it was cut and when it was cut.

Q. About this you ultimately found out that he had no information ?

A. I could not say that he had information. I daresay he had little or no information.

Q. If that was so—that he had no information—he could not give you any ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you proceeded to inflict this punishment on him and you gave him 15 strokes ?

A. Yes.

Q. Who actually gave the strokes ?

A. I think it was an officer of the West Sussex or West Kents. I forget the regiment.

Q. Was he stripped naked for this purpose ?

A. He had his loin-cloth on and he was bound to a tree.

Q. Was the village collected there ?

A. There were villagers there.

Q. Were they in large numbers ?

A. I should think there were about thirty or forty.

Q. What was the number of inhabitants of the village ?

A. About two to three thousand.

Q. Was he able to sustain this flogging ?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you fined him Rs. 200 ?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you recover that amount ?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you do it ?

A. I think he told some of his friends to go and get it.

Q. Was he kept in custody till he was able to pay it ?

A. Well he was not kept in custody. He made no attempt to go away so I accordingly made no attempt to guard him.

Q. Then after that did you take him further in your investigation ?

A. No.

Q. Then did you do anything further ?

A. I questioned various people as to what they knew about it. Eventually I got the information that the cutting of the wire had taken place at mile 364.

Q. You merely got the information that the wires had been cut at some other place ?

A. Yes; that is correct.

Q. It was at that village that you took hostages ?

A. Yes.

Q. When you reached that village what did you do ?

A. I collected all the headmen of the village and leading men and there were a great many retired Indian officers there and we had a discussion.

Q. What was the population of this village ?

A. It was a smallish village. There were about fifty collected for this discussion.

Q. Did you ask them to give information as to who was responsible for the cutting of the wire ?

A. Yes.

Q. They could not give you any information.

A. They could not tell me. They said they had no information.

Q. Did you believe them or not ?

A. On the whole I thought they probably might have something to say about it.

Q. At the moment did you believe them ?

A. At the moment I was quite convinced that they knew something about it.

Q. You say the people consisted of retired army officers and you would expect them to be truthful about it and there was no particular reason why they should not help ?

A. My impression of the men was that if they had known they would have told me.

Q. Did you know at that time that they were Indian officers ?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore you must have thought that if they had information, they would not keep it back from you ?

A. I thought that if they had information they would have probably told me.

Q. All these people who had collected including the retired Indian officers told you that they had no information ?

A. They all told me.

Q. Then why did you take these hostages ? What was the object ?

A. It was more or less protective, to prevent a recurrence of the cutting. I think that was the idea underlying the orders which directed the taking of hostages.

Q. How was that prevented by taking hostages? Supposing there was cutting of wires after you took hostages, what was intended to be done to the hostages?

A. I suppose it was only more or less to impress the villagers that there was such a thing as Government after all and they had some power. I imagine that was the idea.

Q. In order to show to the villagers that there was power with the Government?

A. I imagine so; it is pure guess work.

Q. You took part in these operations. I want to know what the idea was behind the taking of hostages. You say it was to prevent the cutting of wires. How would that prevent cutting of wires, I want to know. Supposing wires were cut—what would you do with the hostages?

A. I do not know that I ever thought what the subsequent proceedings would be. In cases of that kind, one is dealing with emergencies as they arise.

Q. When you were dealing with an emergency?

A. You are talking of the subsequent emergency of wires being cut a second time. That did not arise.

Q. Yes, when you decided upon doing this, it must have been done with some intelligent object. In what way would that have any effect on the villagers, or what was impressed upon the villagers thereby? Were they told what would happen to the hostages?

A. I did not consider what further action should be taken against hostages.

Q. When you took hostages, did you tell the villagers why you were taking them?

A. I told them that they were taken in order to prevent a recurrence of the cutting.

Q. What impression did you think you conveyed by that? If recurrence happened, what would happen to these people?

A. That was left to their imagination.

Q. How did you select these 6 people from among the 40 or 50 that were before you? Did you select the biggest six?

A. I think I had a good deal of help in selecting from the Indian officers who were present.

Q. They helped you in making a selection?

A. Yes.

Q. On what principle was this selection made by them?

A. I told them that they might tell me whom I should take. They pointed out some men. There was an Extra Assistant Commissioner; I forget his name. I asked him also. They named about 4 persons. I asked him to select two more and he picked out two more. As far as I remember, I did not personally select anybody.

Q. Then you took those six people with you?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did you take them?

A. I took them to the police station near by. I forget its name; I think it is at a distance of about a mile.

Q. You left them at the police station?

A. I left them with the *thanadar*.

Q. And you proceeded to other villages, I suppose?

A. I proceeded back to Lahore after this.

Q. After this how many villages did you visit? Was it two only, Kamoke and Nangal Sadan? Then you came back to Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. These hostages were left at the *thana*?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not bring them?

A. No.

Q. What happened to them afterwards?

A. I do not know.

Q. How long were they kept?

A. I do not know at all.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Before the 20th April were any other cases tried by you as a summary court?

A. I think these are the only two cases I have tried.

Q. Before that you never tried cases as a summary court?

A. Not as a summary court.

Q. I believe there will be no record of these two cases anywhere?

A. There ought to be; I sent in records.

Q. There is a record; you did make a record?

A. Yes.

Q. Then did you adopt the same method that was adopted in other places? *i.e.*, you left your place in the night time and surrounded the village in the early morning and you made investigations? When did you reach the first village?

A. Kamoke?

Q. The place where you punished Bhagwan Singh.

A. I think it was at about 5 or 6 in the morning.

Q. The general procedure was adopted, *viz.*, that before waking up the villagers, the village was surrounded by soldiers and the police? Nobody was allowed to leave?

A. Yes.

Q. Similarly, I take it, the village of Mari Megha was surrounded?

A. No; it was not surrounded because I had only about half a dozen mounted men with me. We simply went straight into the village.

Q. Did you punish Bhagwan Singh for any breach of Martial Law or under General Beynon's proclamation or under the Indian Penal Code? For what did you punish him? What was the charge read out to him?

A. I do not remember.

Q. If there is anything in that record, there must be the name of the accused, names of persons who were examined as witnesses and the offence for which he was charged. I do not want any more detail. But according to the form which has been given, you will have to put down the name of the accused, names of the witnesses that you examine, the charge that was read out to him and the punishment, guilty or not guilty. May I know whether you punished him for any breach of Martial Law, or for breach made in connection with the proclamation of General Beynon, or whether you punished him under the Indian Penal Code?

A. I merely punished him for refusing to help me.

Q. You have seen General Beynon's proclamation. Does it make that an offence?

A. I do not think I have seen General Beynon's proclamation.

Q. Certainly it was no breach of any Martial Law. There was no Martial Law that anybody who does not follow a civil officer proceeding with a moveable column to find out people cutting wires, etc., will be punished. There was no such Martial Law promulgated and you will agree with me that his case does not come under any of the sections of the Indian Penal Code?

A. I cannot remember whether I put down in the record any particular section.

Q. You will agree with me that it was no offence under the Indian Penal Code?

A. I do not know. I should like to have a look at the Penal Code. I had not the Penal Code with me at the time.

Q. It was not for breach of any Martial Law?

A. I have never said so.

Q. Why was he not arrested and subsequently taken and tried? It appears to me that your only reason for

punishing him then and there was to enable you to get on with your work. Why was he not arrested as others were ?

A. For one thing, we were in motors ; I do not know that we had very much room to spare, even if I had wanted to take him along.

Q. You subsequently arrested men and brought them ?

A. Then we walked. Nangal Sadan is quite close to the main road.

Q. In the same way as others were arrested and brought by the police or somebody, why was he not arrested and brought by the police or somebody ?

A. Nangal Sadan is off the main road ; as I told you we walked.

Q. But when you brought them after arrest, you must have made some arrangement ?

A. We walked.

Q. Up to Lahore ?

A. To the *thana.*

Q. How far is this village where this Bhagwan Singh was living from the *thana* ?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Certainly not more than three-quarters of a mile ?

A. I am trying to remember where the police station is.

Q. You just now informed me that it was within two miles of Nangal Sandan ?

A. That police station is, I think, about 10 miles away.

Q. If you surround a village at 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning all of a sudden and say that nobody should go out, and if a man stands before you with folded arms and says that he has done nothing, do you call it obstruction ? Don't you think he will be surprised ?

A. He was called up by other people before I went there.

Q. When he came before you, was he not standing with folded arms before you ?

A. Yes. I did not go and wake him up.

Q. Don't you think he will be terribly afraid ? Will he not say 'I do not know what I have done, the police have surrounded the village and there are civil and military officers' ? He is called all at once. He stands before you with folded arms. Is there no other explanation except that he was very insolent or obstructive ?

A. You suggested that he was afraid.

Q. I do not say he was. I say that if at 5 A.M. in the morning the village was surrounded by the police and the Military and if he was all of a sudden called before a military officer, will that not be an explanation that his conduct might be due to his being afraid during those days ?

A. His conduct was anything but that of a man who is afraid. You said that the village was surrounded at 5 in the morning. I said 5 or 6. It was certainly after day break : when I went to his house, it was some time after the preliminary arrangements.

Q. Did you give any instructions to the *thanadar* so far as these hostages were concerned as to what should be done with them ? Were they to take them to the jail or to the Sub-Divisional officer ? What instructions did you give ?

A. I left them in his charge ; they were under the orders of the Extra Assistant Commissioner.

Q. What instructions did you give ? Were they to be taken to some Magistrate after 24 hours, or were they to keep them till something happened ? Did you give any orders when you handed over these six men ?

A. I think I merely told them to keep them until they got order from the Extra Assistant Commissioner to release them. As far as I remember, he was there ; I left them in his charge.

Q. Did you tell him as to what to do ?

A. He knew it.

Q. Was he to make any investigation to find out whether they were guilty, and then if they were not guilty, were they to be released ?

A. He was making investigation at the time.

Q. They had not committed any offences. Were they to be kept in custody until the real offenders were discovered ? There must be some instructions. I can understand an accused being kept in custody pending investigation. But here they had not committed any offence. They were hostages. What were the instructions given to the *thanadar* as to what should be done with them ?

A. As far as I remember they were kept there in order to exert pressure on the village to give information.

Q. Am I right in supposing that the criterion of selection of these six men was that they were the most respectable and influential people of the village ? Am I right in supposing that whenever hostages were taken, they were taken to be the most respectable and influential men of the village ?

A. If it was the criterion, I think the Indian officers would probably come under that. I did not take any Indian officer.

Q. That is your idea. Indian officers do not have that position at all here. My point is, in taking hostages, the underlying idea is in order to bring pressure to bear upon the village, you take the influential and respectable men of the village ?

A. Men of some position, at any rate.

Q. Not *badmashes* ?

A. Not *badmashes* in the ordinary sense.

Q. Here is a man who received 15 strokes. So far as he is concerned, I do not think you said, even if the will of the military officer was supreme, that he refused to do anything that he was asked to do. You saw him at the time you reached there. You saw him going to the roof of his hut or house, and after that he was flogged ?

A. I did not see that myself. A man came to me as I was searching one house. The man said that a man on the roof of his house was shouting to other people to make away with their loot and I said " Bring him down.' Then they brought him down and I punished him.

Q. The military officer did not ask you to flog him or take any steps ?

A. No, he did not.

Q. It was your own work ?

A. Yes.

Q. For what offence did you punish him ?

A. I punished him under the authority I understood I had under Martial Law.

Q. Then you were quite aware that the military were there ? Have you any information that anybody was seen leaving, or subsequently was anybody seen leaving that village ? It must have been day time, because it was 6 A.M ?

A. That was another day.

Q. Then at what time was this ?

A. I think we reached Mari Megha at about 10 or 11.

Q. In the day or night time ?

A. Day time.

Q. So far as your recollection goes, you or any constables or the body of soldiers did not see any persons leaving the village with property ?

A. Subsequently to our searching, you mean ?

Q. When you entered the village, somebody came and told you that this man was standing on the top of the roof saying something to his neighbour. After that, did you, as a matter of fact, find that any number of persons left the village after your arrival with any loot or with any property ?

A. I did not catch any one leaving the village.

Q. Did you see any persons ?

A. If I had seen, I would have stopped them.

Q. But nobody was enabled to leave the village with the loot ?

A. I saw no one.

Q. Who was that man who gave you that information ?

A. He was some villager there.

Q. What was the defence of that man ? Did he admit that he was about to go away ?

A. He did not attempt any defence, as far as I know. He was caught on the roof.

Q. My difficulty is this. It may not be true, but it is possible that when he saw a large body of police and soldiers and British officers coming to the village from the roof of the house, he would shout that soldiers, British officers, etc., were coming to the village ?

A. This was after we had been in the village for some-time. When we were searching houses in the village, he did this.

Q. He was also tried by you as a summary court-martial ?

A. Yes.

Q. Then why were the others not convicted then and there ? Probably there was no evidence ?

A. It was rather doubtful.

Q. There, of course, you could not punish them without identification of property ?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Is there any statutory obligation on *lambardars* of the Punjab to give assistance to Government officers in matters connected with the administration ?

A. There is.

Q. Does the law provide any penalty for breach of the obligation ?

A. Yes, under the Penal Code.

Q. Apart altogether from Martial Law, a *lambardar* who refuses to assist a Government officer in making the investigation when called on to do so, would be punished under the ordinary law ?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. You stated that you had received written instructions from Major Brade regarding persons refusing to give information ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember whether persons refusing to assist could be whipped or punished in some other way ?

A. Yes.

Mr. A. R. B. ARMSTRONG, Executive Engineer, Wazirabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Armstrong, are you Executive Engineer, Wazirabad, in the Gujranwala District ?

A. Yes.

Q. In April last how many European residents were there in Wazirabad ?

A. About 8 or 10.

Q. Rev. Mr. Bailey and his wife and two children lived a little away from the station, Mr. and Mrs. Ward and children, about one mile south of the station. Then you mention some other people. Your wife and yourself were living about one and a half miles from the station and your Assistant Engineer was about three miles away from the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Does the railway station at Wazirabad lie between the city and the railway lines ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you notice anything on the 12th or 13th as regards the demeanour of the inhabitants ?

A. I noticed that they were rather insolent in demeanour.

Q. In what way.

A. My house is very close to the road which leads from Wazirabad, where crowds of people go to attend *Baisakhi* ; they were passing very close to my house ; they frequently came up to the windows and when they were turned off by the servants, they went away, but their general demeanour was insolent.

Q. The news of what had occurred at Amritsar and Lahore reached Wazirabad on the 13th ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Officer Commanding warn all Europeans residing outside Wazirabad to be prepared to rendezvous in the railway lines at short notice ?

A. Yes.

Q. At about 2 o'clock on the 15th, were you all called in to the railway lines ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you instructed to reside in the railway rest-house ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did all the people I have mentioned come into those lines ?

A. Yes, during that afternoon.

Q. Did you also receive instructions from the Deputy Commissioner at Gujrat to take steps to safeguard your European staff at Kathala ?

A. Yes.

Q. You also called Mr. Anderton to Wazirabad ?

A. Yes.

Q. And all the people arrived at about 4 P.M. ?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you were a company of about 24 people ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you lived in the four-roomed house ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the British troops camp close to the house ?

A. Yes, quite close.

Q. Did you see an aeroplane that afternoon ?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you see ?

A. It hovered overhead for a few minutes and then it went north and landed in some field about a mile away.

Q. That night did you post armed sentries round the house ?

A. Yes, as instructed.

Q. Why was that done ?

A. We were instructed by the Officer Commanding.

Q. Were there no troops available ?

A. No.

Q. The night passed off quietly ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did more troops come in ?

A. Yes. More came and joined in the night.

Q. During the 15th, were attacks made from the city on the station and civilians ?

A. Yes.

Q. At the station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were civilians other than railway officials confined to the railway lines ?

A. Yes.

Q. What sort of attacks were made ?

A. I was told that stones were thrown from the street into the station and attempts were made to seduce the railway staff (locomotive) from working, and set fire to some of the locomotive oil tanks.

Q. Were these oil tanks actually set fire to ?

A. They were not set fire to.

Q. Were the telegraph wires cut ?

A. Yes.

Q. At several places ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was anything done to the signal ?

A. Yes. It was pulled down.

Q. What happened to Mr. Bailey's house ?

A. It was burnt.

Q. Is his house about two miles south of the railway station ?

A. Yes.

Q. Fortunately he and his family had removed from that house ?

A. They came at 3 in the afternoon.

Q. Was the house burnt with all its furniture, clothes and everything it contained ?

A. Practically everything in the house was burnt.

Q. Among other things was there very valuable manuscripts ?

A. Yes.

Q. Were attempts made to burn the railway bridges and permanent way ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they ?

A. One was close to Mr. Bailey's house. I heard about it at the time and saw it after some days. Another attempt was made close to Wazirabad, which I happened to see from the railway quarters, a mile away.

Q. Did you actually see the burning of Mr. Bailey's house ?

A. No ; I did not.

Q. Did you actually see the cutting of wires ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see sleepers burnt ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they ?

A. Just north of Wazirabad station.

Q. Did you see the mob at close quarters ?

A. Not at close quarters.

Q. Could you judge as to their mood ?

A. I could not, except their actual cutting of telegraph wires, and trying to burn.

Q. You civilians were in an apprehensive state ?

A. For some days previously.

Q. Could you get supplies in the bazar ?

A. No ; we could not get supplies for some days.

Q. Why was that ?

A. Our servants told us that shop-keepers refused to supply any Europeans with things.

Q. I think you did get some flour from one of your contractors ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he procure it from villages in the neighbourhood ?

A. Yes, from 4 or 5 miles away.

Q. Is that gentleman Rai Bahadur Ram Rattan ?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether he was instrumental in preventing the mob from what they did ?

A. He told me that the Officer Commanding asked him to try and dissuade the mob from burning oil tanks and that he spoke to the mob at the time.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many years have you been at Wazirabad ?

A. One year.

Q. You say that on the 13th news from Amritsar and Lahore arrived ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did news of the Jallianwala firing at Amritsar arrive on the 13th ?

A. That I cannot remember now.

Q. Was the news of the firing at Jallianwala Bagh by General Dyer received at Wazirabad ?

A. I cannot remember exactly what the news was definitely except that there had been trouble at Amritsar and that Europeans had been murdered.

Q. Was that all ?

A. That is all I can remember at the present time. Most of it was in the form of rumours.

Q. On the 13th and 14th you had no definite information as to what had happened at Amritsar ?

A. We had no newspapers.

Q. News may have arrived without newspapers ?

A. That is why I call it rumour. I cannot recollect at the present moment exactly how we got the news

Q. How far is Wazirabad from Amritsar ?

A. About a hundred miles.

Q. Is there constant communication ?

A. In ordinary times we have constant communication.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. The railway station at Wazirabad lies between the town and the railway lines ?

A. Yes.

Q. For some time past two British officers and a dozen British soldiers were living at the railway station ?

A. They were living in the railway lines.

Q. Then you say that attacks were made on the 15th. Except that one act of cutting wires, you did not yourself see other things. You were told by somebody.

A. The only things I really saw were the cutting of telegraph wires and the attempts made to burn on the 15th.

Q. Where were you ?

A. I was in front of the railway rest-house, hardly a quarter of a mile from the scene of occurrence.

Q. Nothing else happened on the night of the 15th and 16th ?

A. Nothing at Wazirabad.

Q. As regards the house of Mr. Bailey also, you have no personal knowledge ?

A. Except that I saw the house afterwards.

Q. Do you know who the leader of the mob was ? The name of the man who is actually responsible for it ? Was he Seshan Lal ?

A. No.

Q. Did you hear subsequently that he was a lunatic ?

A. No.

Q. For how many days was there difficulty in obtaining provisions from the city ?

A. Actually our servants were refused food for about two days, and then supplies were got through Rai Bahadur Ram Ratan. That kept us going for about 10 days. So we did not require any thing from the city for 10 days.

Q. There was *hartal* on the 15th ?

A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. So far as information given to you by your servants goes, it was difficult to get provisions on the 15th and 16th ?

A. Yes, we did not stand in need.

MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH, Tahsildar, Wazirabad.

By the President—

Q. Are you Tahsildar at Wazirabad ?

A. I have been there as Tahsildar since the 5th of April.

Q. On the evening of the 14th April was a meeting convened in the Jumma Masjid ?

A. Yes, there was a meeting.

Q. Was the question of holding of a *hartal* discussed there ? Were you present at that meeting ?

A. I was not present at that meeting.

Q. On the night of the 14th were the sub-inspectors of the city and all the *thanadars* summoned to a meeting ?

A. As I had received orders from the Deputy Commissioner, I had summoned them at my own house in order to discuss the arrangements to be made in the event of a *hartal* the next day.

Q. Did that meeting take place ?

A. Yes, on the night of the 14th.

Q. Did you resolve to call the leaders who had advised a *hartal* ?

A. This formed part of the order and we resolved to do it.

Q. At this time was a large crowd collected outside the *tahsil* ?

A. When I collected the leaders of the city accordingly, there was a great crowd of people outside the *tahsil* at about 9-30 P.M.

Q. Who were the leaders that were brought in consequence of this summons ?

A. Sultan Ahmad, *Zaildar*, Qazi Baki Shah, Baili Ram, coal merchant, Diwan Sikandar Lal.

Q. Were you present at this meeting yourself ?

A. I had convened it ?

Q. And you heard the discussion that took place ?

A. Yes.

Q. What attitude was taken up by the leaders as to the holding of a *hartal* ?

A. Pritham Das, President of the Arya Samaj Society, said that there should be *hartal* and he was not responsible for the peace and order.

Q. Were there any of them who thought it was advisable not to hold the *hartal* ?

A. Diwan Sikandar Lal said that this was inadvisable.

Q. At this time was what happened at Amritsar known there ?

A. I cannot say anything about Amritsar, but we had received information about the incidents at Gujranwala at the time when I received orders from the Deputy Commissioner on the evening of the 14th.

Q. Personally were you not aware that on the 13th there had been very serious occurrences in Amritsar ?

A. No.

Q. Did you not even know what had occurred at Amritsar on the 10th April ?

A. I had a general idea of the general incidents at every place but had no special information about Amritsar.

Q. Was anything said that if the mob was out of hand, they might have to be fired upon, at this meeting ?

A. Yes, Sir. It was mentioned.

Q. At 9 o'clock on the next morning, *i.e.*, the 15th, were all the gentlemen summoned to meet you ?

A. They were summoned at 7-30 but the meeting dispersed.

Q. Was that meeting you were referring to in the night or in the morning ?

A. In the morning.

Q. At 9 o'clock the gentlemen who had been summoned to meet you were allowed to depart ?

A. Yes.

Q. And the mob you said had collected outside dispersed ?

A. Yes.

Q. What did the mob then proceed to do ?

A. I had already heard shouts and cries of the crowd previous to that. But when they were near the gates of the *tahsil*, I apprehended that there was some danger for the treasury, in which I had a good lot of money. As the majority of people who were with me had arms, people thought it was advisable for them to disperse, and went away.

Q. Was it about this time that the crowd burnt down the bungalow of the Rev. Mr. Bailey ?

A. I did not move away from the treasury, but when these things had subsided, I heard the news about Mr. Bailey's house.

Q. You heard that at 1 o'clock ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you also hear of the destruction of telegraph wires and railway signals ?

A. Yes, at about 2 o'clock.

Q. Was there a meeting in the afternoon at about 2 o'clock ?

A. A meeting had been arranged to meet at the *mandi*, but because there were many people, they proceeded towards the post office. At about 3 or 4 o'clock, I received information that people had gathered near the post office and they were ready making preparations to attack the post office. I went there with two inspectors of police and a *zaildar*. I saw a crowd of about 500 or 600 men.

Q. Had you your police force in addition with you?

A. There was a military picket there.

Q. Then were arrangements made to guard certain public buildings ?

A. I have already stated that on the evening of the 14th, I had asked all the sub-inspectors to appoint guards to protect Government buildings.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. At Wazirabad are there any officers superior to you or you are the person in charge of Wazirabad ?

A. Officially I am the superior person.

Q. Who is your immediate superior ?

A. The Deputy Commissioner.

Q. Is he at Wazirabad ?

A. At Gujranwala.

Q. Wazirabad is under the jurisdiction of Gujranwala ?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the population of Wazirabad ?

A. About 15,000.

Q. When did the *hartal* first start in Wazirabad ?

A. Some people had come from Gujranwala on the 12th; they, with certain men of Wazirabad, preached this *hartal* in the bazars and streets of Wazirabad. First of all they decided upon having the *hartal* on the 13th. The sweetmeat sellers had a lot of sweets, therefore they wanted them to postpone the *hartal* to the 15th.

Q. Actually the *hartal* took place on the 14th ?

A. On the 15th.

Q. Why did it not take place on the 14th ?

A. On the 13th and 14th, there was the *Baisakhi* fair.

Q. In your statement, you say that the leaders of the movement postponed it to the 14th ?

A. It was postponed to the 14th, but the sweetmeat sellers insisted for a further postponement and it was again postponed to the 15th.

Q. Did it take place actually on the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did it last ?

A. For one full day.

Q. Only on the 15th ?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 16th, there was no *hartal* ?

A. No.

Q. There was no *hartal* afterwards at all ?

A. No.

Q. When you called the leaders of the town, they barring Pritham Das were not in favour of the *hartal* ? Is that so ?

A. They were silent. Pritham Das was the person who said that there should be *hartal* and the others were silent; Sikandar Lal was against the *hartal.*

Q. The others were silent ?

A. Yes.

Q. In your statement, you say that in this meeting it was advocated that since the leaders of the town had not participated in the movement, the *hartal* should be ended the next day. Is that so ?

A. The people whom I had called did not participate in it.

Q. Those were the people whom you call the leaders ?

A. Barring Pritham Das and Jamiat Singh Bagga, nobody else out of those whom I had summoned participated in the *hartal* movement.

Q. The statement that you make is that the leaders of the town had not participated in the movement ?

A. I do not know whether they participated in the previous meetings or not.

Q. I am not asking about meetings in which they did not participate. I am asking you about the *hartal* movement.

A. Only these two participated, others didn't.

Q. Will you refer me to the paragraph in which you say that ?

A. I have not stated it like that.

Q. The leaders did not participate ?

A. That is correct.

Q. And it was because the leaders did not participate that the *hartal* ended the next day ?

A. That is what I have been told.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Was Jamiat Singh Bagga among those who were present at your place at 9 A.M. on the morning of the 15th ?

A. Certainly.

Q. You first of all made an enquiry as to who had attended the first meeting in the mosque ?

A. Yes, I enquired and nobody admitted this fact.

Q. Did Jamiat Singh inform you that as it was a mosque he considered it to be an ordinary meeting and was present there ?

A. Exactly.

Q. Jamiat Singh was not one of those who, like Pitan Singh, made any demonstration and said there must be a *hartal* ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You have described how the mob dispersed and with which leaders, and according to that statement Jamiat Singh did not head any mob or guide any party ? In your statement you say :—

> " At 9 o'clock A.M. all the gentlemen who were summoned to meet me were allowed to depart, and the mob that had collected outside Lohari Gate was also dispersed. A part of the mob went towards the Railway Station and a part towards Nizamabad by the Grand Trunk road. The mob which went towards Nizamabad included Muhammad Hussain, *alias* Bakra, son of Hafiz Abdul Manan, Bisheshar Nath, Abdul Rashid and others. They took with them men from Nizamabad, Viroke, etc., and looted and set fire to the bungalow of Rev. Bailey. The mob that went towards the railway station was accompanied by Master Muhammad Jan, Jowanda Mal, Jagan Nath Saluga and others." You have not mentioned the name of this man Jamiat Singh Bagga as leading any part of the mob ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. And you have mentioned others ?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it not said by Pritham Das that as the *hartal* had already been proclaimed and arranged it could not be prevented from taking place on the 15th ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And Pritham Das also said that there was no intention of taking any steps ?

A. He said that, but in addition to that he also said that in the event of any disturbance he was not to be responsible.

Q. So far as your statement is concerned, this clause does not find a place, that he said he would not be responsible ?

A. No, it is not there. I distinctly remember it, but I have not written it in my statement.

Q. You have named Bisheshar Nath ?

A. I did not know him then, but I know him since.

Q. Do you know that he is in the lunatic asylum ?

A. I have been told by respectable people of Wazirabad and also I have come to know from a medical certificate that he was a lunatic in 1917.

Q. Do you know whether he is now in the lunatic asylum or in jail ?

A. It is said that he is in the lunatic asylum, or he may be in jail, but he is a lunatic.

Q. Do you know that the Rev Bailey's house was burned down by the people of Nizamabad and Viroke ?

A. I did not see it with my own eyes, but the Nizamabad people accused the Viroke people and the Viroke people accused the Nizamabad people.

Q. Do you know that, so far as the burning of the Rev. Bailey's house is concerned, the people, both of Nizamabad and Viroke, have been convicted ?

A. I do not think Viroke people have been convicted, but Nizamabad and Wazirabad people participated in it.

Q. And this Bisheshar Nath is an inhabitant of Wazirabad ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were your courts open on the 15th ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And they remained open always and were never closed ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And when you went with your two sub-inspectors and one *zaildar* you were able to disperse that mob of 500 about whom you were informed that they intended to attack the post office ?

A. I succeeded in dispersing them by policy.

Q. The military picket that you referred to were the soldiers that were living in the railway lines ?

A. They were not those who were living in the railway lines.

Q. When did they come ?

A. They reached probably on the 14th.

Q. These were already there from the 14th ?

A. I saw them on the 15th.

Q. At what place ?

A. By the post office.

Q. And they were there without your being informed as to what place they came from ?

A. I had no information to that effect.

Q. After the 16th, did you remain all along at Wazirabad ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. During those days was every family taxed a rupee four or five weeks after the declaration of Martial Law ?

A. The Malik Sahib was in charge of the place and he had ordered this, and this money was collected.

Q. One rupee per family or per house ?

A. Per house.

Q. And how was this money spent ?

A. The soldiers were supplied with things which they required because they had not got ready money with them.

Q. In which week after the 16th of April and on how many days was this money collected ?

A. I do not remember the date.

Q. Was it in the month of April or May ?

A. It was in April. And it was collected in a day or two. No, it took 10 or 12 days.

Q. What was the total amount ?

A. Rs. 3,500 about.

Q. Through which agency was this collected ?

A. Members of the municipal committee.

Q. During these days was a Martial Law order passed that the boys reading in every school should come at about 9 and 12 o'clock to salute the Flag ?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was the Flag ?

A. Just near a bungalow which is situated in the city.

Q. How far from the railway station ?

A. A sixth part of a mile from the station.

Q. Were you informed that two Muhammadans were shot at Nizamabad and did you make any investigations and make a report ?

A. I heard the police had taken some measures to investigate the matter.

Q. You were there in charge, what was the report you heard ?

A. Malik Sahib Khan was in charge.

Q. You were there as a subordinate officer, what did you hear ?

A. There was one person supposed to be breaking the railway line and there I heard he was shot.

Q. Do you know the result of that enquiry ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know Diwan Chand of your place, of Wazirabad, a contractor ?

A. I know a wine contractor named Diwan Chand.

Q. Was he fined Rs. 100 for not leaving his cart when an officer passed in a motor ?

A. He was fined, but I do not know for what offence.

Q. There was no disturbance in Wazirabad after the 15th ?

A. The people did remain quiet after Martial Law was introduced.

Q. And the last thing that was done by the crowd was between 1 and 2 P.M. on the 15th, after that nothing happened ?

A. The last incident was wire-cutting.

Q. I am talking about Wazirabad city, not about the line.

A. I received intimation in the evening that they were making preparations to burn the court of the Munsiff, but I arranged to have pickets there and so it was saved.

Q. But did you see any crowds there ?

A. I was informed.

Q. There is Municipal and Government property inside the city at Wazirabad ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was any attacked ?

A. No, Sir, none. They had come near the *tahsil* with a view to damaging it as already described.

Q. You have mentioned in your statement what happened before 9 A.M. on the 15th. Have you in your statement described that there was any intention on the part of the crowd to attack the *tahsil* ?

A. I have not mentioned it in the statement.

Q. Have you any connection with the municipality of Wazirabad ?

A. I am the President of the municipality.

Q. Has any resolution been passed about the Rev. Bailey's house by the municipality ?

A. Not particularly about Rev. Bailey's house.

Q. I may be wrong, but I want to know whether any resolution has been passed by the municipal committee of Wazirabad saying that the Rev. Bailey's house has been burned by the Nizamabad and Viroke people ?

A. One member proposed that as the damage done to the Rev. Bailey's house was done by the people of Nizamabad they should not stand the punitive police.

Q. Has this resolution been passed by the municipality ?

A. I did not wish it to be passed, but because the other members wished it it has been passed.

Q. But it has been passed ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is your protest down there in the proceedings that it should not be passed ?

A. I shall enter my protest when it is submitted to the Government but I have entered there that such and such a man has proposed this and it has been passed.

Q. Did you record your protest ?

A. No, Sir.

Q. The Rev. Bailey's house is not within the limits of Wazirabad, is it not so ?

A. It is not within the limits of Wazirabad.

Q. And how far away is it from Wazirabad ?

A. About two miles.

Q. Do you know Diwan Badri Das of your place ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was his house searched and broken up ?

A. It was not done in my presence.

Q. Do you know that Captain Denning was your Martial Law Officer ?

A. Yes, towards the end.

Q. And within your knowledge did he or did he not complain to Colonel O'Brien that in some cases policemen were fabricating false evidence ?

A. Not in my presence.

Q. Are you aware of it ?

A. I did not know of it.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. You mentioned just now that some particular member of your municipality proposed something which was eventually carried. How long ago was that ?

A. It was on the 6th of December.

MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN, Retired Military Sub-Assistant Surgeon, Wazirabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Mohi-ud-Din, I think you are a retired Military Sub-Assistant Surgeon ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you have expressed a desire to make a statement before us ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What do you know about what occurred on the 14th and 15th of your own knowledge ? You might explain.

A. On the 14th at about sunset outside the Lahori Gate I was sitting in the *mandi* of Munshi Allajoya about 300 yards away from the Lahori Gate. I performed my evening prayer there along with Master Muhammad Hussain Jolly and when I had done so I heard a loud shout by boys who were crying "Rowlatt Bill, Rowlatt Bill." On hearing this I myself and Master Muhammad Hussain Jolly left the place lest these people should come there and we might be taken as partners of the rioters.

Q. Was there any riot that night ?

A. No, Sir; I heard only this.

Q. Did you hear it rumoured that night that there was going to be a riot ?

A. No, no riot but a *hartal.*

Q. I wanted to know what you meant by saying you left there in order that you might not be implicated in the riot ?

A. The disturbance, the *hartal.*

Q. Is a *hartal* necessarily a disturbance ? Does a *hartal* necessarily lead to a disturbance taking place in your opinion ? Do you think it is very likely that if you have a *hartal* you will have a riot ?

A. A *hartal* is not a riot. There is a great difference between a *hartal* and a riot.

Q. Anyhow you told us you went away and you saw nothing else occur on the 14th ?

A. No, Sir., I came to my house by the Trunk Road along with Muhammad Hussain and there were crowds of people walking about in the bazar as there was the *Baisakhi mela* on the 13th.

Q. On the 15th did you see anything of what occurred ? That was the day on which the house of Mr. Bailey was burned down ?

A. I heard that Mr. Bailey's house had been burned at about 2 o'clock. I did not see it myself.

Q. Did you see anything occurring in the station that day ?

A. No, Sir, I was afraid.

Q. What were you afraid of ?

A. I was afraid that as there was great disturbance in Wazirabad city perhaps they would attribute these things to me.

Q. You were afraid that you would get implicated in the riot ?

A. Yes.

Q. You were then very wise in staying away ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The only point I think that you say anything about so far as we are concerned is, I understand, that you think one gentleman who was convicted was wrongly convicted ? So far as we are concerned we are not a court reviewing particular sentences so I do not think I need trouble you about all you can say in favour of that gentleman. But you have some complaint to make in connection with Martial Law ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What is your complaint ?

A. One rupee *tawan* was levied.

Q. When was that ?

A. In the month of April from nearly everybody in Wazirabad city.

Q. What is your complaint in connection with that levy which was made ? It is a complaint that you had to pay one rupee ?

A. Yes, Sir. I myself had to pay one rupee and many people of my place were compelled to contribute tea and butter and that sort of thing. Ali Ahmad was the leading man and he used to come and collect milk, mutton, beds and things like that.

Q. What had you to pay the one rupee for ?

A. They said "we are collecting for the comforts for the military officers and soldiers."

Q. Was it levied as a tax or were you asked to subscribe that amount ?

A. Those who came to collect the things said they were collecting it for the military.

Q. Who collected it from you ?

A. For my ward Sheikh Inaitulla who is the member of my ward used to come along with Ali Ahmad.

Q. What right had they to collect from you ?

A. They said they had received orders from the officers to collect that. I told them that I had been a military man of 20 years' service in the military department, and I had never heard of it, but I was afraid. I knew the principles of Martial Law and that a slight disobedience would entangle one ; therefore I was compelled to pay it.

Q. Have you any other complaint you would like to bring before us ?

A. Yes, I had to pay Rs. 44.

Q. What was that for ?

A. Tawan.

Q. What was the ground on which you were asked to pay that ?

A. For the damage done to Mr. Bailey's house and for wire-cutting.

Q. That would be levied under municipal law, would it not ?

A. I do not know why it was done and who did it, but I had to pay that.

Q. Does that exhaust your complaints so far as you are concerned personally ?

A. Yes. I am a military man with a very small pension and have had to pay so much. I did not take any part in the disturbances and still I have had to pay.

Q. You think the expense connected with these disturbances weighed pretty heavily upon you ?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Have you any other point ?

A. On the 13th I heard a meeting was held in the house of Shamas Din on the 11th or 12th of April and some men were sent for.

Q. You have not any knowledge yourself about this ?

A. No, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Can you tell me the date on which you were compelled to pay this one rupee ?

A. No, Sir, not exactly.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Who is Chaudhri Ali Ahmad who levied the one rupee ?

A. He is sub-registrar and at the same time municipal commissioner and *lambardar.*

Q. What authority was he exercising in Wazirabad at the time when he levied the one rupee ?

A. My idea is that he was solely in charge of Martial Law.

Q. Was he Martial Law Administrator in Wazirabad ?

A. No, certainly not.

Q. How did he come to administer Martial Law ?

A. That is my complaint ; he behaved in such a way as if he was Martial Law Administrator.

Q. That is what you object to ?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you question him when he came to recover the one rupee as to what authority he had for that purpose ?

A. If I had made any objection I would have been handcuffed in a moment.

Q. But you knew he was not Martial Law Administrator ?

A. In reality I knew he was not, but he was exercising the power by force.

Q. Who allowed him to exercise that power ?

A. He was doing that, I don't know who allowed him, or whether he was allowed by any one.

Q. You are an experienced Army man ; true, you paid the one rupee, but did you afterwards make enquiries about it ?

A. Martial Law was in operation and I was afraid.

Q. You were afraid even of making enquiries ?

A. Yes.

Q. Martial Law was removed somewhere in June, was it not ?

A. Yes, on the 9th June.

Q. After that did you make enquiries as to the authority under which this was levied ?

A. Yes, and I came to know that it was under the Deputy Commissioner's orders.

Q. You satisfied yourself that it was under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner ?

A. Yes, then I was satisfied.

Q. Did you see the order ?

A. No.

Q. Did you obtain a copy of it ?

A. Certainly not.

Q. How did you satisfy yourself it was under the Deputy Commissioner's orders ?

A. Every one was saying so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You have given us a very long story about Master Muhammad Hussain and what he did, but unfortunately the Committee cannot ask you any questions about that because we have no right to judge his case. There is only one sentence I wish to ask you about. You say the public was subjected to indescribable suffering, misery and disgrace. What was the disgrace you mention here ? I do not want your hearsay knowledge, have you any personal knowledge of it ?

A. I saw the school boys standing in the sun. One day six or seven boys were exhausted and one of them was brought to me for treatment quite senseless and I applied ice and did what I could and after three or four hours he came to his senses.

Q. How did he get sunstroke ? Why was he suffering ?

A. He was standing in the sun along with other boys. The boys were sent for to make *salaam.*

Q. To make *salaam* to what ?

A. There was some officer there.
Q. How did that boy get sunstroke ?
A. While standing in the sun.
Q. Who ordered him to stand in the sun ?
A. All the boys were ordered to stand.
Q. By whom ?
A. I do not know.
Q. Where did they use to stand ?
A. In the dâk bungalow.
Q. At the time they were made to stand in the dâk bungalow were there any officers there ?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was the headquarters of the military authorities there in those days ?
A. In the dâk bungalow close to the railway station.
Q. Do you know of any other suffering or disgrace or misery ?
A. I do not remember.
Q. You said *ghi* and butter were taken, how were they taken ?
A. Do you mean in what was it taken ?
Q. Supposing half a pice worth of *ghi* was taken, would you complain ?
A. It was collected from nearly all the streets, wherever they could find it.
Q. Why should it not be collected ? What is your complaint ?
A. Without price.
Q. You say it was collected without price, and for whom ?
A. It was said for the military comforts.

At Lahore, Wednesday, the 17th December 1919.

PRESENT.

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.
The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.
Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.
Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Major C. W. J. SMITH, 2-54th Sikhs, F. F. Administrator, Martial Law, in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur.

By the President—

Q. I think you were Administrator of Martial Law in Gujranwala and Gujrat from the 17th April to the 18th May 1919?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At the commencement of the riots you were serving with the Area Unit for Gujranwala?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 17th April you proceeded to Wazirabad under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, and you there entered on your duties as Administrator of Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you then under the late Col. Burbury? Were you present when Martial Law was proclaimed at Gujranwala?

A. Yes. On the afternoon of the 18th. I left Rawalpindi on the 17th and arrived at Wazirabad on the 18th.

Q. And a similar proclamation was made in Wazirabad on the 19th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were copies of the general proclamation of Martial Law circulated throughout the district?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you send them by officers and also through the civil authorities?

A. Yes, they were sent by me to all officers in charge of the detachments. I also handed over copies to the civil authorities and I believe the civil authorities applied for copies direct from the Punjab Press.

Q. Did you also circulate a proclamation as to the protection of railways?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that?

A. It was the carrying out of the orders which had already been instituted by the Deputy Commissioner at Gujranwala and Gujrat and also Lyallpur. Regarding the protection of railways by village patrols, a warning was issued in that proclamation against any damage being done under threat of punishment.

Q. I think you busied yourself, then, with the machinery for the administration of Martial Law?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were Area Officers appointed, and certain other special officers?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You mentioned two officers—Captain Cole and Captain Wheatly—in addition to the Area Officers?

A. Yes, there was also a third whom I remember—Captain Ewing. I sent him in charge of the Moveable Column.

Q. Did you issue Martial Law instructions and furnish every British officer in the disturbed area with a copy?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they lay down the powers of officers?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What do you mean by "lay down powers of officers"?

A. Well, it was repeating the powers laid down by Colonel Burbury in his proclamation and arming all officers, *i.e.*, those officers concerned only, with power to inflict punishments, but the power was not given to any junior officer.

Q. Were further instructions issued by you from time to time?

A. Yes, Sir, in a similar manner: in fact under Martial Law Instructions.

Q. Gujrat I think came under Martial Law on the 23rd April?

A. I see the Martial Law order was dated 24th.

Q. And then Lyallpur came under Martial Law a little later?

A. On the 25th—the date of the order.

Q. As these districts came under Martial Law, did you appoint your officers and issue such proclamations as you had already issued in the Gujranwala district?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they the same, or with some modifications suitable to the districts?

A. There were slight alterations in certain cases. All were not applied, some were applied according to local circumstances.

Q. What means did you take to ensure that the Martial Law instructions and orders would be generally known to the public?

A. As Administrator of Martial Law I sent out instructions to Martial Law Area Officers to have the orders posted in suitable places in the towns where they were acting as Area Officers. Their headquarters as Area Officers was Wazirabad. I had them posted up I think in central places, including the railway station, *tahsil*, Indian Troops Camp, and certain places in the city, and I think on the Arya Samaj building.

Q. In the course of your administration of Martial Law, did you from time to time, consult the civil powers?

A. Yes. There were no European civil officers at Wazirabad which was the headquarters of the military district where I had to remain at headquarters. But I have at times visited Colonel O'Brien and the Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala district. I went on the outskirts of Gujrat and once to Lyallpur during my tenure of office and consulted the civil authorities there.

Q. Was any action taken by you taken exception to?

A. Not that I know of. I had no complaints or even suggestions from the civil authorities that my actions were giving trouble in any way.

Q. I see you indicate that you were handicapped by an insufficient office establishment?

A. Yes, Sir. The demobilisation of British troops was in full swing and it was exceedingly hard to manage. I asked the Divisional Officer for help from his establishment. For example, I could not get a clerk at all and finally I got one instead of the two I hoped to get.

Q. For this reason you had to remain pretty well all the while at headquarters?

A. Yes; Martial Law was a new institution and innumerable questions were being asked by officers of standing and others had to be settled immediately.

Q. I think you stopped your work on the 8th of May?

A. I now think I remember the date to be the 7th of May.

Q. Were your proclamations similar to the proclamations administered in Lahore under the Martial Law. Do you know?

A. Some of them were similar. The general proclamation was almost word for word. There were slight modifications. But there were a lot of local conditions which of course for geographical reasons or otherwise were not the same.

Q. I do not remember any special order issued by you that has never been under consideration before us in connection with some other area. During your administration were there any disturbances in your district?

A. None.

Q. To what do you attribute that?

A. I think it was due to the fact that Martial Law had been proclaimed. I think the troops overawed the people in the towns.

Q. What attitude did the people in Wazirabad and Gujranwala adopt?

A. When I first arrived at Wazirabad there was a sullen atmosphere amongst the populace, but this improved. In Gujranwala from start to finish I thought there was a sullen atmosphere, that is from what I saw of Gujranwala; I was not there very much. But during my opportunities of skirting the towns it struck me that there was a sullen atmosphere.

Q. Did it improve much?

A. No, I think not.

Q. Were not complaints made to you against the hardships of Martial Law?

A. No, except general complaints from the travelling classes—in towns and in *zamindaris* as regards railway travelling.

Q. I suppose restrictions on travelling would cause inconvenience to a number of people in the district?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. Was that felt as a hardship?

A. I should think so.

Q. So that restrictions were relaxed as soon as it was possible in your opinion to do so?

A. I cannot say what the conditions were as regards the railway authorities who were chiefly responsible for the stopping of traffic of 3rd class booking. It was relaxed there shortly before I left.

Q. Now, was any person in your administration of Martial Law dealt with for any offence committed prior to the establishment of Martial Law?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Were the offences dealt with in your area of a serious character or not?

A. In the Wazirabad area I dealt with only one serious case.

Q. That was in connection with setting fire to Delhi House?

A. No, it was before Martial Law was proclaimed. It was in connection with the tampering with telegraphic instruments in the telegraph office.

Q. So far as Gujranwala and Gujrat districts were concerned, were the cases there trivial?

A. As far as I remember they were trivial, with the exception of one at Malakwal.

Q. In that case were heavy sentences pronounced?

A. Yes; there was a term, I think, of a year's imprisonment.

Q. I think you dealt with one case in which you pronounced a sentence of two years' imprisonment?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that the only case where you pronounced any sentence at all?

A. I think that is the only case in which I gave imprisonment at all.

Q. What was the offence there?

A. It was tampering with telegraphic instruments in the telegraph office at Wazirabad, thereby disconnecting the Sialkot-Malakwal-Gujrat line.

Q. As regards the majority of the cases, they were dealt with by the Area Officers and not by you?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Major Smith, I see from your proclamation that as early as April 21st Form V—Martial Law was used. I rather gather from your proclamation, which seems to be very carefully worded, that the intention was that Form V was to be used for every trial, whether it resulted in conviction or not, and under your orders I understand that you saw no reason to suppose that was not carried out correctly. Had you?

A. I have no reason to believe to the contrary.

Q. So that you should have a record exactly of everything that was done, whether by Area Officers or persons nominated by you?

A. If he conformed to that order, yes.

Q. Have you any reason to suppose that in your jurisdistion punishments other than those laid down in the Proclamation were ever instituted or applied?

A. I believe none that I know of.

Q. As regards the restrictions upon railway travelling, I think you said that that was largely required by the civil authorities. Is that so?

A. No, the only thing the civil authorities had to do with the railway was the guarding of it before Martial Law was proclaimed. I dealt with restrictions on railway travelling. As far as the third class was concerned, the restrictions were instituted by the railway authorities.

Q. As a matter of fact the difficulty of providing the necessary accommodation was due to the interruption of communications?

A. I believe so.

Q. Then from the military point of view, was it a part of your duty to prevent the spread of what I might call disaffection or agitation into the surrounding districts?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. And I think with that object you were rather careful in giving passes to people and to the educated classes who may be disposed to agitate or carry agitation any further?

A. Yes.

Q. I think some of my colleagues will be interested to see that pleaders were to be regarded as suspicious characters unless they can prove that they were travelling to attend cases in court the dates of which were actually fixed. Please see Martial Law Instruction No. 6.* What was the object?

A. The object of that: it was believed that some pleaders were interested in the spread of disaffection and the system of issuing passes enabled the authorities to know who were travelling and therefore made it easier to watch the movements of a few who did travel.

Q. Was a Proclamation in force throughout the area proscribing meetings?

A. It was proscribed in the general Proclamation by General Burbury in his original proclamation prohibiting a meeting of more than 10 persons.

Q. A large part of your time, especially at first I understand, was occupied in giving advice on problems that officers who were actually in command of particular spots had to deal with?

A. Yes.

Q. Now did you lay down regulations as regards investigation of cases before they were brought to trial?

A. No, it would be the duty of all officers to investigate any cases.

Q. May I take this one case regarding the telegraph man who put out of action these two lines. Before that man was tried was his case investigated in the usual course by the police or the Criminal Investigation Department?

A. The case was investigated by the Assistant Provost Marshal, Wazirabad.

* Page 258.

Q. Before being brought up, it was not dealt with by the police at all?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that exceptional procedure or was that the usual course?

A. That was the usual course. The Assistant Provost Marshal used to bring all the cases to me as Area Officer, and that was the only serious one that was brought up at all.

Q. Then in addition to your work as Administrator of Martial Law, you supervised other areas?

A. Yes, by general instructions, and they submitted Form V to my office.

Q. Did you have information at the time as to how long persons were kept under arrest before being put up for trial?

A. In the case of my own area normally a man was never more than two or three hours under arrest. I used to hold my court every afternoon, I think at about 4 o'clock and that finished the cases for that day. The only case that lasted longer was one in which a telegraph operator was brought up and that was under investigation for not more than three days—I think.

Q. Did you find that the immediate disposal of cases enabled you to get evidence for the prosecution and also any evidence that was wanted for the defence?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Have you any reason to suppose that people were prejudiced by being tried on the spot as they might have had a better defence if they had had further time for consultation?

A. I do not think so. With the one exception of the telegraph man, the cases brought up by me were so trivial that they required no time for consideration.

Q. Was this telegraph man defended?

A. No, he had no one to defend him.

Q. Did he ask to be defended?

A. I cannot remember, but presumably one would always ask or be asked to be defended. I cannot remember now.

Q. I presume he was asked?

A. No, apparently he had no pleader.

Q. Did he ask for an adjournment and did he get one?

A. No.

Q. I see there is a provision in Martial Law Instruction No. 3,* paragraph 5 that in case it should be deemed impracticable in the interests of Martial Law to bring offenders before an Area Officer, they may be disposed of by any of the officers mentioned in paragraph 18 of the Proclamation, but officers other than Field Officers, Area Officers, or officers specially nominated were to use their powers only after reference to Field Officers or officers so nominated. Was that section brought into force, do you remember?

A. No, that order was issued by General Campbell.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Major Smith, did you take charge on the 19th?

A. On the 18th.

Q. And Martial Law was proclaimed on the 19th?

A. On the afternoon of the 18th at Gujranwala; it was proclaimed by the Punjab Government in the Gazette, the date of which I don't know.

Q. On the 18th?

A. I don't know the date of the Gazette.

Q. In all the areas you were put in charge?

A. Only in the Gujranwala area.

Q. In that area there were no disturbances after the 19th at all?

A. No.

Q. I don't quite follow, Major Smith, what you say in your statement as regards crimes and punishments. You say that no person was dealt with under Martial Law for any offence prior to the establishment of Martial Law. All offences in connection with the actual disturbances had been committed before the 19th. I don't know what you mean by this, 'that for offences committed prior to the establishment of Martial Law no person was dealt with under Martial Law'?

A. I mean by that, that officers like myself whose magisterial powers came into existence by the application of Martial Law tried no cases of disturbances which had occurred prior to the proclamation of Martial Law.

Q. Then who took cognizance of those cases?

A. The civil powers.

Q. You don't mean to say the ordinary courts took cognizance of those offences?

A. They were taken cognizance of by the special tribunals.

Q. Those offences were taken cognizance of either by the special commissions appointed or by the special courts created under Martial Law?

A. The courts were.

Q. All those tribunals were created under Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. It would not be accurate, therefore, to say that all offences prior to the establishment of Martial Law were not dealt with under Martial Law. Obviously it would be inaccurate. They were not dealt with by the Area Officers?

A. Not by Area Officers. That is my meaning.

Q. Then was Mr. Bosworth-Smith an Area Officer or what was he?

A. Mr. Bosworth-Smith was appointed an Area Officer by the Lieutenant-Governor, I think, by an order.

Q. Was he an Area Officer or not?

A. He was an Area Officer at Chuharkana and at some other places.

Q. Mr. Bosworth-Smith says in his statement that he dealt with a large number of cases of people who were arrested for offences before the 19th, and he was an Area Officer at that place?

A. None of the cases dealt with by Mr. Bosworth-Smith reached my office. I don't know what happened after I left.

Q. I am speaking of the period when you were there. Mr. Bosworth-Smith's statement comes to this, if I understand it correctly, that he arrested a large number of people for offences committed before the 19th, and they were tried during the period when Martial Law was in force. Is that correct?

A. I don't know. None of the cases under Form V reached the Martial Law Office before I left. I know of no cases tried by Mr. Bosworth-Smith.

Q. You mean to say no returns came to you. They may have been tried but you don't know?

A. No.

Q. If they were so tried it would not be accurate again to say that offences committed before the 19th were not tried under Martial Law by any Area Officer?

A. That statement of mine is made from the knowledge I had judging by the Form V submitted to my office.

Q. After you took over Martial Law Administration, did the civil authorities carry on as before under your general supervision?

A. Yes.

Q. And they made arrests of people that were reported as suspicious?

A. I believe so. I did not go into the question closely.

Q. I mean all that was left to them. The civil authorities and the police acted in the ordinary course as before?

A. Yes, so far as I know.

Q. Now with regard to the various orders that were issued under Martial Law, I see one was issued for controlling prices. Under what authority did you issue that?

A. Under the authority of Martial Law.

Q. Why was the controlling of prices necessary for the administration of Martial Law?

A. Because prices rose in the bazar just after the disturbances and it was creating considerable discontent amongst a very large body of men employed in the railway workshops, and it was considered necessary in the interests of good order that some measures should be taken to stop the rise of prices.

Q. You thought it was necessary to do so to maintain law and order?

A. Yes.

* Page 257.

Q. Did you fix the prices of all commodities or how did you act?

A. I acted through the tahsildar and several members of the Municipal Committee who came before me. We discussed this matter and finally decided that until the end of April—I forget the date now but I think it was the 13th April—prices were to be fixed. After that the civil authorities fixed the limit weekly or fortnightly, I don't remember which.

Q. The prices were fixed in several places in your area or only at one place?

A. The prices were fixed in Wazirabad by me only. At the request of the Officer Commanding the detachment at Kanki a Martial Law Order was also issued. I think up to the 7th May those were the only two.

Q. Those restrictions on prices remained in force all throughout your administration?

A. I don't know, but they remained in force up to the end of my administration, the 7th of May.

Q. Now with regard to your Martial Law Instruction No. 6.* This is how you put it with regard to pleaders: "Pleaders should be regarded as suspicious characters unless they can prove that they are travelling to attend a case in court the date of which is actually fixed." Why did you regard the pleaders as a class as suspicious characters?

A. Because I believed that some pleaders had been instrumental in spreading disaffection.

Q. Because you were told that some pleaders were instrumental in spreading disaffection. Who told you this?

A. I cannot say who told me.

Q. Mr. Bosworth-Smith or Colonel O'Brien?

A. I think it was the general impression I got at the time, and from reading what had happened elsewhere I considered it desirable.

Q. Did you get this impression merely from reading what had happened elsewhere or you were told by any officers, or did you gather it from what you read of what was taking place at several places?

A. I think so.

Q. Do you mean thereby that you read in the newspapers that at other places than Gujranwala pleaders had taken part in agitation? Is that what you say?

A. Yes. I fancy I got the impression at the time. Pleaders had taken part in Gujranwala also.

Q. The impression that you got was that some pleaders were instrumental in spreading disaffection?

A. Yes.

Q. On that do you think you were justified in casting an unmerited reflection on the whole class of pleaders; because some pleaders were creating disaffection you thought you were justified in casting a reflection on the whole class?

A. I think I was justified in issuing that order to Area Officers.

Q. What I put to you, Major Smith, is this. You say you felt yourself justified in making that statement. But do you still think that you were justified in making a sweeping assertion like this, in casting a reflection on the whole class of pleaders that they should be regarded as suspicious characters? Do you think that was a right thing to do?

A. I still think so. I feel I was quite justified.

Q. Because some pleaders behaved badly, you thought it right to casting a reflection of this character on the whole class of pleaders?

A. In using the words suspicious characters, I meant that care should be exercised in granting them passes.

Q. That is not the language you use. You say that pleaders should be regarded as suspicious characters. Was that sweeping assertion casting a reflection on the whole class of pleaders a right thing to do?

A. I still think I was justified in using that expression there?

Q. Some pleaders had taken part in spreading disaffection, but I suppose people of other classes, merchants and shopkeepers had done the same, had not they?

A. I have no knowledge.

* Page 268.

Q. Surely, you do not mean to suggest, Major Smith, that all the agitation and creating of disaffection in Gujranwala and other places was the work only of pleaders and not of any other class. People of other classes such as merchants and shopkeepers and others must have also done the same, more or less?

A. Yes.

Q. You don't characterise those classes as suspicious characters as you do the pleaders. Some shopkeepers had spread disaffection, some merchants had done the same, so had some pleaders, but while in the case of merchants and shopkeepers you do not make that sweeping assertion that they are all to be regarded as suspicious characters, you choose to make that assertion on the whole class of pleaders. Why do you distinguish the pleaders like that from all the other classes?

A. Everybody was suspected in a way then.

Q. What had the pleaders as a class done to merit your displeasure in this manner?

A. I considered it desirable that the movements of certain people should be specially watched including the pleaders.

Q. Surely, Major Smith, you could have done that without using language of this character?

A. This was not a public proclamation. This was an official instruction to certain Area Officers.

Q. You think you were therefore justified in doing it?

A. Yes.

Q. You issued an order, Martial Law Instruction No. 11,* requiring students to salute the flag. Schoolboys together with their masters were made to salute the flag at every parade with a view to inculcating a sense of respect for the British flag. What I want to know, Major Smith, is, when they were asked to do that at every parade, how many parades had you in a day?

A. The carrying out of this order was handed to the Assistant Provost Marshal. I think I am right in saying that there were two parades for the older boys, and only the morning parades, I think, for the smaller boys, but I am speaking from memory.

Q. Was this order made with regard to all towns within your jurisdiction or at particular places?

A. I think my instructions were with regard to all towns. As Administrator of Martial Law I issued an instruction that in all towns wherever there were detachments of troops this order should be obeyed.

Q. In all towns where troops were stationed this order was carried out?

A. Yes, at all places where there were Area Officers or officers commanding the troops.

Q. It applied to all schoolboys including the infant classes?

A. The infant classes were exempted from the evening parades. I think all schoolboys had to attend one parade at Wazirabad, and the infant classes were exempted from the second parade.

Q. Infants also had to come in once, and they included boys of the age of 5, 6 or 7. You are aware of that?

A. I don't know what the ages of the boys were.

Q. And you thought that by asking children of 5, 6, or 7 to attend the parade and salute the flag you were inculcating in them a sense of respect for the British flag.

A. Yes, certainly, because I think a child of 5, 6 or 7 is quite capable of appreciating.

Q. You do not suggest that those children of 5, 6 or 7 had taken part in the riots or in the disturbances?

A. I don't know of what age the youngest boy was who took part or was present in the riots in Wazirabad.

Q. Yo do not suggest any appreciable number of boys of 5, 6 or 7 took part in any place in these disturbances?

A. I think it improbable.

Q. Then why was it necessary with regard certainly to the infant students in schools, to enforce this order of saluting the flag. What were you effecting thereby, Major Smith?

A. It was considered that this would teach all school boys respect for authority as represented by the British flag.

Page 259.

Q. Do you think you can teach respect by enforcing orders of this character? Do you believe in them?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. You do not think that it was a hardship on those small boys of 5 or 6 who were brought there every day for *salaaming* the flag.

A. No. The distance was very small. I think the distance was a few hundred yards. I doubt if the distance exceeded 800 yards from the school in any case.

Q. Do you seriously think that you were serving any earthly object by enforcing an order of this character with regard to infant boys?

A. I think so.

Q. If you were again put in charge of Martial Law administration, I think you will do the same?

A. Yes, if I was satisfied that the schoolboys as a whole had been guilty of offences and had taken part in riots, etc., I would do the same.

Q. Then do I understand that this was done as a matter of punishment?

A. As a matter of discipline.

Q. You said just now that you would do the same if you found the schoolboys taking part in disturbances. Do I understand that this was inflicted as a sort of punishment? Evidently from what you say it looks like it?

A. Yes. If I found school-boys in a similar case taking part in riots or disturbances, I should consider that they would require further instruction in their duty as citizens.

Q. Then it comes to this, Major Smith, that certains boys in this area, according to you, had taken part in the disturbances?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you thought that it was necessary partly by way of punishment and partly by way of inculcating respect in their minds to enforce this order on the infant boys of 5 or 6 who had not taken part in these disturbances at all?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you still think that was a wise thing to do?

A. Yes.

Q. The restrictions about travelling, were they also put as a matter of punishment at Gujranwala?

A. Not originally.

Q. Those restrictions were continued as a matter of punishment?

A. They were continued, I think, for a fortnight after they were taken off at other places.

Q. They were re-imposed again, I understand?

A. I do not know. I had left.

Q. After you left?

A. They were originally imposed on the whole area. They were taken off the whole area and imposed on Gujranwala for a period of one fortnight during which I left the district.

Q. That is after you left?

A. The period expired after I left. I know nothing more.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You were the Administrator of Martial Law, and I think that all the Area Officers and all the persons who were trying cases in summary courts, were subordinate to you; their duty was to obey your orders?

A. Their duty was to obey the orders of the General Officer Commanding the Area.

Q. It was their duty to carry out your instructions and to obey the orders passed?

A. Yes, as emanating from the General Officer Commanding the Area.

Q. Therefore I take it that it would be the duty of Mr. Bosworth-Smith, Mr. Penny and Mr. Howell to obey your instructions dated 21st April.*

A. Yes.

Q. Now I would refer you to Martial Law Instruction No. 3,† paragraph 12. There you say that the "officers holding summary courts will take the oath laid down for Summary Courts, Martial, and, if necessary, the interpreter's oath. Evidence will be taken on oath of affirmation and a very brief precis of evidence and accused's statement will be submitted on or with a Form 5." They were also bound to obey this order?

A. Yes.

Q. Then so far as you were concerned up to the time that you remained you did not receive any Form 5 from Mr. Bosworth-Smith or Mr. Penny or Mr. Hoyle?

A. I cannot catch the last two names.

Q. Mr. Penny and Mr. Hoyle?

A. Where was Mr. Hoyle?

Q. He was in Lyallpur.

A. Some Forms 5 came in from Lyallpur. I was not able to refer to them. But as far as I remember they were cases tried either by Colonel Hodgson or Major Polley.

Q. Do you know whether these gentlemen obeyed this order or not?

A. No, I do not know whether they obeyed or disobeyed them.

Q. So practically I take it you don't know what cases were tried by them and who investigated those cases?

A. No. I should only be able to judge by Form 5.

Q. The cases were tried by them. They were not investigated by the Provost Marshal, they may have been investigated by somebody, but you don't know by whom they were investigated?

A. No.

Q. Were Area Officers empowered to issue any instructions or regulations when you were there as Administrator?

A. Up to the time I left on May 7th, all Martial Law orders were issued by him, but if an Area Officer deemed it necessary to take immediate action, he could issue a proclamation and send it to General Campbell for approval and this was being done when I left.

Q. Will you kindly see Nos. 28 and 29. There it is said "Whereas I understand that a large number of people concerned in the riots at Wazirabad and Hafizabad have left those cities and are hiding themselves elsewhere, it is now notified for information that if such persons do not return immediately, their property or the property of their fathers or of their nearest relations will be liable to confiscation." Do you know if Colonel O'Brien is responsible for this or it is the Brigadier-General?

A. It is signed by General Campbell.

Q. The previous one is exactly in the same terms?

A. No, I had left when that order was published.

Q. I think it is useless for me to ask you as to whether you thought that the order to confiscate the property of those who had left the city or of their nearest relations was just and equitable?

A. It had nothing to do with me. I have formed no opinion on it.

Q. With regard to the parading of boys, I take it that your statement is confined to what happened at Wazirabad?

A. As Administrator of Martial Law I issued general orders and instructions to Area Officers and as Area Officer of Wazirabad I instructed the Assistant Provost Marshal to take certain action on that order.

Q. So far as other villages and towns are concerned I take it that you do not know whether parades were held three or four times a day?

A. I do not know.

Q. You left it to the discretion of your Areas Officers to hold the parades as many times as they liked?

A. Yes; once daily or more often if considered desirable.

Q. I would like to draw your attention to an order which was issued regarding the fixing of prices and the replenishing of grain.

A. That is no order of mine. Kindly quote the order you refer to.

Q. It is No. 31.* "Whereas it has come to my knowledge that in certain districts of this area merchants are selling . . . . . will be arrested and punished under Martial Law?

A. That order is dated the 9th of May. I left on the 7th. I know nothing about that.

* Page 256.
† Page 257.

* Page 254.

Q. Now with regard to restrictions on travelling in Gujranwala. These restrictions were removed after sometime and within two or three days they were re-imposed. What was the reason for this?

A. They were re-imposed as a punishment and this was done on a report received from the Officer Commanding Troops at Gujranwala and in this report it was stated that as hostility and sullenness in Gujranwala had increased he asked that steps should be taken to deal with it, and the Officer Commanding considered that this was a suitable step to take.

Q. Was there anything definite in that report?

A. I cannot remember the actual report now but that was the outcome of it—that the tone in Gujranwala had deteriorated.

Q. What I want to know is whether anything definite was put down in that report or was it simply put down in a vague sort of way?

A. No; nothing serious had been done by any person. As far as I remember the gist of the report was that hostility and sullenness had increased and the general tone had deteriorated in Gujranwala.

Q. Now please refer to No. 36 where it says "whereas for the furtherance of the public safety the Lieutenant-Governor concurs that the movements of legal practitioners be restricted; Now therefore I order that no legal practitioner whose ordinary place of business is outside the Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area and Gujrat will enter that Area without the permission of the Administrator, Martial Law, Lahore Divisional Area?"

A. I know nothing about that order.

Q. Now refer to No. 33 which is an order to control the movements of school-boys and the answering of roll calls at certain specified times; and also refer to No. 27 where it says "whereas it has been shown to my satisfaction that the attitude of the inhabitants of Gujranwala towards Europeans has decreased . . . . . shall be again imposed." Do you remember if anything happened?

A. I cannot now remember the statement made by the Officer Commanding, Gujranwala, but that was the purport of the statement that the inhabitants of Gujranwala had been more sullen and more hostile and he considered that general action should be taken.

Q. Were any internment orders issued by you or the Officer Commanding during your time?

A. Only one was issued by me and that is No. 25.

Q. One is No. 21?

A. That was issued by Colonel Hodgson and afterwards approved by the General Officer Commanding.

Q. There are two such orders?

A. Yes, one No. 25 and the other is No. 21.

Q. So far as your command was concerned, I understand that during these weeks trouble was expected from the railway employees and telegraph men and that there was a sort of strike from Rawalpindi to Gujranwala?

A. There was.

Q. Were arrangements made by the military to prevent this strike from spreading?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it found that the cutting of telegraph wires and the removal of rails were done by expert gangs?

A. I have heard that stated.

Q. Do you know anything about the firing by the first train that went to Gujranwala and Wazirabad?

A. I know nothing. I did not arrive till the 17th.

Q. That was before your arrival?

A. Yes.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Were you acting under general instructions issued by General Beynon?

A. No, I was acting under the orders of General Dobell.

Q. You felt bound to act on the instruction issued by General Dobell?

A. Yes, I was bound by the instructions of General Dobell.

Q. You attribute in your statement that calmness and quietness to Martial Law? What grounds have you for saying that?

A. The prompt appearance of the troops in the town seemed to overawe . . . . .

Q. Do you mean Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. Assuming that there were only troops and no Martial Law do you think that there would not very likely have been calm?

A. In my opinion evil-doers knew more about Civil Law and were more likely to take advantage of the delays of Civil Law and I think the promptitude of Martial Law had a very deterrent effect.

Q. But there are always evil-doers present. You do not suggest that there should be Martial Law for ever?

A. No.

Q. I think that you simply made that suggestion because there was Martial Law, otherwise you have no ground for saying that?

A. I think I expressed my own opinion in that statement—the opinion I formed at the time.

Q. Further on you say "Wazirabad city was a little sullen at first, and Gujranwala, from what I saw of it, seemed sullen to the end of my administration. Am I right in concluding that the sullenness of the people was due to the introduction of Martial Law?

A. No, I do not think sullenness was caused by the introduction of Martial Law. In my opinion the sullenness was after the effect of the riots, not as a result of Martial Law. I do not think the infliction of Martial Law caused sullenness. Martial Law at first I think created a certain amount of uncertainty in people's minds. For instance one of the reasons suggested to me for the increase of prices in Wazirabad city was that the *zemindars* in the neighbourhood were uncertain of their reception under Martial Law and were not anxious therefore to come into Wazirabad.

Q. Don't you think that the introduction of Martial Law would cause sullenness?

A. No; not sullenness. Sullenness is a different thing to uncertainty and even fear.

Q. You do not think Martial Law would cause any sort of disrespect or displeasure?

A. No, I think Martial Law would instil nervousness until they knew what it really was.

Mr. T. H. NORRIS, Station Master, Wazirabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Norris, are you Station Master, Wazirabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you there during the period of the riots?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What damage was done to the station?

A. There was very slight damage done; some window glasses were smashed; and a culvert and gate house were burnt about two miles out of Wazirabad.

Q. When was that done?

A. That was done on the 15th.

Q. Did anything occur on the 14th at Wazirabad?

A. A mob of about 100 Indian lads came to the station about half-past eight at night but I managed to turn them off with the assistance of Mr. Gereson, Inspector of Police, and Muhammad Akram, assistant station master. The mob was told not to create a disturbance on the platform, so after a little while they went away and when they were going over the bridge they threw a number of stones at us but nobody was hit.

Q. Was any damage done to the goods?

A. There was no damage done to the goods.

Q. What happened at the goods-shed?

A. About 8 in the morning the mob made their way to the goods-shed but the troops dispersed the mob.

Q. After they were dispersed, did the mob start cutting telegraph wires?

A. Yes, Sir, they began cutting wires and uprooting posts near the station.

Q. Did you advance in the direction of Gujrat station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How far is Gujrat from Wazirabad?

A. About 22 miles.

Q. Did you notice from the station that the mob had knocked down the outer signal?

A. Yes.

Q. That was on the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. In the meantime the 2-Down Mail left Kathala?

A. We trolleyed down the line—the Permanent-way Inspector, the Police Inspector and I. We found a number of boulders on the line which we removed. When we got to the outer signal I showed the danger signal and stopped the Mail and piloted her into the station.

Q. If you had not removed the boulders what would have been the effect?

A. The train would have got derailed.

Q. Would that have caused loss of life?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After you removed the boulders, where did the mob go?

A. They went in the direction of Gujrat, Sir.

Q. On the arrival of the Mail you found that the culvert between Wazirabad and D. U. X. had been burnt?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you in consequence order the Mail to be detained?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you found the culvert burnt?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you extinguish the fire?

A. The Engineering department did that. They were there before I got there.

Q. The Sub-Divisional Officer was there and he gave you instructions to return to Wazirabad?

A. Yes, Sir.

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH, I.C.S., Joint Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhupura, Gujranwala District.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Bosworth-Smith are you Joint Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhupura?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That is one of the districts of Gujranwala?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That is the southern division of the district?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. It includes apparently a considerable area?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In connection with that district, when did the riots start?

A. I only arrived and took over charge on the 21st: The riots started from about the 8th or 10th of April.

Q. I think this statement is in response to a circular letter which you got?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the information which you collected in consequence of an official enquiry which you made? Was this statement of yours giving detailed information as to the occurrences, prepared as a result of the official investigation you made?

A. It is a summary or report.

Q. In Section III of your statement you give a chronological narrative of the events and you start with Sangla, which I think is a village on the west of your district?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the damage that was done at Sangla and when was it done? You state here it started with a *hartal* held on the 12th. You also refer to certain agitation that took place in a village. It seems to have been very much on the lines of the agitation at other villages, *viz.*, making strong statements about the Rowlatt Act and such other matters?

A. Yes.

Q. Then on the 13th April, you state that "the effect of these meetings on the popular mind was not at once made evident." Then on the 13th, there was the *Baisakhi* festival which passed off fairly quietly and on 14/15th April, in the night, the railway station was burnt. That seems to be at a short distance to the east of Sangla.

A. Yes.

Q. On the 15th, you refer to the cutting of telegraph wires between Sangla and Salarwala. Where is the other station?

A. That is on the further side of Sangla.

Q. Is it on the west of Sangla or on the east?

A. It is on the far side from Moman.

Q. Is it in Lyallpur direction?

A. I think it is.

Q. On the 16th April, you say that a Sikh with the help of some other Sikhs, backed by a large mob from the town, forcibly released a military prisoner at Sangla station?

A. Yes.

Q. What escort was there?

A. Some native troops, about four or five.

Q. Was the prisoner an Indian prisoner?

A. An Indian prisoner.

Q. Then on the evening of the 16th, you say that some man made a murderous attack on Mr. Wale, Telegraph Inspector, at Sangla post office?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was Mr. Wale seriously injured on that occasion?

A. Yes and those people were found and punished by the tribunal in consequence.

Q. How many people were there when the attack was made? Was that an individual attack on Mr. Wale?

A. One man was caught actually and identified by Mr. Wale.

Q. Was he one of a crowd?

A. Yes; there were others with him.

Q. On the 16th-17th, did you find that the villagers of Baroa tore down telegraph wires on the Lahore line near their village? Where is that village?

A. It is on the other side of Sheikhupura.

Q. Is it on the eastern side?

A. On the Lahore side.

Q. Is it in your district?

A. Yes.

Q. In connection with the incidents to which you have referred, were a number of arrests made?

A. I only took charge on the 21st April.

Q. I see you state "numerous arrests were made after a rather belated investigation." Does that mean that the investigation was conducted by you?

A. There were so many incidents of violence that very little could be done for some days.

Q. Were the arrests made after you went to the district or were they made before?

A. Very few were arrested before I went to the district. Only two or three people were arrested before I went.

Q. Then you arrested upon information which you got as to what had occurred at these different places?

A. Yes.

Q. How many arrests did you effect altogether?

A. I cannot say definitely. I think it was about 300 or 400.

Q. That was as regards the whole period and covering the whole district?

A. I think so.

Q. I see again you refer to an incident under Dhaban Singh. This is a station also to the east of Moman?

A. Yes.

Q. Apparently there was some damage done to the railway plant there?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I see you say that a railway bridge was cut 1½ miles from Dhaban Singh railway station and attempts made to wreck the line?

A. Yes.

Q. And you refer to certain people going from there to the village of Mahniawala and getting others to come and assist them in the burning of the bridge?

A. Yes.

Q. Was serious damage done to the bridge?

A. Yes, it was partially burnt.

Q. Was Dhaban Singh railway station itself looted and burnt on the morning of the 16th April?

A. Yes, it was nearly morning and partly in the night.

Q. So far as your information went, had many people participated in that act of incendiarism or destruction?

A. Yes, Sir. There was a large crowd there.

Q. Then you refer to occurrences at Chuharkana. Of what size village is that?

A. It is a market village of about 300 or 400 people.

Q. I see you say that the trouble there started on the 11th and then you give similar causes to the other villages, and on the 12th you mention that a complete *hartal* was held. Was there any damage done at Chuharkana?

A. There was a great deal of damage done.

Q. That was later on I believe?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the exact damage done there?

A. The bridge was pulled by a crowd of about 2,000 people during the day. It took a long time to do and the signals were pulled down, and afterwards the railway station itself, which is a big station, was looted and burnt.

Q. That was on the 15th?

A. Yes; and the missionaries' house and hospital burnt.

Q. I see you say that about 11 a special troop train arrived, containing a detachment of the 2/22 Punjabis on their way to Hong Kong. Were some of these men detrained?

A. Yes.

Q. You refer there to some endeavour to get the soldiers to join in the looting?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you get much evidence at the time with reference to that? What information had you on that point?

A. There was a special enquiry and a report was made to Government about it and it was undoubted that some people rather fraternised and attacked together.

Q. I see that later in the day after the troop train had departed, a crowd assembled and wrecked the line between the canal bridge and the station. Did a passenger train in the meanwhile arrive there on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it attacked and looted and the engine damaged?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember whether much loot was taken from that train?

A. I do not remember much about the train. Everything in the station worth taking was taken.

Q. Then you say following on that, the station staff were assaulted and the station looted and burnt. That is Chuharkana station?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it burnt to the ground or partially burnt?

A. Everything that was burnable was burnt pretty well.

Q. And you say that the station itself was looted. What sort of things were looted?

A. Anything that was available. Goods in transit were robbed and carried away and anything they could carry away was taken away, and the station was cleared out.

Q. Then you refer to two bridges being damaged by fire and the telegraph wires cut. Where are those bridges?

A. One bridge is about half a mile from Chuharkana.

Q. Where is the other?

A. I forget where the other was.

Q. The telegraph wires were also cut at that time?

A. Yes, in several places.

Q. Did a mob finally collect from the villages north of the line and approach the station?

A. Yes.

Q. You say their intention was to hold up the train and then to loot the *mandi*. Did they attempt to hold up the train and loot it?

A. I think so. I was not there at the time. I think they were dispersed by the armoured train.

Q. You refer to their being dispersed because the first train that arrived was an armoured train, which opened fire and dispersed the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. Then the next town you deal with is Sheikhupura. What size of town is that?

A. I should think it has about 5,000 or 6,000 inhabitants.

Q. How far is it situated from Chuharkana?

A. About seven miles.

Q. I think the occurrence that took place there was on the 14th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it appear from your information that at about 5 a small party went to the railway station to meet the train?

A. Yes.

Q. They tore up signals and signal wire pegs on their way back from the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they collect in greater numbers at the bazar and then proceed to assault some one?

A. Yes.

Q. Later on the same night, I think the post office telegraph wires were cut.

A. Yes.

Q. Also the wires between Sheikhupura and Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. I should have asked you at the outset as regards Moman which is the first you refer to. I think there was an attempt there on the 14th April to destroy the station?

A. Yes.

Q. I see certain men seem to have broken into a lamp room to get oil for fuel and set fire to the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 19th April?

A. Yes.

Q. I think we have had a statement from Colonel O'Brien as to the administration of Martial Law. You started on the 21st of April?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you arrived at Chuharkana on the 21st and took statements of the railway staff, and on the following day, you say you held an identification parade? Can you describe the way in which you conducted the identification parade?

A. On the day previously, I had taken statements of certain railway employees that they had been present on the occasion, they had seen a large crowd and that if they were confronted with the people they could probably identify them. On the following day or days, I sent for all the inhabitants of selected villages, it being common knowledge that certain villagers who were quite close to the scene of occurrence had attended. The villagers were lined up round a large compound and first class magistrates were called for, and they walked down the line with these railway employees, the other railway employees being kept away at a distance. The railway employee would stop and say that that man was there and the magistrate would note the fact down, and then proceed further on through the whole line. Then another fellow would be taken. It took about two or three hours. The railway employees were often people of the locality, so that they knew the people either by name or by sight. The villages chiefly concerned in these disturbances were quite close to the station.

Q. When a man was identified, was he at once arrested?

A. Not in all cases; where only one witness identified the man and there was a possibility of doubt, he was not arrested at all. Where two people independently identified, then he was invariably arrested.

Q. Was he taken at once to jail or where?

A. He was kept in police custody for some days and then notice was given and if he wanted to have any defence witnesses he was told to bring them and all the *lambardars* went and summary trial took place then.

Q. I think you adopted the procedure followed in connection with the arrest of people implicated in the occurrences at Chuharkana in the neighbouring villages as well, in Dhaban Singh, Moman and Sangla?

A. Yes.

Q. The procedure adopted there was just the same as you described in connection with what was adopted at Chuharkana?

A. Yes, similar.

Q. As regards getting information from the villagers who were implicated in the disturbances, did you find that an easy matter? Were the villagers reluctant to communicate information?

A. At first practically no information was forthcoming, till the railway staff identified the people.

Q. After the railway staff had identified people, did they give more information?

A. Yes, the village headman helped certainly.

Q. When did you start trying cases? Was it between the 6th and 20th May?

A. Yes.

Q. In what capacity did you try the cases? Was that as a judge sitting in a summary court?

A. Yes.

Q. From whom did you receive your appointment as a judge in that court? Was it from the military authorities?

A. I was appointed by the Government.

Q. I see you say between the 6th and 20th May, 477 persons were tried and 294 convicted. They were tried by you and Mr. Penny?

A. Yes.

Q. I see you suggest that there was some considerable delay in trying cases. But if you had 477 people to try, the 6th to 20th May did not give you a great deal of time for it?

A. Summary procedure was not lengthy. The people were all ready. There was nothing doing till the orders came giving us power.

Q. You think you could have with advantage started trials earlier than 6th May?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Then in the last paragraph of Section IV, you say 'Practically no Martial Law has been enforced in this part of the district and no punishments given under Martial Law." What do you mean by that statement?

A. Other than the summary courts.

Q. That is a very substantial exception? You were acting under Martial Law.

A. No Martial Law was enforced in this part of the district as soon as Martial Law was started, for offences committed, *i.e.*, after Martial Law was proclaimed. That is what I mean.

Q. I do not quite follow you. The cases you tried were cases of offences under Martial Law?

A. They were offences committed before Martial Law.

Q. Do you mean that so far as obedience to the orders issued under Martial Law is concerned, you had not to deal with any cases of such offences?

A. No case at all was dealt with.

Q. I see you made the school boys of Sangla parade every morning and salute the Union Jack?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that done under your orders or under the orders of the military?

A. I think that was done by a military officer at Sangla.

Q. Generally speaking, have the people behaved well under Martial Law?

A. There was no trouble at all.

Q. I see you express the view as to the movement being anti-European and also anti-Christian?

A. Yes.

Q. That, I take it, was based upon the information you got before you arrived there, or was that in consequence of what you yourself saw during the period that you were actually in office?

A. No; it was based on frequent incidents of crowds running down to the trains that pass through Chuharkana to look for people to assault and the American missionary's statement that he ran away on the day his house and dispensary were burnt; and similarly at Sangla.

Q. You yourself gave substantial sentences?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any whippings in public?

A. They were done in the compound of the Canal Bungalow after the court had finished its sittings.

Q. Was not an order issued by the Government that whippings should not take place in public?

A. Yes.

Q. After that order was issued, did you continue to whip in public?

A. No.

Q. The whippings then were entirely in private?

A. I cannot remember if any whippings were carried out after that order came. There were no public whippings at all.

Q. You say it was administered in the compound of the Canal Bungalow after the court rose; is not that an area open to the public view?

A. The Canal Bungalow compound is a long way from any habitations.

Q. Were the public who attended the court allowed to remain to see the whippings?

A. Yes, there were some of them probably present.

Q. But that only occurred up to the time when you received the order from the Government as to the advisability of whippings being in private?

A. Yes.

Q. In your view was Martial Law necessary or advisable for the maintenance of peace and order during the period for which it was inaugurated?

A. It might perhaps have been taken off a little sooner.

Q. That is to say, so far as the particular district administered by you was concerned?

A. Yes.

Q. Were the Martial Law orders relaxed as time went on in your district, or did they remain as they were originally promulgated?

A. I think we had very few Martial Law orders that affected the district as a whole at all.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Mr. Bosworth-Smith, were the cases that you tried for breaches of the Martial Law proclamations, or for offences specified under the Indian Penal Code, or for offences of any other kind?

A. I think for offences specified in that proclamation of April 19th, I think it is.

Q. So you did not try any people except as a summary court and except for offences against that proclamation of the Major General's?

A. No.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Bosworth-Smith, how long have you been in the Punjab?

A. About 21 years.

Q. Your whole service has been in this province?

A. With the exception of a short time down in Bombay.

Q. When was that?

A. I was down there for some famine.

Q. What year?

A. I cannot remember the year; it was in the Panch Mahals.

Q. Were your services lent to the Bombay Government for the famine?

A. Yes.

Q. You were there for a short time I take it?

A. Yes.

Q. You have known Gujranwala and the surrounding places for a long time?

A. No, I have never been in this district before.

Q. Then what was your charge during these 21 years?

A. I have been in charge of various districts. I have been in charge of Attock district for 5 years and Ferozepore district for 5 years.

Q. You have never had any official connection with the Gujranwala district?

A. No.

Q. Now in the districts of which you had charge all these years did you find the people loyal and law-abiding generally?

A. Pretty loyal, but not too law-abiding.

Q. You mean they committed robberies and thefts and things of that kind?

A. Both the Attock and the Ferozepore districts are said to be exceedingly criminal.

Q. In the way of dacoities, and so forth?

A. They are given to murders, house-breaking and the like.

Q. Resulting from disputes as regards property?

A. A large proportion.

Q. And so far as you observed, there was no anti-European or anti-British feeling to any appreciable extent?

A. No, with the exception of the Sikh movement which spread from certain Sikhs from America in the Ferozepore district.

Q. You mean what is called the *Ghadr* movement?

A. Yes.

Q. That was an exotic thing brought from Canada by certain emigrants returned from San Francisco and other places?

A. Yes.

Q. Barring that, so far as the indigenous population is concerned, you did not observe any anti-British or anti-European feeling all these years?

A. No, none.

Q. When this disturbance took place where were you?

A. At Ambala.

Q. And the Punjab Government sent you to Gujranwala as Deputy Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. Now before you were sent, had you any consultation with any officers here at headquarters?

A. No, none.

Q. You were not called up here to consult with Government or take any instructions from them before you went to Gujranwala?

A. No, I was telegraphed for and went straight there from Ambala.

Q. I see that in your view *hartal* itself is illegal and an offence. You say: "A *hartal* is in itself illegal, and an open incitement of violence, which should not be allowed after the present experience in the Punjab." Your view seems to be that a *hartal* is in itself illegal?

A. Perhaps it would be better to say "Should be deemed illegal."

Q. What you mean is that it is not illegal as the law stands at present, but the law should be amended so as to make it illegal?

A. That is what it comes to.

Q. That was the view you held when you went to Gujranwala?

A. After I had been there, I think.

Q. And in your view any person shutting his shop should be deemed guilty of having committed an offence and should be punished?

A. I think a general shutting of shops is undesirable.

Q. It may be undesirable, but is it your view that, if there are a large number of shops shut, each individual shutting his shop should be deemed to have committed an offence and should be punished accordingly?

A. Perhaps illegal is too strong: most undesirable.

Q. You think it is undesirable, you don't think it should be made illegal or should be made an offence under the law?

A. I say perhaps it is too strong; that was my opinion at the time I wrote it.

Q. Was that opinion this, that it should be made an offence for any person to shut his shop?

A. Not any person; by a *hartal* you mean every one shutting his shop.

Q. What happens is that each individual shuts his shop, and if that is done on a large scale, or by a certain number, then each one committing that act should be deemed to have committed an offence?

A. I cannot say.

Q. Was it your view, or is it your view that people attending meetings where a *hartal* is advocated should also be deemed to be guilty of committing an offence?

A. No.

Q. In the second paragraph of Section V of your statement you say:—"There is no place where disloyalty is so deep as in Delhi, Lahore and Amritsar." Have you had any personal experience of Delhi?

A. I have spent a certain amount of time there.

Q. Have you been ever connected officially with Delhi?

A. No.

Q. You have gone there on occasions as many of us have gone there?

A. Yes.

Q. That is all your experience of Delhi?

A. That is so.

Q. On what material do you base this statement that there is no place more deeply disloyal than Delhi?

A. This report was a confidential report made to Government of my opinion.

Q. I quite see that, but when you make a confidential report surely any statement you make is based on some material, and not merely because you think so or assume so? What I want to know is on what material you base this statement. You had no material at all I take it?

A. I had my own opinion.

Q. True, but you do not arrive at opinions without any materials for those opinions. What were the materials on which you arrived at this opinion? You cannot tell me?

A. I prefer not to say.

Q. I do not follow whether you have materials on which you base this opinion, and are not prepared to disclose them, or that you have none?

A. I have a good number of reasons which I could give, but I do not wish to give them.

Q. You do not wish to tell us what those reasons are?

A. No.

Q. Why?

A. I do not think it is desirable.

Q. And those materials are materials which you collected from others or were the result of your knowledge by your occasional visits to Delhi? Is that the only way in which you got those materials?

A. No.

Q. Where did you get those materials from?

A. I do not care to say unless I am ordered to do so.

Q. May I know why you do not care to enlighten the Committee as to the materials on which you base this opinion? Is it because it is against the public interests to do so, or have you been ordered by your Government not to state them? Why are you so unwilling?

A. I do not care to say.

Q. You do not care to give me the materials, or you do not care to answer the last question I have put to you. You do not desire to give these materials because you think it would be against the public interest to do so or because you have been ordered by superior authority?

A. In my opinion it is not desirable.

Q. Undesirable for what purpose? Why is it undesirable? You a responsible official choose to make this statement in a responsible manner, surely you ought to tell us the materials upon which you base it?

A. It is not for me to say that.

Q. I want to have the position clear; you do not wish to answer this question?

A. I have said already I do not think it is desirable.

Q. I want to know in what manner it is undesirable, whether it is against the public interest in your view, or what it is?

A. And I say I do not wish to answer that question.

Q. May I know the reasons why you do not wish to answer?

A. I do not wish to give reasons.

Q. You do not wish to give reasons and you do not wish to tell me why you do not; do you think that is the way to assist the Committee? Does the same thing apply to your assertion about Lahore and Amritsar?

A. Yes, the same thing.

Q. That you won't tell us the materials on which it is based, and you won't answer those questions?

A. Yes.

Q. Then, I see that you seem to be very much against the lawyer or pleader class, and you say on in Section V of your statement :—" Had there been no pleaders in Sheikhupura, it is safe to say that there would have been no trouble there." You think generally the pleader class is a nuisance? If it did not exist there would be no trouble in India at all, is that your view?

A. No.

Q. What is your view about the pleader class, why do you dislike them?

A. Is that a fair question?

The President.—You have expressed an opinion on that, you have not?

Witness.—About Sheikhupura. I have expressed no opinion about the pleader class at all.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. I have read to you your view with regard to the pleaders of Sheikhupura. You do not apply this to pleaders anywhere else?

A. I have not said so one way or the other, I merely stated my opinion about what happened at Sheikhupura.

Q. But you have a large experience of other districts in the Punjab, what is your view about pleaders there? Do I take it that your general view is against that class so far as you have had experience of it?

A. I wish to make no general statement about pleaders at all.

Q. I do not know whether I am correct in describing it in that manner, but your view seems to be that if Martial Law were permanent and there were no lawyers, that would be an ideal state of things.

A. I did not say that, I think.

Q. You say " Martial Law is eminently adapted for a people of this kind in times of disturbance, and indeed always, if properly carried out, and supervised." In your view Martial Law if introduced normally as a permanent measure and properly carried out and supervised would be a much better thing than the present system of administration, is that so?

A. No, I do not think I quite meant that really.

Q. Then you go on to indicate the reasons " Quick and ready justice without the uncertainties of law, cost of pleaders and the oppression of the police is what is wanted." You would have no difficulties about law and pleaders if you had permanent Martial Law, is that your view?

A. Not exactly. The meaning of this was that Martial Law worked very well.

Q. So far as Chuharkana is concerned, from the materials before you it appears that on the 11th of April there was a meeting at Chuharkana? The 11th of April passed off peacefully? There was no disturbance on the 11th?

A. I think so.

Q. On the 12th there was a *hartal* which also passed off peacefully and you had also a meeting on that day? That day I see that there was a great fair which is called the *Sacha Sauda* fair?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that a big fair?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. That also passed off peaceably?

A. Yes.

Q. Then on the 13th and 14th you had the *Baisakhi* festivals which also passed off peacefully. Then on the 15th there was no *hartal* I take it, is that so?

A. I think there was a *hartal* on the 15th. I was not there.

Q. And it was on that day that the railway line was damaged at about midday?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did they get the tools for causing damage to the railway line? Did any railway people join it, or any railway labourers' gang? How did they get the necessary tools for uprooting the line?

A. I do not know.

Q. Were any enquiries made by the police as to that?

A. No railway people were convicted.

Q. You require special implements for that purpose? Uprooting the railway line is not an easy thing?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore they must have got hold of them from some railway men?

A. Yes. Some of the crowd came to the Chuharkana Canal Bungalow to try and get instruments from there, but they were turned off.

Q. But where did they actually get the instruments?

A. I do not know.

Q. There was no result of the investigation in that matter?

A. No, nothing was found.

Q. At that time the police arrived and dispersed the crowd when they were trying to uproot the railway line?

A. They did not disperse them. They would not disperse apparently.

Q. Did the police make any arrests on that occasion?

A. No, none.
Q. Why not?
A. They were paralysed by fear and outnumbered.
Q. What was the number of the police at that time?
A. About four or five men.
Q. Were they armed?
A. I was not there.
Q. So far as your information goes?
A. I should think they were probably not armed. There were about 2,000 people engaged in pulling up the lines.
Q. Were any measures taken that day to prevent further mischief after the railway line was damaged?
A. Further mischief proceeded; Chuharkana station was burned and looted after that.
Q. When the police found they could not disperse the crowd when they were uprooting the railway line, what measures did they take to ask the authorities to come to their assistance? What did they do?
A. The wires were cut.
Q. What was the nearest place they could ask help from?
A. Lahore.
Q. There was no nearer place to which they could appeal for help?
A. No.
Q. And did they inform Lahore?
A. The police? Yes, information was sent as soon as they could send it.
Q. And did any help arrive from Lahore?
A. An armoured train came along.
Q. An armoured train was sent from Lahore. Was it in pursuance of that appeal for help?
A. Probably from the railway staff's appeal; things leaking through from the railway staff.
Q. And the armoured train left Lahore, I understand, on the night of the 15th?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was armed with machine guns and search-lights, is that so?
A. I think so.
Q. And was Lala Sri Ram in charge of the armoured train?
A. He went with it.
Q. Who is he, is he your assistant?
A. He is Sub-Divisional Officer at Sheikhupura.
Q. He was there before you arrived in charge?
A. Yes.
Q. And when did this armoured train arrive at Chuharkana?
A. You had better ask him this question; he is a witness here.
Q. He was all through on the train during all these operations?
A. Yes, he was there throughout, you can ask him.
Q. This train I find was working on the line for several days?
A. Yes.
Q. Then if you will turn to Section III, under date 16th-17th April of your statement, you will see you there say that numerous arrests were made. Is that in Sangla or also in other places?
A. It refers to many villages.
Q. Thereafter you say "Numerous arrests were made after a rather belated investigation, but the attitude of the people including those of local status indicated so clearly that they had no intention of implicating their fellows by making a full statement that it was ultimately decided to prosecute only the leaders." Then, does this mean, at first it was felt there was not justification enough to arrest or prosecute the leaders but it was only when the villagers would not give information implicating those who participated in the riot that this method was resorted to?
A. It is too long for me to follow. If you ask more simply, I can answer.
Q. Take your statement "Numerous arrests were made after a rather belated investigation..... they had no intention of implicating their fellows;" you found that people had no intention of implicating their fellows? These fellows were people who actually took part in the disturbance; is that what you mean?
A. Yes; I think so.
Q. These were not the leaders?
A. No; I think not.
Q. Then you say, because the attitude of the people was not to implicate their fellows by making a full statements it led you ultimately to decide to prosecute only the leaders?
A. I would like to correct myself. This refers only to the village of Baroa.
Q. We will confine it to Baroa; the question still remains. That shows that at first in that village you did not feel yourself justified to arrest or prosecute the leaders. It was the attitude of the people that they would not implicate the acual perpetrators that made you ultimately resort to this expedient. Is that so?
A. These chronological events of the 11th were taken from the Superintendent of Police's diary, and I incorporated them in my report.
Q. It may be you are merely repeating what the Superintendent of Police has said?
A. Yes, repeating *verbatim*.
Q. I want to know whether the Superintendent of Police meant that at first he did not arrest or prosecute the leaders, but ultimately when it was found that the people of the village would not implicate the actual perpetrators by making a full statement he resorted to this expedient of arresting the leaders?
A. I think that is the meaning of it.
Q. What is the meaning of it?
A. We wanted to get everybody, and when we could not get all, we went on to the leaders.
Q. Then before these identification parades were gone through was any census of the village taken?
A. No.
Q. And as to persons who had gone away from the village, who were absentees, were any of their relations arrested as hostages and kept in custody till the absentees returned?
A. I think not.
Q. No single instance of that kind?
A. I cannot remember any case.
Q. You may say the allegation is untrue?
A. I cannot remember any case.
Q. Now, were these identification parades resorted to in many villages? In how many villages?
A. About 7 or 8.
Q. How often in each village was this parade gone through?
A. Once.
Q. Only once?
A. Once.
Q. And the whole population was turned out practically?
A. Except the women and children.
Q. Now, you tried a large number of cases yourself?
A. A good number.
Q. And was that for offences committed before the Martial Law came into operation?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it not that a large number were put up for trial in batches?
A. A fair number together.
Q. In one trial about 100 people were put together?
A. Not so many as hundred.
Q. Any number approaching one hundred?
A. I think about 40 were put up in one lot; generally less.
Q. At these trials were counsel allowed to appear?
A. If they appeared, they were allowed.
Q. Is it true that they were not allowed to cross-examine witnesses, but you allowed them merely to suggest questions? Is that correct?
A. I think generally they suggested questions, and these questions were put by me.
Q. When you say that they only suggested questions, was that method of their own choice or did you ask them to do it? Did counsel say, which is very unlikely, 'I won't cross-examine; I would only suggest

questions,' or did you make that order that you would not allow counsel to cross-examine, but you would allow them only to suggest questions to you?

A. I made no definite order. I merely put the questions they wanted to ask.

Q. No counsel said that they wanted to cross-examine?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Very curious. Unless you restrict him to suggest questions, it is very unlikely that counsel appearing in a case would content himself to merely suggesting questions?

A. I think in only one or two cases counsel appeared.

Q. Did Mr. Mortan appear before you?

A. He appeared on one occasion.

Q. Is it true that he suggested a question which you disallowed?

A. I cannot remember.

Q. Upon that he refused to do anything further? Is it true?

A. Is what true?

Q. First, the question that he suggested was disallowed. On that he said: "If you do that, I cannot further appear in that case"?

A. I can't remember.

Q. This is a matter which if it happened is not one which could go out of your memory. It is rather a peculiar incident. If it did happen, you would remember it?

A. To the best of my belief, he asked some questions.

Q. Was there no incident of that sort? You disallowed his questions and on that he did not take any further part in that case?

A. I do not think so.

Q. With regard to the people who were absent from the villages, were any orders issued prohibiting any people connected with them from sowing the fields or reaping the harvests till they returned?

A. Yes; I think an order was passed that no crops should be cut till the absentees returned.

Q. In the Mahnianwala village, were the women folk ordered to come out?

A. No; I think not.

Q. That is not correct?

A. I think not.

Q. No women of any village were asked to come out?

A. I think not.

Q. You know the *lambardar* of this place—Mahnianwala,—called Atar Singh?

A. I do not remember him.

Q. Do you remember ordering his arrest?

A. I do not.

Q. He is an old man?

A. I do not remember that.

Q. He was put on horseback and marched handcuffed to Lahore?

A. I remember nothing.

Q. That could not have taken place without your knowledge?

A. I do not think it happened in my time.

Q. Now, in Sheikhupura, one Gohur Singh was arrested. Do you remember it?

A. That was not in my time.

Q. You came on the 21st April?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did you continue?

A. I continued there till the end of June.

Q. You were there in May?

A. Yes.

Q. This man was first arrested, you have it in Colonel O'Brien's evidence, as hostage for his sons who were wanted. He was arrested on the 19th April and released on the 30th, or somewhere about that, of the same month. He was re-arrested while you were there on the 17th May?

A. I think not.

Q. He was released on the 30th May?

A. I think you are wrong in your facts. I do not think Gohur Singh was arrested.

Q. He was not arrested?

A. I do not think so.

Q. It has been asserted very often that this man was arrested on the 17th May and was let off after the Martial Law was removed on the 29th. Did you release him after the 29th?

A. I do not remember his arrest.

Q. Was any charge formulated against this man, Gohur Singh?

A. I do not remember.

Q. Who would be able to tell us? When you do not seem to remember these things that happened in your administration, who would be able to tell us about them?

A. I think Colonel O'Brien. He arrested him?

Q. He first arrested him; then the second arrest was during your time?

A. I do not remember.

Q. There must be some record somewhere?

A. I do not think he was arrested by my order.

Q. That may be. But you say 'I do not remember.'

A. When I say 'I do not remember' I do not think he was arrested.

Q. There must be somewhere some record of the people who were arrested from time to time. You might not remember it; I quite see that. If you have a record we can find out from that. If he was arrested his name would be there. If he was not, his name would not appear there. There must be some record of the arrested persons?

A. There probably would be.

Q. Did you not keep any such record?

A. The police keep a register of the people arrested.

Q. You were in charge of the administration and you must have supervised the work of the police and seen whether records of that kind were properly kept or not?

A. Probably so. I did that with the under-trial people.

Q. With regard to this man, is it true that on your recommendation his pension has been stopped?

A. I made some recommendation to that effect.

Q. You remember having done something of this kind?

A. Very well.

Q. When did you make that recommendation?

A. I cannot remember when I made it. I made the recommendation.

Q. Did you make it while you were there or after?

A. When I was there.

Q. Was that recommendation made because he had been arrested and was in custody at the time? Was it while he was in custody?

A. I do not know whether he was in custody at that time.

Q. How did you come to make that recommendation?

A. If you see a copy of my letter, you will know it. I made an official report. I have not got it now.

Q. Surely you can tell me what he was guilty of?

A. I think, to the best of my belief, his three sons were implicated in the disturbances at Sheikhupura and two of these sons absconded.

Q. That Colonel O'Brien has told us. These sons ultimately in a few days surrendered themselves. That was finished. But what was this man personally guilty of?

A. He was not charged with any offence under the Indian Penal Code. In my report, he was not charged under the Indian Penal Code.

Q. Then why did you recommend that he should be deprived of his pension?

A. I recommended that because his three sons had taken a leading part in the disturbances, and because he apparently failed to exercise his father's control over them.

Q. Then you recommended him to be deprived of his pension for what his sons had done?

A. He also took some part.

Q. Had he himself taken some prominent part in the disturbances at Sheikhupura?

A. Apparently.

Q. Why was he not prosecuted if he had taken part?

A. At the meetings prior to the disturbances.

Q. Then he has not taken part in the disturbances themselves?

A. No.

Q. He has attended certain meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that your report?

A. That was on the conduct of his sons.

Q. At Sheikhupura, did you arrest certain pleaders?

A. No; that was all done by Colonel O'Brien before I came.

Q. After you came, these pleaders were still in custody?

A. Probably.

Q. And they remained in custody for a considerable time, till Martial Law was removed?

A. That had nothing to do with me.

Q. You arrived on the 21st April?

A. I think so.

Q. When you came on the 21st April, you were thenceforward in charge of the division that was assigned to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Surely, after that date, if these people remained in custody, they were so in custody under your administration?

A. No; they were arrested by Colonel O'Brien and dealt with by him.

Q. These people were never brought to trial; nothing was done to them; they were merely kept in jail and released after Martial Law was over?

A. That may be.

Q. What people were in jail after you took over charge?

A. Colonel O'Brien arrested them, and Colonel O'Brien knows the accused.

Q. Is it true that all the male population, including pleaders and others, were made to assemble on a certain day and you talked to them?

A. Yes.

Q. When was that?

A. I do not know the date.

Q. Somewhere in May?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you ask them to assemble for?

A. To address them on the disgrace that had fallen on Sheikhupura and to ask if any of them would come forward and say as to who were to blame.

Q. Was that late in May?

A. About the middle, I think.

Q. Is the allegation true that you abused the people calling them *Suar log* and *Gandimakhi?*

A. No; I did not.

Q. That is untrue?

A. I think so.

Q. You know what school boys were made to salute the flag?

A. I believe that was at Sangla.

Q. How many times during the day were they made to do that?

A. I have no knowledge of that. That was apparently a military order.

Q. You know what was done?

A. I heard that they did salute the flag.

Q. Four times a day?

A. That I do not know.

Q. That order applied to all school boys, including the infant classes?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Then with regard to sentences of whipping, was that inflicted with regard to offences committed prior to the 19th April?

A. Yes; prior to that.

Q. For not taking part in the actual disturbances, but for taking part in meetings?

A. I do not understand your question.

Q. For what offences was whipping inflicted?

A. For offences connected with the disturbances.

Q. For offences connected with the actual disturbances on the 14th and the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. In Section IV, you say with regard to Sangla that very few offenders had been brought to account, and therefore executive action of another kind was recommended to deal with the situation there. What was the executive action that you were going to take?

A. I recommended fines and certain disciplinary action with regard to the honorary magistrates.

Q. Was that all?

A. Yes.

Q. Has that been carried out?

A. I do not know.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You used to hold your Court in the Canal Bungalow?

A. Very often.

Q. Everyone of these cases that has been tried by you has been tried there?

A. Not every one of them.

Q. In all 14 cases have been tried by you?

A. I daresay.

Q. And was any one of these cases tried anywhere else?

A. One or two were tried at Chuharkana and Sangla.

Q. Excepting these two cases every one of them was tried at the Canal Bungalow which has a wall on one side while the other sides are open?

A. It is more or less open all round save for trees.

Q. And there usually as soon as you decided your cases you pronounced judgment, and then at the time of the rising of the Court the flogging used to take place?

A. Yes.

Q. You commenced the trial of these cases from the 9th of May?

A. Very likely.

Q. May I know as to whether, as is usual, there was any daily diary of the cases tried kept by your reader or *shcrishtadar?* You know that in every Court a diary is kept where all the cases that come up for trial are mentioned?

A. No, I do not expect he kept any diary.

Q. Now, I do not suppose any of these cases was heard for two days continuously, that is, you take up a case, hear the evidence and pass the sentence then and there?

A. Generally.

Q. On the 9th May you tried 6 cases and decided them on the 9th. You will find that there are 65 accused persons in these 6 cases. You will also find that excepting the one case, *i.e.*, the first of these cases, in every one of the cases you found the accused had pleaded 'guilty' or admitted their guilt?

A. Very likely.

Q. Your second hearing was on the 14th May. On that date you tried six cases?

A. Yes.

Q. And in these there were 73 accused persons.

A. Very likely.

Q. And excepting the eight persons, every one of them, according to your record, pleaded guilty?

A. Very likely.

Q. The next trial took place on the 15th May. On that day you tried two cases. Well, here also I find, according to your record, that every one of them pleaded guilty.

A. Yes, very likely.

Q. The next trial was on the 29th May. Only one case was tried by you. And in this one case there were 70 accused persons.

A. Yes.

Q. Then on the 22nd May only one case was tried by you—King-Emperor *versus* Kesho Singh and others?

A. Yes.

Q. And then your next trial was on the 26th May when you tried two cases?

A. That is so.

Q. The rest of the cases tried by you were heard on the 30th May?

A. Yes.

Q. There were cases in which there were 70 accused persons and you will find that excepting one or two cases, out of a total number of 283 persons you have had before you only 8 or 10 pleaded not guilty and the rest pleaded guilty or admitted their guilt?

A. Yes.

Q. Now may I ask as to whether there was not something very peculiar in the procedure of your court that everyone who came before you at once confessed his guilt? It seems to me very peculiar that barring a dozen or two persons out of these hundreds tried by you, the whole lot confessed their guilt whenever they appeared before you. Have you any explanation to offer for this? Were they trying to adopt a repentant attitude by making a clean breast of their conduct, or was there some mistake in the statements you have made out?

A. I suppose they had been identified in public quite clearly and their own village people appeared in court and said that it was a common knowledge that they were there and they admitted guilt. There was no question about it.

Q. You will see that in answer to Mr. Justice Rankin you said that these persons were not tried under the Indian Penal Code?

A. What is your question?

Q. My question is whether it is not a fact that they have been tried under the Indian Penal Code sections 143, 436 and 149. When that question was put to you by Mr. Justice Rankin you said that you had not tried any persons under the Indian Penal Code but from this statement I find that the whole lot of them, with a few exceptions, were tried under the Indian Penal Code.

A. They were tried under the Proclamation of 1918 for offences under the Indian Penal Code.

Q. Then did you send a summary of these cases after filling up Form V to the Administrator of Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. And so far as these cases are concerned, there will be on record a précis of evidence of witness if we see the original files?

A. You can see for yourself; I do not know.

Q. Surely you know as to whether or not you did record the evidence of prosecution witnesses?

A. Their statements were recorded I think.

Q. When these accused persons were being tried, they would be present at the time of the flogging I presume, and supposing out of these 70 or 65 persons, you ordered the flogging of two: the flogging took place at the Canal Bungalow; so that all these accused persons and relations of the prosecution witnesses and *lambardars* would be present in the compound of your court?

A. Not necessarily. A lot of them very likely had gone away. Undertrials would be removed.

Q. You state that no flogging took place in public?

A. The general meaning of "whipping in public" is whipping in a town or city or some place where there are a lot of people.

Q. You say that they were not flogged in the town or in the city?

A. That is the general meaning.

Q. Do I understand that they were not flogged inside the city or town?

A. They were not.

Q. And the people that were flogged in the compound before these persons who were present, in your opinion, they were not flogged in public?

A. It was not altogether private and it was not public.

Q. In any of these trials was any substance of the statement detailed?

A. You are going to see the files.

Q. What is your recollection? Did you record statements of the accused or defence witnesses?

A. I recorded the statement of the accused.

Q. And in none of these cases the statements of the defence witnesses were recorded?

A. Very few I think.

Q. Now with regard to identification. When you were holding these identifications was any record of them made?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any record made of the statement of these witnesses coming after the identification statement?

A. I expect it was.

Q. Have you seen any of these statements?

A. I expect I took some of the statements of the witnesses in the cases I tried myself.

Q. Is it not a fact that in almost all these cases at one place every conviction is based upon the evidence of three or four railway officials?

A. No, I think not. There were more than three or four.

Q. Do you remember if there were more than five or six witnesses examined by you?

A. That you will see from the record.

Q. Do you think that when you tried these five cases or six cases charging and finishing these cases in one day, you were doing complete justice to these accused persons? Now with regard to this assault by Harnam Singh. In reply to the President you said that the European who was assaulted identified one man of a large mob and that was one of the reasons why you say that thing was anti-British?

A. Yes.

Q. I will read to you from the judgment of that case and I should like to know whether you are prepared to modify your opinion: "The evidence shows that this was an isolated occurrence—an attack by a fanatic upon an officer of the Government." Therefore I hope you will modify your opinion that he was not one of the mob?

A. Probably he was not.

By the President—

Q. Were you not wrong in your recollection?

A. Probably so.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Do you remember that it was admitted and alleged in favour of Harnam Singh who is a Sikh, that he and two other persons admitted that they did all this mischief. They lost their heads because they had heard that the Golden Temple had been attacked. Do you know?

A. I know nothing about it.

Q. I mean to say that it has nothing to do with the Rowlatt Bill agitation at all?

A. The case was not in front of me.

Q. It was within your jurisdiction. You mention it in your chronological statement. I want to know whether or not you connect this assault with the Rowlatt Bill agitation, or admit that this was a solitary attack done through panic because he believed that the Golden Temple was attacked?

A. I have no specific knowledge.

Q. Then may I take it that all those cases which were investigated and tried by other officers never came to you during the time that you were in charge of Sheikhupura and other places? The different cases were not tried by you, probably the investigation of those cases came to you for your information?

A. Sometimes they did.

Q. Not always?

A. No.

Q. Therefore this case of Harnam Singh regarding the attack on Mr. Wale did not come before you?

A. I don't think it did.

Q. At least yoou ermember that Mr. Wale shot Harnam Singh twice?

A. It all happened before I got there.

Q. Then you have stated in answer to Sir Chimanlal Setalvad's question that your chronological statement is based upon the diary or report of the Superintendent of Police. That is true?

A. That is what I have said.

Q. It is not the result of your personal investigation?

A. No.

Q. You went to Sangla on the 12th of May?

A. Yes.

Q. And there you arrested on that very day 77 persons?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any evidence against them before you arrested these 77 persons?

A. There was a lot of general evidence of the disturbance.

Q. Was there any evidence before you that these 77 persons were concerned with that general disturbance?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a statement by any person?

A. I don't think there was any recorded statement.

Q. Did you hear those witnesses make oral statements to you? Did about half a dozen or a dozen persons make any oral statements to you?

A. I think a lot of people told me in general terms.

Q. And they gave you the names of these 77 persons?

A. As far as I remember, some people pointed them out.

Q. That would be for the purpose of identification?

A. For the purpose of showing that they had taken part in the disorders.

Q. Therefore may I take it that at Sangla the identification took place before you arrested these men?

A. I think so.

Q. You first of all held an identification?

A. I think they were pointed out.

Q. On the 14th again you arrested 47 persons?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Is it not a fact that out of all these 122 or 123 persons whom you arrested, only eight people were challenged and the others were released after they were kept under arrest for four or five days?

A. I think that is so.

Q. Is it not a fact that one of the things suggested by you was the realisation of a fine of Rs. 50,000 from Sangla?

A. Yes.

Q. And you collected the respectable people of Sangla on the 19th, and told them that you would realise Rs. 50,000, and when they agreed to pay the fine of Rs. 50,000, you released all those persons?

A. No, that has nothing to do with the other matter.

Q. Is it or is it not a fact that the Government instead of making a demand of Rs. 50,000 has reduced it very considerably? Do you know what the Government demand is now?

A. No, I don't know.

Q. Do you remember that at Sangla under your order a roll-call was made under which boys had to attend four times a day—at 10 A.M., 2 P.M., 5 P.M. and 8 P.M.?

A. I have already answered that to your neighbour.

Q. Was it four times?

A. I have said in so many words that I don't remember how many times.

Q. Was it four times?

A. I have already answered that.

Q. I don't remember. Kindly give the answer again.

A. You will get it from this record. I don't remember it. It was a military order. I don't remember how many times they were required to attend.

Q. It was a military order, but you were the Area Officer there, and it was for you to see as to whether this order was obeyed or not?

A. It is a statement. Do you want me to agree to your statement?

Q. You were the Area Officer at Sangla?

A. I was the Area Officer at Sheikhupura.

Q. And also at Sangla?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Did you order that when these boys attended the roll-call they should make a statement?

A. I have already said that the order was given by a military officer.

Q. Do you know that the order to these boys given by the military officer was they should say *mainne koi qusur nahin kiya, aur na age koi qusur karunga, tauba, tauba, tauba.* That is to say, we have not committed any offence, we will not in future commit any other offence, and *tauba, tauba, tauba*, that is, we repent, we repent, we repent. Do you know if any such order was given?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did you make any suggestion about erecting any house of repentance? Did you suggest any *tauba ghar* should be erected in any of these villages?

A. I suggested that possibly good might come out of evil by getting the leading people to subscribe to the building of a jail *ghar* at Sheikhupura.

Q. And you thought that this would cost about Rs. 10,000, and you wanted to realise half of it from the pleaders?

A. I don't think so.

Q. And your idea was that the people would go inside that building and repent for what they had done on the 14th or 15th April?

A. That was the idea.

Q. Did the Government accept your suggestion?

A. It was never laid before Government?

Q. So far as these pleaders were concerned, did you cause any proceedings to be instituted before the Punjab Chief Court?

A. I made a confidential report.

Q. Then the papers were sent back to you, and you put Mr. Penny on to make enquiries into the conduct of these pleaders?

A. You have asked me two or three questions, out of which which do you want me to answer, the first part or the second? You first say that the papers were sent back. I don't think the papers were sent back.

Q. Was this matter under your orders investigated by Mr. Penny?

A. I think Mr. Penny made some enquiries.

Q. Did you give any notice to these pleaders under the law? Did you give them time?

A. No, the matter was reported for the High Court's orders. There they take action.

Q. But before you report the case to the High Court and the High Court passes any orders, do you know that under the Legal Practitioners' Act you have to give the pleaders time, you have to take their explanation?

A. The High Court does that.

Q. Now am I right in saying that more than a dozen *durbars* were held by you during the month of May in different places?

A. I don't know what you mean by the word '*durbar.*' More than a dozen times people were collected no doubt in different villages.

Q. And you made speeches?

A. I talked to them sometimes.

Q. Of course those were *durbars* on a minor scale, and in those *durbars* was the conduct of the pleaders the subject of your discourse?

A. Very likely it was alluded to.

Q. And in very emphatic terms?

A. In not very favourable terms.

Q. You asked the people never to trust the pleaders, they were a set of cheats and so forth?

A. No.

Q. Do you know Ushanak Rai, pleader?

A. Whereof?

Q. Of Sheikhupura. He happened to be a *lambardar* and you dismissed him?

A. Very likely.

Q. Can you give me any idea of the number of persons who attacked the Sangla station?

A. The station was attacked, what do you mean?

Q. What was your information as to the total number of the mob that attacked the Sangla station?

A. Do you mean the crowds that went down to the station.

Q. Yes?

A. I cannot give any definite number.

Q. Am I right if I say that the number was less than a hundred?

A. I was not there. I can't say.

Q. Supposing they were less than a hundred, then how do you account for the arrest of more than a hundred persons?

A. Because a very large crowd paraded the town with a black flag, and a very large crowd collected outside the railway station and there were disturbances outside as well as inside.

Q. Was any amount collected under your orders at Sangla for the comfort of soldiers and receipts given?

A. No.

Q. Were any respectable persons to your knowledge called for the purpose of pulling *punkahs*?

A. No.

Q. Do you know one Mohan Lal, merchant, of Sangla, and one Sardar Sardari Lal, another cloth merchant, of Sangla?

A. I don't know them.

Q. Do you know that a number of persons were killed on the night of the 15th at Chuharkana?

A. I have heard of some.

Q. What happened to them, do you know anything?

A. No, I don't know.

Q. Do you remember that about 185 persons were arrested at Chuharkana?

A. Very likely.

Q. Do you know whether those persons who were killed or wounded at Chuharkana were residents of that place or came from outside villages?

A. No, I don't know that.

Q. Do you know one Mastan Chand?

A. Whereof?

Q. He was the assistant station master of Moman station?

A. Yes, I have met him.

Q. Did you arrest him?

A. I think I did.

Q. Do you know that he was kept in custody for four or five days?

A. Very likely.

Q. Then he was not prosecuted at all?

A. No.

Q. He was the principal witness in the case which came up for trial about the attack on Moman station?

A. I don't think he was. He may have been a witness.

Q. Now is it not a fact that the identification made by the station staff was made after this man was released

A. That I don't know.

Q. You were able to make these large number of arrests without any military help?

A. Yes, the military were there at the back.

Q. I mean to say you did not requisition their help, but you arrested them as District Magistrate?

A. There was a force of military in Chuharkana at the time.

Q. You know the *Baisakhi* fair, it is a very big fair, within your jurisdiction?

A. This fair is different from the *sacha sauda* fair.

Q. It was held on the 13th or 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. And according to your statement all the seditious speeches or the strong speeches were delivered on the 11th or 12th?

A. Very likely.

Q. I would like to know if all this, as you say, happened as a result of the speeches and of what happened at Chuharkana and Moman and at other places on the 11th and the 12th: how is it that nothing happened on the 13th or 14th, when there was every opportunity for a very large crowd to commit all sorts of damage and disturbances?

A. That is one of the contributory causes. The speeches were one of the contributory causes prior to the outbreak.

Q. Nothing happened on the 13th and 14th.

A. People rushed down to the trains both on the 13th and the 14th asking for Europeans.

Q. What reasons had you to believe that what happened on the 15th was the result of the speeches delivered on the 11th?

A. Plenty of reasons. If people speak against the Government, against the Bills, and inflame the ignorant masses, that is a contributory cause to the outbreak that followed four days afterwards.

Q. If I understand your statement rightly, you do not say that those speeches were in any way objectionable?

A. When?

Q. On the 11th?

A. Where?

Q. At Sheikhupura and at some other places?

A. The speech on the 11th at the *sacha sauda* fair was a very objectionable one.

Q. The speeches at Chuharkana and at Sheikhupura?

A. They were. Objectionable language was used there too.

Q. Have you got any record of these speeches?

A. Some police were there.

Q. They have got the record.

A. I expect so.

Q. Do you or do you not believe as a matter of fact that all these disturbances and damage committed on the 15th were due to the fact of a number of Sikh soldiers going inside the town and inciting the mob?

A. What do you mean? In Chuharkana?

Q. At Sheikhupura. You make a statement that a number of Sikh soldiers went inside the city and incited the mob?

A. Are you talking of my report?

Q. Was it at Wazirabad?

A. No, no.

Q. Do you agree with me that all that had happened at Chuharkana was the result of the incitement of those soldiers?

A. No, certainly not.

Q. Have you seen the police reports about it?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't they ascribe what happened at Chuharkana to the incitement of these Sikh soldiers?

A. No.

Q. And if there is any such report before this committee, that report will not be correct that the Sikh soldiers were responsible for what happened at Chuharkana?

A. I don't think you will find any report to the effect that the Sikh soldiers were responsible. You will find some reports that some exciting language was used by some of the soldiers to these people.

Q. They said "go and commit the mischief, burn the thing, and so on." Up to that time nobody was inclined to destroy or burn anything. If my memory is correct, that is what is before us.

A. I have given you my answer.

Q. You yourself in your statement say that the sepoys urged them to commit further excesses by cutting telegraph wires, and so on?

A. That I believe to be true.

Q. Do you know one Ralla Ram of Chuharkana?

A. Who is he?

Q. Ralla Ram of Chuharkana, the father of Mangu. You wanted Mangu. This man Ralla Ram was arrested as a hostage as Mangu had absconded?

A. Possibly it is true.

Q. For how many days was he kept under arrest?

A. I cannot tell you.

Q. And he was taken as a hostage because his son Mangu had absconded?

A. Very likely.

Q. I would like to know whether in your opinion there was any need for the maintenance of Martial Law in your district after the 30th April?

A. Yes, I think it was desirable to keep it on a bit longer.

Q. What were your reasons for it?

A. Just to show the power of the *sarkar* and as a lesson to the people.

Q. Do you know the total population of the *tahsils* that were in your jurisdiction?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that the number suspected or who were in the crowd, even taking the largest figure, was infinitesimal as compared to the total population?

A. It was very small.

Q. You admit that after the 10th April nothing happened in your jurisdiction?

A. It was absolutely quiet.

Q. Then the arm of the law and existence of the military power was there for 11 days even before you arrived there?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore I want to know if this military display for 10 days was not sufficient for bringing those persons who had forgotten the power of the Government to their senses?

A. Still we had to do a good lot of sweeping up, getting absconders, effecting the arrests of several persons, and so it was certainly advisable to have the help

of the military, because practically there is no police there at all.

Q. Do I understand that because there was Martial Law that would be an inducement for people to turn up?

A. We had our own way of getting men.

Q. So far as that is concerned, Martial Law had nothing to do with it at all?

A. The presence of the military, I think, had a great effect.

Q. I am not quarrelling with that at all. You may have got the assistance of the military. My point is about the maintenance of Martial Law?

A. There was no harm in it. Nobody was suffering any hardship. I am only giving my opinion.

Q. So far as the arrests were made, you have mentioned two points—Martial Law had got back absconders, and you admit they could have been got back without the military. Therefore I don't see how Martial Law could help you in making arrests and getting absconders.

A. I say the presence of the military, and the keeping on of Martial Law had a great effect.

Q. You admit that the military was there before the proclamation of Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you cannot give us any other facts which necessitated the maintenance of Martial Law after the 30th April?

A. I have already given you that information.

Q. You cannot add anything else to it?

A. No, I cannot.

Q. You have stated that a large number of these persons who were identified were known to the railway staff because they were the residents of the city itself or of the surrounding villages which were close to the railway station. Am I right in supposing that up to the date of your arrival these railway officials were questioned by the police and up to that time they had not given the names of any persons whatsoever?

A. I don't know whether they had been questioned by the police, but they had given the names of very few people.

Q. It was after your arrival that more names were given?

A. Yes.

Q. And am I right in supposing that till your arrival only three persons were arrested and no more?

A. Very few.

Q. When you were asked on what you based your opinion, you stated that you have based your opinion about the whole agitation being anti-European on the frequent statements that were made before you when trying cases?

A. I have never said so. I said there were manifestations against Europeans. I have never said that the disturbances were anti-European.

Q. So far as your district is concerned, the assault on Mr. Wale is one?

A. Yes.

Q. The second one, the American Mission which was burnt at Chuharkana?

A. The man there escaped.

Q. So far as this thing is concerned, I don't think the missionary was inside the house at all?

A. He ran away to Lahore the morning that his house and mission were burnt.

Q. At what time was this house attacked?

A. He left in the day and his house was burnt at night.

Q. He had already left in the day time and his house was burnt in the night time?

A. Yes.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Do I understand you rightly, that people were generally loyal but not law-abiding?

A. That was my experience in the Punjab in two other districts.

Q. What about the people of those districts that you were in charge of?

A. I have already said that I had no personal experience before I went to that place.

Q. When you got there did you find anything against the Government going on or any organisation or conspiracy? Apart from these disturbances?

A. No, I found nothing else.

Q. When you came to these *tahsils* so far as you could see was there anything in their general conduct to make you modify your opinion as regards the people of districts of which you have experience?

A. Nothing.

Q. Am I correct in concluding that there were a number of *badmashes* always ready for opportunity and loot?

A. Yes, always.

Q. You say something about ill-disposed pleaders at Sheikhupura and seditionists in the markets of Chuharkana and Sangla misrepresenting the Rowlatt Bill—how did they express themselves in this matter, was it done privately or in public?

A. Both at public meetings and in private talk.

Q. Did they go round asking people to protest by means of a *hartal*?

A. I am not in a position to say.

Q. Then on what is your statement based?

A. It is based on police and other reports.

Q. What sort of reports?

A. Probably reports from the Sub-Divisional Officer and reports from people who attended the meeting.

Q. I presume most of the protest was done through meetings?

A. Perhaps.

Q. I understand there was very easy communication between Amritsar and Lahore and these places and probably events which happened to Lahore were carried to those places in a day?

A. Yes.

Q. The disturbances there took place on the 14th, 15th and 16th, so probably they had news of what happened at Amritsar on the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. You have stated that crowds very often visited the railway station to meet trains and the object is stated to have been to attack Europeans? Did they attack any Europeans in the train at all?

A. They asked for them on several occasions, but I think there were no Europeans on the train. There were about two trains each way and they used to run down and ask for them.

Q. The crowds used to go down to the station and ask for Europeans?

A. They were heard shouting out " any *gora log?*"

Q. Who heard that?

A. The railway officials.

Q. They made reports to you and on that you founded your statement?

A. I have not put that in my statement at all.

Q. You say in your statement " at about 2 P.M. after the troop train had departed, a large crowd of villagers and rioters from the *mandi* assembled and set to work to wreck the line between the canal bridge and the station. The arrival of the passenger train from Lahore diverted their attention to the station; the train was attacked and looted and the engine damaged. Following on this the station staff was assaulted." Is that so?

A. The station master was rather badly knocked about.

Q. On the 15th you mention that an armoured train arrived which picked up a portion of a crowd with its search light and opened fire with a machine gun. The rioters hastily dispersed and thereafter there was no more trouble. I take it that there was no more trouble in your jurisdiction?

A. There was no more fresh trouble.

Q. Martial Law was proclaimed in those two *tahsils*, but as everything was quiet after 15th what was the object of proclaiming Martial Law if that was so?

A. I have already given an answer to that. I think it was a good thing to keep on Martial Law for a bit longer.

Q. But if everything was quiet what was the necessity for proclaiming Martial Law?

A. It was a good thing to teach the people what Martial Law is and also in case of any further outbreak it shows how quickly the *sarkar* gets on to them.

Q. If there is a possibility of a further outbreak then must Martial Law be imposed for ever?

A. No; that does not follow at all.

Q. You say the total number of really disaffected persons in this district was probably under three figures, though some ten thousand persons took part in demonstrations, looting or destroying without really knowing what they were doing?

A. Yes.

Q. Whom would you really call disaffected persons?

A. I cannot enumerate them all, but disaffected persons are those who are always ready to proceed to violence in order to attain their ends.

Q. But such persons were very few and the rest may be ready for mischief?

A. They thought they could go to Lahore and they thought that the end of the *sarkar* had come.

Q. You describe the black flag as an emblem of violence—is it not an emblem of sorrow?

A. It is generally used when violent action is contemplated.

Q. So you have experience of it being used in that way?

A. I cannot give you instances.

Q. Where is it generally used?

A. Generally in the Punjab. I cannot give you instances, but I have heard that it is used for purposes connected with violence.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Surprise has been expressed at the fact that when you made a certain number of arrests you only sent up eight for trial. Is that due to the salutary rule that persons will not be sent up for trial when there is not more than one witness against the accused?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to very many persons who confessed their guilt, did you take measures to see that there was no undue pressure brought to bear on them?

A. The police had no dealings in the matter at all.

Q. After how many days were these men tried?

A. About six or eight days.

Q. And where would they remain in the meantime?

A. They remained in police custody.

Q. When you brought these men up did you ask them whether they were confessing voluntarily and did they appear to confess voluntarily?

A. It was quite clear that they were guilty.

Q. Were you ordinarily present when these floggings were being administered?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us approximately how many men were present at these floggings?

A. There were about twenty or thirty persons, if the man being whipped howled, to see what was happening.

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhupura.

By the President—

Q. I think you were in charge of the Sharakpur subdivision of the Gujranwala District?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And your head-quarters were at Sheikhupura?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you were there during the whole of the disturbances?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. I see that nothing happened in Sharakpur *tahsil* except that telephone wires were broken near Muridke?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it ever discovered who did that damage?

A. It remained untraced.

Q. You start off by explaining what happened at Sheikhupura and I see that there was *hartal* on the 6th of April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And there was a meeting at which a certain amount of political discussion ensued?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had that a tendency to excite people?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I see there was a calm on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th April?

A. Yes; there was an outward calm.

Q. I think you left for Gujranwala on the 10th April?

A. On the evening of the 10th.

Q. You returned to Gujranwala on the 13th of April?

A. Yes.

Q. I think your train ran all right on that day although there was some discussion as to whether it would go or not?

A. I had no connecting train at Shahdara but the train from Gujranwala to Shahdara ran all right, but I missed connection and I had to go in a *tonga*.

Q. How far is that?

A. 19 miles from Shahdara.

Q. Did you travel that distance in a *tonga*?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you got back to head-quarters at Sheikhupura in the afternoon was there a second *hartal* at Sheikhupura on the 14th April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There was a free *langar* opened for the people?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was there a riot in the afternoon at a baker's shop?

A. Yes the same evening.

Q. Why was that?

A. Some people sold *jhatka* meat and some Muhamdamans objected. On this matter there was a riot and those people who sympathised with the *hartal* came and threw things down from his shop as they did not like it.

Q. After dark were the telegraph lines interfered with?

A. The same evening both postal and railway telegraph lines.

Q. And this resulted in delaying the Bombay Mail?

A. Yes, both the Bombay Mail and a troop train. The delay of these trains arose from the fact that the main line near Gujranwala was broken.

Q. You heard about that damage on the morning of the 15th and did you visit the place and make arrangements for the damage being repaired?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that damage serious?

A. It was a serious damage because it stopped the train from going and telegraphic communication was also stopped. I had to wait till telegraphic communication was restored in order to send telegrams to my officers.

Q. Did you send a telegraphic message asking for military assistance and were you apprehensive of the situation?

A. I was very apprehensive that the situation would get out of hand.

Q. Are the people of Chuharkana in close commercial relationship with Lahore and Amritsar?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You refer to a meeting that was held on the 11th?

A. That was held during my absence on the evening of the 11th.

Q. Was another meeting held on the 13th near Chuharkana village?

A. On the 12th there was a meeting and again on the 13th.

Q. Were violent speeches delivered at any of these meetings?

A. Yes, Sir. Violent speeches were made both on the 12th and 13th.

Q. Did you get a report at the time?

A. I did not get a report from anybody. I was away and I came to know later.

Q. Nothing particular happened on the 14th?

A. No, nothing happened.

Q. On the 15th what occurred?

A. On the morning of 15th a number of people from the Chuharkana market—shop-keepers and others—went and broke a part of the rail road near the canal bridge. After some time a troop train came and found the lines broken. A permanent way man was also there and in order to let the troop train pass he had that damage repaired and then the troop train passed.

Q. After the troop train passed the damage was done again?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was this done by another crowd?

A. Another and a bigger crowd because the people of Chuharkana also joined.

Q. On this occasion was the line torn up?

A. The line and the telegraph wires were also put out of action for a considerable distance.

Q. After that had been done did the mob turn their attention to the station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What did they do there?

A. They burnt the station and looted it. There was a safe inside the station master's room which was looted. There was also Rs. 1,500 worth of jewellery belonging to the station master on leave which he had left behind together with some notes and all this was also looted. The jewellery was subsequently found intact in the possession of a rioter.

Q. Was a railway train held up?

A. Yes, the railway train was held up. It reached just about the time the station was burnt.

Q. Was any looting done?

A. The contents of the brake van were looted which consisted of fruit and vegetables.

Q. Was not damage done to the train?

A. I found the glasses broken and the machinery of the engine was smashed and besides this they looted a number of tickets which they scattered. They told people that they could get free tickets to Calcutta and other places.

Q. That same night did you receive word as to damage being done by a crowd?

A. The same evening at 5 o'clock I received a telegram from a member of the notified area. As a matter of fact I had sent for the members that morning and asked them why they had allowed a *hartal* to be held on the morning of the 16th; and they told me that they were trying to prevent people from putting stones on the railway line. When I heard about this I told them to go back and look after the line and they probably delayed in doing so as they were going in *tongas* and their horses had to be fed.

Q. Was that about 12 o'clock?

A. At 10 o'clock again came the *zaildar* of that place and informed me that about 2,000 or 3,000 people had assembled at the canal bridge and he heard rumours that other people beyond Chuharkana were pulling up the rail road towards Sangla side. This was at about 10 o'clock in the evening. Then came the armoured train.

Q. Did you get into the armoured train?

A. I got into the armoured train.

Q. And did you proceed to Chuharkana station?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you move slowly and carefully along the line?

A. Yes, because we were afraid that the lines on the way might be torn up.

Q. Did you find any obstructions on the line?

A. We found one pointsman's box placed across the line just as we were nearing Chuharkana station, *i.e.*, near the distant signal.

Q. After removing that did you proceed further?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see any men about?

A. We saw men about and then from what we had heard, we thought it advisable to open fire.

Q. Did you open fire?

A. We did open fire.

Q. Were there many men on whom you opened fire? Was there a large crowd?

A. There were men, but I cannot say how many men were there, because the night was not moon-lit. We could only see by the searchlight. We only found one man dead in the morning and probably there might have been more people dead, but we did not know. People might have been removed during the night.

Q. When you took that action, what opinion had you as regards the intentions of these people?

A. They were probably out for mischief on the line.

Q. Was there any lawful occasion for their being on the line?

A. There was no lawful occasion for their being on the line at that time.

Q. If you had not removed that pointsman's box from the line, might it have derailed the train?

A. Quite so.

Q. Did you next morning find not only the body of the one man who was killed, but also a coil of broken telegraph wires?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that found near the man?

A. Quite near the man.

Q. Did you know how that wire had been broken?

A. We did not know whether he was in the crowd or broke it later on. This man did not belong to Chuharkana village or market, but came from another village; probably he came as other people from neighbouring villages were rushing towards Chuharkana market to loot it. He was a *machchi* by caste and belonged to Kujar; he had no connection with the market or with Chuharkana village ostensibly, but had evidently come for the purpose of looting.

Q. Did you then proceed to Chuharkana Station itself?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened to the mob after you had fired?

A. They heard our gun shots; of course the searchlight could be seen from a distance. They dispersed before our arrival.

Q. You were using a searchlight?

A. Yes, we were still suspecting that there might be some hiding themselves in the neighbourhood; we got down from the armoured train and went into a factory where we suspected some people were hiding. We actually forced open the door of a room and found a brand new *chavi* outside it and inside there was a stalwart young Jat. He had probably left the *chavi* outside. A *chavi* is a pointed weapon with a long sweep which can be fixed to a long handle. It is the weapon used in these parts to kill people.

Q. Were some rifle shots fired?

A. Yes.

Q. At whom?

A. They were fired in the dark simply to terrify people. There was no particular aim.

Q. So far as you could ascertain afterwards, was anyone killed?

A. No one was killed.

Q. Meantime it was daybreak and you proceeded along the line?

A. We proceeded to the village of Chuharkana, because it was some distance from the Chuharkana market.

Q. Did you then supervise the mending of the telegraph wires?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were there, did you notice any movement of a large number of people from the far side of the village?

A. Sitting in the armoured train, I noticed movements of people and we thought that they were arranging to attack us.

Q. What did you do?

A. Then we went into the village and we did some firing there; but no one was hurt in the village itself, so far as I know. Then during our absence, the machine gun was opened, because a number of people tried to get out of the house and I think two or three people were wounded and one man subsequently died.

Q. I see you refer to a number of people having armed themselves with a view to attack?

108576

A. Yes, later on. I found from those very people of Chuharkana that they had in fact collected in places to attack us.

Q. Did you yourself actually see any hatchets in the hands of the people?

A. No; we had no occasion to go near a dangerous mob. But I heard from a reliable source.

Q. The next morning did you look for the bodies of people who might have been killed?

A. Yes, we went into the fields and we found the dead body of only one man.

Q. That is the one you have already referred to?

A. Yes.

Q. When you were engaged in that operation, did you see anything occur?

A. We saw a man waving a signal from the mission house there. The Rev. Smith, the owner of the house, who was residing there before had fled a day or two before, because some Indian friends had told him that he might be molested, being a European; so he left by a night train.

Q. At this time, was there strong anti-European feeling among these villagers?

A. So it seemed. The gentleman had to fly for his life; and as a matter of fact in the train that was held up at Chuharkana, there was one man, Ikbal Singh, pleader, Lyallpur. There was also with him another young man, son of Khan Sahib Abdul Khudus, Sessions Judge in the Punjab, who was in European dress. As the train reached Chuharkana, Ikbal Singh gave him his *pugree* and asked him to change his European hat, and the young man did change. They were all held up and they had to stop in a house for the night. There was also an executive engineer; he was electrical engineer of Lyallpur and he was with his family. They were afraid of these looters. They hid themselves in a house and fastened it from inside, and they had brickbats and other things. I subsequently came to know this from the owner of the house and there were a number of women and children in the house. They were all crying for help just before we arrived. Not only this, but a good many people from that market had left for the fields and had to pass the night on filth.

Q. Do you mean to say that there was such a state of alarm?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. You saw that yourself?

A. I did not see the people in the fields, but I heard as soon as I went there the next morning.

Q. You are referring to the 16th?

A. Yes, I am referring to the night between 15th and 16th April.

Q. The armoured train returned to Lahore on the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it go back again to Chuharkana on the 17th?

A. On the 17th we went back again to Chuharkana.

Q. Did a party of soldiers come to the village to effect the arrest of somebody there?

A. Yes. They went to another village Padranwala close to Chuharkana. Ram Singh Thakuria who was wanted had fled towards that village from Chuharkana, of which he was a resident.

Q. Did you find from them that there had been some firing?

A. As the soldiers returned, they told us that there was some firing because two men armed with guns fired at them and in exchange they had also to fire upon them.

Q. Coming to Dhaban Singh and Moman, these are two railway stations situated, as we know, between Chuharkana and Sangala?

A. Yes.

Q. Were both those stations burnt?

A. Both stations were burnt and the goods lying on the station premises looted.

Q. Were large mobs engaged in these acts of incendiarism?

A. Two whole villages were concerned in the looting of Dhaban Singh station, and so far as my information goes, 8 or 9 villages were concerned in the looting of Moman station.

Q. Was much loot obtained at these occasions?

A. No loot was obtained from the station. Some rice was taken from Dhaban Singh station and we came to know it was thrown in the pond on our arrival.

Q. On the morning of the 16th was through communication restored?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. And did you then proceed in the armoured train towards Sangala?

A. Yes, because Sangala was also within my subdivision.

Q. Where is that village Mahnianwala?

A. It is between Moman and Dhaban Singh.

Q. Did anything occur there?

A. Yes, as both the villages of Mahnianwala and Pakka Dalla were concerned in the mischief in the case of Dhaban Singh, and had looted that station, I and the Officer Commanding took counsel together and thought it advisable that some lesson must be taught to these villagers. Then we walked into the village. I had no occasion to go into Pakka Dalla village, because it is further away. Mahnianwala is nearer at a distance of one mile. Myself, the Officer Commanding and some soldiers walked together, and on the way a crowd that was in the fields was fired upon.

Q. Was that crowd bent on mischief in your opinion?

A. Yes, the whole countryside was bent on mischief in those days. It was only after this firing had been done that they came to their senses.

Q. You effected the arrest of the village *lambardar*?

A. Yes.

Q. Had he been engaged in any of these things?

A. His son was involved.

Q. Had the *lambardar* himself personally anything to do with these things?

A. I do not think so. At any rate he ought to have given information. He could stop his son from joining the mob. He, being a *lambardar*, it was his duty to give information.

Q. He gave no information?

A. No.

Q. Did you then proceed to Sangla?

A. Yes.

Q. I think there had been a *hartal* there on the 12th April?

A. Yes.

Q. And wires had been cut in several places on the night of 15-16th?

A. Yes, in three directions, towards Sangla Hill, Hafizabad and towards Lahore.

Q. Was a European telegraph inspector attacked by a religious fanatic?

A. Yes.

Q. At Sangla then did you learn that the station of Marh Bilochan was in danger?

A. I saw a note written by a *lambardar*, when I went to Sangla. On seeing that note, I took the armoured train there, because I had to arrange for the safety of the station. After I had arranged for the safety of the station, we came again.

Q. Did all go well after the 18th?

A. Yes, nothing happened.

Q. On the 19th April, I think Lt.-Col. O'Brien visited the affected places?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he take part along with you?

A. Of course, he being the Deputy Commissioner. I had to work under him.

Q. Did you supervise the police investigation?

A. Yes, thereafter.

Q. Was it at Sheikhupura?

A. Both at Sheikhupura and Chuharkana.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Had you anything to do with the cases which Mr. Bosworth-Smith tried?

A. I had not except that I supervised the preliminary police investigation.

Q. Were you present in court when he tried cases on any particular occasion?

A. Once.

Q. Do you remember whether on that occasion lots of people pleaded guilty?

A. Yes.

Q. From what you saw there, were the people pleading guilty genuinely?

A. Yes, as a matter of fact people came to confess what they had done.

Q. As I understand the identification parades were the basis of the crown case or had you independent witnesses?

A. That and also the evidence of the notified area committee members. The committee members were all reliable people and they also testified.

Q. Then as regards the bulk of the people who were tried by Mr. Bosworth-Smith, were they charged with rioting?

A. They were charged with breaking the lines and the telegraph. This is a most serious charge under the Railway Act.

By Sir. C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Lala Sri Ram, how many years have you been employed in these parts?

A. I joined Sheikhupura on the 24th August 1918. That is, I was there about six months before these disturbances took place.

Q. Before that were you in some other districts?

A. I was in a good many districts of the Punjab.

Q. Your service is a long one in the Punjab?

A. Yes.

Q. You have known the people of the Punjab intimately, I take it?

A. Yes; they are my countrymen and I know them very well.

Q. Have you found the people in the Punjab, in your experience all these years, loyal and law-abiding?

A. Not since some time.

Q. Up to what period did you find them loyal?

A. Some time before these occurrences I had found them openly talking against Government in the railway trains.

Q. When did that begin?

A. I was not a touring officer before I came to Sheikhupura, but since I became touring officer, I found that.

Q. I want the period?

A. Nearly seven months.

Q. Before what?

A. Before these occurrences.

Q. Seven months before April 1919?

A. Yes.

Q. Till then they were perfectly loyal?

A. Not that even.

Q. They were never loyal?

A. Not never, but not everyone of them.

Q. You cannot expect everyone in a country to be loyal? When you speak of the Punjab, you cannot single out individuals.

A. But I did not meet everybody in the Punjab. I met only some; out of this some I found some not loyal.

Q. You are an experienced officer of the Punjab and surely you can give me a general view as to your opinion about the people of the Punjab. In your experience did you find them generally loyal and law-abiding?

A. So far as the ignorant people are concerned, they know nothing about loyalty and disloyalty. They cannot make any difference.

Q. Surely, Lala, you can answer this simple question?

A. The word generally means a lot. It is not a simple question.

Q. You understand what loyalty means?

A. It is very difficult to define things, but I understand it according to my light.

Q. You are the first officer who has found difficulty in answering this question. So many officers have in one way or another answered this question?

A. I have to give a correct answer.

Q. I do not mean to suggest that you should give an incorrect answer.

A. I do not say you want to suggest to me that I should give a wrong answer. As a witness, I am supposed to give a true answer.

Q. What is your experience? Did you generally find people loyal?

A. With regard to which class, the masses or the educated class?

Q. Take the masses first?

A. The masses so far have been loyal.

Q. Did they also begin to show signs of disloyalty during these 7 months that you referred to or not?

A. Not before the Amritsar occurrences.

Q. Till we come to the 10th April or somewhere about that, the masses were loyal?

A. Yes, about the 10th or 6th April, when the agitation began.

Q. I will take the beginning of April. Up to that the masses were quite loyal?

A. I think so.

Q. Then the educated classes compared to the masses are very infinitesimal?

A. They are very impulsive, I should say.

Q. That is not my question. They are infinitesimal; they are a small minority compared to the masses?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they loyal or disloyal before the 7 months?

A. Some loyal and some disloyal.

Q. As a class did you find them loyal or disloyal?

A. It is very difficult to say ' as a class ' what their attitude was. I can only give the names of a few people whom I met and who were loyal. I have not met everybody.

Q. Do you consider yourself among the educated class?

A. I think so.

Q. Now, the educated classes, you will agree, Lala, are the product of the western education that the British Government have given to them?

A. Yes, they are.

Q. And their influence and position is intimately bound up with the maintenance of British rule in this country?

A. Quite so.

Q. Therefore even pure self-interest will dictate loyalty?

A. They ought to be loyal if they think of this.

Q. Did you say that some of them were perverse?

A. Not all of them.

Q. Was it a very small proportion?

A. I cannot say a very small proportion, but I would say some of them.

Q. You would grant then that the bulk of them are loyal?

A. I cannot say that. Some are loyal and some disloyal.

Q. Have you met with more loyal people or disloyal people?

A. That I cannot say, because I have never counted the number. Some loyal and some disloyal.

Q. These masses were loyal according to you up to the beginning of April. How did it happen that they so suddenly took part in these disturbances?

A. With regard to the masses, so far as I have come to know, most of the trouble was due to the fact that false rumours were circulated to these masses that the golden temple at Amritsar was being bombarded. This I learnt from a leader Jagat Singh, who was concerned in the Dhaban Singh loot. It was due not only to this cause, but there are other causes also. This agitation about the Rowlatt Act also had something to do with it, because *hartal* and meetings took place in Chuharkana in connection with the Rowlatt Act. That prepared the greater part of the ground.

Q. You attribute these disturbances in Sheikhupura and the adjoining places to the agitation over the Rowlatt Act and the rumours that came about the golden temple at Amritsar having been bombarded?

A. Yes.

Q. That excited the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. Then I suppose that the people who were out for loot, they joined merely for loot?

A. Not only for loot, because when Chuharkana Station was looted, a member tried to stop it, and the men said they would not stop.

Q. Which member?

A. Member of the Notified Area.

Q. Were you present?

A. No, I was not.

Q. Then you had better not give that. We want what you actually know.

A. Why not if you want me to hear fully? I have deposed to many things which are not within my personal knowledge; but as a matter of fact, I was the officer in charge of the sub-division and I know things better than anybody else.

Q. My only question was this, Lala: that a considerable number of people who joined in these disturbances from the various villages joined because they thought that this was a good opportunity to loot. Is it not so?

A. Not simply this; I am going to answer this question.

Q. Was loot one of the objects or not?

A. It became that object later, but not when the railway lines were broken first.

Q. With what object did they come?

A. The object was religious; they thought of the religious persecution by the British Government with reference to the bombarding of the golden temple.

Q. That brought them on?

A. That brought them on; of course, as I have said in my statement, seditious speeches were made on the 13th, before a large crowd by two men.

Q. Were you present at that meeting?

A. I heard a good deal about it.

Q. Did you get reports about that meeting?

A. I heard reports as soon as I came back from Gujranwala, as soon as I had occasion to go there.

Q. Kindly follow me and do not be hasty. Was any official present at that meeting?

A. There was one sub-inspector, who unfortunately was busy with the dispersing of the rioters at the *mela* and he could not attend the meeting and find out what was going on.

Q. There was no official present at the meeting?

A. Not at the meeting, but somewhere near.

Q. No official was present at the meeting?

A. Because none knew that seditious speeches were going to be delivered.

Q. The reason is another matter. No official was present. We want to get at the facts.

A. No.

Q. Therefore no report could have been made to you or to any other officer of what happened at the meeting, by any official?

A. Yes, but the report of other people is just as good as that of an officer.

Q. What you are saying is from what you heard from some other people?

A. Some reliable people.

Q. You have no official record of any speech made at that meeting?

A. No official record.

Q. This is about Chuharkana?

A. Yes.

Q. In Chuharkana on the 11th April there was a meeting?

A. Yes, on the evening of the 11th, there was a meeting in the mosque, a union meeting between the Hindus and Muhammadans; there they distributed sweetmeats to each other, and pledged to stand together.

Q. You think that was wrong?

A. So far as this went, it was not wrong, but the meeting became wrong by reason of what happened later.

Q. There was nothing wrong about the meeting of the 11th?

A. In itself, no.

Q. On the 12th you had a *hartal*?

A. And a seditious meeting in which two men came from a village 20 miles away.

Q. I am first dealing with the *hartal*?

A. Yes, I want to give out the whole thing at once.

Q. On the 12th April you had the *hartal*?

A. Yes.

Q. And that *hartal* passed off peacefully?

A. There was no disturbance but there was a meeting in which sedition was preached.

Q. We are now dealing with the *hartal*. Will you concentrate attention on that?

A. Sir, you have to take my answer with the qualifications I have to make.

Q. I am going to ask you about the meeting. The *hartal* passed off without any disturbance?

A. Will you not allow me to qualify my answer?

Q. It did pass off without any disturbance?

A. No disturbance.

Q. There was a meeting on the 12th?

A. There was a meeting on the 12th in which sedition was preached.

Q. Where was this meeting?

A. At the grain market.

Q. What was the meeting about?

A. Two men gave the incidents at Lyallpur.

Q. What was it called for ostensibly?

A. Ostensibly to preach against the Rowlatt Act.

Q. And did they pass any particular resolutions at that meeting?

A. No resolutions were passed but they talked a good deal.

Q. Were any resolutions passed protesting against the Bill or to petition the Secretary of State or the Government of India?

A. The people were not sufficiently educated to know that resolutions should be passed.

Q. How many people were there?

A. About 200.

Q. Of Chuharkana?

A. Chuharkana.

Q. Were you present?

A. No.

Q. You had no official information of what was done at that meeting?

A. Because no official was present. I had none.

Q. On the 13th and 14th you had the *Baisakhi* festival?

A. On the 13th only, not on the 14th.

Q. And there was a fair?

A. A big fair.

Q. All that passed off peaceably, there was no disturbance?

A. No disturbance showing that they were against Government.

Q. There was a *hartal* on the 15th, was there?

A. There was a *hartal* on the 15th at Sheikhupura, not at Chuharkana.

Q. All these happenings that you have deposed to took place within 4 days?

A. Yes, within 4 days. The disturbances ended on the night of the 16th. Most of what happened happened on the night between the 15th and the 16th. There was no repetition because of the firing.

Q. After the 16th nothing happened?

A. After the 16th, no, so far as the people were concerned; except that it was reported to me that the station of Mir Bilochi was in danger.

Q. So far as Chuharkana and these other places you have spoken about are concerned, everything was over by the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that was the result of firing?

A. I think so.

Q. Things became quiet because you fired?

A. Yes.

Q. About this armoured train that came from Lahore, was it asked for or how was it sent?

A. I wrote to Government for 100 British soldiers early on the morning of the 15th as I found that the railway and the telegraph wires at Sheikhupura had been broken during the previous evening.

Q. You asked for military?
A. Yes for military aid.
Q. And an armoured train was sent down?
A. Yes, it came about midnight.
Q. It came first to Sheikhupura?
A. Yes.
Q. And you got in there?
A. Yes.
Q. At what time?
A. We left Sheikhupura at 11-55.
Q. And as you have told us, it was a dark night?
A. As far as I remember.
Q. You had British soldiers on the armoured train?
A. Yes.
Q. How many?
A. I cannot say the actual strength.
Q. And you had machine guns?
A. I think so.
Q. How many?
A. I did not try to find out.
Q. And you had searchlights?
A. Yes.
Q. From Sheikhupura you proceeded to Chuharkana on the train?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you reach Chuharkana?
A. I cannot say. In my estimation we might have taken two hours; it was a distance of 9 miles.
Q. Then you say you saw certain men on whom you opened fire?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you find them?
A. They were near the distant signal towards Chuharkana.
Q. Where were they, on the line itself or outside?
A. Outside.
Q. Outside the railway railing?
A. The railway fence you mean? There is no railway fence there, it only stretches up to the station yard.
Q. How many people were there?
A. I cannot say; there were a good number.
Q. You could not see?
A. I might be able to see, but I could not see how many they were.
Q. The searchlight was thrown on them?
A. Yes, but it could not make them so very distinct. Perhaps we could see more distinctly in front than on each side. At any rate I found it so.
Q. The searchlight would throw its light in front and not on the sides?
A. It turns to the sides also, and it was by turning the light to the sides that we were able to discover their presence.
Q. By turning the searchlight on them you must have been able to see them? Could you not see how many there were, whether they were five or more?
A. There may have been five or more but from what I have come to know the number must have been more.
Q. Anything may be possible; I am only asking you how many you saw?
A. I have answered the question; I cannot say.
Q. Did anybody else see them?
A. Those who were on the train might be questioned and they may give an answer.
Q. Did you see what they were doing there, were they standing or what were they doing?
A. We found, as I have written in my statement, a coil of wire.
Q. You found it afterwards? You found that wire after the firing, not before?
A. Yes, after the firing, next morning.
Q. When you fired you had not seen the wire?
A. No.
Q. When you saw them by the searchlight what were they doing?
A. I cannot say. They were standing very probably or doing something; I could not see anything.
Q. You did not make out what they were doing?
A. No.
Q. And who decided to open fire on them, did you or the soldiers?
A. Myself and the Officer Commanding.
Q. Who ordered it?
A. We took counsel together. If an order was necessary, I am ready to take the responsibility.
Q. I only want to get at the facts as to who decided to fire.
A. Both, I myself and the Officer Commanding.
Q. You consulted together and decided to fire?
A. Yes.
Q. When you consulted together, on what did you come to the conclusion that you should fire?
A. Because we had already come to know that a mob of so many had assembled near the canal bridge. I knew it, there was reliable information with me.
Q. When you came at this point and saw these people standing there by means of the searchlight you had no particular information about these people being there?
A. It mattered little whether they were near there or at some distance; we knew there was a big mob at Chuharkana.
Q. You knew the people of Chuharkana had assembled at some time, that there was a large mob? That must have been early in the day?
A. Not early in the day; I learnt about it at 10 o'clock in the evening.
Q. But when had they assembled?
A. They were still there even at 2 o'clock in the morning. As I said, they were out for looting the market.
Q. At this point you did not see the mob at all?
A. Of course we could not see the mob, as I say the information was given at the canal bridge which was probably a mile away.
Q. From the point where you were, the crowd you had heard about, if still there, was over a mile away?
A. I had not simply heard the mob was there, I had also heard that the people from neighbouring villages were rushing towards Chuharkana to loot it.
Q. Therefore you believed the people you saw standing there were people come to loot the market?
A. Yes, and to do damage to the railway line.
Q. And, therefore, without any further enquiry, you opened fire?
A. Yes, we determined to open fire.
Q. And your idea was, as you have said once or twice, that you wanted to strike terror?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. You had started on the armoured train with the intention to strike terror?
A. Yes, if necessary. We found it necessary; we found men near about the line.
Q. After that firing did you proceed further to the station?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you do anything there?
A. Yes, as I said we came to know that there were some police people at Chuharkana who were fearing for their own lives and for their wives.
Q. You are now speaking of the return journey?
A. No, I am speaking of the outward journey. As we reached the station the few people of the police who were there and who had tried to dissuade these people from tearing up the line, without success, came and informed us that the mob was no longer there and had fled on hearing the shots that we had fired from the machine gun, and they also informed us that some people were hiding in a factory near by.
Q. You went to the factory then?
A. Yes, we got down from the armoured car and went to the factory.
Q. That was in the night?
A. Yes.
Q. And having got back from the factory, you proceeded on your journey?
A. No, it was daylight then. We had to pass the remainder of the night there.
Q. Then in the morning you pulled up your armoured train at a village? How far was that village?
A. It was about a mile off.
Q. And is it on the railway line?

A. Yes, quite close to the railway line.

Q. So you moved your armoured train from the station to a place in front of this village and pulled it up there?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you fired into the village, did you?

A. I have said in my statement that while we were in the armoured train we noticed the movement of a number of people in the village.

Q. Yes, I will deal with that in a minute. How far were these people whose movements you saw from the train?

A. So far as the eyesight could reach.

Q. How many yards from you?

A. I cannot give the number of yards. It was as far as my eyesight went.

Q. You were on the railway line?

A. Yes, and I could see the movement of the people.

Q. You were in your armoured train opposite to the village? The village consists of houses?

A. Yes, but we discovered the movements of the people on the outskirts of the village.

Q. That is between the village houses and the railway line?

A. No, on the other side.

Q. There must be several rows of houses, there cannot be only one row?

A. Yes, but I am speaking of the outskirts of the village. The outskirts could be seen, but not the inside of the village.

Q. Where were these people, on the other side or where?

A. By other side I do not mean a place which I could not see. I mean they were near the village, but on the outskirts of the village, and that I could see them from the armoured train.

Q. Were they between you and the village houses?

A. No.

Q. Between you and the village houses there was nothing?

A. No.

Q. Where were these people?

A. These people were on one side of the village.

Q. What do you mean by other side? Do you mean behind the houses?

A. No. I do not mean that, I mean a side that I could see myself.

Q. They were in some outskirt that you could see?

A. Yes.

Q. How many were there?

A. I could see movements of people.

Q. You could not see the people at all?

A. I could see the people. Some of them could be seen moving on horseback a little further away. I could not give an exact idea of their number.

Q. You must have formed some idea? You cannot say whether they were 5 or 10 or 100?

A. No, I say I discovered movements of people.

Q. You saw the people and you cannot tell me whether there were five or a hundred?

A. I cannot tell you. There might have been a hundred people hidden behind.

Q. I am asking you about the people you saw?

A. There were a good many people. They were considerably more than five certainly.

Q. Could you see their faces from there very well?

A. Yes.

Q. What were their movements?

A. They were moving.

Q. I want to know what you mean by saying you saw their movements, what movements?

A. They were not committing any mischief, I do not say that. They were probably in consultation.

Q. They were not committing any mischief?

A. No, not at that time.

Q. What were their actual movements?

A. People were coming into and going out of the village.

Q. You did not know what their object was?

A. As I came to know later their object was to attack us in the armoured train.

Q. Their object was to attack you?

A. Yes; they were collecting and some were going to call other people.

Q. From looking at them in the distance you made out that they were going to call people from the village to attack you?

A. No, I did not say so, I said I learnt about it later, but we could guess that they were meaning some mischief to us.

Q. It is true that you learnt that afterwards; I am dealing now with what happened then?

A. Unfortunately I cannot eliminate things that are in my brain; I have to take things together.

Q. What we are dealing with now is what you saw at that time and what materials you had then, and what your frame of mind was. For that purpose what you learnt afterwards is utterly useless. When you refer to their movements, what were their actual movements?

A. As I said they were coming and going. I fancied they were collected for some object.

Q. You saw some people going into the village and some people coming out of it and from that you concluded that they were collecting to attack you?

A. Yes, they were collecting with some sinister purpose.

Q. From the mere fact that some people were going into the village and some coming out at the time, you concluded that they were assembling for some sinister purpose?

A. Yes. I knew what their temper was before. We were still there and they had collected and had not gone into hiding.

Q. May I take it in this way, that because when you arrived in your armoured train they did not go into hiding, you thought they were out for some sinister object?

A. Not exactly. I knew these men had done mischief, and on the arrival of the armoured train they did not disperse, and as they were still moving about I knew some mischief was intended.

Q. You say these people had done the mischief?

A. The whole village was there, I could not make any distinction.

Q. You did not make any distinction?

A. No, certainly not, and as a matter of fact the whole village was there.

Q. And you considered the whole village to be guilty?

A. Yes.

Q. And because they were not in hiding and were still showing themselves you thought you were entitled to fire?

A. Those people ought to have dispersed in the ordinary course.

Q. Your view was that when your armoured train arrived opposite the village, no villager ought to be seen, is that your idea? That is what it comes to?

A. It does not come to that, that no villager should be seen.

Q. When the armoured train came there you noticed certain movements?

A. Yes I noticed certain movements and I concluded those movements were intended for some sinister object.

Q. What I want to know is why did you conclude that?

A. They were not there in the morning; they had collected then; why were they there?

Q. What time of day was this, early in the morning?

A. It was about 12 or 1.

Q. And your idea was that they had no business to be going out of or coming into the village at that time?

A. Not going out and coming in. They had some horses with them, why had they these with them?

Q. These village people should not have any horses at all?

A. No, but they should not be on their horses at that time.

Q. Your reason for concluding that you must fire was because you saw some people on horses, is that so?

A. As I say, this was one of the factors; do not take things in an isolated manner.

Q. One of the factors on which you decided to fire was that you saw people on horses?

A. Yes, some coming and some going.

Q. And you thought these people had no business to be on horses at all?

A. Not at that time.

Q. And on that you fired?

A. Yes.

Q. That was the joint action of yourself and the officer?

A. Yes; we went into the village. I took the party into the village.

Q. When you left the armoured train it had not fired?

A. The armoured train had not fired at that time.

Q. Then you decided you should fire?

A. At that time we held no consultation as to whether firing should take place or not.

Q. When you saw the movements of the crowd you did not then decide to fire?

A. We did not then decide to fire, but we went into the village with the idea of dispersing them.

Q. You did not then decide to fire?

A. Not at that time.

Q. Those movements did not decide you then to fire?

A. They made us go into the village.

Q. For what purpose?

A. To see what was happening.

Q. Who else went into the village?

A. British soldiers and the Officer Commanding.

Q. How many?

A. I cannot say, probably 10 or 12.

Q. You went to the village with a machine gun?

A. No, with rifles.

Q. Did you go into the village?

A. We went into the village, but we found nobody there. Very few people were there.

Q. You first went into the village?

A. I think so; we first went into the village.

Q. In the village you found very few people? Had they gone out of the village, or were they in their houses?

A. I cannot say where they were.

Q. What did you do next?

A. We went out and saw a number of people and the British soldiers fired, but it did not take effect.

Q. Where did you see them?

A. On the outskirts of the village.

Q. At the same place as you had seen those people before?

A. On the same side.

Q. When you saw the people what were they doing?

A. I cannot say.

Q. You did not notice what they were doing?

A. I have already said what they were doing.

Q. But you now came near them, you had first seen them from the train; you had now alighted, did you see what they were doing?

A. At that time I did not notice what they were doing.

Q. You did not care to enquire what they were doing?

A. I did not care to enquire.

Q. You at once decided to fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you decide to fire?

A. Because we knew they were out for mischief. I had already come to know these men were doing some mischief.

Q. Because you had the fixed idea in your mind that these people were bent on mischief you fired?

A. Yes.

Q. When you reached near them you did not enquire what they were doing at the time?

A. No.

Q. Or look at them?

A. We were looking at them.

Q. You did not care to see what they were doing, you straightaway opened fire at them? How many shots were fired?

A. I do not know, some shots were fired.

Q. How many people were killed?

A. I do not think anybody was killed; one man was wounded.

Q. And did you do this also to teach the people a lesson and strike terror?

A. I said to avert that danger.

Q. To avoid the danger of their doing further mischief?

A. And attacking, and eventually it was found that they were ready to attack.

Q. After having done this, did you go back to the train?

A. Yes.

Q. And then to what place did you move the train?

A. We stopped there for some time mending the telegraph wires and then returned to Sheikhupura, because we had to look after Sheikhupura as well, and the armoured train went to Lahore.

Q. This was on the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. And the armoured train came back on the 17th?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did you board it?

A. At Sheikhupura again.

Q. Did the armoured train do anything at Sheikhupura?

A. It did nothing.

Q. Then you proceeded where?

A. Proceeded to Chuharkana.

Q. At what time did you proceed to Chuharkana?

A. Might be about 10 o'clock.

Q. 10 o'clock in the night?

A. In the morning.

Q. What did you do there?

A. Nothing was done.

Q. Did you pull up at the station or opposite the village?

A. Opposite the village, because those wires had to be mended again.

Q. What did you do?

A. Nothing was done at Chuharkana.

Q. No further firing?

A. No.

Q. Then you went further?

A. Not that day. I returned to Sheikhupura.

Q. Nothing further was done on that day, the 17th?

A. No.

Q. Did you again go in the armoured car on the 18th?

A. Yes.

Q. You again started from Sheikhupura?

A. Yes.

Q. Where did you go?

A. Now that communication was restored I wanted to visit those places again. I have said in my statement: 'We pulled up the armoured train between Dhaban Singh and Moman.'

Q. Is Dhaban Singh a railway station?

A. Yes.

Q. And Moman?

A. Yes.

Q. You pulled up somewhere between the stations? What did you do?

A. We went to Mahnianwala village, a village which had taken considerable part in the disturbances.

Q. You came with soldiers?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do there?

A. On the way, a crowd was seen and they were fired on.

Q. Where?

A. Near Mahnianwala.

Q. Outside it?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the number?

A. I cannot give the number. It was a crowd.

Q. Will it be 10 or 15 people?

A. More than that.

Q. How many?
A. More than 25.
Q. What were they doing?
A. There was the crowd. They did nothing. I cannot say they were doing anything.
Q. At what distance were you from it?
A. About 2 furlongs, I should say.
Q. You did not see what they were doing?
A. No.
Q. You did not care to see?
A. No.
Q. In what direction were they going? Were they standing or moving?
A. They were probably standing.
Q. You were not sure?
A. They were probably standing.
Q. What do you mean by 'probably'? You were not sure? They might be moving in some direction?
A. They were there.
Q. What were they doing? Were they standing there or moving?
A. Some might be standing and some might be moving.
Q. You do not know what they were doing?
A. No.
Q. And you opened fire on them?
A. Yes.
Q. Who decided that? Yourself?
A. Myself and the Commanding Officer.
Q. Why did you decide to fire?
A. Because these people had taken a very large share in the loot.
Q. What do you mean by 'these people'?
A. The people of Mahnianwala.
Q. It cannot be the whole village?
A. Yes; it was the whole village.
Q. What is the population of Mahnianwala village?
A. I cannot give the exact number.
Q. Roughly, how many thousands?
A. I cannot say.
Q. Surely when you say that the whole village took part, you would also be able to say how many?
A. I cannot say; I did not try to find out the population.
Q. About 10,000?
A. I do not think so.
Q. About 7,000?
A. No, we have not such big villages here.
Q. Can you give me some rough estimate?
A. I cannot give. I have not tried to find out the population.
Q. You say the whole village took part?
A. That was my information.
Q. Surely that must be exaggerated. You cannot say what the whole population is?
A. That was my information.
Q. Because your information was that the whole of the Mahnianwala village had taken part in the riots, therefore any people of Mahnianwala you saw standing there you thought you were entitled to fire on?
A. I considered none of them to be innocent.
Q. The people that you saw you thought were not innocent; therefore you opened fire on them, though at the moment they were doing nothing?
A. They were doing nothing at that particular moment, but there was a crowd.
Q. You thought you were justified in firing, because you believed they were concerned in the riots?
A. Yes.
Q. How many were killed on that occasion?
A. One man killed and one wounded, as I came to know later. But I have said in my statement one man was killed.
Q. After you went into the village, what did you do there?
A. We arrested the *lambardar*.
Q. And passed the night there?
A. No, we came to Sangla.
Q. You proceeded to Sangla that very night?
A. That afternoon.
Q. Did you stop at Sangla?
A. I stopped at Sangla for some time and went into the market and learned some things about what had happened there.
Q. Had you any firing there?
A. No.
Q. You gathered certain information at Sangla?
A. Yes; about what happened.
Q. Where did you go then?
A. There is a railway station, Marh Bilochan, 5 miles off. That station was in danger. I learnt at Sangla from a letter of a *lambardar* that that station was in danger; so I took the armoured car and there, with the help of some people, arranged for the safety of the station.
Q. That was all you did there? Did you take the armoured train anywhere else that day?
A. No.
Q. Was there no further action of the armoured car?
A. Nothing.
Q. Then the armoured car returned to Lahore on the 18th?
A. Yes; on the 19th, Colonel O'Brien came in the special.
Q. That was at Gujranwala. You wanted to teach the village of Mahnianwala a lesson and so you fired upon the crowd there?
A. You may take it that way.
Q. That was in your mind?
A. Yes. They would have returned to the charge again had nothing been done. Of course when quiet has been restored, it is very easy to say that nothing had happened and firing was not justified.
Q. Were you carrying out arrests in various places at this time?
A. At that time arrest was impossible; it was after this firing had been done it became easy, and some arrests were effected, but not wholesale arrests; no one could go near them, such was the temper of the people. And it was on the 19th that the Deputy Commissioner arrived after the firing was done, and then some 50 people were arrested at Mahnianwala and Pakka Dalla villages.
Q. You began the arrests on the 19th?
A. On the 19th, the Deputy Commissioner's special came and on that day, the police made some arrests.
Q. Did you make any arrests on the 19th?
A. Some arrests were made.
Q. You began the arrests on the 19th?
A. Some people were arrested even before. For instance, we arrested that man whom we found in the market the same day. Some were arrested the next day.
Q. These people that were arrested, where were they kept?
A. They were taken in the Deputy Commissioner's special to Lahore.
Q. How many?
A. About 50; and they came from the villages of Mahnianwala and Pakka Dalla.
Q. Before you arrested them, had you any definite information against these people?
A. It was the police that did it. They probably had some information. The police made the arrests. I was with the Deputy Commissioner moving on the line.
Q. He ordered their arrest?
A. It was the business of the police to make the arrests. They were afraid to make arrests before.
Q. That was under a special order?
A. Of course under a special order. As we were coming, the Deputy Commissioner asked the inspector, and the inspector of police had brought those people.
Q. You know Gohur Singh of Sheikhupura?
A. Yes; I know him.
Q. He was arrested, was he not, on the 19th April?
A. I do not know the date.
Q. Somewhere about that date?
A. Yes.
Q. He was arrested as hostage for his two sons that were not forthcoming?

A. Yes; other people were also arrested.

Q. How many hostages did you take in all?

A. I think, 2 or 3 men were taken at Chuharkana market and village.

Q. At Chuharkana, 2 or 3 were taken?

A. Two, I remember.

Q. Hostages for what?

A. Because their sons had absconded after committing mischief.

Q. At other places similarly people were taken as hostages?

A. Not a good many. One Amar Singh was arrested. I think Gohur Singh was the fourth man that was arrested.

Q. After the arrest about the 19th, he was kept in custody till the 30th April?

A. I do not think so; he was released next day, because his sons appeared.

Q. Was he arrested again in May?

A. Yes.

Q. What was he arrested for?

A. He was arrested, because he was threatening the witnesses for the prosecution.

Q. He was never charged with anything and never brought to trial?

A. Not for this offence.

Q. Not for anything, after his second arrest he was never brought to trial?

A. He was not brought to trial.

Q. He was released on the 30th?

A. I do not know on which date he was released.

Q. He was kept in custody for a considerable time?

A. I do not know.

Q. Were any hostages taken in your district for the good behaviour of the villagers?

A. I think these hostages served both purposes; they served the purpose of bringing back absconders and they also served the purpose of keeping the people under restraint.

Q. Then do I understand that these hostages that you took were kept on as hostages, even after the absconding people had come back, for the good behaviour of the people?

A. No, they were not; as soon as they appeared, these were released.

Q. What do you mean?

A. Some people were kept as hostages for the good behaviour of the other people; that was what I said.

Q. Were any people taken as hostages, even when there was no question of absconding?

A. No.

Q. You say during the trials various people came to confess.

A. As a matter of fact, once this took place in my presence.

Q. Why do you say that people came to confess?

A. Once I was present.

Q. It is only on one occasion you saw this?

A. Yes.

At Lahore, Thursday, the 18th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.
The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.
Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.
Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Rai Sahib LALA SRI RAM SUD, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhupura—*continued*.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. About the meeting at Sheikhupura, in your statement you say that this was largely responsible for the atmosphere of hatred against the Government that was thereby created?

A. Yes.

Q. Am I to understand that at that meeting speeches were made in a tone of incitement to violence or anything of that sort?

A. Not incitement to violence actually, but some speeches were made. For instance, a man Atma Singh recited a prayer in which he said that we should suffer all these misfortunes with some strength, *i.e.*, he preached the doctrine of passive resistance in India of Mr. Gandhi.

Q. And therefore you say that these speeches created an atmosphere of hatred against the Government?

A. Yes.

Q. And the *hartal* also?

A. Yes; not only the meeting, because the people became curious as to why the *hartal* was held.

Q. So far as the speakers were concerned, did they in any way misinterpret the Rowlatt Act. Did they circulate rumours?

A. Not at the meeting itself. To judge from reports coming to me, no such thing was done there.

Q. And it is a fact that, so far as you were concerned, when you reported the result of this meeting to your superior officers you said there was nothing objectionable. Am I right?

A. Yes.

Q. And as a matter of fact you deputed three persons to attend this meeting and after their return they reported to you that so far as this meeting was concerned and so far as the speeches that were delivered at this meeting were concerned, there was nothing objectionable?

A. Yes.

Q. I am reading from the first paragraph of your statement. You say that "even illiterate women in the streets of Sheikhupura were heard to say that the British people were intending to interfere with marital and sisterly relations by legislation preventing husbands and wives, sisters and brothers to come together." This was not the result of anything said or done at that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Now before this meeting was held did you call a number of pleaders on the 5th at your place?

A. On the morning of the 6th.

Q. And you dissuaded them from holding and attending this meeting?

A. Yes, I did. Before this I had heard . . .

Q. I do not want the grounds.

A. Please hear me. Before this I had heard about the riots at Delhi and I told the gentlemen that they were welcome to hold the meeting, but it was just possible that they might not have been able to control the mob later on, and on these grounds I asked them to beware.

Q. Did you also threaten them to the effect that if they attended the meeting, their licences would be forfeited?

A. I told them that if any seditious speeches were made—and subject only to this condition—that they were not to attend any seditious meetings and if they persisted in talking sedition, I would be compelled to report against them.

Q. Is there any clause in their licences making such restrictions?

A. Yes, there is a clause so far as I know, that they should not attend seditious meetings.

Q. Like school-boys?

A. That rests with the High Court. I have no say on that point.

Q. You say that there was an outward calm on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th. By this you imply as a matter of fact that there was no real disturbance?

A. Outwardly they appeared calm, but there were misapprehensions in my mind.

Q. You were already in possession of what had happened at Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. And according to you there were misgivings in your mind on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th. Therefore I want to know why you left your post and why you went to *salaam* Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien?

A. I did not go simply to *salaam* Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien. I had to attend a meeting.

Q. Why did you leave your post?

A. Well, I had to leave my post, because I was summoned to do so.

Q. Was there a regular *durbar*?

A. Yes.

Q. When you had thought that there was a possibility of some riot and serious consequences, why did you leave your post?

A. There was nothing serious at that time. There were no misgivings and there was no tangible proof that violence was actually going to take place.

Q. You were also aware that during those riots there was a very strong rumour of a general railway strike materialising?

A. This rumour came to my notice when I was at Gujranwala.

Q. The people of your district were aware on the 15th as to what had happened at Amritsar on the 10th and 11th?

A. Yes.

Q. There is no doubt in your mind?

A. No. Not only on the 15th, but also on the 16th when the railway and telegraph wires were broken at Sheikhupura.

Q. May I know to what you ascribe the immediate cause of this outburst at Sheikhupura

and other places within your jurisdiction? Was it the immediate result of the meetings held within your jurisdiction, or was it the result of news coming from Amritsar, or was it due to some other causes; that is to the agitation against the Rowlatt Act and the seditious speeches that were made both in the market of Chuharkana and in the Chuharkana village itself, and also to the misrepresentations that had been made regarding the Amritsar affairs, *i.e.*, about the damage done to the Golden Temple?

A. Yes. This I learnt from a man who was concerned in the riot at Dhaban Singh. He was Jagat Singh, the ring-leader at the Dhaban Singh loot.

Q. Any other cause?

A. To my mind these were the two causes—the two principal causes.

Q. Did you consider any other cause to be the principal cause of all this?

A. I do not think so.

Q. You are quite sure?

A. I have given you my answer. I said I do not think so.

Q. And you did not give your opinion to any other officers of what happened at Chuharkana and Sheikhupura? Have you up to this time given any other reasons to any officer?

A. I was never asked and never gave any.

Q. I will remind you. Did you or did you not inform Capt. Flowerdew that nothing would have happened at Sheikhupura or Chuharkana, that all this was due to what was done by the Punjabis on the 14th or 15th?

A. Well, I do not know the gentleman to whom you refer.

Q. Well, I will give you the exact words. Capt. Flowerdew says "I was informed by the Sub-Divisional Officer" (he means you, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate) "and the Sub-Inspector of Police at Sheikhupura that the real cause of the riot was due to a party from a troop train of the 22nd Punjabis which helped at the station the day before"?

A. I could not say so, because I knew early that morning at about 9 o'clock that the people of Muridke had already broken into the railway station.

Q. I am bringing out this information, and am asking whether or not you did make this statement?

A. Not in these very words. I could not. But as I have also stated in my statement, the troops did something.

Q. Did you or did you not say that the real cause of the riot . . . . .?

President.—He says the troops may have done something.

The Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan.—Therefore Captain Flowerdew was wrong in what he says in his statement?

A. Well, he might have misunderstood me.

Q. Probably you were carrying on the conversation with him in English and not in Urdu?

A. Very probably in English.

Q. Have you any doubt about it?

A. I do not remember, but very probably it was in English. It was just the same if we conversed in English or Urdu or any other language.

Q. What do you mean by saying that the people of Sheikhupura were waiting for your return to have another *hartal*?

A. Well, I was informed by a man and, so far as I could gather, they thought that as I had sent for those pleaders on the 6th morning they were against me and they probably thought that whatever they wanted to do they should do in my presence, and so wished to have the *hartal* in my presence. This was because I had dissuaded them, as you say, from the meeting.

Q. Therefore there was some ill-feeling between the pleaders and yourself?

A. No ill-feeling had arisen from my conversation with them on the 6th, and if they had engendered any sort of ill-feeling I was unaware of it, and naturally I could not help it.

Q. Were you responsible for collecting funds for the O'Dwyer Memorial?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any dispute between you and the pleaders over this affair?

A. Not at all.

Q. Did you not ask every one of the pleaders to subscribe and they refused?

A. Not at all.

Q. Now you say a free *langar* was also opened in imitation of the Lahore *langars*, and there was a baker about whom there was a row. Do you know if this baker was a Hindu or a Muhammadan?

A. He was a Hindu.

Q. This was one of the *langars* that was started on the 14th?

A. I do not think so. It might be one of them. I do not remember. But the riot took place at Shahdara.

Q. Do you know why it is that if it was considered to be a riot and a serious thing when for the first time you instituted the investigation of the case? Do you know the date?

A. It was the business of the police to investigate.

Q. But you were the officer in this part.

A. I say it was the business of the police and not of the magistrate. The information comes to the police first; that is the ordinary practice. I come to know of it later.

Q. Is not any information of a serious nature which comes to the police, transmitted to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate within 24 hours?

A. Well, those were days in which everyone was busy.

Q. Do you know that this matter was tried on the 26th May?

A. I do not know the date on which it was tried. It may have been so.

Q. Why was it tried so late?

A. Because we were busy with the Chuharkana investigation and could not therefore attend to the Sheikhupura investigations.

Q. Do you know that *jhatka* meat is not taken by Muhammadans?

A. Yes.

Q. In this case, were they all Hindus?

A. Yes. I think so.

Q. Do you not think that you have made this case into a riot, when it was only a remonstrance on behalf of the Hindus who remonstrated with this man when he was preparing *jhatka* meat?

A. You may think so. We thought it was a riot case.

Q. But there was no riot. The origin of the dispute was due to *jhatka* meat. The Hindus said that the Muhammadans were also taking it from this *langar*. They said "why did you prepare *jhatka* meat instead of *halal* meat?"

A. Yes.

Q. You were paying the bills of this man who was supplying the authorities with food for prisoners?

A. I did not know who the man was. But we got our food from one of these *jhiwars*. There were 2 men—one a Hindu and another a Muhammadan.

Q. Is it not a fact that on the 14th and 15th the bill of this man was paid and he did supply food to prisoners?

A. Well, if he was the man his bill must have been paid. I do not know what actually happened, because I did not attend each time the food was being supplied. It was the business of the man in charge.

Q. Did you have any complaints against this man?

A. I had none. I think the Sub-Inspector told me perhaps that this man at first refused to supply food, for the people asked him not to open his shop. Subsequently the sub-inspector asked him to supply food and it was supplied. I think, from the *langar*, so far as I know.

Q. You made a statement yesterday that Gohur Singh, after he was released from his arrest, threatened certain witnesses?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you record the statement of these witnesses?

A. Yes. Well, I do not know who these witnesses were. I did record the statements of certain witnesses of Sheikhupura.

Q. Did you record the statement of any persons who came to you and complained that they were threatened by Gohur Singh, because they were prosecution witnesses.

A. Not to that effect, but I know it as a matter of fact that this had happened.

Q. Were you present?

A. I was not present at the actual threatening but people came complaining.

Q. Have you seen these statements recorded anywhere, in any paper or anywhere?

A. Where do you mean?

Q. In any paper?

A. Before the police you mean or anywhere else?

Q. It may not have been recorded by any police officer, but have you seen these recorded statements anywhere?

A. I don't know. The police might have recorded those statements.

Q. Do you know how many persons were threatened by this man?

A. I did not try to make out the number.

Q. Have you ever brought a case against this man for threatening prosecution witnesses?

A. It was not my business. It was the business of Mr. Bosworth Smith. He was in charge and I was working under him. I was supervising the police investigation, and I was under Mr. Smith.

Q. I want to know as to whether any criminal prosecution was instituted against this man for threatening prosecution witnesses.

A. So far as I know, none. But your question was different first.

Q. You were not present on the 12th, 13th and 14th at Chuharkana?

A. I came back on the evening of the 13th. I was not present on the 11th and 12th.

Q. And therefore as you were not present probably nobody was deputed to be present at the meetings that were held on the 12th? It is quite possible that the inspector or somebody else might have deputed someone, but I want to know if any person was deputed.

A. None could be deputed, because we had no information that a meeting was to be held.

Q. There is no written record of the speeches on the 12th and the 13th?

A. There might be something in the police diaries.

Q. Have you seen them?

A. I have not seen any, but there might be something.

Q. So far as your knowledge goes, you have not seen any recorded notes of these speeches?

A. I have not seen any, but there might be some. This can be ascertained from other witnesses.

Q. I am concerned for the moment to know as to whether so far as your knowledge goes you have seen any recorded notes?

A. I have told you all the things that I know in order to convince you. You want to get facts from me, and I am giving them.

Q. How far away were the people from the armoured train when the machine-gun was fired for the first on the night of the 15th?

A. Well, it is difficult to give the distance.

Q. You can give us some idea?

A. They were quite near; that is all I can say. They could be seen so far as eye-sight could reach.

Q. Was it 10 or 15 yards?

A. I cannot give the exact measurements.

Q. I don't want the exact measurements. I want you to give me some approximate idea of the distance?

A. I can't give you the distance, they were near and they could be seen. That is all I can say.

Q. How many rounds were fired?

A. I could not say that. The officer in charge could tell you that.

Q. How is it that although the crowd was so near when the machine-gun was turned upon them and although more than one round was fired only one person was killed or wounded?

A. It is just possible that there might have been some other people wounded and they might have been taken away during the night.

Q. Up to this time you have not been able to trace any of those wounded persons?

A. We have not been able to trace them, because those who removed the wounded were not in a mood to give us any information.

Q. That is only your guess?

A. Perhaps it is a right guess.

Q. Have you seen any wounded persons removed?

A. We saw some traces on the ground.

Q. Persons had been dragged on the ground?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you think that the wounded persons were dragged in that fashion?

A. I don't know whether they were wounded or dead.

Q. Therefore what I want to know is, whether any wounded persons were dragged by the mob?

A. I have not seen any. That is also circumstantial evidence.

Q. Is it not a fact that in all the surrounding villages you went wherever you suspected anyone, identification proceedings were held and people were taken out of their houses and made to parade at all these different places?

A. Except, I think, in one village Banduki.

Q. You have not been able to trace any of those wounded persons up to this time?

A. No.

Q. Supposing there was no one else wounded except that one man, how do you account for it? You say that the crowd was near, the machine-gun was turned upon them, and so far as your personal knowledge goes there was only one person wounded or killed.

A. I did not say that the crowd had assembled at one place. People were here and there in the neighbourhood. Some might have been hit by the machine-gun and some might not have been hit.

Q. May I know what is the highest number you put? Give me a guess. What was the number of that crowd upon which the machine-gun was turned?

A. You don't want me to give any guess. I can't say. I have already answered this question yesterday. I never tried to ascertain the number at that horrible hour. I could not think of these things.

Q. It was horrible for those upon whom the machine-gun was turned?

A. It was horrible for the whole *ilaka*. It was horrible for the other people, and not for the crowd which was out for mischief.

Q. May I know whether the burden of the Empire was on your shoulders?

A. Not the burden of the Empire; at any rate the burden of the division was on my shoulders. I was responsible.

Q. Was there a large crowd?

A. I can't say. There were people there. I can't say the exact number.

Q. Give me some idea of the crowd.

A. There were some people here and there. I can't say the exact number.

Q. Some may mean 5 or 5,000?

A. You may take it in any way you like. As I understand by the word 'some' I have said that some people were here and there.

Q. You gave me the word 'some.' What is the highest and what is the lowest number you mean by the word 'some'?

A. It is very difficult to define words. I can't give you the exact number. They might be 10, 20 or 30. There were hedges there and some of them might have hidden under these hedges.

Q. So far as you saw, I would like to know the number.

A. There were some people round about in that neighbourhood. I can't give the exact number.

Q. Could a crowd of 100 be described by the word 'some'? Let us now take it in a negative form.

A. The crowd was not in one place. They were on both sides.

Q. Would you call them 'some' if they were 75?

A. Well, that is also 'some.'

Q. If there were 50 people will you call it 'some'?

A. No.

Q. Well, I am satisfied. I won't go any further. Therefore I take it that at that time you are quite sure you did not see about 800 persons assembled there?

A. They were not there. The 800 or 1,000 people were half a mile away and they had fled away on hearing the gun shots. There were not so many people there.

Q. On the first occasion you did not see 800 persons there?

A. No.

Q. You saw only some persons there and those some persons would not include 75?

A. Yes.

Q. I am quite satisfied with that. How many persons had been prosecuted and proceedings had been instituted against them in connection with these occurrences. Was one Mangal Singh, *zaildar*, mentioned by you, produced as a witness in any of those cases?

A. This Mangal Singh was a *zaildar* and as he was taken as a hostage for his son, and he could not possibly be a good witness for the prosecution. He could not be produced.

Q. According to your statement, this Mangal Singh was the informant who gave you news from time to time of important matters?

A. I do not say so anywhere. He gave me news only once when he came to me at 10 o'clock at night, and he did not give me news from time to time.

Q. In your statement you have deposed certain matters of which you received information from some persons. I want to know whether these persons were produced as witnesses?

A. Kindly tell those parts of the statement where I say so, so that I may give you full details.

Q. Were you examined as a witness in any of these cases?

A. No. I was a supervising officer, and it is generally regarded as improper for a supervising officer to give evidence.

Q. Is it the case throughout the Punjab or only in your district, because in other places even officers of the rank of Deputy Commissioner and others have come forward?

A. It is generally regarded as not very good evidence.

Q. It may be regarded as *infra dig.* for an officer . . . . . ?

A. I would have told them that I had no objection, but they did not examine me.

Q. Yesterday you made two or three statements saying that although certain matters were not within your personal knowledge, yet either on the second day or subsequently you were informed by some that something did happen, and you may remember that with regard to two or three occasions when firing took place you said that you came to know of it afterwards, that the intention of the mob was such and such, therefore I want to know were any one of your informants produced as witnesses in any of these cases?

A. What about?

Q. As to the intention of the mob and as to who were in the mob and what the mob was doing and so forth?

A. I think two or three members of the Notified Area Committee of Chuharkana came as witnesses.

Q. They were your informants?

A. They and also other people, in fact all people from the market whom I met on the day after the occurrence.

Q. If I cannot get the answer, I will take your statements one by one. You made a statement that you were subsequently informed of the intention of the mob and that was to attack the armoured car and to attack you and you said that that was the information given to you. Who was the person?

A. This information leaked out.

Q. Who gave you that information?

A. Shivdev Singh was one. The *lambardar* of Chuharkana.

Q. Was he examined in any of these cases?

A. I think he was examined in other matters regarding Chuharkana affairs.

Q. He was never examined and he never made a statement?

A. I think he did not make a statement. He made a verbal statement to me only.

Q. Now is there any person who gave you that information and who was examined in any of those cases and who made a statement to this effect? Is there any recorded statement?

A. No, so far as I know.

Q. On the first occasion, according to you, there was a mob of about a thousand persons?

A. Not a thousand, but two or three thousand.

Q. Therefore by the mere fact of the firing, the hearing of the noise of the machine-gun and the sight of the searchlight from a distance, they all bolted away and when you reached the place nobody could be found there?

A. Except one man whom we found hiding in a factory.

Q. I want to know how is it that within the brief space of a few hours from a crowd of three thousand which had bolted a crowd of about 3 or 4 hundred persons were ready to attack the armoured car?

A. Firing could control any number of people.

Q. They knew that the armoured train was there?

A. They would have all been killed if they had come there.

Q. They had seen the armoured train, and there was a crowd of 3,000 which bolted away. Therefore I want to know how this change occurred within a period of 3 or 4 hours, that only 300 or 400 persons were ready to attack the armoured train the next day?

A. The others probably thought it safer not to come near us.

Q. Therefore may I take it that, according to you, it was not safe for them to attack the armoured train in the night time when they were 3,000 strong but they thought it safer during day time and when they were only 300 or 400 strong to attack the car?

A. That rested with them. I could not guess their intentions. I have told you what I know, and it is a fact, and you can form your own opinions. I am here merely to give facts.

Q. In answer to Sir Chimanlal Setalvad you stated that you did not identify any one of those who were fired upon, but you only saw people coming and going?

A. Yes.

Q. This side of the village is the north side where the crowd was fired upon, the place where the firing took place?

A. I gave you the description.

Q. But I want to know whether it was the north side?

A. The railway line runs from east to west, I think.

Q. This firing, according to you, took place on the north side of the village according to the map?

A. North side of the railway line.

Q. The railway line runs from east to west?

A. That is the west side of the village and not the north side.

Q. How far was that place from the railway line?

A. Not very far away. It was daylight and people could be seen moving about.

Q. How far were they away from the railway line?

A. I think the village is nearly a furlong away from the railway line.

Q. You were not able to identify as a matter of fact any of these persons?

A. No.

Q. Why did you come to the conclusion that every one of them was a resident of Chuharkana?

A. Well, there might be other people also for aught I know. I never said that they were all residents of Chuharkana.

Q. One of the reasons given by you is that every resident of Chuharkana was in the riot and therefore you said that you were justified in giving your order to fire on them?

A. That was on the night between the 15th and 16th April, and not in the morning. In the riot there were not only the people of Chuharkana who were concerned but there were people of other villages also. I could not wait for the introduction of Martial Law to order firing.

Q. I understand that your power as a civil authority to give the order for firing is limited by the Criminal Procedure Code? Do you know that, as a magistrate, your powers are limited in the matter of giving the order to fire?

A. You can take it in any way you like. I had to act in that emergency. There was no help.

Q. I want to know whether, as a Magistrate, you know it or not that your powers of giving orders to fire are limited?

A. Limited in what respect?

Q. In every respect. Do you know that you are not authorised to order firing?

A. You should give me credit for knowing something.

Q. Do you know whether or not you are empowered to give order to fire?

A. I am empowered to give order to fire.

Q. By which Act?

A. By the Criminal Procedure Code.

Q. Is there any other Code under which you can order firing?

A. I do not know of any other Code.

Q. Therefore your powers are limited by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you fulfil the conditions laid down there when you ordered firing?

A. I think I did.

Q. Did you ask the crowd to disperse? Did you give them any time to disperse?

A. I don't think they could be begged to disperse at that time.

Q. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that under the Criminal Procedure Code you should have given them some time and you should have told them that unless they dispersed within a prescribed time they would be fired upon?

A. There was no time for telling them that. They were in no mood to hear us.

Q. You know, I think, by this time that it is not the military authority that is responsible for that firing, but you are yourself responsible?

A. If I am responsible I am ready to take the responsibility. It rests with you. I did what I thought proper at the time.

Q. Do you or do you not realise that you are responsible for that?

A. I have told you that I have done what I thought proper and necessary in the interest of peace and good order, and I have acted in good faith so far as I know, and if I have exceeded my limits, it is for the Committee to decide.

Q. Did you take any steps to disperse the crowd upon which you fired on the night of the 15th?

A. I have said that you should take it from me that my answer is the same with respect to every crowd. I could not help it. Would they have gone away by my begging them to disperse?

Q. How many persons were arrested on the night of the 15th?

A. On the night between 15th or 16th, I arrested one man Mana Singh.

Q. No one else was arrested?

A. No one else was found on the night between the 15th and the 16th.

Q. On the night between the 15th and 16th was anyone else arrested by you?

A. I arrested one man and no one else was found.

Q. And therefore it would be wrong if anywhere it is stated that at least between 22 and 40 persons were arrested during that night?

A. So far as I know we only arrested one man. Others might have been arrested the next morning. You can take it from me that only one man was arrested and you can compare my statement with the evidence you have received. It is for you and not for me to say whether that statement is right or wrong.

Q. You were present all along with the party that went?

A. I was.

Q. Therefore I say that if the statement is made that at least between 22 and 40 persons were arrested during that night, it would be wrong?

A. Some people, I think, were arrested either on the 16th morning or perhaps on the morning of the 17th in Chuharkana.

Q. I am talking of what happened between the night of the 15th and the 16th?

A. So far as I know, only one man, Mana Singh, was arrested. You need not ask my opinion whether if any other statement is made it is right or wrong. It is for you to decide and not for me.

Q. I am asking you.....?

A. You asked me whether it was wrong. That would be a question of opinion. You asked me whether it was right or not, it is a question of opinion. But the fact is only one man was arrested.

Q. You have stated in answer to Sir Chimanlal Setalvad that first of all when you went inside the village on the morning of the 17th no one was to be found there?

A. A good many people were found, but a good many had also fled away.

Q. And therefore why should it not be concluded that those men whom you saw on the west side of the village were those who were leaving the village on account of the presence of the armoured car?

A. They had not left the village. They had rather collected there, so far as my information went, at a village pond.

Q. Your information was subsequent and two days later. I am talking of what happened at the time. At that time you had no information as to who those people were?

A. They were people probably from Chuharkana. They had not fled from the village. We did not go through the whole village. We went through only a part of the village and then we went outside. I did not search the whole village.

Q. In your statement before this Committee you have stated that you saw certain persons on horseback?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you make that point clear in your written statement that there were other persons?

A. There were a good many things which I have omitted from the written statement which I did not think to be necessary for the sake of brevity. Those things I left over for your cross-examination.

Q. You were prepared for cross-examination when you wrote this?

A. I was, certainly. I have given you many details now which I have not mentioned in the written statement.

Q. And therefore you thought it was a very unimportant matter?

A. I did not think it very important. The important thing was firing and the reasons for that I have already explained. Some people were walking, some were on horseback, that was not an important matter to my mind.

Q. As a magistrate you know that if people are killed an inquest is held?

A. Yes.

Q. Now there were three firings, one near the bridge, another on the next day in the village itself and the third at the Padiwan village. May I know if any inquest was held at these three places?

A. No. It is the business of the police. The police ask for inquest, and then the thing is done.

Q. Were any inquests held?

A. No, so far as I know. We had no time.

Q. Apart from that man did you make any attempt to find out the names of those persons who were killed?

A. Yes; I think so. There was one Mehna, a sweeper, who was killed and Mahounda—a number of persons were also wounded at these three firings. I saw one man wounded and one man dead.

Q. Was this man who was wounded *challaned* or was any case brought against him?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. That is a matter which rested with the police or Mr. Bosworth Smith.

Q. But were you not Sub-Divisional Officer?

A. Yes, I was; but these things go through the police.

Q. Did you make any enquiry about the man who was caught red-handed?

A. The man wounded was not caught red-handed. As I have said that firing took place in Chuharkana. Only one man was caught red-handed and he was killed.

Q. Was this man who was wounded an innocent person?

A. I do not believe he was an innocent person.

Q. He was one of the crowd that was fired upon?

A. Where?

Q. At the Chuharkana market?

A. That man was dead.

Q. Then this man who was wounded—where was he wounded?

A. He was wounded near the distant signal on the Sheikhupura side.

Q. This man who was wounded, why was he not prosecuted?

A. He was not caught red-handed; he was not found tearing up the line or doing damage to the telegraph wires.

Q. My point is this: The men were members of an unlawful assembly and were fired upon.....?

A. There were a good many unlawful assemblies —some were found tearing up the line, some had escaped, and some were prosecuted.

Q. I want to know whether this man who was wounded was prosecuted? He was not prosecuted because he was an innocent person who had nothing to do with it?

A. No; not for that reason. He was not prosecuted because he was not caught red-handed.

Q. Up to this time was there anybody else wounded at all?

A. Where?

Q. At the three firings?

A. One man was wounded and one killed. In my statement I had said one but I corrected that yesterday. There were two casualties instead of one.

Q. Was there any man Asa Ram who was wounded?

A. I did not know about him.

Q. Was there any man wounded who was easing himself in the field?

A. No; I know nothing about that either.

Q. Do you know any man by the name of Bhai Ishar Singh?

A. Possibly he is the very man whom I have mentioned.

Q. He had four shot wounds?

A. I do not know how many wounds.

Q. Variam Singh—was he wounded?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know whether Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien arrested certain pleaders at Sheikhupura?

A. Yes, and those pleaders were arrested under my advice.

Q. And they were kept under arrest for about forty days?

A. Yes, up to the 29th May?

Q. And they were released on the 29th May?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any police investigation made into their conduct?

A. Yes.

Q. And is there a record of the investigation?

A. Yes.

Q. By whom was that investigation made?

A. It was I think, made by Autar Singh and Ali Mohammed. I myself recorded the statement of two men.

Q. We are talking of the investigation made by the police?

A. I also took part in the investigation and recorded certain statements and statements were recorded also by police officers.

Q. Was any investigation made?

A. Yes, investigation was made.

Q. And therefore when you say investigation was made you mean that the statement of persons were recorded?

A. Yes.

Q. And above and over that you also recorded two statements of two persons?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you also record the statement of this man Gohur Singh about those pleaders?

A. No; I did not record it.

Q. Was the statement of Gohur Singh recorded by anybody in connection with the investigation of those pleaders?

A. That was perhaps being done departmentally —a departmental enquiry was perhaps being held into the conduct of those pleaders and that ought to be taken separately from the police investigation. The departmental enquiry took place later on.

Q. I am talking of the police investigation.

A. I heard that some statements of some people were recorded against pleaders later on in the departmental investigation.

Q. In the departmental investigation was Gohur Singh's statement recorded?

A. It was not recorded in my presence, so I do not know.

Q. Were these papers submitted to the High Court?

A. I do not know. It was not in my hands. It was in the hands of Mr. Penny.

Q. Do you know whether during this time any papers were submitted to the Chief Court, either of the police investigation or of the departmental enquiry?

A. I heard that some papers were submitted to the High Court.

Q. I presume these police investigation papers will be in existence?

A. Yes, the papers must be in existence.

Q. So far as you are concerned, I would like to know whether you suggested as a result of the enquiry certain things against those pleaders.....

A. The departmental enquiry was in Mr. Penny's hands; I took part only in the police investigation.

Q. After the matter had been represented to the High Court and when there was a subsequent enquiry did you take any part in this?

A. All that I know is that a preliminary enquiry was held into their conduct and that certain papers were submitted against them to the High Court. I do not know what the orders of the High Court were.

Q. Did you formulate any opinion of your own about this?

A. I had my own opinion.

Q. Did you put it down in writing?

A. I do not remember having done so.

Q. Now with regard to one Alamdin. You formulated certain charges against him and the gist of them were (1) that he subscribed to the "*Moslem Herald*," (2) that he was seen at the house of another pleader on the day of the *hartal*, and (3)

that he had written a letter to the President of the meeting expressing regret for his non-attendance. The above was a gist of the charges against Alamdin?

A. Yes.

Q. Then there was another pleader Ushnak Rai and the gist of the charges against him were that he subscribed to the *Tribune*, that he was seen bare-headed at another man's house and that he wrote a letter regretting his inability to attend the meeting?

A. This man led the rest and also presided at some meetings.

Q. How far off were you and your party when you fired upon the crowd on the 16th?

A. I think the distance was a furlong.

Q. You said in your statement that the train was a furlong away.....

A. This means that we did not fire on them from the armoured train, we fired upon them when we were in the village.

Q. Therefore your statement is not correct that you fired upon them from a distance of one furlong?

A. It is just possible that the crowd was that distance.

Q. The nearest approach to the crowd so far as your party was concerned was one furlong?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it you who proclaimed Martial Law at Sheikhupura on the 16th?

A. There was no Martial Law at Sheikhupura on the 16th. I do not know who proclaimed Martial Law on any date. At Sheikhupura I was with the armoured train and with the Deputy Commissioner's special.

Q. You did not follow the example of other places and hold a *durbar* and proclaim Martial Law?

A. No.

Q. You did not proclaim Martial Law in any way?

A. No.

Q. Did you inform the people of Sheikhupura or the people who were within your jurisdiction that Sheikhupura was going to be bombarded and that the bombardment of the place was prevented by your intercession?

A. No.

Q. Up to what time did you remain at Chuharkana?

A. I think till about 5 or 6 o'clock in the evening.

Q. What I want to know is whether you had any police papers or statements with you when you left Sheikhupura?

A. No.

Q. Did you ask the military authorities to arrest a certain number of persons?

A. Only one man was arrested at my request and that man was Mana Singh.

Q. Between the 15th and 17th, did you give to any of those military commanders any list of persons to be arrested.

A. No.

Q. At Chuharkana or any other place?

A. I gave a list of some persons on the 17th.

Q. Was there any evidence against them?

A. There was good deal of suspicion. I should arrest people on suspicion.

Q. Therefore all those persons who were arrested on the 17th and 18th in various villages—they were arrested at your suggestion because there was strong suspicion against them?

A. Except those who were taken as hostages.

Q. There was no recorded evidence with you up to that time?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—.

Q. There was a question put to-day and again yesterday about firing from the armoured train. It would be perfectly wrong and unfair to suggest that you fired wantonly or without justification?

A. Certainly.

Q. I think you said that before any action was taken you took counsel with the military authorities who were on the train with you?

A. Yes.

Q. Now that day had been a very exciting day?

A. It was a critical day. The Chuharkana station had been burnt and looted, the wires had been cut and the lines obstructed and I gathered from the temper of the people that they were turbulent and bent on anything.

Q. I take it that you had every reason to believe that the crowd was out for mischief?

A. Yes, and I heard from a guard of a railway train what was being done at other places.

Q. So all these events were in your mind and you knew that the crowd was out for mischief and you would have been failing in your duty had you not taken the action which you took to restore order?

A. Yes, if I had not done so there would have been a regular mutiny.

Q. And as a matter of fact after this peace was restored?

A. Yes.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Of the educated people some were loyal and some were not loyal. Am I right in taking it that you speak from personal experience and not from hearsay?

A. I daily come across educated people who are not very loyal.

Q. Whom would you regard as not loyal?

A. People who tell me that foreign domination is not wanted. To my mind these people are disloyal.

Q. That foreign domination is not wanted?

A. That is my idea of disloyalty.

Q. How many educated people do you know who are your acquaintances and who express such sentiments?

A. That is a very difficult question to answer. That is my opinion and it is not good to give names.

Q. I am asking as to the number of educated people.

A. I cannot give you the exact number.

Q. Can you give me an approximate number?

A. It is very difficult to say.

Q. Are they over 100?

A. I think much more than 100.

Q. About 200?

A. More than that number.

Q. Is it 300?

A. It is very difficult to answer that question. It is a question of memory and not an easy question to answer.

Q. How many told you that foreign domination was not a good thing?

A. I daily hear it in conversation in the railway train and in private also.

Q. Anything else?

A. I think I have told you the worst.

Q. Are those your friends who told you this?

A. No; not only friends but companions in the same train.

Q. Have any of your friends told you that foreign domination is not a good thing?

A. Well, not my friends.

Q. I want to know whether any of your friends told you this?

A. Some of them might be friends.

Q. Don't you know your own friends?

A. My friends may consist of good and bad people. It is very difficult to answer this question as to whether they were my friends or my enemies. That is my general impression.

Q. If any of your friends told you this you would probably have remembered?

A. Not necessarily; I might forget things told by my friends.

Q. And would you still continue to be friends with him?

A. That is a difficult matter. He might have his own opinion. A person may not be loyal but at the same time he forms his own opinions. Why what do you see in Parliament—the members embrace each other outside and in Parliament they tear each other.

Q. I presume that your friends are all educated people?

A. Some are educated and some are uneducated.

Q. Now as regards whipping—was any doctor present at the time of whipping?

A. I had no hand in the whipping.

Q. Do you know whether any doctor was present?

A. Only one case of whipping took place in my presence and on this occasion there was no doctor present. The whipping took place at the Canal Bungalow and it is just possible that he was examined but so far as I know he was not.

Q. And if anybody was examined you would probably know?

A. Not necessarily. I was not the magistrate who inflicted the punishment. I was not with Mr. Bosworth-Smith always.

Q. Then no doctor was there?

A. The doctor was close by and he may have been examined.

Q. At the time that you were there you did not see any doctor?

A. No.

Q. They did not examine those who were going to be whipped?

A. Not to my knowledge.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. With regard to those pleaders whom you said were arrested on your advice, how many were arrested?

A. Four. There were ten but six were not arrested because they had taken no part.

Q. When you gave that advice what information did you have against them?

A. I had very strong suspicions against them. They held the *hartal* and they held meetings and on the night of the same day that the *hartal* was held the telegraph wires were cut.

Q. They were kept in jail for 40 days?

A. They were kept for 40 days.

Q. They were not let out on bail?

A. I think none applied for bail so far as I know.

Q. They were better off in jail?

A. They were better off in not being prosecuted. I did not say they were better off in jail.

Lieutenant TATAM, Military Grass Farm, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division.

By the President—

Q. Lieutenant Tatam, you are stationed at Rawalpindi?

A. Yes.

Q. And, have been there for some time?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 14th April last, did you leave Lyallpur by the 8-16 train on duty for Rawalpindi?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At that time you were looking after a little boy?

A. Yes.

Q. When you arrived at Hafizabad railway station did anything occur?

A. I heard a noise just before the train reached the station near the level crossing and I looked out and I saw a huge crowd of men with flags and sticks and making shouts. Thinking there would probably be trouble to the little boy and myself, I at once closed all the shutters of the windows and bolted the doors of the carriage. We went into the station and stayed there for about seven or eight minutes. Then I heard the crowd coming along from the level crossing and up to the platform. They soon came to my carriage and they were shouting. They tried to open the doors of the carriage by turning the handle. Finding they could not they moved further up. Two or three minutes afterwards, they returned and applied the same operation of turning the handles. Finding they could not open the doors or windows, they smashed them.

Q. Why did the crowd select you as their object?

A. I could not say that.

Q. Did you form any opinion about it at the time?

A. No.

Q. Had you done anything?

A. Not at all.

Q. Were you in uniform?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there anyone else in the train?

A. No other European.

Q. Was any attack made on anyone except yourself?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What happened afterwards?

A. When they saw me, they were very much excited, and asked me to come out. I sat on the further side from them. They started throwing in sticks, stones, shoes, etc. They were dancing about in front of me, beating their breasts, and waving their flags and sticks. As I was apprehensive and anticipated danger, I removed into the bath-room with the boy and locked the door. Immediately they went through the back of my carriage and through the other compartment (second or third class) came to the other side of the carriage and smashed the windows.

Q. The window of the bath-room was protected by bars?

A. Yes. I thought that it was insecure as long *lathis* were coming through the window. I came out into the main carriage again, and on arriving there, as soon as I got outside, I saw two Indian gentlemen near the door talking and beating the mob with sticks and preventing the crowd from coming in. I sat down for a few minutes and then the crowd seemed to me to be increasing all the time. I tried to talk and asked them what I had to do with their *tamasha* as I was simply going to Rawalpindi. The only satisfaction I got was that I was struck in the stomach by a *lathi*, and another *lathi* just missed my eye. So I got across from that side to the further side from the platform. Then there was another man of the crowd, who was evidently one of the ringleaders at the commencement. He evidently had some hold over the crowd and seemed to keep the mob under control and tried to get into the carriage. After about seven or eight minutes, there was no sign of the train going. A native Christian guard came to my carriage. I asked him to get the train started. He had been to the station master's room, but he could not find him anywhere. He was nowhere to be seen. But as things were getting very bad, he telephoned to the next station and moved the train to the signal, and eventually the train did start again amidst jeers and shouts of abuse and throwing of stones. We eventually went out of the station. The carriage was smashed a bit, the three windows, glass, venetians and wire, were all smashed.

Q. As I understand, you never went out of the carriage?

A. No.

Q. If you had gone out of the carriage, and the crowd had got hold of you, what would have happened to you?

A. I think probably in the excited state in which they were, they would not have me let off.

Q. Had you any doubt about their intention?

A. I certainly think that that was their intention, because as they saw me, they at once came to the carriage and started all those things that I have mentioned. That was their object.

Q. In your statement, I see you say that the crowd was shouting *Captain sahib ko maro; sahib sala andar hai.*

A. Yes.

Q. When the train was moved on, I suppose you reached your destination all right?

A. From there I got to Wazirabad. I was held up there. On the way somebody who got out at the next station, told me that there was another crowd there about two stations off, but there was nothing there at all.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You say in your statement, Lieutenant, that there were two men who assisted you in keeping back the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were they? Did they come from the crowd or were they people in the train?

A. One man was in the train. He got in at a station further down, and the other man was on the platform at the time.

Q. Was he in your compartment?

A. Neither of them was in my compartment.

Q. He came to your compartment and assisted you?

A. Yes.

Q. Some days after the incidents, were you asked to identify any people?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were you taken for that purpose?

A. First of all I went to Gujranwala.

Q. Did anything happen at Gujranwala about which you could identify people?

A. No; it had nothing to do with me.

Q. What were you taken to Gujranwala for?

A. I believe some men were arrested at Hafizabad and taken to the Gujranwala jail.

Q. You were taken to the jail to identify?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you identify anyone?

A. I indentified two or three.

Q. As forming part of the crowd at the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Then where were you taken?

A. To Hafizabad.

Q. And there, how was the identification made?

A. In the afternoon I went round with the Deputy Commissioner, Colonel O'Brien and the Superintendent of Police and some inspectors and sub-inspectors of police. We just casually walked through the *mandis* and bazars. Colonel O'Brien asked me to say if I could recognise anybody that might have been in the crowd. That is what took place that afternoon at Hafizabad.

Q. Did you recognise anybody?

A. I recognised three or four there.

Q. Then what happened further?

A. The next morning, probably about two or three thousand people were paraded under the orders of the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. At Hafizabad?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was it done? Was it at the station?

A. This was just outside on the road near the dâk bungalow, and I went carefully up the lines and picked out men that I recognised as having formed part of the crowd.

Q. How many in all did you identify like that?

A. 35 or 36.

Q. Were they among those who actually attacked your compartment?

A. They were in the crowd all round my compartment.

Q. You were in the carriage itself?

A. Yes.

Q. For some time you were in the bath-room?

A. Yes, for about two or three minutes.

Q. You could have seen only a very small number of people at the carriage window.

A. I could see the whole crowd as all the windows were smashed open on one side.

Q. With regard to the two men who assisted you, was anyone of them arrested and shown to you afterwards?

A. No.

Q. Did it happen that you were shown someone and asked to identify him?

A. I was not asked to identify anybody; I simply had to pick out anybody whom I thought was in the crowd on my own initiative.

Q. No particular man was brought to you?

A. Nobody was pointed out to me.

Captain S. P. FLOWERDEW, 1-24th North-Western Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, Lahore.

By the President—

Q. Captain Flowerdew, were you Captain in the North-Western Railway Battalion of the Indian Defence Force?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 17th April last were you ordered to proceed with one non-commissioned officer and 14 men by special train from Lahore to Chuharkana?

A. Yes.

Q. That was early in the afternoon?

A. I was given my orders on the night of the 16th some time about midnight and I actually went to the station about 6 o'clock on the morning of the 17th and there was some delay in getting the train assembled to take me out. The first thing in the morning as soon as the train could be got ready, I went to Chuharkana.

Q. When did you arrive in Chuharkana?

A. At about 1 o'clock in the afternoon.

Q. I think you found no civil authorities at the station and so pushed on to the village and there you met armoured train No. 1 and the sub-divisional magistrate?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there a sub-inspector with him?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you receive instructions about a man to be arrested there?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was he? In Chuharkana?

A. He was a man who lived at Chuharkana.

Q. Were you able to effect the arrest?

A. No.

Q. Why was that?

A. He was not at the village, but had gone to a well a couple of miles away and was there with a party of men. The information I received from the sub-inspector of police was to that effect, and when we approached the well they all ran away.

Q. I think you could not overtake him?

A. We could not overtake them as they ran very fast.

Q. What action did you take?

A. We followed them up and they went into a village Padiawala and we went through the village to see if we could find him there. We could not find him as he had gone on.

Q. Did you take some people from the village with you?

A. We obtained information that there were a certain number of people hiding in the village who had joined in burning the Chuharkana station and destroyed the lines, and we arrested some. We had to search the houses. They were hidden inside the house in all places and in the roof and the houses were all locked from outside.

Q. Among those prisoners, was there a sepoy on leave?

A. There was a sepoy named Fauza Singh.

Q. Was Ram Singh an ex-sepoy?

A. He was; so I was told.

Q Before this had you fired on the party?

A. We fired on the party when we started pursuing them from the well.

Q. Were any casualties caused in consequence of your fire?

A. One man was killed there to the best of my knowledge.

Q. When you returned to the lines, did you find Sergeant Davies?

A. Sergeant Davies and one or two men had gone out.

Q. Had he gone out separately?

A. We went out together, but when Ram Singh fled, we divided into two groups and I took most of the men with me in a larger group, and Sergeant Davies took I think about four men in the other group.

Q. Did Sergeant Davies do any firing?

A. Yes. One of a large party some of whom were armed fired at Sergeant Davies.

Q. And Sergeant Davies returned the fire?

A. He shot him at once. Sergeant Davies was a very good shot.

Q. Did Sergeant Davies bring back any prisoners?

A. He brought altogether, I think, four.

Q. Of these two were retained and two released?

A. That was about it. The Magistrate examined them and was of opinion that two were not concerned in the riots.

Q. Your assistance was not required?

A. I suggested that I should set out the next day to effect the arrest of Ram Singh, but I was assured that there would be no difficulty in arresting him.

Q. You were informed, I think, that this Ram Singh was one of the important ringleaders?

A. I was told that he was a leader of the riots at Chuharkana.

Q. Was he captured?

A. I believe he was taken prisoner the next day.

Q. You yourself returned to Lahore with some eight prisoners with you?

A. Yes.

Q. Or was it more? I see you returned with eight prisoners taken by your own party and some three taken by Captain Joscelyne's party?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Captain Joscelyne the officer in charge?

A. Yes, of No. 1 armoured train.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You went with this armoured train on the 17th?

A. It was not an armoured train. It was an ordinary special train, with two carriages, a brake-van and an engine.

Q. You were not with the last witness, that we have had, in the party?

A. The last witness was at Hafizabad.

Q. I understand. I meant to refer to the one before the last witness, Rai Sahib Lala Sri Ram.

A. I met him at Chuharkana.

Q. When you arrived at Chuharkana, the armoured train was there?

A. It was there repairing the line and repairing the telegraph wires.

Q. You formed your own party and had nothing to do with the armoured train?

A. I had nothing to do with it. I came with a special object.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. In the reports which you made to your superior officers after returning from this expedition, it is put down that "Captain Flowerdew states that he was told by the Sub-Divisional Officer and Sub-Inspector of Police that the real cause of the riot at Chuharkana was due to a party from the special train of the 22nd Punjabis which halted at the station the day before the riot."

A. That was not the actual report I made on the actual events of the day. That was a special report on the other information. I sent in a special secret report to the General Officer Commanding. I wrote it out about the middle of the night, as I had been out all day long.

Q. I am just giving it word for word. Therefore I take it that to the best of your recollection and belief that was the information given to you? "Captain Flowerdrew states that he was told by the sub-divisional officer and the sub-inspector of police that the real cause of the riot at Chuharkana was due to a party from the special train of the 22nd Punjabis which halted at the station the day before the riot."

A. I said that it was the spark which caused the whole conflagration. The field was prepared before.

Q. And this man was speaking to you in English?

A. He probably spoke in English. I have seen him; he speaks English better than I speak Hindustani.

Q. There is one more fact. Neither this report on which you have been examined nor any other thing mentions the fact that anyone fired upon Sergeant Davies?

A. No.

Q. And to-day you add this statement that one man fired upon Sergeant Davies and upon that he returned the fire?

A. Yes; I may explain it. At the time I wrote this report there was no need to prove to anybody that there were riots on. It was a self-evident fact.

Q. Because there were riots on, therefore to your mind it was quite clear that any party of soldiers that would go to any village would be fired on?

A. No.

Q. The mere fact that there were riots does not necessarily prove that Sergeant Davies must have been fired upon?

A. I did not refer to it because it was self-evident that there were riots at the time.

Q. Then it appears to me that on the night of the 15th-16th, there were 22 other persons who were arrested?

A. I was not there.

Q. Did they come to Lahore with you?

A. Three men were handed over by Captain Joscelyne.

Q. So far as you are concerned, no other persons were with you on the 17th?

A. I had eight taken by myself and three taken by Captain Joscelyne.

Q. All the leaders or persons that were arrested by you, were arrested practically at the instance of the gentleman who has just now given his evidence, Lala Sri Ram Sud?

A. No; he was not with me at Padiawala. He met us five or six miles away from the railway line. He did not accompany us.

Q. The magistrate gave you the names of Teja Singh, Kartar Singh, Sohan Singh, Mehar Din and Syed Nahal Shah?

A. But they were not arrested that day.

Q. He gave you the names of those men who were really wanted?

A. No; he gave me names of these men, when I was going home after the day's proceedings were all over.

Q. At least the names of men who were arrested were given to you by that man?

A. I wrote them down myself.

Q. At his dictation?

A. I asked the men their names.

Q. You did not know who they were at all?

A. No.

Q. The men who were wanted, were given by this magistrate?

A. The magistrate was not there when I arrested them. I did not know the names of the men that I was arresting. I did not know the men. I only knew Ram Singh. After being able to get him, I came to this village somewhere on the line. I was informed that there were various men hiding in the house who had taken part in the riots. As I was there, the best thing was to apprehend them and take them home with me.

Q. By whom were you informed?

A. By a man of the village. We found a man in the village and asked him if he had joined in the riots. He said he had not, and we asked him to let us know the names of those who had joined, and he told us the names and where they were hiding. We had some difficulty as the houses were all locked and men hid themselves behind walls and behind bales of cloth.

Q. That was on the information given to you by the informer?

A. Yes.

Q. There was another sepoy who was on leave, Fauza Singh.

A. He was one of the men who were hiding there.

Q. Was he on leave from the regiment?

A. I could not say. He belongs to the 3rd Guides. I do not know where his regiment was stationed.

Q. There is only one more explanation. The persons who were shot by Sergeant Davies were shot by him from a distance and that is why he could not go close to them and take their arms?

A. As far as he explained, they were not very far, *probably about 200 yards away. Some of them were quite close to the man who was shot and they picked the rifle up and ran away.*

Q. You say that the servants ran away with the arms?

A. Yes.

Q. Servants were not on horseback?

A. Certainly not. But the Punjabi can run much faster than a heavily laden soldier with a rifle and kit on.

Sardar Sahib AMAR SINGH, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sheikhupura.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Amar Singh, you are an Extra Assistant Commissioner at Sheikhupura?

A. Yes.

Q. You are cognisant of certain incidents that occurred there?

A. Certainly.

Q. May I take it that you agree with the account that has already been given by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Rai Sahib Lala Sri Ram Sud?

A. I do not remember exactly what he said.

Q. Were you instructed to make investigations into Sangla, Moman and Machhike cases?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In connection with the investigations you made as to those occurrences did you employ any force to extract statements from witnesses or use any threats?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Will you explain what method you adopted in getting statements from witnesses as to what had occurred?

A. The police investigated and I called the witness and told him that no threat was meant to be offered and he should give a true statement, and I wrote the statement.

Q. At the time of the investigation were a number of men made to stand in a line and was the witness then asked to point out any man that he recognised as having taken part in the incidents?

A. That was the way in which people were found out. We made a list of those persons who were pointed out by witnesses and then that list was handed over to the police.

Q. And before being handed over, was the list signed by those identifying the people?

A. No, Sir, but it was signed by myself.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. At Sheikhupura you attended the meeting which took place there on the 6th of February?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There was nothing seditious spoken at that meeting?

A. Not at all.

Q. Then you had a *hartal* on the 10th?

A. Not on the 10th. I have some doubt about the date, but I think it was on the 6th.

Q. Whenever it was, it passed off peacefully?

A. There was no disturbance in my presence.

Q. There was a further *hartal* on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. And that went off peacefully also?

A. There was no disturbance in my presence, but during the night a wire was cut.

Q. The cutting of wires was on the night of the 14th?

A. The night between the 14th and 15th.

Q. Were you concerned with the arrest of the pleaders at Sheikhupura?

A. They were not arrested in my presence.

Q. Had you anything to do with their arrest? Did you make any investigation?

A. Nothing.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. The wire cutting at Machhike had nothing to do with the riot; it was only a private personal grudge?

A. As far as I could investigate it was due to a personal grudge.

Q. How long after your reaching Sangla did the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Bosworth Smith, arrive?

A. I accompanied him on the first day.

Q. And when did he come again?

A. Perhaps after 5 or 6 days later, I do not remember the exact date.

Q. Mr. Bosworth Smith arrested a large number of persons at Sangla on one day, was it on the first or the second occasion?

A. I think it was the second day.

Q. And when you went to Sangla there was some inspector also sent with you?

A. Yes, Kartar Singh, Inspector, accompanied me.

Q. Till the second arrival of Mr. Bosworth Smith you had only arrested three persons?

A. I do not remember the exact number, either 3 or 4 or 5; the inspector did it.

Q. According to the investigation made by you up to that day only these persons were liable to be arrested?

A. I had not completed the investigation yet and I was awaiting its completion.

Q. So I say up to that stage of your investigation only these three persons were arrested and no others?

A. As far as I remember, I made no arrests. They were already arrested.

Q. Did not the pleaders at Sheikhupura, when you were there, help you in keeping law and order?

A. On the night of the 15th-16th, when Rai Sahib had left me in charge of the place, I called Lala Sheonath Rai and asked him to help me in patrolling the city.

Q. And did he and other pleaders help you or not?

A. Lala Sheonath Rai offered to help and did so.

Q. Was he deprived of his *lambardarship*, do you know?

A. I do not know.

Q. You do not know up to this time whether Lala Sheonath Rai has been deprived of his *lambardarship* up to this time?

A. I have heard of it now, but have nothing to do with the revenue work.

Q. Did you know he was a *lambardar*?

A. Yes, he was a *lambardar.*

Q. Now the man, Harnam Singh, who assaulted Mr. Wale, the telegraph inspector, do you know him? You have made a statement that you never saw him. You know about the attack by Harnam Singh on Mr. Wale?

A. I investigated and found that he had done it.

Q. He was the man who released a prisoner from the railway station?

A. The same.

Lieutenant Khan ABDUR RAHIM KHAN of Zaida, Cadet, Indian Army.

By the President—

Q. You are a Lieutenant *in the Indian Army?*

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you leave Lahore *on the 15th of April last* for Lyallpur at about 2 in the afternoon?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I *think you were accompanied* by another cadet?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you reach Chuharkana at about 4 in the afternoon?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When the train was stopped there did you notice anything?

A. Yes, Sir, when the train reached Chuharkana I noticed a lot of *mandi* people running towards the train as if expecting to see something.

Q. Did you look out of the window?

A. When I looked out of the window there was a servant of mine there and I asked him why the train was halted for such a long time. He told me there were some people in front who were trying to dismantle the line, and when I looked out I saw about 50 to 60 persons. I cannot give you the exact number. I did not see them actually dismantling the line, but they were on the line and the engine was detached and taken over there, and after some time I found the engine coming back and going past the train on the other line, and then I found all those people who were in front were running towards the station, and they had axes in their hands, and some people rushed the station master's room and some people rushed a few hundred yards towards the Lahore side and got on to the telegraph poles and started cutting the wires, and also started dismantling the lines towards the Lahore side.

Q. Was there a crowd collected on the station itself or a number of people collected there?

A. There were the passengers and also some *mandi* people.

Q. Did you hear any one addressing any of the people?

A. Yes, there was a man very shabbily dressed, an unimportant sort of person, and he was quite close to my window and he was addressing them generally, not any particular audience, and he was telling them to wake up and start looting.

Q. Did he say anything about regaining the *Raj?*

A. Yes, he said "You Sikh people, get up, now is your time, if you try you will get your *Raj.*" I did not pay very great attention to what he was saying.

Q. Was he exciting the people?

A. The people did not seem to be very much excited by his speech.

Q. But they were excited otherwise?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you notice that two railway employees were attacked or surrounded by men?

A. Yes, Sir. There was the station master (I was told he was the station master) and another man and some people rushed the station master's room and he was dragged out and one man who had a big iron rod in his hand was trying to hit him on the head.

Q. With an iron rod?

A. Yes, Sir. Then a pleader, who was travelling with me, interfered and stopped him.

Q. Did you notice that a signal was given to loot the train?

A. No, Sir. I did not notice any particular signal.

Q. I see you say the signal to loot was given by an old man, probably a Muhammadan and a very unimportant sort of person?

A. By that I mean he was the first man to start the looting.

Q. Did you see the looting proceeding?

A. Yes, Sir. There was not very much to loot. No passengers were looted in my presence, but the people rushed the station master's room and pulled him out and they were inside; they must have been looting.

Q. Then did you go along with Mr. Iqbal Singh, a pleader, to the *mandi*?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And from thence did you go to a house close by where Mr. Budh Singh, Executive Engineer, followed you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you got there what did you do?

A. When we got there we first thought the best thing would be to get out of the place, but we had our luggage with us. I was coming on vacation from Lahore and Bawa Budh Singh had his family with him, and as we could not get a conveyance there nor at any near place, we thought the best thing would be to get into the house and try to protect ourselves in the house.

Q. Did you think there was risk of general massacre, of people being killed?

A. I cannot say about a general massacre, but of course there was some risk of these people coming and trying to loot us.

Q. I think the gentleman in whose house you were staying made arrangements for food?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And were altogether about 20 passengers of the train collected in that house?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What had happened to the train itself? Were the mob looting it?

A. I could not see the train from there, but I could see a portion of the train. In the morning when I came to the station I found the panes were broken and the cushions were torn.

Q. You stayed all night in this house?

A. Yes.

Q. You had not intended to stay there of course?

A. We could not find any means of leaving the place, so we stayed there.

Q. It was only because you were unable to leave the place that you got accommodation in this house?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was the station itself set on fire?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see it blazing?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was a whistle blown by some one?

A. The train whistle was being blown.

Q. By some member of the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. The station and the train and everything seem to have been in the possession of the mob?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you collected bricks in your house to throw if necessary?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you sleep that night on the roof?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then on the morning of the 15th-16th were you awakened by Mr. Iqbal Singh and told to get ready?

A. Yes, Sir, that was about 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning.

Q. Why were you to get ready?

A. Because Iqbal Singh told me the word had been sent by the rioters that we should accompany them and lead them to Lahore and other places they intended to attack or be ready for the consequences.

Q. What did you understand the consequences would be if you didn't fall in with their proposal?

A. We drew our own conjecture; we thought they would come and loot us and we would have to put up a fight, and if they were in superior strength then they might kill us.

Q. Did you find out whether there was a large crowd?

A. We heard shouts all night long, all round, but we could not see any particular crowd; it was quite dark.

Q. I think you loaded your revolver?

A. Yes, Sir. I had a small pocket revolver with me.

Q. Did these shouts continue throughout the whole night?

A. At first they were continuing but after the machine-gun had fired and the armoured train arrived they ceased. One could hear one or two shouts at intervals.

Q. After the firing from the amoured train the noise stopped to some extent?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you in the morning go to the place from which the shots had been fired from the armoured train?

A. We went first to the armoured train which was repairing the railway bridge over the canal and then we got into the armoured train. At the same time the armoured train was taken back and I was told they were going to search for dead bodies at the place where the armoured train had first started firing. When we reached there I went a few hundred yards away from the armoured train and did not find anything, but later on I was told by my fellow cadet that there was one person lying dead.

Q. You did not actually see that?

A. No, Sir, I did not see it.

Q. Did you resume your forward journey at about 10-30 in the morning?

A. Yes, Sir, I think it was about that time.

Q. As you crossed the railway bridge in what state did you find the telegraph wires and poles?

A. Absolutely broken.

Q. Was that all along the way in front of Chuharkana village?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What had happened to the small bridge over the canal?

A. It had been burnt.

Q. Was the line dismantled there?

A. Yes.

Q. Then another armoured train arrived?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And did you hear some firing from it?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When did this second armoured train arrive?

A. I think it was after midday. I cannot remember the exact time.

Q. And you resumed your journey at 10-30? How far did you get?

A. We went about 1,000 yards.

Q. And were you detained there?

A. Yes, Sir, because the bridge was burnt and the line was being repaired.

Q. You were detained 1,000 yards outside the station and were unable to proceed on your journey? For how long were you detained there?

A. Till 5 in the evening.

Q. And it was while you were detained there that this second armoured train came up?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see the sub-divisional officer of Sheikhupura bringing some villagers under a guard?

A. I could see it at a distance. The armoured train in which I was repairing the bridge.

Q. And I think you spent that night in the train?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you reached Sangla next evening?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. At midnight?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. So that altogether your journey from Lahore to Lyallpur had occupied 2½ days?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What is the distance?

A. I cannot tell you, I think it is about 100 miles.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. In Chuharkana you remained from 11th to 16th?

A. 15th and 16th.

Q. You stayed there on the night of the 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. That night, an armoured train came and you heard the firing one after another in the night?

A. Yes.

Q. After that you say the people quieted down?

A. We first heard a loud noise; then one or two cries.

Q. After which the people considerably quieted down?

A. Yes.

Q. In the morning, you considered it safe to leave the house and resume your journey?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you came to the station in the morning at about 10?

A. Yes.

Q. And you found the armoured train there?

A. Not in the station actually; it was about 400 yards towards the Lyallpur side.

Q. You took that armoured train?

A. We got into the armoured train.

Q. While your armoured train was near the station, about 1,000 yards away, the other armoured train came?

A. No, Sir. There are two bridges, one of which is on the main canal. When we went in the morning, they had nearly repaired it. There is another bridge and we were there when the next armoured train came.

Q. You were near the second bridge?

A. Yes.

Q. And the armoured train came from the other direction?

A. From the Lahore side.

Q. It came to the station?

A. I do not know.

Q. How far was the second armoured train from where you were?

A. It was about 200 yards.

Q. And this was behind you?

A. Behind us; towards the Lahore side.

Q. You could see from your armoured train the second armoured train?

A. I could only hear the firing.

Q. And the firing was done from the armoured train?

A. Yes; and we heard also some firing inside the village.

Q. You could not say at what the firing was aimed?

A. No, Sir.

Q. You say here "another armoured train arrived and after some time we heard its machine gun firing on the village; also rifle shots were heard being fired inside the village."

A. It was far in the direction of that village. The other armoured train was at the extreme end of the village and this armoured train towards the Lahore end of the village.

Q. In front of the village?

A. Yes.

Q. And from there, they fired on the village?

A. In the direction of the village.

Q. After that you heard some firing in the village itself?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. I think, being conversant with these matters, you could have no doubt about the noise of the machine-gun firing and the noise of the rifle? You could distinguish between the two?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore there was no doubt that the second armoured train did use its machine-gun.

A. Yes.

Q. After that, you heard rifle firing?

A. Yes.

Q. Then with regard to the first armoured train, I think you were quite particular about your time because you were looking at your watch?

A. Yes.

Q. And the whole night you were not able to sleep?

A. It was very uncomfortable.

Q. You heard the machine-gun firing at about 1-45 or 2 o'clock?

A. Is it the first night you mean?

Q. On the first night. Then you say, the rest of the night you heard it firing from time to time. You have no doubt about it?

A. Absolutely none.

Q. It is not only one firing; but you heard the firing from time to time?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Then you went to find the dead bodies of the men that were fired upon?

A. Yes, Sir; in the morning.

Q. In how many lines were the armoured trains standing?

A. At the station, there were two; there it was only one single line.

Q. And to the best of your recollection, belief and memory, you did not find any dead body on or about the line there?

A. None.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. Do you think firing was necessary to bring the people to their senses on that occasion?

A. It is very difficult to answer.

Q. Do you think it was necessary to fire at all?

A. I think it was.

Reverend S. C. PICKEN of the American Mission, Sangla Hill, Sheikhupura.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Picken, you were a missionary at Sangla?

A. Yes.

Q. Is your bungalow near Sangla?

A. Yes.

Q. How far?

A. Just across the canal, about a mile from the railway station.

Q. The *hartal* was held on the 12th of April?

A. I believe so.

Q. You were at the railway station on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. There was a large crowd gathered there?

A. Yes.

Q. The crowd was being addressed by one or two people?

A. Yes.

Q. As you left the station did the crowd do anything?

A. They gathered round my car and round me when I started from the station.

Q. Did they do anything?

A. They hooted and jeered at me.

Q. Was that very unusual?

A. It was very unusual. I could not understand it. I had not seen it before.

Q. Were stones thrown at your car?

A. I was told afterwards that stones were thrown but I did not see anything then.

Q. Did you remain in Sangla till the evening of the 15th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. During the period between the 12th and the 15th, what was the attitude of the people?

A. After the 12th I did not go out of my bungalow. The attitude of the people was very hostile towards us.

Q. Were many rumours afloat?

A. Very many.

Q. What sort of rumours?

A. Different rumours; rumours regarding the Rowlatt Act, rumours against Government, and other bazar rumours.

Q. Did this excitement last for some time?

A. I left on the evening of the 15th. It lasted up to that time and even after that, till investigations were started.

Q. Were you subject to great inconvenience and anxiety during the period at Sangla?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And afterwards too?

A. Afterwards too. We do not have any protection in Sangla other than the good-will of the people.

Q. Did you seem to have lost the good-will?

A. I must judge so from the treatment I received on the Saturday previous at the railway station.

Q. How do you account for that?

A. I think so because when people gathered there for the *hartal* there were some violent speeches being made. I did not hear them myself, nor see any report of those speeches.

Q. In your statement here, I see you indicate something in connection with the investigation, that it gave an opportunity for some people to wipe out old scores.

A. That is, it was rumoured, if one person had an enemy then there was an opportunity to get back on him by reporting against him, and on that report an arrest was made.

Q. Do you know of any cases where false testimony was given against innocent people in view to wipe off old scores?

A. I do not think so; that is the only case.

Q. What is the case?

A. That is the cutting of the wires near Sangla.

Q. Did you hear that wrong people were arrested?

A. I heard both ways. In the first investigation, there were one or two arrested.

Q. Wires must have been cut by some men?

A. Yes, that is evident.

Q. Some people said to you that innocent people were arrested and the guilty escaped?

A. I heard so. It might be some man might have been arrested, though the fact was that he was not guilty at all.

Q. Can you tell me whether it was a difficult matter to get information from the people as to who had been instrumental during the acts of destruction?

A. Yes, because of two reasons. One is the fear of revenge. The other is, all reports might be made public. And if they were making any reports public, they would not want to be brought into the investigation.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You say something about the police, that "had they done so (tried to suppress the disturbances), they would have been a bit roughly handled." From the 12th to the 15th were you going about or remaining in your bungalow?

A. I was in my bungalow. I had gone as far as the canal.

Q. Then on the 15th, I think, you left?

A. Yes.

Q. So, during the actual time of the disturbances you did not know what the police did?

A. No.

Q. You think that the police might have had a difficult time of it?

A. That is my opinion.

Q. You were saying something of this wire-cutting case?

A. Yes.

Q. You said that two people were arrested?

A. I have said two people; later there were further arrests.

Q. I want to make that quite sure. Is there any circumstance in connection with the time and manner of making arrests that was brought to your notice, and that seemed to you to be suspicious?

A. Nothing. Only the second investigation was rather suspicious.

Q. When Mr. Bosworth Smith came, things began to open up?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. How many years you have been at Sangla?

A. I went there in January 1918.

Q. And before that were you in the Punjab?

A. I was in the Punjab.

Q. Now, how many years have you been in the Punjab?

A. I came to the Punjab in October 1909.

Q. Nearly 10 years?

A. Yes.

Q. In your experience of these ten years, did you find the people exhibiting anti-British feeling?

A. I could not see any signs.

Q. Wherever you went you were treated well?

A. I must say, yes.

Q. On the whole you found the people law-abiding?

A. Yes, I think.

Q. The villagers who came in contact with you were all law-abiding?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there no indications that the events that did happen in April were likely to happen?

A. There were no indications at all.

Q. What is the investigation that you are referring to here: 'Those who came to investigate seemed to make it more of a personal matter . . . . .?' By 'those who came to investigate' do you mean the investigating officers?

A. I would hardly make it the investigating officers, because the investigating officers would have to come from outside.

Q. What do you mean by 'those investigating'?

A. My meaning is there is a Muhammadan community, there is a Sikh community and there are different communities, and they judge.

Q. You do not mean the divisional officer?

A. No. Those who would bring witnesses to him. For instance, one Kartar Singh had to do investigation there.

Q. So, by ' those who came to investigate ' you mean the persons who are investigating and come for that purpose?

A. Yes, the Divisional officer had got his evidence through the police.

Q. Do you mean by the words the officer or officers who investigate and come there for that purpose?

A. I hardly referred to them here in my statement. I mean those who were giving evidence, bringing the evidence, getting the evidence. The reports that came to me led me to form this opinion.

Q. You mean the people who gave evidence. This does not mean ' those who came to investigate.'

A. They were gathered by some one. Witnesses were brought in by some one.

Q. It must be some investigating officer, not the witnesses.

A. The investigating officer and those who were giving evidence. This opinion of mine I formed from things I gathered.

Q. You mean the investigating officer and the people who gave evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. I want to know what did the investigating officer do in the way of making it a personal matter.

A. I would not say it was a personal matter. The investigating officer would not have a personal matter. No one was willing to give evidence, no evidence was forthcoming when the matter was investigated. It was difficult for them to get at the real facts and in gathering these facts, people were asked and complaints were placed upon certain individuals; and I considered that on all these complaints they arrested the men.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. I will read out to you what you have stated here : " In the matter of investigation of cases here several things came to my notice. Those who came to investigate seemed to make it more of a personal matter, and it gave an opportunity for some to wipe out old scores." I believe this was written by you?

A. Yes.

Q. It is your own statement, not translated by any one, added to or subtracted?

A. In the beginning of my statement . . . . .

Q. I am referring to the last paragraph.

A. It is mine.

Q. You say ' in the matter of investigation of cases here several things came to my notice; those who came to investigate seemed to make it more of a personal matter, and it gave an opportunity for some to wipe out old scores, I mean the guilty party would be shielded as much as possible and the blame placed on some poor fellow who happened to be standing round at the time and yet was not doing anything. In this way it was very difficult to get at the real facts. So what I have heard has been gathered not from one man but many. The Deputy Commissioner had his difficulties along this line when he came. No one seemed willing to tell anything and in this way some men may have been convicted who were really not guilty.' If this means anything, it means that according to you the investigation was not strict, that this opinion you have not based on one man coming to you and making the complaint but it is based on general information, that practically witnesses were coming forward with the view to wipe out old scores and people who were not really concerned were accused and those who were the real culprits they were not dealt with. Am I right in my interpretation of those sentences?

A. I suppose that is right.

Q. Only one thing more. The 12th of April was the day of the *hartal*, was it not?

A. I believe so.

Q. You know that on the day of the *hartal* all the shops were closed and if there were any conveyances, they were not allowed to ply for hire. Why should I not understand, unless you say otherwise, that when you left the station they were shouting because you were going in a car?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Were you able to catch the words of the mob?

A. Of those who gathered round the station?

A. Yes.

A. They were shouting regarding Gandhi, they were shouting regarding the Rowlatt Act. I did not catch anything.

Q. When you left the station in your car, people hooted and jeered?

A. They only hooted and jeered; I did not catch any real words.

Q. Why do you say that this booting was not due to the fact that you were in your car, that day being a *hartal* day?

A. I shall say that it was not due to that. I have said that I do not know the reason for the treatment I received.

Q. Is it possible that that might have been the case?

A. Might have been. But there are few conveyances in Sangla; people do not drive in *tum-tums*.

Q. Do I understand that up to the 10th of April nothing of the kind was going on?

A. They might have talked, but they did not hoot us.

Q. You did talk with the people?

A. Somewhat.

Q. What sort of work you do? Preaching?

A. Yes; preaching.

Q. You were likely to know everything that was going on before the 12th?

A. I would not say that I am likely to know everything before the 12th.

Q. You did not notice anything?

A. I noticed nothing.

Q. Then how far away do you live from Sangla?

A. I live outside; it is about a mile from the railway station. The town is on one side of the canal and the bungalow on the other side.

Q. How far?

A. It is about a mile from the railway station. The bungalow is beyond the canal.

Q. How far is the bungalow from the town?

A. It is about half to three-quarters of a mile.

Q. From the 12th to 15th, you did not visit the town at all?

A. No; I did not.

Q. Then how could you say that the attitude of the people was hostile towards you?

A. From the treatment I received on the 12th when I was at the railway station (I was at the railway station on the 12th), and from the rumours I received through my servants, and others coming to me.

Q. What sort of rumours did you receive? What did they tell you?

A. For instance, the Calcutta Mail came there. It was on the 13th or 14th. Stones were thrown at it. From these things I judged that the attitude of the people was hostile.

Q. Stones were thrown at the train? You also say that two stones were thrown at your car?

A. So I was told.

Q. By whom?

A. By some individuals; I do not know.

Q. People who were in the crowd told you that they had done so?

A. I learnt this some time later, about stones being thrown at the car.

Q. Who told you?

A. Several people; I did not see anything.

Q. Were the crowd around your car?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You would very likely have seen it?

A. Not necessarily. My attention was in front, because the car was going on.

Q. No stones struck your car?

A. I have said no stones struck my car.

Q. Now you say that something was being said against Government? What was that?

A. Rumours of different kinds concerning the Rowlatt Act, marriages and of people gathering together; just the ordinary rumours.

Q. It is against the Rowlatt Act, and not against the Government?

A. That is all.

Q. That is what you call "something being said against Government"?

A. That is all; nothing else.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Mr. Picken, whatever you might have said in this written statement of yours, do you mean to suggest to the Committee that the Government officials who went to Sangla to investigate, tried to wipe out the old scores which they had?

A. No, indeed.

Q. You mean the people, the Muhammadan and Hindu inhabitants?

A. Yes.

Bawa BUDH SINGH, Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Provincial Division, Lyallpur.

By the President—

Q. You are an executive engineer, I think?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And you journeyed from Lahore to Lyallpur leaving on the 15th April and reaching Lyallpur on the 18th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you hear the evidence that was given by Lieutenant Abdur Rahim Khan?

A. Yes, I heard it.

Q. Do you agree with that?

A. Yes, mostly.

Q. You were confined during one night I think in a house at Chuharkana, and your wife and family were with you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were they in a state of alarm during that time?

A. Yes, mostly.

Q. Was it a very critical position in which you were all placed?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the village practically in the hands of the mob?

A. Not at the *mandi* where we were putting up. There was no mob, but there were only some villagers who were patrolling the town; the mob was somewhere near the railway bridge.

Q. What about the railway station?

A. It was burnt by the mob.

Q. And they were shouting hard at that time?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Do you remember during the night some firing was heard?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you were informed by some one that it was machine-gun fire. What effect had it upon you?

A. Of course, as soon as we heard the machine-gun firing we were much terrified, but we felt some relief that we were out of danger.

Q. Did the relief come from the attention of the mob?

A. We were informed that the mob was collecting at the railway bridge and that they would probably attack the *mandi*.

Q. Did you see the station master being attacked?

A. Not exactly. I was outside the station and I heard the cries and screams of somebody who was being beaten inside.

Q. Was he being beaten by the mob?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. You speak of an old Muhammadan trying to beat a babu clerk with a *lathi*, and you said that the crowd intervened to stop the assailant?

A. Yes, some people on the platform stopped this man from beating him.

Q. Then they were against any violence being used against individuals?

A. As a matter of fact the crowd at the station had been suppressed. The crowd consisted of passengers.

Q. By "crowd" you mean not the rioters?

A. Only passengers and other people on the platform.

Q. I see. You left the next morning, did you?

A. Yes.

Q. And you left by the armoured train?

A. Yes.

Q. And while you were getting into your armoured train, a second armoured train arrived?

A. The second armoured train arrived while we were standing at Chuharkana village.

Q. How far from you?

A. It stopped about a furlong or two from where we were.

Q. At that time everything was quiet?

A. At that time there was no mob nor were there crowds.

Q. After the first machine-gun fire by the armoured train at night things had quietened down?

A. Of course, they must have quietened down.

Q. After the second armoured train had come and stopped, did you see them firing into the village?

A. I did not exactly see if they were doing so as I was in my armoured train. But they were standing behind us and firing into the town. Then a party went into the town later.

Q. Did they begin firing soon after their arrival?

A. The first notice we got of the train's arrival was the firing we heard.

Q. How long before had it arrived?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. When the party from the armoured train went into the village, do you know what they did?

A. I simply heard some firing after the party had gone into the village.

Q. Did your armoured train go away first or did the other one leave before yours?

A. The other one.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. On the first occasion, before the crowd of hooligans came to the station, there was a large number of people from the *mandi* also coming to the station to see the *tamasha*?

A. Yes.

Q. Numerically the mob was not very large?

A. No, the mob on the platform was large; the hooligans were not many.

Q. And you could only see about a dozen people with *lathis*?

A. Yes.

Q. And about another dozen people who were on the other side of the train cutting wires?

A. Yes.

Q. As a matter of fact, your wife and mother were in the train?

A. Yes.

Q. When these people passed the carriage in which your wife and mother were, and when they saw them shutting the windows, they told them not to be afraid, that no harm would be done to them as they only intended to pull down wires?

A. Yes.

Q. As a matter of fact the principal portion from which the inhabitants of Chuharkana come is the *mandi*?

A. Mandi is quite a different place from the village of Chuharkana. All the merchants and principal people live *in mandi*.

Q. They were invited to join the mob, but they refused?

A. Rumour had it to that effect, but I cannot say whether they were actually invited or not.

Q. When the armoured train came, you, from time to time, heard the firing of a machine-gun and the cracking of rifles not only once but several times?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you heard the noise of a drum beating from the *Padre's* bungalow, and you saw there a man waving a white flag on the top of the bungalow. You thought that the mob was there and assaulting. But when the train moved nearer to the bungalow a party with loaded rifles left to rescue them. But not a shot was fired as there was no mob to be found?

A. Yes.

Q. On the next morning the big gun in the train was ranged on the village and villagers were given a few hours to remove their women and children before bombarding?

A. That is what I had heard. A friend of mine had told me.

Q. You say while the train was still standing at the bridge, the commander saw through his binoculars some miles distant a huge crowd moving towards the train?

A. Yes.

Q. While you were standing there, another armoured train arrived and stopped opposite the village of Chuharkana and without waiting they opened fire with the machine-gun. With what result do you know?

A. That I do not know.

Q. Then when you were going in your armoured train and after you had reached Bahalike, then also the machine-guns cracked a volley into the village?

A. Not into the village. We went beyond Bahalike. There was a bridge burnt by the mob.

Q. Searchlights flashed and the whole country side was lit up? You found no mob at the place?

A. Yes.

Babu DEWAN CHAND, Sub-Permanent Way Inspector, North-Western Railway, Lyallpur.

By the President—

Q. Were you sub-permanent way inspector at Lyallpur connected with the North-Western Railway?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. On the 14th April did anything occur on your railway near Chuharkana?

A. Not on the 14th but on the 15th.

Q. What occurred?

A. Between Chuharkana and Bahalike at mile 30 the line was uprooted and a bridge set on fire.

Q. Were you near at hand when that occurred?

A. I was patrolling on the line.

Q. Did you interfere with the rioters when they were doing this?

A. I accompanied the special train which contained troops and when I arrived there no rioters were to be found.

Q. Before that, when you were alone on your patrol, had you not to leave because the mob threatened to burn your trolley?

A. This happened when I was coming in my trolley. The mob met me and threatened me to the effect that if I refused to get down from my trolley they would burn it. But I told them that there was no use burning the trolley. They then left me. I came back to the station. The mob meanwhile had uprooted and burnt down the station.

Q. After the special troop train had been there, did the mob gather again late in the evening?

A. After the troop train had departed between 3 and 5, the mob gathered there, uprooted the line and burnt the station.

Khan Sahib DURAN KHAN, Honorary Civil Judge and Vice-President, Notified Area Committee, Sangla Hill, Sheikhupura.

By the President—

Q. Are you Honorary Civil Judge and Vice-President of the Notified Area Committee, Sangla (Sheikhupura)?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In the beginning of March, was there some agitation in the town of Sangla?

A. No, not in the beginning of March.

Q. But did not a *Brahmacharya* come to Sangla in the beginning of March?

A. Yes.

Q. What was he doing?

A. He used to preach in the Sanatan Dharma School and Thakurdwara Temple.

Q. Did you know what he was preaching?

A. On enquiry I was told that he used to recite *Mahabharata* and preach religious sermons.

Q. Was there a *hartal* held in Sangla on the 13th April?

A. On the 12th April.

Q. Did anything occur on that day?

A. I was at Gujranwala at the time, but when I came back I heard that a crowd of Muhammadans and Hindus at first bathed in the canal and then walked through the city bareheaded with a black mourning flag.

Q. Were they shouting anything?

A. They were mourning and shouting cries against the Government and the Rowlatt Act and they were not using desirable words.

Q. What do you mean by " desirable words "?

A. They said " we have been subjected to tyranny and we will not suffer this tyranny any longer."

Q. Were the crowd apparently anti-Government?

A. Yes, apparently against the Government.

Q. Did you hear a rumour at this time that the line had been broken up?

A. On the 14th news was brought to me that the line leading to Gujranwala had been broken up and that the Calcutta Mail would run by Sangla.

Q. Did you go to the station and find out about this?

A. I went to the station, made enquiries from the station master and asked him to inform me when he got news about the arrival of the train.

Q. Were you at the station again later in the evening?

A. Then there was a storm, but at a quarter to six a man came to me from the station and told me that the station master had intimated that the train had arrived at the station and he wanted me to go to the station because a mob had gathered there.

Q. Then on the next day in the morning did a special troop train pass through Lyallpur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After that train passed through, was there excitement noticeable among the people?

A. Just as the train passed the people got excited and there was a general excitement all over the city and people began to gather in the city.

Q. How did the passing of this train cause this excitement?

A. We had checked people before the train had arrived there. But when the train came in they also arrived there with sweetmeats, water and other things to serve these people and so we allowed them. After the train passed through they came out and told the people that the troops had informed them that this was the time for them to wake up because the world was all along sleeping and that the troops would side with them.

Q. On the evening of that day was a note sent to you by the station master that the station was on fire?

A. On the evening of the 15th I received a note from the station master saying that the Chuharkana station had been burnt and they were in danger and he wanted me to help and rescue them.

Q. Then did you go?

A. I accompanied by my servants and with my weapons went to the station.

Q. Did you make any announcement in the bazar?

A. I sent the railway station staff and my servants to the city to inform the people that if anybody was found after 8 with any mischievous intentions coming towards the station he would be shot down, because we had received orders from the Government to fire at such persons.

Q. Did you consider it was necessary for the maintenance of order and peace that that step of firing should be taken?

A. Yes, Sir, there was great excitement then.

Q. The next day were you at the station again on the 16th in the morning?

A. I remained at the station throughout the night.

Q. And did a train come in from Lyallpur?

A. A train arrived going to Lyallpur from Wazirabad.

Q. Did you make any request to any one there for military assistance?

A. The Hon'ble Sayad Mehdi Shah was in that train, and as the train would not go further I arranged for his conveyance to take him to Lyallpur and I sent a message with him that they could not receive any help from Gujranwala or Lahore. Therefore the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. deMontmorency, should despatch some military assistance.

Q. Was there any incident when Mr. Wale was assaulted?

A. On the evening of the 16th Mr. Wale came with me to the post office. I went away to my house to say my prayers. At that time I heard a woman crying that a European soldier had been killed by a Sikh. I ran at once on hearing this report and I found that a Sikh had caught hold of a European by his right hand and he was beating him on his head with a club which he had in his hand, and the European gentleman was pulling the Sikh towards the station through the post office. There was a fencing ahead and I myself saw the European gentleman jump over the fencing, and this Sikh's hand slipped. Then the European gentleman took out the revolver he had with him and shot him, three or four shots.

Q. Was that European Mr. Wale?

A. Yes, Sir. I went there myself and saw blood oozing out of his head and his clothes were besmeared with blood.

Q. Did you follow Mr. Wale's assailant into the bazar in the town?

A. Just at the time when I reached that European gentleman, Mr. August, the D. T. S., with his staff arrived and he asked me to follow the assailant. I at once followed him and found that the assailant was lying on a cot in the bazar and a big crowd had gathered round him. I told them that they should go away and that they should not interfere in the matter and if they did so they would come to trouble and grief. But I heard that assailant saying that he had been done for but that he had also finished the work of another man.

Q. The man said he himself had been done for, but at least he had done the work of another man at the same time. I understand from you that he said he had done the work of one of them. What did you understand he meant by "them"?

A. He did not mention "them," he only said he had done the work of another.

Q. I think the police came and that man was taken to hospital?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you stay that night again at the station?

A. Yes, Sir, because there was a lot of danger that night.

Q. Was this a very critical time for those in authority?

A. It was a critical time especially for Europeans.

Q. Why was it especially a dangerous time for Europeans?

A. Though the Rowlatt Act was made a pretext, yet people were excited and I think there was a certain movement.

Q. Movement against what?

A. Against the Government.

Q. Do you know who is responsible for that movement?

A. It was imported from outside, and I think that the *Brahmachari* who had arrived from the Kangri Gurukul at Hardwar was the cause of this movement.

Q. Then on the next day a train arrived with a number of Gurkha soldiers?

A. During the night between the 16th and the 17th a train arrived with Gurkha troops, and that night was full of danger because Harnam Singh was wounded and we were apprehending danger from his villagers.

Q. Were troops necessary in order to quell the disturbances?

A. They were essentially necessary, and had the troops not arrived, the hooligans would have looted the country.

Q. Were they absolutely defiant of all order and of Government?

A. They were defiant and also minute by minute they were becoming worse.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. This *Brahmachari* you say came from the Gurukul. You say you often saw him?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When you saw him, did you notice that he was anything beyond a religious preacher?

A. After seeing him I made enquiries of the members of the municipal committee and also from Lala Girdhari Lal, the Manager of the Sanatan Dharma School, as to who that *Brahmachari* was. They informed me that the man in yellow robes was their religious preacher, and after that I had nothing to do with it.

Q. What do you mean by saying, "I often saw him"?

A. The Sanatan Dharma School is situated just in front of my house. Besides that he was strolling all over the city, and I had on different occasions seen him.

Q. When you say "I often saw him," you mean that you merely saw him from a distance, you never spoke to him?

A. I only saw him from a distance.

Q. You did not hear what he was preaching at any time?

A. I was told that he recited *Mahabharata* and delivered religious sermons. He stayed in the houses of Hindus, so I could not go in.

Q. You did not hear any sermon of his at all?

A. No.

Q. Then what reason have you for suggesting that it was this *Brahmachari* who had imported this movement against Government in Sangla?

A. When I returned I heard about the incident of the 12th. I came to know that this *Brahmachari* was the leader of the mob. He made them mourn, he made speeches and he led them throughout the city, and therefore I considered that he was the fountain-head of all this mischief.

Q. Was this *Brahmachari* arrested?

A. He fled away on the night between the 15th and the 16th.

Q. You saw him taking part in the occurrences of the 12th at Sangla?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you see him on the 12th leading the mob or lecturing to them or taking part or did you hear about it?

A. I have already stated that I was not at Sangla on the 12th. I came back after the 12th and I heard of what had happened.

Q. Where do you live?

A. I live at Sangla.

Q. Were you not in Sangla on the 12th?

A. I had gone to Gujranwala.

Q. When did you return to Sangla?

A. On the night between the 13th and 14th.

Q. When you returned there you heard that this *Brahmachari* had taken part on the 12th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you report that fact to the authorities or take any steps to have him arrested?

A. Throughout the 14th he hid himself in some house in the city. We could not find him; on the night between the 14th and the 15th, he had fled away. But I informed the authorities that the man at the bottom of all this mischief was there.

Q. Did the police make any further enquiries about this *Brahmachari*?

A. They tried their level best, but they were not successful.

Q. Then this *Brahmachari* was not in Sangla on the 15th and 16th?

A. He was not to be seen.

Q. He did not lead any of these disturbances?

A. No, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You have stated to-day that it was reported that the troops would side with the people. Did you make that allegation in your statement before this committee?

A. I think I have done it. I submitted a statement in vernacular. It is not with me. I submitted it to the Government.

Q. It is not here in this English translation, the fact that the troops would side with the rioters is not mentioned here?

A. I am pretty sure it was mentioned in my statement.

Munshi ABDUL KADIR, Permanent Way Inspector, North Western Railway, Lyallpur.

By the President—

Q. Were you permanent way inspector on the North Western Railway?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you were formerly on the Lyallpur section?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Had you charge of the section from Lyallpur to Chuharkana *viâ* Sangla on the 15th April 1919?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you got information on that day as to the destruction of railway lines and burning of bridges?

A. Yes, Sir, from my Assistant, Dewan Chand.

Q. Did you leave by passenger train at about 4 P.M.?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you were instructed to see that the passenger train did not go beyond Sangla station without your being sure that the line was safe?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You passed through Sangla station, I think?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is Moman a station before you come to Sangla or after you leave Sangla?

A. It is a station after leaving Sangla.

Q. You got information as to what occurred. After you left Sangla you went on to Moman. What did you find there?

A. Everything was intact there and the station master was working. I wired to the station master, Sangla, saying that the line was safe up to Moman. Then I trollied onward to Dhaban Singh and everything was all right. I wrote out my telegram and gave it to the station master saying that the line up to that place was all right, but he told me that the instruments were not working.

Q. Did you go back to Moman?

A. Then I wanted to go further on to Bahalike, but I saw a flame of light on one of the bridges, and those foot passengers who had got down at Chuharkana from the Lahore train were walking from that place. They brought me news that the people were burning the bridges and uprooting the lines. That bridge was about two miles away from Dhaban Singh. I sent my *jamadar* to see what was being done there. He went there in disguise and came back and told me that the people were burning the bridge and uprooting the railway line, and some of them were coming towards Dhaban Singh. When I actually heard the noise quite close to the station, I trollied back to Moman, and there I found that the Moman station was all in flames. I asked the station master what had happened. He told me that about 60 or 70 men came there and burnt the station, and that they had gone to Sangla to attack that station. So seeing that those people were damaging the lines all along, I took off my trolley and hid in the bushes and came on foot and saw many marks on the line, that is sleepers hacked with axes and such like things. On the way I also saw that telegraph wires were cut near Baroa village. When I reached Sangla, I saw that the Sangla station was not attacked.

Q. Was the situation one that required an armed force to control it?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I think you requested an armed force to be sent and thirty Indian troops came?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did the situation appear critical after that?

A. Up to the time the Gurkhas arrived and they came on the 17th.

Q. They were a party of about 170?

A. I did not count.

Q. Before that was the situation in which you were critical?

A. Yes, Sir.

Mr. R. C. CHOPRA, Hafizabad.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Chopra, you have requested to give evidence?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. How long have you been in Hafizabad?

A. For the last three years off and on.

Q. You desire to give us your views as to the occurrences there?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. We have been informed that upon the 14th of April.....

A. I know nothing before the 17th. I only know of things after the 17th.

Q. When were you in Hafizabad previously?

A. In March. I went away for a few days.

Q. I would like to know this—we have been informed that upon the 14th of April a crowd went to the station of Hafizabad and attempted to enter the compartment which was occupied by Lieutenant Tatam and a little boy with a view to put them to death? With your knowledge of Hafizabad can you give us any explanation of how that occurred?

A. As far as I know that was done by two or three people from outside, who came from adjacent villages. It was not done by the ordinary public. That is my view.

Q. Your view is that the occurrences cannot have happened owing to the action of the Hafizabad people themselves?

A. With the exception of a very few men.

Q. I think that on the day after there was some destruction done to the railway lines—how do you account for that?

A. That was also done by a man from outside—a Gujrati: that is what I heard; and that this man was a drunkard.

Q. On what matters do you think you can give us useful explanation?

A. The only information that I can give is about matters after the 17th. For instance about punishments that were given to people without any charges being framed against them.

Q. Do you know of some cases where you think people were punished who ought not to have been punished?

A. I have given a number of examples.

Q. As regards the measures that were taken, what exception do you take to the measures that were adopted?

A. In the first place all these people were tried in one day—the 7th of June.

Q. How many people were tried in one day?

A. From 50 to 90. There were two kinds of complaints—on the one hand that people were kept too long before they were tried and the other complaint that too many people were tried in one day.

Q. Do you know whether the people who ought to have tried these cases were engaged during this time in trying other cases?

A. I do not know.

Q. Then you want to make a general expression of opinion that these people were detained too long and all tried in one day

A. I made enquiries from people about this.

Q. Did you hear the cases that were tried?

A. No; I could not go inside.

Q. You cannot say whether or not the magistrate or the officer who tried the case did not hear everything that was to be said in the defence of each person?

A. Not exactly, but I asked those who were acquitted how they were treated and I had some of my friends who were witnesses.

Q. But the people who were acquitted would not have any complaints?

A. Even they had complaints.

Q. The complaints were they did not get proper trial on the ground that they were tried under Martial Law and not tried by a civil court?

A. Yes; and they said that the witnesses gave false evidence and a headmaster of one of the schools, who was one of the prosecution witnesses, gave false evidence.

Q. Who is this headmaster?

A. Ramsahib.

Q. What school does he belong to?

A. There is only one high school there.

Q. Do you mean to say that he perjured himself?

A. Yes, he has mentioned this to the Congress Committee.

Q. How do you know?

A. Because he told me—this man Ramsahib.

Q. I want to know whether from your own personal knowledge you can give us some useful information?

A. In the first place I do not think there was any necessity for Martial Law after the 17th.

Q. But how can you express an opinion when you do not know what occurred?

A. At that time there was no necessity at any rate. At that time the city was quiet and there was nothing on.

Q. What would you consider a necessity for establishing Martial Law less?

A. Rioting; and when the civil power could not manage affairs.

Q. Then you think Martial Law is necessary?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you say whether on the 14th Martial Law was not necessary?

A. I cannot say as I did not see—only on the 17th, 18th and 19th.

Q. During the 17th, 18th and 19th, is it not the case that there were considerable forces of military in Hafizabad?

A. I do not think— at least I do not know,

Q. Were there no military?

A. None.

Q. How far is Hafizabad from Wazirabad?

A. 38 miles.

Q. And how far is it from Gujranwala?

A. By the direct route 30 miles and by train it is about 62.

Q. There were a great number of serious occurrences taking place about this time in that neighbourhood. I suppose you knew about that?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you an observer of any one of those occurrences or not?

A. No; I was a good bit away.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Did you say that the headmaster of the high school told you himself that he committed perjury before the summary courts martial?

A. He told me that he had given his statement to the Congress Committee.

Q. Did he or did he not lead you to suppose that the evidence he gave before the summary courts martial was perjury and erroneous evidence?

A. The impression he gave me was that he was forced to do it.

Q. Is he one of those people that were locked up at any time?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he locked in a place that did not have a good lavatory and did he complain of the smell?

A. No.

Q. Did he tell you that a policeman sat over him and threatened to brain him unless he gave perjured evidence?

A. No; I did not ask him.

Q. And did you send up his name to the Director of Public Instruction as a headmaster of a high school who ought to be enquired about?

A. No; he gave his statement to Mr. Andrews.

Q. Is this headmaster going about openly stating that the evidence he gave was false and excusing himself on the ground that he was forced to give evidence but not stating in what way he was forced?

A. Not exactly; I asked him about it and he told me that he had given a statement to the Congress Committee and that he would come to this Committee as a witness.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. What are you?

A. I am doing nothing at present.

Q. What is your profession?

A. I am in the commercial line.

Q. What are you doing in the way of commerce?

A. Anything I can get.

Q. Are you doing anything at present?

A. I am in some rice business just at present.

Q. Do you export or import rice?

A. I send to different towns. I am not doing it myself but through some people.

Q. Do you buy rice and export it?

A. Yes.

Q. In Hafizabad?

A. Yes.

Q. How long have you been there?

A. Since a couple of months.

Q. What were you doing before?

A. Doing nothing before.

Q. For how many years?

A. For the last three years.

Q. How have you been living?

A. I have been living on my means and my parents also helped me.

Q. You say in your statement that before you were residing in Europe for about 13 years. What were you doing there?

A. First of all I was educated there. Then I got into the commercial line.

Q. What commercial business were you doing?

A. Some stock-exchange business.

Q. Did you take part in politics in England?

A. No; I once went to hear some lectures delivered by Mr. Gokhale.

Q. Beyond that you did not interest yourself in politics?

A. No.

Q. After you returned to India, have you interested yourself in politics?

A. No.

Q. Did you take part in the Rowlatt Act agitation?

A. No.

Q. At any place in Hafizabad and Wazirabad?

A. I was in Bikaner in those days.

Q. What were you doing there?

A. I went to see some relations of mine.

Q. When the Rowlatt Bill was going on you were at Bikaner all the time?

A. From the 3rd to the 17th of April.

Q. The Rowlatt Act agitation started in February or March. Did anything happen in Hafizabad?

A. At Hafizabad there was no agitation about the Rowlatt Act—at any rate before the end of March.

Q. Was there any *hartal* at Hafizabad on the 30th March?

A. No.

Q. Was there a *hartal* on the 6th of April?

A. I do not know. I was not in Hafizabad. I came there on the 17th.

Q. You speak about recruiting in your statement, have you any personal knowledge about the matter?

A. I have some personal knowledge.

Q. Did you take part yourself in recruiting?

A. No; but I have seen them being beaten.

Q. Where?

A. In the *tahsil* in Hafizabad.

Q. Were you present yourself when anybody was beaten?

A. I was with my cousin when I saw this.

Q. On what date was that?

A. About a year back.

Q. Why had you gone there?

A. My cousin was going there on some business and I accompanied him. I accompanied him a part of the way.

Q. You did not go into the *tahsil*?

A. I did go half way.

Q. Has it a compound?

A. Yes.

Q. Your cousin went inside and you stayed outside?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you go with him?

A. He had some business and I used to go with him for walks.

Q. When you arrived there what did you observe?

A. I saw a man being beaten with shoes.

Q. Who was doing the beating?

A. Some *chaprassi*.

Q. You saw who was being beaten and who was doing the beating?

A. I do not know their names.

Q. Was the tahsildar there?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he doing the beating?

A. No; some *chaprassi* was doing the beating.

Q. Was the Deputy Commissioner there?

A. No.

Q. How many people were being beaten like that?

A. I only saw one.

Q. And he was being beaten with shoes?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he undergo that beating without any protest?

Q. He was simply lying down.

Q. Was he thrown down after you arrived?

A. This happened before I reached there.

Q. Somebody was standing near him and beating him with shoes?

A. Yes, on his ribs.

Q. This man was quietly lying down suffering all that?

A. Yes, he was suffering and moaning.

Q. Was he howling?

A. Yes.

Q. Why didn't you help that man?

A. We could not do anything at Hafizabad.

Q. You saw a man being beaten by a *chaprassi* and you took no action to prevent that?

A. No.

Q. How do you know that this beating was in connection with recruiting?

A. Because there was nothing in those days going on except recruiting, and I heard many times before that people were being beaten like that.

Q. You heard it many times before?

A. Practically every day.

Q. That people were being beaten?

A. Yes.

Q. And this was the only occasion on which you saw it personally?

A. Yes.

Q. After that you never saw it again?

A. That was only accidental.

Q. Did you make any complaint about what you saw to any person in authority?

A. No.

Q. Why didn't you do that?

A. This kind of thing was being done every day in the rural districts.

Q. You are an educated person in Hafizabad and you have been in Europe for 13 years and when you heard of this bad treatment to the people you did not think it your duty to inform the authorities?

A. A man would get into trouble if he did so.

Q. Why didn't you inform the authorities?

A. Because I was afraid.

Q. Then you are not afraid now to come before this Committee and tell us about these things?

A. No, because the Lieutenant-Governor has given full permission to come forward and inform the authorities about these things.

Q. Why didn't you come forward before?

A. Because it would be of no use and besides I was afraid.

Q. It would not have been of any use then?

A. No.

Q. Why do you think so?

A. For several reasons. One of my relation was being interfered with in connection with the war loan.

Q. So you thought it discreet to keep quiet and not say anything about your cousin's affair?

A. Yes.

Q. You are re-assured now?

A. Yes.

Q. You speak of some proclamation of the 30th April under which all people were brought up to the *tahsil*—did you see that yourself?

A. I was present there myself. Under the order I had to be present.

Q. By whom was that order issued?

A. By the Deputy Commissioner.

Q. The whole population of Hafizabad was asked to go there except the females?

A. Yes; all the adult male population were ordered to go.

Q. And you were among them.

A. Yes.

Q. And what happened?

A. Lieutenant Tatam picked out about forty men.

Q. Lieutenant Tatam was asked to identify?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not think that this should have been done?

A. People would have gone there without the proclamation which was worded rather harshly.

Q. You objected to the terms of the order because the orders were according to you that every adult male person should present himself to-morrow morning in front of the *tahsil*—if anybody absented himself he would be shot?

A. Yes.

Q. How was this notification published?

A. By beat of drum.

Q. You heard the proclamation yourself?

A. Yes; two or three times.

Q. Was that the only occasion when you were asked to go or was there any further notification?

A. Only once.

Q. When you speak of roll-call for school children, did you see that yourself?

A. That was another proclamation which was notified by beat of drum in Hafizabad itself.

Q. That proclamation required all school boys to attend roll-call?

A. Yes.

Q. How many times was that done?

A. I could not tell you.

Q. Who took this roll-call?

A. A military officer of the Supply and Transport Corps.

Q. What were they expected to do in this roll-call?

A. I used to see the boys standing there.

Q. What were they asked to do?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did the school children include even small boys of four?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. In your statement you refer to some humiliation to the people especially by the Deputy Commissioner—have you any personal knowledge?

A. Well after the lecture everybody was made to catch their ears and say "*Tauba, Tauba, Tauba.*"

Q. After Colonel O'Brien made his speech he made you do all this and did you do it?

A. Yes.

Q. You were present once?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had to do it also?

A. Well, I did it all the same.

Q. Colonel O'Brien ordered this to be done?

A. Yes.

Q. And were there a large number of persons?

A. Yes, anything from 200 to 500.

Q. And what was the subject of his lecture?

A. The subject of it was, "You are going to fight against the British Government. The British Government is very powerful: it has suppressed Germany and so forth, what are you? You must not do these things; these days are not like the days of the Diwans."

Q. Was there anything else that you saw?

A. I did not myself see any other thing.

Q. Do you pay any land revenue?

A. No, my father is alive.

Q. Your father pays it?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any order received by your father about payment of land revenue?

A. The cultivators and the *lambardars* received orders.

Q. You say Colonel O'Brien issued an order through the local *tahsil* that the land revenue must be paid at a certain date, otherwise proceedings would be taken under Martial Law? Had that anything to do with you or your father?

A. No.

Q. How did you know about this order?

A. The order was issued from the *tahsil* and given to *lambardars* and other people.

Q. You have seen this order given to large numbers of people?

A. I have not seen it.

Q. Then how do you know?

A. The people who had it, told me.

Q. Then you say about Gopal Dass, Ahluwalia, that he was pressed by the police to give evidence and he refused to be a party to false evidence and he was arrested on May 16th. Have you any personal knowledge of that?

A. He told me this himself, and the people he consulted on the 14th and 15th, I asked one of them.

Q. You talk of the arrest of a *dhobi*, have you any personal knowledge of this?

A. I did not see him being arrested, but I saw one man under arrest.

Q. You saw him under arrest?

A. No, I saw the Sikh under arrest.

Q. Did you see the *dhobi* under arrest, or arrested?

A. No, I did not see him.

Q. Then all this is hearsay about the *dhobi*?

A. I asked the *dhobi* himself how he was arrested.

Q. Therefore your knowledge is confined to what the *dhobi* himself told you?

A. What the *dhobi* himself told me and what other people told me, and I saw one of these persons in prison one day and he told me.

Q. Whom did you see in prison?

A. Ladha Singh, the Sikh.

Q. He was kept in prison for one day and he was released?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw him with your own eyes?

A. I saw him under arrest once, because I was told so and I went specially to see him.

Q. Do you know that Lala Muthra Das, *tahsildar*, Hafizabad, was obliged to take leave on transfer?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know from your own knowledge that the local munsif was also transferred by Colonel O'Brien?

A. Yes, the local munsif was transferred in those days.

Q. Do you know that Lala Srinath, *zaildar*, was dismissed from his position?

A. Yes.

Q. These things are within your own knowledge?

A. Yes.

Q. And the officiating Inspector of Police was transferred?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were all these changes made?

A. All these changes were made when Colonel O'Brien came on the 13th of April.

Q. And why were they transferred?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. Why have you put it down?

A. Because the impression on the people was that they were transferred to enable those people to be arrested easily. That was the idea the people had because they were all transferred at once.

Q. How could they prevent the arrest of people? First of all you have no personal knowledge as to why they were transferred?

A. They were transferred on the 30th April and the people were arrested on the 1st May, and some whose houses had been searched before, even they were not arrested before, but after the transfers all these *vakils* and so on were arrested.

Q. How could they prevent the arrest of these pleaders and others even supposing your impression be true?

A. They might or might not.

Q. You come before the Committee and you put this down in black and white and make any allegation, there must be some reasonable grounds for what you say, otherwise what is the good of putting it down here?

A. Because they were transferred and other people came in their places who were quite new to the situation.

Q. If some officers are transferred, others have to come in their places?

A. But they were quite new to the situation and they knew nothing about it.

Q. Were you present on the occasion of any speeches delivered by Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien at recruiting durbars?

A. Main lunga, main lunga, main lunga was the only thing I heard.

Q. What did you hear?

A. He said "We want recruits," and "*Main lunga, main lunga, main lunga.*" These were his words.

Q. What objection have you to that?

A. The way he said it, people took it to mean that he would take the recruits by force.

Q. You say press-gang methods were adopted by Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien, what do you mean by this expression? First of all, are you giving me your hearsay story or have you any personal knowledge of these methods?

A. Some of the cultivators came to me and complained that they were forced to join as recruits.

Q. Of your father's village?

A. Yes of my father's village or my cousin's village.

Q. Now from the 17th onwards, what was the attitude of the people? Were they sullen or were they terror-struck and demoralized? What is your impression?

A. Nothing from the 17th to the 30th; only after the 30th they were terror-struck.

Q. You here say the people were terror-struck by the Martial Law *régimé*?

A. People were so terrified that they did not even speak. That was during the whole of May. They would not say anything whatsoever and kept indoors.

Q. You say a cruel wrong had been done, what do you mean by that?

A. People have been punished without fair trial.

Q. Your complaint is about the method of trial?

A. Yes.

At Lahore, Friday, the 19th December 1919.

PRESENT.

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
Major-General Sir GEORGE BARROW, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., I.A.
The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.
The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.
Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.
Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Mr. V. W. SMITH, Superintendent of Police, Lyallpur.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Smith, you are in the Indian Police?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you transferred to Lyallpur on the 1st April last?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You had previous experience of the district?

A. I went first in May 1915 and stayed there until May 1916; then from October 1916 to May 1917.

Q. Is Lyallpur a large district?

A. Yes; very thickly populated.

Q. Are there any large towns?

A. The headquarters is a large town; others are small towns.

Q. Is the district liable to be affected by political movements?

A. In 1907 there was very serious political unrest over the Colonization Act and for some months this unrest continued. There was a good deal of wire cutting, and on one occasion an attack was made on the police station, and a number of seditious speeches were made.

Q. Was a District Congress Committee formed there early in 1919?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. To agitate against the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes, Sir. I think they were about 20 or 30 to start with. I think, it was in February; a meeting was held and on that occasion the membership was considerably increased.

Q. A public meeting was organised on the 5th April?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. That was organized by the Congress Committee?

A. That was run entirely by the Congress Committee.

Q. It was resolved at that meeting that the *hartal* should be held next day?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And I think the *hartal* was held?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was it completely successful?

A. It was a complete success.

Q. Was there another meeting in the evening of the 6th?

A. On the 6th there was a meeting.

Q. The meetings on the 5th and 6th were orderly?

A. Some of the speeches were strongly worded.

Q. Was there any further agitation until the 12th?

A. Nothing at all.

Q. At that time, the question of renewed *hartal* came up?

A. That came up on the 12th.

Q. Was any active propaganda work done in connection with the proposed *hartal*?

A. It was scarcely active in the sense that I could see it. But it was done in the open bazar.

Q. You say misrepresentations took place. What do you mean by misrepresentation?

A. Misrepresentation of the intentions of the Rowlatt Act.

Q. What sorts of misrepresentations were made?

A. The chief misrepresentation was that any body of persons, it may be 5 or 10 (the figures differed), would be liable to arrest by the police.

Q. Who was responsible for that misrepresentation?

A. It came out subsequently in the investigation that the leaders of the Congress Committee were responsible. A number of shop-keepers had been drawn into the Committee.

Q. Did the misrepresentation with reference to the Rowlatt Act create a considerable amount of agitation among the people?

A. By that time, the question of the arrest of Gandhi had arisen, and there was a good deal of misrepresentation about that. It was generally believed that he was arrested and put in jail.

Q. A *hartal* was decided upon for the 13th (Sunday)?

A. I do not know how it was decided. The *hartal* came into existence on Sunday.

Q. Did the crowds collect early in the bazar?

A. There was nothing very much, I think, till about midday.

Q. What happened then?

A. At about 3 o'clock, we heard shouts in the civil station, shouts of *Mahatma ki jai*. And the Deputy Commissioner and myself became alarmed and went into the city. Between 5 or 6 o'clock, a big crowd began to collect and move about.

Q. You patrolled the streets?

A. Yes.

Q. What reception did you meet with?

A. We found the people very sullen, and scarcely a single man paid us the usual mark of respect. We saw one or two objectionable posters stuck up on the wall.

(The Government Advocate put in a printed translation of the objectionable posters, and a copy was handed to the President).

Q. I see there are 17 posters. Did you find all these posters pasted up?

A. They were pasted practically every day. I found some, my subordinates others.

Q. You take it that all these posters were in point of fact pasted up?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. Among the posters, I see this one, Nos. 8-9 "O Sikhs, die or drown yourselves in the tank of Deputy Commissioner's bungalow as your daughters were dishonoured at the hands of the sweepers. Allow your young men to take revenge." This is one of the posters?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What is the reference there?

A. It refers to the *Kirpan* trouble. There was a rumour as regards the girls at Amritsar.

Q. That was investigated by Mr. Kitchin and he found that the rumour was without foundation?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I see there is another poster:—"Blessed be Mahatma Gandhi! We are sons of India. We shall

not give way. We shall lose our lives. We shall never abide by this Rowlatt Bill. Gandhi! We the Indians will fight to death after you. The flag of cruelty and oppression has been fixed in the ground. Alas, British, how you have cheated us. Do you remember those days when you were groaning; when Germans were threatening you in the battlefields of Europe. Your boat was light, but the storm was heavy and you were calling us (the Indian ship) for help. We the Indians lost our lives for you and defeated your enemies. Now be ashamed you have done much oppression upon us, and our cup of patience is about to overflow. You have fired on the Indians and have shot them to death. See that night is coming for your days of wrongs. The times are coming when you will not be here and all your oppressions and cruelties will come to an end." Then another poster runs :—" The treatments which have been meted out to our girls at Amritsar are unbearable, and we cannot express them. You should ponder over this that we should have seen such a time even in a dream. It is very sad that all your brethren are keeping silent at this moment." Another is " Sangla is far better than your town. It is smaller than our place. It has brought out a black flag, but don't you feel shame for this. You should follow." Then I see ' Black Bill ' in which there are these statements contained :—" Oh! Get up and let these monkey-faced know that you possess a tongue in your mouth." " Sacrifice yourself for the nation and the country. Nothing can be done without sacrifices. Why do you fear dying and murdering? Burn Government buildings." Then another appeal to the people " to be up and doing and enforce unity as the inhabitants of Lahore and Amritsar have done." Further the poster says : " What time are you waiting for? Send for your brethren from the *Chaks* at once, and do at once the acts committed in Gujranwala, Amritsar and Lahore, so that the enemies of our life and honour may surrender. This time won't come again. and again. What time are you waiting for now? There are many ladies here to dishonour. Go all round India, clear the country of the ladies and these sinful creatures, and then will be the only time when we can all say together : " Blessed be the Hindus, Muhammadans and Sikhs." ' You say these different posters to which I have referred appeared every day?

A. Every day from the 13th to the 16th.

Q. In large numbers?

A. 2 or 3; at the most 4 a day.

Q. Were the posters in different parts of the town?

A. I think a large number were pasted near the shop of Dina Nath who was subsequently convicted. But there was no particular place.

Q. I suppose you realised that such posters might have a very serious effect on the population?

A. They were undoubtedly very inflammatory.

Q. Now you were referring to your patrolling the town with the Deputy Commissioner. How long did you continue your patrol on that day (13th)?

A. Less than an hour I think.

Q. Did the excitement that was manifest when you were going through the city continue through the whole day?

A. Yes; it got worse towards the evening.

Q. Did the Deputy Commissioner send out to the neighbouring cavalry farms for assistance?

A. That was after I came back. I have mentioned here that we met with a hostile reception. I was passing down through one bazar, which has a square in the middle, into another bazar. I stopped there to take my sub-inspector, and I noticed a big crowd gathering behind my back, 300 or 400 I should think. Certainly I heard shouts and jeering around me. I looked round and saw all facing me and shouting; obviously it was aimed at my person. I went a little further and came back and informed the Deputy Commissioner. Then we had dinner. Information came to the bungalow that there were one or two petty riots in the city. We went out to the Sadar police station; the Deputy Commissioner issued written orders to the cavalry farms.

Q. Did you realise that you had not sufficient force in the town to maintain order?

A. Yes. There was not sufficient force. Particularly, we had no mounted police.

Q. Did the mounted men come in?

A. They came in just before the meeting on the following day. It took them 24 hours to come in.

Q. They came on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were they posted?

A. They were picketted in the Deputy Commissioner's garden.

Q. Then on the 14th did the *hartal* continue?

A. Yes; there was a complete *hartal* on the 14th.

Q. Were efforts made to cause a strike in the civil offices?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What sort of efforts do you refer to?

A. The Irrigation clerks and the Railway clerks were met on their way to office and they were told not to go to office. Eventually they went to office and informed the District Traffic Superintendent of what was happening and he said ' we had better close our office entirely.'

Q. Where is the *Idgah*?

A. The organisers were attempting to hold a meeting. They provisionally fixed a certain garden (the other side of the garden). And the Deputy Commissioner sent for the owner of the garden and told him that if a meeting were to be held there permission should be obtained first, and he would be held responsible for what happened. This upset their plans. At a very short notice, they fixed a joint meeting at the *Idgah*. We got notice of this only a few minutes before the meeting.

Q. Did you make arrangements?

A. The Deputy Commissioner went straight up with a number of *sowars*. He sent word to the two trustees of the *Idgah* and informed them that they would be held personally responsible for anything that happened, and I myself hurried to arrange the police guard.

Q. Meantime, what did the European residents in Lyallpur do?

A. They got wind of these petty riots the night before. They were rather alarmed, and they decided that the best thing to do would be to concentrate in two bungalows in the centre of the Civil Station. That was on the evening of the 14th.

Q. I think in fact the meeting at the *Idgah* did not result in any violence?

A. No. It fell flat entirely. The only real work that they did was to appoint a committee of 20 which was to sit together and decide whether the *hartal* should continue or cease.

Q. I think the *hartal* did continue on the 15th, and some shops began to close?

A. They were waiting for the decision. It took them 2½ hours to decide.

Q. What did they resolve upon?

A. They decided to open their shops again.

Q. I think you say that the situation became worse owing to news of the outrage at Chuharkana and the spreading of the infection down the line?

A. On the morning of the 16th we got information that on the previous night the train had been held up at Chuharkana. Later on, further information came about Dhaban Singh and Moman. There was a general belief that a huge mob was travelling down the line towards Sangla, and in order to hold up this mob the Deputy Commissioner diverted a portion of the troops coming from the town to protect Sangla.

Q. Was the village Sangla burnt?

A. There were rumours going round. One was that Sangla was burnt. Another was that the next station down the line was burnt, and so on. These rumours were false.

Q. Sangla station was burnt?

A. It was not burnt. Those 30 men of the 50th Rifles saved the situation.

Q. Was the situation in those days extremely acute?

A. I think it was most critical on the night of the 16th, between the 16th and 17th. It was after that date that all the excesses occurred.

Q. Were the exits of the town strongly picketted by the police?

A. Yes. It was about 9 o'clock or 10 o'clock on the evening of the 16th that the District Traffic Superintendent who had been sent to Sangla with these 30 men reported that the situation was extremely critical, and but for that assistance he would not have been able to hold up the mob. We were afraid that, next morning, the mob after burning Sangla would advance towards Lyallpur. I knew that I had sufficient men to keep the city in hand, but we were afraid of trouble from the other side towards Sangla, so I practically sent every man available there next morning and the remainder of the troops protected the civil station.

Q. Did bands of men emerge from the city?

A. About 17 or 20 men left by the morning train and got down at Jammu or some station; their intention was to join the Chuharkanians. The idea was that a big mob was coming down and they wanted to join this big mob. I forget where they got down exactly. On their way back to Lyallpur they did damage to telegraph wires.

Q. Was destruction done to property about this time?

A. The wires were cut on three or four occasions, and that same night Government stacks of *bhusa* were burnt.

Q. What is that?

A. Lyallpur is a great wheat-producing colony and vast quantities of straw are always kept in reserve there. Government was making a big purchase for the army. In these market towns, big stacks of straw were kept ready for despatch. On this night at about 9 o'clock someone set fire to one of these stacks. Just at that moment an enormous dust storm came on and 4 out of the 8 stacks were in flames.

Q. That was on the 17th?

A. On the night of the 17th.

Q. Then did a moveable column arrive the next day?

A. I think a moveable column arrived on the 19th.

Q. When did the *hartal* come to an end?

A. It came to an end on the decision of this committee to end the *hartal* and the next day shops were opened. Meanwhile this inducement about Sangla came in; either for that reason or some other reason, on the next day all the shops were again closed. That lasted until the evening.

Q. That was on the following day, 18th or 19th?

A. On the 17th shops were again closed and on the 18th shops were opened.

Q. Was this agitation confined to Lyallpur, or did it extend?

A. It started independent at Jaranwala.

Q. How far is that?

A. That is in another direction, almost in a straight line to Lahore.

Q. Is it far from Lyallpur?

A. It is about 23 miles from Lyallpur.

Q. At this town, a *hartal* was held on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. Were some features of the *hartal* openly seditious? What do you mean by that?

A. There was a man called Nand Lal who came back from Delhi after the 30th March *viâ* Bhatinda and Rohtak, where there had been some *Satyagraha* demonstrations. He is reported to have induced the people to join him in the seditious endeavours in the bazars. I will give you particulars if you like.

Q. You might give us particulars.

A. This is the report: "Everything remained quiet in Jaranwala until the arrival from Delhi of Nand Lal, petition-writer. He had been working at Jaranwala as a petition-writer for some years. On his arrival from Delhi he began to spread false and alarming rumours saying he had seen the British kill Hindus and Muhammadans for nothing in Delhi on the 30th March. Mahatma Gandhi had been arrested by the authorities. They all knew him to be innocent. Hindus and Muhammadans of Delhi had joined. Again the British had that most dangerous weapon, the Rowlatt Bill had been introduced. This he declared should be named *kala nag* (cobra) or *Danda* (cudgel). By the introduction of this Bill, liberty will be lost. Ten men sitting together will be convicted by the police without being given a fair chance of trial. Birth, death and marriage ceremonies will then be performed with great difficulty." After this he had advertised (with a postal peon and two or three shopkeepers) that a meeting would be held at the cremation ground that same evening, at which Nand Lal would explain what he had seen in Delhi. This meeting was held and was attended by both Hindus and Muhammadans. Nand Lal made a speech.

Q. How did you get that information?

A. This is the result of our subsequent investigation.

Q. What was the result?

A. First he spoke of the services of India during the war. He said "Now you know actually that the reward was something quite different. The Rowlatt Bill properly speaking should be called *Kala* Bill (Black Bill) or *kala nag* (cobra). It lays down that where ten men are seen sitting together they will be arrested by the Police and convicted without being given a fair chance to prove their innocence. This is hanging over our heads. Mr. Gandhi has stood up to help Indians. He has opposed the Bill and has sent us a message to do the same. He has also directed us to adopt *Satyagraha.*" At this stage Nand Lal removed his *pagri* and his shoes, and said that he would not wear them until the Rowlatt Bills were cancelled. He then began saying that "in Delhi on the 30th March Hindus and Muhammadans had joined with one mind. I have seen this with my own eyes." After this one or two others made similar speeches, and the five chief men moved into the town bare-headed shouting "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*" and "*Hindu-Mussalman ki jai*" and directed the people to observe *hartal* on the following day. All shops, he said, should be shut, and if anyone did not shut he would have to suffer. On the next day there was *hartal* in Jaranwala.

Q. Were any acts of violence committed during the *hartal*?

A. There was a certain amount of coercion in the *hartal.* People were made to shut their shops.

Q. Was there any destruction of property?

A. There was no violence of any kind.

Q. Then at Gojra was there agitation?

A. Yes, the agitation appears to have spread from Lyallpur further down.

Q. How far is it?

A. It is about 30 miles.

Q. When did agitation start at Gojra?

A. It started on the 14th. There was a Hindu shopkeeper who died. His body was taken as usual to the cremation ground, and in the middle of the proceedings before the body had reached the cremation ground, a Hindu got up and said that everyone must come to the cremation ground. Ordinarily only relatives of the deceased follow the body as far as the cremation ground. On the arrival of the dead body at the cremation ground, there was some sort of speech made. Then they came back to Gojra and later in the day a meeting was held. I think that was also in the *Idgah.*

Q. I see you say that the missionaries were compelled to leave in consequence of the rumours?

A. The church missionary there heard that his house was going to be burnt; so he thought it best to leave the station.

Q. The *hartal* continued on the 15th and 16th?

A. On the following day the *hartal* really started. Early in the morning, a big crowd went to the station and we have reason to believe that they went there to find out if there were any Europeans in the train. They actually held up the train and two men mounted the train and said it could not go. They assaulted a sweetmeat vendor and attempted to close the refreshment stall. They came back to the city and later in the day there was a seditious demonstration in the *mandi*—grain market. There was a black flag and

there was a certain amount of speech-making. On the 16th there was a similar demonstration.

Q. You say that the crowd was decidedly anti-British. Is that in consequence of this demonstration, the attack on the train, etc.?

A. Yes. It was said that British troops had been murdered, and Indian troops had risen in revolt. One man was heard to say 'there was no European in the train.'

Q. That was after they held up the train?

A. Yes.

Q. In connection with the agitation in the villages, there were numbers of rumours that you referred to. What sort of rumours were they in the Sikh villages?

A. They were rumours regarding the Rowlatt Bill, but in actual fact, they were rumours regarding other social matters, such as the Patel Bill, the Income-Tax Act. For instance, the rumour about four men being liable to be arrested was extremely common. That was heard everywhere. The other rumours, which I call social rumours varied considerably. In some places it was generally believed that 50 per cent. of the sale proceeds of grain would be taken by Government, that any man who sold his daughter in marriage would have to give half of the sale proceeds to Government. These were two of the many rumours that were afloat.

Q. Were those rumours tacked on to rumours connected with the Rowlatt Bill or were they independent of the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Rowlatt Bill was the name; everyone knew the Rowlatt Bill.

Q. Where is the village Jehangir?

A. It is about 9 miles from Lyallpur.

Q. Canal wire was cut there?

A. Yes.

Q. At Chak 150 what happened?

A. A gang of people emerged from the village and went to the railway line and attempted to take off a rail.

Q. What distance is the Chak from Lyallpur?

A. That is a long way, 40 miles at least.

Q. In that case were the culprits followed to their village by the police?

A. The police got information at once and they got a party out and by the evening they arrived at the village. The men surrendered the next day.

Q. I see you express the opinion that the movement connected with the *hartal* was anti-official and anti-Government but not anti-British?

A. Yes.

Q. You think it became anti-British afterwards?

A. Yes.

Q. From the 13th onwards was there strong feeling in the bazar against Europeans?

A. Yes, it began from the 13th.

Q. You also express the opinion that the movement in its more undesirable aspect was almost entirely Hindu?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that the result of your investigation made at the time?

A. It is my opinion from the very beginning. It was obvious from the information we were getting that the Hindus were mainly responsible. The population of Lyallpur is largely Hindu.

Q. You say that a few Muhammadans allowed themselves to be involved?

A. Yes. As a matter of fact, the whole city observed the *hartal;* there is no question about that. But in its most undesirable aspect, it was Hindu.

Q. You mean that many who joined the *hartal* might have had no intention of committing violence?

A. Quite so.

Q. And those who were bent on violence were mainly Hindus?

A. Yes.

Q. In your opinion was Martial Law desirable?

A. It was certainly desirable.

Q. Was it essential?

A. It was not essential.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. As things turned out, nothing subsequently happened after the 20th.

Q. How far was the fact that nothing happened due to the circumstances that Martial Law was in operation?

A. The information that Martial Law had been declared in Lyallpur spread everywhere rapidly and had an undoubted restraining effect.

Q. I see you say here that it was only enforced at headquarters and did not interfere with the liberties of the general public except in the matter of travelling by rail. What do you mean by that?

A. Martial Law had no effect in any place except Lyallpur. In the matter of travelling by rail, there were certain restrictions.

Q. In the other villages in the Lyallpur District, there were no orders issued under Martial Law?

A. None. Things were absolutely normal in the villages and in the smaller towns also. It was only at headquarters that any notices were issued. After that if anything serious had happened, Martial Law was there to provide the remedy.

Q. In Lyallpur district you say the only restriction on the public was the order as regards travelling?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that order essential or advisable?

A. I do not know who passed that order. I was not consulted in the matter, but I think it was certainly advisable, because the population of Lyallpur is drawn from practically every district in the province.

Q. And therefore did you restrict travelling by the public?

A. It spread from Lyallpur and there was importation into Lyallpur. Subsequently the Afghan War altered the situation.

Q. Did you not have the Curfew Order or any of these other orders?

A. We had a salaaming order; that is all.

Q. That was as regards all the officers?

A. All British officers.

Q. Were there any convictions for failure to *salaam*?

A. Yes, there were a few convictions.

Q. What sort of punishments were meted out?

A. I think usually it was a reprimand and I think fines of Rs. 5 or Rs. 10. I do not think any man was whipped for not salaaming.

Q. I do not know whether you can tell us, you do not mention it in your statement. But during the existence of Martial Law, were there many cases from the Lyallpur district dealt with either by the special tribunals that were set up or by summary courts?

A. The only case dealt with by the tribunal is 150 Chak case, attempt to remove railway line and cutting of telegraph wires. All the other cases were dealt with by the local summary courts.

Q. Were there many cases that were tried by the summary courts?

A. A very large number of cases.

Q. Were they rioting?

A. Petty rioting and cutting of telegraph wires and the situation created at Kiala Kalan, and also the demonstrations at Jaranwala and Gojra.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. You referred to the salaaming order. Was it simply that people must *salaam* British officers or salute them, or was there some special form of salute or *salaam?*

A. It was said that every Indian should accord to British officers the measure of respect which they normally would accord to an Indian of high rank, *i.e.*, they should salute with the hand or *salaam*, and if riding, they should descend and if carrying umbrellas, they should lower them.

Q. Was any other order enforced or was this the only one?

A. This was the only one.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. In Lyallpur itself, there were no serious disturbances at any time?

A. There was the offence of attempting to remove the railway lines, etc. It is a very serious offence.

Q. That was not in Lyallpur *itself?*

A. In headquarters, there was the offence of setting fire to the *bhusa* stacks. It was a very serious offence; the loss involved was Rs. 60,000.

Q. Besides the burning of the stacks of *bhusa*, there was no other serious disturbance in Lyallpur itself?

A. There were only petty riots; that is all.

Q. That applies also, I take it, to the surrounding parts?

A. In the immediate neighbourhood there were riots in Kiala Kalan of a very serious nature.

Q. There was no disturbance?

A. It was a preparation before a very serious disturbance.

Q. For what purpose?

A. A party had come to Lyallpur for attacking the treasury.

Q. When did all this happen? Between what dates?

A. Petty riots occurred on the 13th. I considered that it was really dangerous subsequent to the burning of Chuharkana about the 16th and 17th.

Q. When did petty riots take place?

A. On the 13th and there was another one on the 15th.

Q. Owing to what took place at Chuharkana on the 16th, there was reflex action here?

A. Yes, there was the general feeling prevailing that the Chuharkanians were coming to their assistance. That was the general attitude of the people.

Q. How long did that feeling continue? For a few days?

A. It continued practically until sufficient troops arrived. On the 19th April a moveable column arrived and everything was over.

Q. This feeling continued till troops arrived on the 19th?

A. It already arrived on the 16th and again on the 19th.

Q. You had some troops on the 16th and 17th, and more arrived on the 19th?

A. Yes.

Q. That quieted the whole thing?

A. Absolutely.

Q. There was nothing after that?

A. Nothing after that.

Q. Was no unrest at all after that?

A. A good deal of bitterness was left. The Amritsar Sikhs were certainly sullen for about two months afterwards.

Q. There was no open manifestation after the 19th?

A. No.

Q. For all practical purposes, things were quiet, shops were open and business was doing?

A. Yes.

Q. Martial Law was not introduced in Lyallpur till the 24th?

A. It was proclaimed then, but the date on which the Local Government was asked to sanction Martial Law was the 20th. It was asked for on the reports which the Deputy Commissioner and myself were sending in.

Q. The actual proclamation of Martial Law was on the 20th?

A. Much later, on the 24th.

Q. In view of what you have told me that things had quieted down after the 19th, in the manner you have described, was it essential on the 24th to have Martial Law?

A. It was desirable.

Q. Not essential?

A. Not essential.

Q. How long was Martial Law continued? Till July?

A. Till the first week of June.

Q. It was not essential on the 24th April when it was introduced, although desirable. Was it necessary to have continued it for such a long period till the end of June?

A. I think it was necessary.

Q. You told me that it was not essential to have introduced it in the first instance, though desirable?

A. Yes.

Q. If it was not essential when introducing it, was it essential to continue it?

A. We required some special form of machinery to dispose of all these cases. That is the point.

Q. It was only necessary to deal with the cases?

A. It was necessary up to about the third week of May because of the Afghan War. Almost immediately after the introduction of Martial Law, the Afghan campaign started and it was quite impossible for us to say at the time what reflex action it would have on the Lyallpur district. After the third week of May it would have been safe to remove Martial Law in its military aspect, but I consider it most desirable that we should have had some special machinery to get rid of all these cases. It is only in the third week of May that we started disposing of the cases. Even when Martial Law had been removed, the chief case in which the really big men were concerned, had not been decided.

Q. I take it that the continuance of Martial Law was required in your view in order to dispose of cases in which people had been arrested?

A. Quite so.

Q. About the Rowlatt Act and the misrepresentations in connection therewith, you say in your statement that the pleader class was responsible for these misrepresentations?

A. Yes.

Q. There were misrepresentations and, you say, that pleaders were responsible for them. What is the evidence?

A. A lot of evidence came out in investigation. I can give you details if you like to have them.

Q. Were any particular pleaders found to have done this?

A. Yes, particular pleaders.

Q. Who had made misrepresentations?

A. Yes.

Q. Where?

A. In the city. They were saying that to shopkeepers and others.

Q. Were there meetings?

A. Not many meetings. I think it occurred at one of the meetings. Mention was made at the meeting on the 5th or 6th. There was certainly one misrepresentation about the intention of the Bill. It was said that there was no appeal and no vakil.

Q. The misrepresentation that you refer to is that there was no appeal and no vakil?

A. That is only one slight misrepresentation. The general effect of that on the mind of the public was that some special Act had been enforced which would affect all criminal cases. It was not made clear that the Bill would only apply to anarchical and revolutionary crimes.

Q. Speaking of misrepresentation, do you mean that the pleaders did not make it clear to the people that this Bill was a special one which would apply to anarchical movement?

A. Apart from that they misrepresented the Act in the bazar. I can give you particulars if you like.

Q. They went about misrepresenting the Act?

A. They called the shopkeepers and were giving them wrong information.

Q. Were these pleaders traced?

A. I will give you particulars if you like to have.

Q. Was any action taken against them?

A. Three chief men were arrested. I should like to tell you that the arrests were made on the evidence we had.

Q. Were they prosecuted?

A. Yes.

Q. Were they convicted?

A. Yes; the case was almost decided when Martial Law was withdrawn. Then they decided to let the case go on. They were convicted and then they appealed. The Summary Courts started the case. The same magistrate continued the case and convicted them as an ordinary court. Then they appealed to the Sessions Judge who acquitted them because of a misjoinder of charges. It was then decided to take the case again into the ordinary court of law. Eventually the Local Government stepped in and withdrew the prosecution.

Q. Your view that the pleaders misrepresented is based on what you came to learn in connection with the case of these three pleaders?

A. Well, there were others with them. We arrested 12 men altogether and started an investigation. During that investigation this information came out.

Q. You prosecuted 12, of whom two were convicted. The rest were shopkeepers. The Sessions Judge ultimately acquitted them?

A. No, he said there should be a further trial.

Q. The further trial was not proceeded with?

A. Yes.

Q. And so your observation about the pleaders is based on the information that came to your knowledge during the investigation of this case in which the three pleaders were concerned?

A. Here I should like to bring in the question of the arrest of these men. During the week of agitation when things were safe at headquarters, the Deputy Commissioner wrote a private letter to each of the Members of the Municipal Committee and also to the President of this body of 20. He asked them to inform him confidentially which men of Lyallpur were mainly responsible for the *hartal* and the consequent excitement. All the Members of the Municipal Committee sent in their reports to the President of this body. The President was asked to send in a report, but he refused to give a reply. It was on the statements of these Municipal Commissioners that the arrests were made. Practically every one of the municipal commissioners implicated these three pleaders.

Q. So far as the pleaders were concerned, three of them came before you?

A. Well, there was a very large number of other pleaders who were also mentioned by the Municipal Commissioners.

Q. So that against the other pleaders, you did not think there was sufficient evidence or information to justify you to proceed against them? Is not that so?

A. It practically comes to that. We did not want to go and arrest the whole city. We wanted to get hold of the big men only.

Q. You had definite information and evidence with regard to these three pleaders and not against the others, so you did not want to arrest them?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, about these posters, they were not printed, but written in manuscript?

A. Yes.

Q. How many posters in all were there?

A. I cannot tell you the exact number, but I think there must have been over a dozen.

Q. And did you trace the person or persons responsible for these ?

A. We traced the writer of one poster only. I think his name was Tilok Chand. I think he was one of the witnesses. We thought it was unnecessary to prosecute him at all. I think he was a student. No, I am wrong, he was a bookseller. He was instigated by other people.

Q. He said that himself?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were those people according to him?

A. I have forgotten their names.

Q. You said in your statement that you think there was a widespread organisation?

A. Certainly. In the first *hartal* there was a widespread organization. It was an anti-Rowlatt Bill agitation.

Q. What do you mean by "widespread organisation?"

A. Spreading all over India.

Q. The *Satyagraha* movement was to be found in many parts of India, therefore your view was that there was a widespread organisation?

A. Yes.

Q. This man Anand Lal that you speak of at Jaranwala, he was a person residing for a long time in Jaranwala. He was not a person who had come from Delhi. He simply went to Delhi and returned to Jaranwala. He was not a Delhi man?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Did you make an enquiry about the burning of *bhusa*?

A. Yes.

Q. Has any one been convicted for that?

A. No one was convicted, as sufficient evidence was not forthcoming. But I have no doubt in my mind as to the man who actually burnt it.

Q. Was there any evidence to the effect that this was the action of the crowd?

A. It was the action of three men. It was not done by the crowd, otherwise the culprits would have been found out at once.

Q. So far as your investigation goes, you found out that it was not the action of the mob that was going about in the city but of three men?

A. Quite so.

Q. So far as the information about these three pleaders is concerned it is based on the statements made by certain shopkeepers I suppose?

A. Not only shopkeepers, but some respectable people also.

Q. About the misrepresentations you said that some shopkeepers further misrepresented the Rowlatt Bill when they went inside the city. May I know how many shopkeepers misrepresented?

A. I do not know.

Q. Is there no record?

A. There is, but I cannot give you the number.

Q. Approximately?

A. Well, I think about a dozen.

Q. What were the misrepresentations?

A. They were to the effect that the intention of the Rowlatt Bill was that if a party of four or ten men, as the case may be, were seen anywhere, they were to be arrested. That was one: I will give you others.

Q. I am specially confining it to the misrepresentation by the pleaders.

A. Here is one report which I have got. On the night of the 4th a certain baker was sent for by Barucha pleader. There were also Bhagat Ram and Sant Singh there. All these men were subsequently arrested. Another pleader Mian Chand and four others who were subsequently arrested were sitting there. They told this baker that he was summoned as a representative of the bakers and that they were all to close their shops as a protest against a tyrannical new law under which any five persons seen gathered together would be liable to summary arrest and imprisonment. That is one instance. Another instance. This was on the night of the 5th just after the first meeting of a number of men consisting, among others, of Barucha, Bhagat Ram, Sant Singh. These are the three arrested pleaders. Others subsequently arrested, but who were not pleaders, went about the town joining traders in the observance of the *hartal*. The next day traders, etc., were persuaded to close their shops on account of the Rowlatt Act. They said that it was given to the police to arrest without warrant 5 persons collected together and that restrictions were placed on [illegible] and funerals.

Q. You yourself did not record any of these statements?

A. No.

Q. By whom were these statements of the shopkeepers recorded?

A. By my inspector.

Q. And these investigations were held after the arrest of the pleaders?

A. Yes.

Q. And these statements were recorded after their arrest?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore they were arrested before the investigations were made?

A. Yes.

Q. As a matter of fact there is no written record in your possession of the misrepresentations either at the meetings or at any other place?

A. Yes, I think we have a full account of the meetings.

Q. Now, people were arrested from time to time by the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. de Montmorency, who has now gone on leave to England?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you be able to say as to whether this note is correct. That is, on the 20th April the Deputy Commissioner arrested 9 persons at Jaranwala, and on the 21st April the Deputy Commissioner arrested 9 persons at Gojra. On the 22nd April, he arrested 10 persons and 3 pleaders at Lyallpur city?

A. Twelve arrests were made including Dina Nath and three pleaders.

Q. Therefore up to the 23rd April, no investigation was started by the police at all?

A. No.

Q. Then on the 23rd April, 13 arrests were made at Kiala Kalan?

A. Yes.

Q. Five arrests were made on the 24th April at Jehangir?

A. I cannot give the date, but I think it was later, about the 25th.

Q. And some arrests were made at Toba Tek Singh village on the 25th April.

A. I think they were made on the 20th or the 21st.

Q. Some other persons who were arrested have been left out?

A. They may have been subsequently arrested probably.

Q. On the 27th, some arrests were made at Soha village.

A. I think the Deputy Commissioner did go and arrest 2 or 3 people.

Q. With regard to these meetings, is it not a fact that at these two places all the mischief done was committed by the 3 young men who had come back from Amritsar after the Baisakhi fair on the 13th and that the brother of one of them was shot and he started this.

A. You are mixing up the two instances. In Chak No. 150 the brother or the brother-in-law of one of the men implicated had been wounded at Amritsar.

Q. I am sorry I am mixing that up. I think you are right. It was after these men had returned to this village from the Baisakhi fair on the 13th at Amritsar?

A. I think it was after.

Q. There were also in Lyallpur allegations about bombing the Golden Temple?

A. There were allegations.

Q. Were there also some rumours that Sikhs were not allowed to keep *kirpans?*

A. I was told that Lyallpur is a very strong Sikh centre and that was the reason why these rumours were so prevalent.

Q. Something happened at Amritsar and it was not serious, but simply magnified and that rumour was received?

A. Yes.

Q. A great deal of wire-cutting roundabout this Chak was done by a gang of young persons headed by this very man who had returned from Amritsar?

A. That is not true. Well, wire-cutting did occur on one occasion. They came and they went after cutting the wires. I do not think that the man who headed the gang was a deserter, nor do I think that any other gang has been to Amritsar.

Q. Is it not a fact that some serious allegations were made by this young man who had returned after the 13th from Amritsar?

A. I cannot say for certain.

Q. Had you not any news?

A. I have got a list of men who had returned from Amritsar and of those who lived in its neighbourhood.

Q. You are not sure of Kiala Kalan?

A. It is probable that the reports of men getting back from Kiala Kalan had an unsettling effect, but that was not the cause of the meeting there.

Q. Now about the occurrence of the 15th at the railway station. When you say that the sweetmeat-seller was assaulted and people went to the station, is it not a fact that when they went to the station and made a demonstration, their idea was to ask the guard and the driver not to move the train but to observe *hartal?*

A. Yes, one of their ideas was to stop the train. Perhaps that may have been their intention.

Q. At Lyallpur about 80 Indian Infantry were called in on the 16th and 30 were sent to Sangla. More infantry arrived on the 17th?

A. Yes.

Q. And on the 19th there was a Moveable Column with a Motor Machine Battery and a Squadron of Cavalry?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had already introduced the *thikri pahra* system by the 16th?

A. I think orders on the railway were issued on the 13th. It took about 3 days to get into proper working order.

Q. The Martial Law order about the posting of notices was also introduced there, *i.e.*, the protection and posting of notices as was done in Lahore. They were placed on the houses of these pleaders who were ordered to see that they were not removed, these pleaders and so-called agitators who were taking an active part in the political agitation worked up by the members of the Congress Committee?

A. Yes.

Q. There was a similar proclamation to the effect that no outside legal practitioners were allowed to come to Lyallpur?

A. I do not think that was passed. I cannot say for certain. I had practically nothing to do with the administration of Martial Law, and therefore cannot say.

Q. May I ask you as to whether Martial Law orders were in force at Lyallpur?

A. I think there were three orders in force.

Q. Then there was some order about replenishing stock and selling off grain?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know anything about summary trials?

A. Yes, I know something about them.

Q. Is it not a fact that about 24 cases were tried by Major Polley?

A. Those were Martial Law cases.

Q. Then there was a case of obstructing a recruit?

A. I know nothing about that.

Q. Then there were some cases under the heading of harbouring rebels?

A. Yes, this wire-cutting case at Chuharkana was reported to us very late. On the 19th we got the first information about this occurrence. First of all the Deputy Commissioner sent out an extra assistant commissioner to hold a judicial enquiry. Subsequently we got instructions regarding the prosecution of Martial Law cases and he decided that the police should take it over and start investigations after which we would turn the case over to the Summary Court. The story of the prosecution was that this wire was cut at mid-day on the 16th by two Musalmans which was an obvious falsehood. It was proved on an examination of the Canal records, that that wire was working on the 16th and it was probably cut on the morning of the 17th. We told them that the evidence was obviously a fabricated statement. One of them actually knew when the breach had occurred. So we gave them to understand that if they failed to produce the evidence they would be arrested under Martial Law. They were arrested accordingly under Martial Law and were convicted.

Q. Therefore up to this time you do not know the names of the offenders?

A. No.

Q. And nobody stated as to who were the persons who actually cut the wires?

A. We could not say definitely. We had our suspicions.

Q. And therefore without knowing the names of the persons and without making any investigations you arrested these 2 persons and punished them?

A. Well, they were the *lambardars* of the village and were expected to know all that happened within 200 yards of the village.

Q. I want to know how you prosecuted these 2 men for protecting rebels when the names of the rebels were not known and when they were not mentioned in the charge sheet. You cannot prosecute any person for protecting *a*, *b* and *c*?

A. Well, this may have been under one of the other sections of the law. They were arrested because they failed to give any information about these rebels whom they were naturally assisting.

Q. Was any person prosecuted for tampering with evidence?

A. Yes, one man.

Q. What are the facts of this case?

A. I have forgotten the facts. It was an unlawful case of five men. I think 2 or 3 were standing at an assembly on the 16th. I think they went and visited Dr. Dina Nath and they formed an unlawful assembly to meet at Chuharkana. We intended to prosecute these 5 men, but eventually the case was withdrawn as 4 of them were already convicted in another case. A few days before the prosecution I got the information that one witness—I think his name was Bhola Nath—had been tampering with evidence and told them to make a false statement. So I prosecuted him.

Q. How many witnesses made that statement to you?

A. I think he was convicted on the statement of 2 main witnesses and I think there were 2 others corroborating them.

Q. Can you give me the names of the witnesses?

A. I cannot give their names, as I do not remember.

Q. What is your opinion about the behaviour of the college students in your district?

A. The resident students behaved very well. There are two big colleges there, the Khalsa College and the Agricultural College. The behaviour of the students of both these colleges was excellent. The Government High School, which is very close to the city, kept rather lax control and two or three students got embroiled.

Q. Was it not the result of your investigation that the underlying idea of all these gangs at Kiala Kalan was to do some injury to Government for what had happened on the 13th at Amritsar?

A. Well, the idea at that time was that the Government was dissolving. The general impression was that everything was going *phut*, and therefore they created mischief.

Q. Is it not a fact that the result of your investigation was that the authorities came to the conclusion as a matter of fact that the underlying idea of these people was to do some injury to Government for what had happened at Amritsar on the 13th?

A. I should say that was a minor motive. That was certainly an indirect or distant cause, but the immediate intention was to do damage to Government property because the authorities were weakening.

Q. Now about the demonstration at the railway station, on arrival of the trains, you said that one of the persons was heard saying that there was no European in the train? Was that statement made to you direct by him?

A. No, not to me.

Q. Then it was made to some C. I. D. man or police officer?

A. It came out in the investigation.

Q. This statement must have been recorded by somebody?

A. It appears in the police diary.

Q. That some person came before the police and said that he heard so and so making that statement. That appears in the police diary?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore your information is third hand?

A. Yes.

Q. First of all that statement was not made to any person in authority either police or civil. Practically, it came in this way that one person who came before the police made a statement that he heard somebody making that statement?

A. The probability is it was made before the honorary magistrate on the spot. I cannot say for certain that it was made before the honorary magistrate, but it is probable because he heard all the statements.

Q. And this statement was made by a person who was produced before him as a witness and he gave him the information that he heard this in the bazars?

A. Yes.

Q. That is third or fourth hand information?

A. Yes.

Q. There was practically one demonstration one day at the railway station so far as Lyallpur was concerned?

A. None at Lyallpur.

Q. There was only one at Gojra?

A. In almost every big town every train was met by large crowds of people.

Q. During those days when there was no source of information everybody would be anxious to find out what was happening in Lahore and Amritsar?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. W. F. Rice—

Q. You said, Mr. Smith, as regards the introduction of Martial Law, you thought it desirable but not essential. Is that your expression?

A. Yes, that is my expression.

Q. What exactly is the distinction that you draw between desirable and essential in this connection?

A. Well, we had troops. But, as things turned out, it has been impossible for us to dispose of all these pending cases.

Q. That is a continuation, but to begin with, if you had not had Martial Law, do you think you could have carried on merely with the presence of the troops without any authority exercised by any military officer?

A. As a matter of fact, before Martial Law was declared, we had troops, but we should have required an extra large force; we should have kept a larger force.

Q. That is to say, without Martial Law you would have required a larger military column than with Martial Law?

A. Yes, quite so.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You say in your statement that violent speeches were expected, but action taken by Deputy Commissioner resulted in orderly proceedings. What sort of violent speeches were expected?

A. We had very definite information that on the morning of the 13th, two men came from the Lahore side with very alarming rumours about the Kairon girls and the bombing of the Golden Temple and things of that sort. This created a great sensation in Lyallpur, because there are a large number of Sikhs there, and during the day efforts were made to agitate on the point, and it was largely on account of these rumours that this meeting was held. It had a bad effect not only on Sikhs but on all classes of people, and we had definite information that one particular man was going to deliver a violent speech on the subject. Therefore the Deputy Commissioner issued this order.

Q. What order?

A. Informing the two trustees that if anything serious occurred they themselves will be held responsible.

Q. And that resulted in the proceedings being orderly?

A. It took the wind out of their sails.

Q. What was expected to be a very serious thing was averted by these proceedings?

A. I think so. The possibility of serious trouble was averted.

Q. When did things become serious at Lyallpur, you say about the 16th or 17th or 14th?

A. From the evening of the 16th, things began to get really very serious. On the 14th and 15th our anxiety was only regarding the city of Lyallpur. Subsequently we were afraid of the Jats rising when we heard of the events at Gujranwala, and we were afraid that the neighbouring villages on the border would also rise.

Q. How long will it take for news to travel from Amritsar to Lyallpur?

A. We had to go *viâ* Multan, but usually news came by train when the wires were cut.

Q. How long will it take?

A. The ordinary train journey is 5 hours from Lyallpur.

Q. From Amritsar?

A. About 6 or 7 hours.

Q. What happened on the morning of the 13th at Amritsar would probably be known on the afternoon of the 13th at Lyallpur?

A. I don't think that could have come. The evening train does not leave Amritsar until 7 o'clock, so that no news could have reached until the following morning.

Q. You say in your statement that from the 13th onward, the feeling in the bazar was one of hatred of the white man. Do you not attribute that to what had happened in Amritsar and Lahore and to the shooting of people?

A. Shooting of the people was not known in Lyallpur. There were rumours, but there was no definite information, I did not know myself about it.

Q. Don't you think that exaggerated rumours were afloat?

A. I think that rumour about the Jallianwala Bagh was not exaggerated. I don't think people knew very much about it. I have forgotten when that news arrived in Lyallpur.

Q. On the 13th?

A. It must have been later.

Q. Did it reach on the 14th?

A. It may have reached, but there were other absurd rumours.

Q. I want to know when the news arrived.

A. I cannot say about the firing on the mob. The rumour about the bombing of the Golden Temple was a far more important thing to the people there.

Q. But when did that news arrive there?

A. It may have arrived late on the 16th.

Q. It is likely to have reached there on the 14th?

A. Yes, probably.

Q. If it reached on the 14th, don't you think it would excite the feelings of the people?

A. Nothing like that.

Q. That would excite feelings?

A. I don't think it did so. I think the story about the burning of Chuharkana would have a far greater effect.

Q. You have stated that one Nand Lal incited people by telling them that people had been killed in Delhi and that excited the feelings of the people?

A. Yes.

Q. At the same time you say that the killing of people in Amritsar would not excite the feelings of the people in Lyallpur?

A. People had been killed in Amritsar on the 10th, that information had reached us. People were killed on the 14th. But they had already been agitated by the story of the happenings on the 10th, and the happenings on the 13th would have no greater effect.

Q. It would not add to it?

A. It was not known then how many people had been killed.

Q. Naturally exaggerated reports get about. If 100 people are killed, people will say about 1,000 have been killed and soon therefore there must have been great exaggeration about the number of people who had been killed at Amritsar on the 13th, and do you think that would not excite the feelings of the people?

A. The only thing that I can say is, any rumour regarding the Jallianwalla Bagh affair had no great effect on public feelings. The incidents that were agitating the public were the story of the Kairon girls and the bombing of the Golden Temple. These were the main things.

Q. And those in your opinion caused the feeling of hatred towards white men?

A. Yes. I can give the details of that if necessary.

Q. I think I can take your word for that. Now, you say that some features of the *hartal* were openly seditious. This refers to the *hartal* at Jaranwala?

A. About Nand Lal's speech and attitude. That is the instance.

Q. From that you say, of the *hartal* itself?

A. I mean the demonstrations which led up to the *hartal*.

Q. Not the *hartal* itself?

A. No, not the *hartal* itself.

Q. There was no attempt made to assault any European in Lyallpur?

A. There was one case of assault on a Greek, a European subject. He was threatened by a tailor. This gentleman had gone to make some purchases and an Indian tailor took up a ruler and brandished it.

Q. Did he come and report that to you?

A. The man was convicted eventually. There was no other assault, but this instance did occur.

Q. Nothing happened beyond that?

A. There was no attempt made to assault a white man.

Q. How many white men were there during those days of disturbances in the Lyallpur district?

A. I think about 40 or 50.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Mr. Smith, you told us that during these disturbances the European residents were concentrated in two bungalows. Can you say how many Europeans took refuge in these two bungalows?

A. I think the final number was about 90.

Q. How many of those were ladies and how many were children approximately?

A. About 20 or 30 ladies and about 20 or 30 children.

Q. Did they find any difficulty in getting the necessaries of life?

A. I have stated an instance here that during the days of the disturbances I questioned my bearer if he had been to the bazar. He said that he was afraid to go to the bazar, and if he did so he would be injured. I asked him what he meant by that. He said that all servants of Europeans were in danger of the general public at Lyallpur. He related the case of a baker who used to bring bread. When bringing bread the baker was assaulted and all his loaves of bread were thrown out, and he was told never again to take any bread to Europeans and eventually he had to send bread to the Europeans in handkerchiefs.

Q. For how many days did these people live in these bungalows?

A. They actually lived in two bungalows. At the end of the troubles there were 90 people living in one bungalow.

Q. Why did they live in one bungalow?

A. It was found very difficult to defend two places in case of an attack, so that they were all concentrated in one bungalow.

Q. Was it an ordinary bungalow or a large bungalow?

A. It was a very ordinary bungalow.

Q. About the garrison that you had there, on what date had you the largest number?

A. I should say about the 19th. I do not know the exact date, but I should think it was on the 19th.

Q. After that the number decreased. The mobile column left when?

A. About a week after its arrival, about the 1st of May I should think; I cannot give you the exact date and numbers.

Q. After the 19th the number decreased. On the 19th you had the largest number?

A. I should say so, I am afraid I cannot tell you the exact number.

Pandit AVATAR KISHEN KAUL, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lyallpur.

By the President—

Q. Are you an Extra Assistant Commissioner at Lyallpur?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. We have been told about the *hartal* by the last witness, so that I need not trouble you about that matter, but tell me as regards the *hartal* that occurred, was it entirely a voluntary movement?

A. From the statements made by some of the men who appeared before me I am inclined to think it was not voluntary.

Q. Do you mean that undue influence and coercion were exercised to make people observe *hartal*?

A. Some sort of influence was brought to bear upon the people.

Q. After the 13th was the city in a restless state in your opinion?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there wild and unfounded rumours in circulation?

A. I believe there were.

Q. After that date can you say whether the population became anti-British or not?

A. Well, taking into consideration that there was an attack on one telegraph inspector and that there was a poster put up to outrage European women, I am inclined to think that the population had become anti-British.

Q. What do you mean by the insult offered to Messrs. deMontmorency and Smith?

A. I mean people clapped their hands.

Q. On what date was that?

A. I believe it was on the 14th or 15th.

Q. Were these gentlemen engaged in official duty at the time?

A. They used to come early in the morning to the clock tower. They had the police force there, and one magistrate remained there by turns. When one morning these two gentlemen came there, they were hooted by some people.

Q. I think you also put forward the cutting of communications and the damage done to Government property in support of the view which you have expressed as regards the attitude of the people becoming anti-British?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now, did the officials lose influence over the people?

A. Judging by the fact that the Government did not want a meeting to be held at all on that day and the people had in defiance of the orders of the Deputy Commissioner collected there, I am inclined to think that they did not care for the Deputy Commissioner's orders at all.

Q. Were you in charge of the war loan at Lyallpur?

A. Yes, Sir, I was in charge of the war loan in Lyallpur town.

Q. Was there any complaint made about compulsion?

A. No complaint was made.

Q. Had you anything to do with recruiting?

A. No, I had nothing to do with it.

Q. In your official capacity was any complaint made to you about the methods adopted?

A. No.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Now, about the hooting and hissing that you spoke of, were you present at that time?

A. I came immediately afterwards.

Q. You did not see that?

A. No, I did not see it myself.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jayat Narayan—

Q. Are you aware that the attack on Mr. Wale was by a single individual, and there was no crowd?

A. I was at the Sangla station in the District Traffic Superintendent's carriage, when we heard revolver shots and we all rushed out.

Q. I don't want you to give facts. What I want to know is, are you aware that the attack on Mr. Wale was by a single individual and not by a crowd?

A. Mr. Wale said that he saw 10 or 12 people standing about 10 or 12 yards away, and he seemed to think that this man was acting with them, but only one man actually attacked Mr. Wale.

Q. Do you know that Mr. Wale never suggested that there were more persons involved in the affair, but said there was only one man?

A. I do not know. That case was tried in the Gujranwala district.

Q. For how many years have you been Extra Assistant Commissioner?

A. For 3½ years. I joined in May 1916.

Q. Is it or is it not your experience that during the course of the year there were many fires at railway stations or goods sheds where goods were burnt, or do you mean to say that this was the sole and the only instance where you heard that *bhusa* was burnt? Is it or is it not your experience that things are burnt during the course of the year in several places?

A. I do not know of any special instance.

Q. Why do you connect this burning of *bhusa* with this *hartal* movement?

A. That was my opinion upon it. I certainly had no evidence about it.

Q. About the war loan, is it not a fact that in the Lyallpur district people rightly or wrongly were complaining against the war loan and recruiting methods?

A. I never heard anything.

Q. Had you ever any talk with your Deputy Commissioner about this matter?

A. No.

Q. Do you know up to this time what his views were upon this point?

A. No.

Q. Do you know that any complaint was made to His Excellency the Viceroy about the recruiting affair in your district?

A. I do not know anything about it.

Q. You say in your statement, and I think it is true, that the shooting at the Jallianwala Bagh made Lyallpur excited?

A. Yes.

Q. That is your opinion, that is correct, you have put it down here?

A. Yes.

Q. And that the rumours about the Kairon girls and the bombing of the Golden Temple were also circulated at Lyallpur?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as your personal knowledge is concerned was any coercion used by anybody?

A. One day when I was on duty at the clock tower—I think it was on the 15th—a few shops were being opened when a mob came out and forced the shopkeepers to close their shops.

Q. Can you tell me whether any shopkeepers were assaulted or shops looted?

A. No, not in my presence.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. At about what time did the news of the Jallianwala Bagh shooting reach Lyallpur?

A. I think it was on the 14th, though I am not quite sure. I have kept no diary.

Q. What is your idea?

A. I think it was on the 14th.

Q. What did the people say about it?

A. They said that a thousand or twelve hundred people had been killed—some said fifteen hundred.

Q. Did that excite the people a great deal?

A. All these things taken together—the firing at Delhi, the arrest of Gandhi excited the people a great deal.

Q. You say in your statement that leaders supposed to be siding with Government were not listened to—what is the reason for that?

A. I do not know.

Q. Can you assign any reason?

A. I suppose simply because they were siding with Government.

Q. I think the people were anti-Government?

A. This started with the Rowlatt Act and the other incidents also affected the people to a certain extent.

Q. And that is why the leaders who were supposed to be siding with Government were not listened to?

A. Yes.

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat.

By the President—

Q. You are Deputy Commissioner in Gujrat?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is that a large district?

A. Moderately large—rather less than the average.

Q. When was Martial Law declared in that district?

A. I got a telegram from Government on the 19th and a general proclamation was issued on the 20th April.

Q. As regards the unrest that existed in your district, what do you think were the causes of it?

A. The causes were not very much apparent at the time—it was largely an agitation about the Rowlatt Bill.

Q. I think the agitation about the Rowlatt Bill arose in a district which was given to political agitation?

A. Yes.

Q. Were rumours circulated about the effect of the Rowlatt Bill?

A. Yes; rumours were prevalent both in towns and villages.

Q. What were these rumours?

A. Rumours were that the Bill would affect the domestic and private life of the people.

Q. Did people believe these rumours?

A. Some of them did.

Q. Did that cause agitation?

A. Yes; to some extent.

Q. Have you any newspapers in the district?

A. Only one and it is chiefly confined to religious subjects.

Q. Is the eastern half of the district a congested tract of small holdings?

A. Yes.

Q. Do many of these people migrate?

A. A good many. Wherever there are small holdings of people who have no livelihood they usually migrate and take service elsewhere—they go into the army and the police and some take up private employment.

Q. What is the size of Gujrat city itself?

A. About 19,000.

Q. And do the people of that city have commercial relations with Bombay and Karachi?

A. Yes.

Q. Are the men of the district in touch with affairs outside?

A. Yes. They have constant knowledge of what is going on elsewhere.

Q. Do you know whether in the district there was any fear of a boycott unless they joined in the *hartal*?

A. I was led to believe that some traders were told so, though I have no proof of it. But several people have told me so.

Q. So far as the pleaders in Gujranwala are concerned they have not shown any marked interest in politics?

A. No; but they naturally read newspapers and take more interest in outside affairs than the rest of the community.

Q. Have you ever had occasion to take exception generally to their action?

A. No; no cause.

Q. On the 6th of April was there any sign of agitation?

A. No.

Q. There was no *hartal* on the 6th?

A. No.

Q. In your statement you say "between the 6th and 14th April the apathy of Gujrat in the passive resistance movement began to be the subject of comment"—what do you mean?

A. I mean that one or two people who went to other places to see their friends there were rebuked. The people used to say "why don't you do something in Gujrat"?

Q. Where is Sialkot?

A. About 16 miles away on the other side of the Chenab river.

Q. In which district?

A. In the Sialkot district.

Q. You refer to a pleader who came back after being remonstrated with?

A. Yes. He was one instance of the comments just noted.

Q. Early on the morning of the 14th were two inflammatory notices posted in the city?

A. Yes.

Q. What notices were they?

A. They were manuscript notices written in a way that suggested a student or at any rate an inexperienced writer. It said that on the following day some violence would take place. I forget the wording of it. They simply said that something would be done on the following day.

Q. Was it indicated that that something was to be violent?

A. Yes.

Q. Against whom?

A. Against the Europeans.

Q. Did that notice which you refer to or the other notices proceed from certain men from Amritsar?

A. There were no means of telling—the notices were not signed. The notice itself did not say that it was issued by certain men from Amritsar.

Q. These notices did not seem to be widely read?

A. Very little attention was paid to them.

Q. I think the first indication of anything unusual occurring was on the 14th at about 10?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you meet on the morning of that day with some of the leaders of the town?

A. The Superintendent of Police had a meeting.

Q. You say in your statement that "on the morning of the 14th I saw several leading men at the request of the Deputy Commissioner....."

A. That paragraph is a quotation from a report sent in by the Superintendent of Police.

Q. About 10 in the morning did the shops suddenly begin to close?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did anything occur in the nature of acts of violence on that day?

A. I was told that the shops gradually closed and I was given to understand that people induced others to close their shops mainly by pressure and not by violence.

Q. I see that some course was taken by the authorities to stop this?

A. Yes, we had a police patrol parading the roads.

Q. On the 15th did anything occur?

A. I had come back myself on the 14th so on the 15th I was there. I went round the town in the morning to see what was happening and I met a crowd and I spoke to them for a few minutes and as they were not committing acts of violence I left them to be looked after by the police. The crowd appeared to be a little violent, so I thought I had better get away. I then called a small conference of officials and the leading men of the town in order to talk over matters and we discussed how to deal with the situation. When that was finished we heard that the Mission School had had its windows broken. I went along with the Superintendent of Police to see the damage and I found that the crowd had gone to the Mission School and asked the boys to join them. The headmaster and others resisted the crowd but they were not able to do anything and the crowd began to throw stones and brickbats, some of which hit the headmaster and others did some damage in the shape of damaging furniture; then the crowd passed on.

Q. I understand that the crowd then went to the Zamindara School and the Government High School?

A. Yes, but these closed before their arrival and so there was no disturbance. I had troops and I called them out at once on hearing of the damage; but the damage appeared to be slight and the crowd

disappeared and they appeared to be doing nothing further, so we took no action for the time being. The troops went back because they had had no food. I was told that the crowd had dispersed. I gave instructions to my magistrates to let me know when the crowd became dangerous; but no reports were brought to me for some time I think. In the afternoon apparently the crowd formed again somewhat unexpectedly and it was observed emerging from the Kabuli gate from where it proceeded to the Shrine of Shah Hussain near by and halted and here they all drank water. They then made a dash for the railway station where considerable amount of damage was done by the crowd. They broke furniture, doors, panes of glasses, etc. They then went into the station master's office where they broke the telegraph instruments and clock outside and then passed on to the booking office where there were a certain number of papers and parcels. Some of the parcels were of a rather inflammable character and these things were set on fire. Apparently on the road to the station they broke the street lamps and took up tins of oil and they appeared to have used this oil picked up in this way. In the meantime the senior magistrate, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and other magistrates and other people who were helping me had followed the crowd and they dashed up and immediately helped to put out the fire by dragging out all the burning articles and the Senior Magistrate gave orders to the police guard of twenty men to fire and the crowd dispersed.

Q. Were you present at the firing?

A. No; I arrived a few minutes later.

Q. Were any casualties caused by that fire?

A. No.

Q. How many rounds were fired?

[*Mr. Herbert.*—The senior magistrate who is coming to give evidence will speak about that.]

Q. Did a number of military troops arrive that day?

A. Troops were in Gujrat at the time.

Q. But you say you asked for some troops?

A. Yes, they arrived after the station was burnt. I thought it would be wise to have some more troops, so I sent for some more.

Q. On the morning of the 16th were notices issued under the Police Act prohibiting meetings?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was that particularly directed against meetings connected with the Rowlatt Act?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were police posted throughout the city?

A. The police at first were not very numerous but as soon as the military arrived and took over the defence of certain points we were able to put the police on to their legitimate duties of unarmed work.

Q. You refer to a place called Jalalpur Jattan? How far is that?

A. It is about 8 miles from Gujrat.

Q. What occurred there?

A. A meeting had been called to arrange a *hartal* but nothing very much happened—the shops began to close and a crowd paraded through the town when the municipal commissioners went to the municipal Hall to arrange matters and the crowd came there and assaulted the municipal commissioners.

Q. Apparently there was a force of *sowars* sent round to take charge?

A. Yes. I was not quite certain of Jalalpur. I did not receive any notices of disturbances at this place but I thought it would be wise to take precautions by sending for some troops.

Q. Was it on the night of the 15th that some telegraph wires were cut?

A. That was the most serious offence that took place. Much more serious than the actual rioting.

Q. On the 16th of April did anything occur?

A. On the 16th the shops were again closed but there was no general *hartal* as far as I remember.

Q. I think you had a conference in the Town Hall to discuss what was to be done in the way of stopping the trouble?

A. That is the conference to which I have referred.

Q. Were you at that meeting?

A. No.

Q. Did the crowd interfere with the proceedings?

A. The crowd went into the hall and created a disturbance while the members of the committee were discussing what to do and assaulted the municipal commissioners.

Q. Did they damage the furniture in the hall?

A. Yes.

Q. I think they insisted upon the municipal commissioners observing the *hartal*?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The conference was held for the purpose of considering how they should maintain peace and order?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did anything occur about that time in the way of violent action?

A. The main violent action was that they had cut the telegraph wires.

Q. On the 17th I think the shops gradually opened?

A. Yes.

Q. You refer to a place called Malakwal—is that a railway junction?

A. Yes.

Q. How far is that from Gujrat?

A. About 55 miles.

Q. Is the village itself a fairly large village?

A. Yes. It is a village but not a town.

Q. At the railway station is there a bazar?

A. Yes.

Q. Are there a great number of railway employees there?

A. Yes.

Q. For some time prior to the 14th of April was there a certain amount of discontent among the railway staff?

A. Yes, a railway strike was being arranged.

Q. Were signallers getting news of events on their instruments?

A. Yes.

Q. You refer here to the signallers getting information on their instruments of the things at other places, what do you mean by that?

A. It is a common thing I understand for the signalling clerks to talk to one another when work is slack.

Q. And the information you mean is information as to occurrences at Lahore and Amritsar?

A. Yes.

Q. Did a railway strike come off at all at that time?

A. No, not actually.

Q. And you have no means of saying whether there were any political agitators behind the railway strike?

A. No.

Q. I think there was a resolution carried that a strike should be held?

A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. Was that at a meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Did a crowd go to the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Was any damage done?

A. No damage. There were some troops there and the sergeant of the guard told the men to go away and they thought they had better do so.

Q. Had the crowd come intending to do damage?

A. I don't think so.

Q. What was their intention so far as you think?

A. They had been intending to make a demonstration, but I think they wanted to call off the men who were on duty.

Q. I think some men struck but there was no general strike?

A. Yes, so far as I am informed.

Q. Then on the 16th what occurred at Malakwal?

A. A meeting was held at the mosque there which both Hindus and Mussalmans attended. But there was no very definite result from the meeting.

Q. Was there on that day any destruction of property there?

A. On the 16th nothing happened till the evening.

Q. What occurred in the evening?

A. Some of the men who had been at the meeting in the mosque seemed to think they must do something, so they arranged among themselves to break communications. A party went out and cut the telegraph wires. They went away from the junction, well clear of the station off the main line to a quiet place far from any habitation near a village called Kalawal. There they cut all the telegraph wires, seven or eight of them, leading towards the main line of the railway. The party who had done that were then coming back and they met the other party who were going to take up the railway line and joined them. Some men of the combined party turned back but such as were left of the combined party returned and took up a section of the railway line and threw the whole piece of the two lines attached to the sleepers down a steep railway embankment, and the result was that on the following morning a train which came along there was derailed and two lives were lost.

Q. The next town you mention is Kunjah, how far is that?

A. About 7 miles to the west of Gujrat.

Q. What occurred there?

A. Practically nothing except that there was the beginning of a *hartal* and a man went round telling people to close their shops but they were soon opened again as some men came along and induced the shopkeepers to open.

Q. The next place you mention is Rasul?

A. That is the headquarters of the Lower Jhelum canal where there is a fairly large canal staff and an Engineering College. The chief thing that happened there was that there was some indiscipline among the students of the College and there was a meeting at which both Hindus and Musalmans attended. When the Principal of the College came back he expelled some of the students and that seemed to put an end to the disturbance. There was no violence there.

Q. You have referred generally to the military assistance that you received; you give it more in detail in section 4 of your statement I see?

A. Yes.

Q. It just amounted to this, that from time to time you did receive drafts of military to help you to maintain peace and order?

A. Yes. I asked on two occasions, the night of the 14th and the night of the 15th, for troops to be sent to Gujrat, and meanwhile the General Officer Commanding at Jhelum had on his own initiative sent troops to other places in the district as a precaution in case anything happened. He sent troops to Lala Musa, Malakwal and Rasul.

Q. At all these different places occurrences were taking place which necessitated this?

A. Which necessitated it. Lala Musa and Malakwal were large railway junctions which certainly ought to be guarded. Rasul was a place where there had been a report of some disturbance, although it did not amount to much in the end, and the engineers of the Canal department had asked for help to be sent.

Q. Now in connection with the proclamation of Martial Law in Gujrat area, what was your view as to the necessity or advisability of it?

A. By the time Martial Law was proclaimed there was no riot or disturbance; they had ceased.

Q. Then in your opinion was it advisable that there should be Martial Law?

A. It was not necessary for the quelling of riots or disturbances. It was a precaution against further trouble; it was a very wise precaution. I could not tell whether disturbances from Wazirabad or Gujranwala were likely to increase so as to come into my district and cause trouble there. That was known to the Government very much better than to me.

Q. Were the different measures that were taken in your opinion adequate and successful?

A. Yes.

Q. As regards Martial Law in your area, were there many special orders issued under Martial Law?

A. Not many.

Q. Were there many cases of offences against those orders?

A. Very few. I think the total number of men tried was about 12 or 13.

Q. For offences against the orders?

A. Yes. One or two men for spreading false rumours, a couple of cases of men refusing to sell, and I forget the others. They were not very serious offences.

Q. What sort of sentences were passed on these men speaking generally?

A. Speaking generally, mostly fines.

Q. Were there cases of whipping?

A. In one case a sentence of whipping was imposed, but it involved two men.

Q. Who were the officers who were acting in the special summary courts?

A. There were three officers in the district. At Gujrat itself Colonel O'Brien was Area Officer, at Malakwal Colonel Grant, and at Lala Musa Major Besley.

Q. There was no civil magistrate?

A. I had powers myself.

Q. And did you try some cases?

A. I tried no cases.

Q. As regards the rioting and the destruction of railway plant to which you have referred, were there cases arising out of these incidents?

A. Yes, the destruction of property in Gujrat railway station where the telegraph and telephone instruments were smashed, and the booking office set fire to, ended in a case which was tried by a Martial Law Commission.

Q. That is one of the Tribunals?

A. Yes. The Jalalpur case was also tried by a tribunal and the Malakwal derailment was tried by a tribunal.

Q. Did these trials take place in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. I see in your statement you say the rioters themselves were mostly composed of the scum of the town?

A. Yes.

Q. So far as Gujrat was concerned, the influential classes did not seem to participate at all?

A. They were not among the rioters; they were not actually in the crowd.

Q. Of the people sent up for trial in the Gujrat cases, I see you say 13 were petty shop-keepers, five big shop-keepers, four students, three *tum-tum* drivers, two teachers, two members of the Bar, and three miscellaneous.

A. Yes.

Q. Was the rural population implicated?

A. Not at all.

Q. Did they on the contrary render assistance in patrolling the railway line?

A. Yes.

Q. By the rural population do you refer to any particular part of the rural population as having rendered that assistance?

A. That is to say the cultivating class.

Q. The *zemindars*?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you mean that they generally throughout the whole district rendered that assistance?

A. I only called upon them to patrol the railway line for a few miles on either side of the railway. It was not necessary to send for them from any great distance.

Q. I see you express the opinion that the movement in your district was absolutely anti-Government, but that there were no manifestations of anti-British or anti-Christian action?

A. Yes, that is my general conclusion.

Q. Is that the general conclusion you came to from the enquiries you made at the time?

A. Yes.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Williamson, after the 16th or 17th there were really no events of any importance in your district?

A. Not after the morning of the 17th.

Q. And you have told us the villagers assisted in maintaining order and patrolling and so on?

A. Yes.

Q. Martial Law was extended to Gujrat on the 19th?

A. I got the orders on the night of the 19th.

Q. And you have told us that in your view you could have carried on without Martial Law?

A. If Gujrat is considered isolated I could have done so.

Q. It was your view then?

A. It was my view then that no more riots or disturbances were actually taking place.

Q. And were likely, so far as you knew, to take place?

A. I could not tell.

Q. But your view was you could go on without Martial Law?

A. If Gujrat was considered by itself.

Q. Your view was that you could have carried on at that time without Martial Law?

A. I do not think I would quite express it in that way.

Q. However, when Martial Law was notified you wired to the Punjab Government saying that in your view it should not be so extended?

A. I wired that the district was quiet.

Q. With regard to Martial Law you definitely stated that in your view it was not necessary to extend it to Gujrat

A. I did.

Q. And after it had remained in force for a few days, you again wired to the Punjab Government stating your view that it should be removed?

A. I did.

Q. On what date was that?

A. It would be on the 21st or 22nd.

Q. Martial Law was only in operation for two or three days and after that you wired again asking that it should be removed?

A. I did not ask that it should be removed; I wired that it was not necessary.

Q. So you again repeated on the 21st or 22nd your view that you had expressed on the 19th?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. The first disturbance took place at Delhi on the 30th March?

A. I do not know.

Q. Not even up to this time?

A. I am unable to say whether it is right or wrong. I don't know much about Delhi.

Q. From 30th March to 20th April, from different sources, you were aware as to what was happening at Lahore, Amritsar, Wazirabad, Gujranwala and Kasur?

A. Only from what I saw in the paper.

Q. From time to time various officers were going to your place previous to the 20th?

A. I went at the end of March, and I was on tour until the 14th April.

Q. You were aware before the 20th April as to what took place at Lahore, at Amritsar and at Gujranwala?

A. A very little.

Q. So far as Lahore and Amritsar were concerned you were aware of what had happened there?

A. I received information about Amritsar.

Q. When you received the news of the introduction of Martial Law at Gujrat, were you surprised?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time, you practically thought that this communication did not refer to Gujrat, but it referred to the Gujarat in the Bombay Presidency?

A. That was my idea.

Q. I find from the military report here " the Deputy Commissioner received orders that Martial Law had been extended to Gujrat District, but it was not proclaimed as the Deputy Commissioner thought it must be a mistake and meant for the Gujarat District near Bombay. Is that so?

A. It was proclaimed.

Q. I shall read the report of the Officer Commanding, Gujrat (Captain Churchhill). He says.....

A. I am not responsible for it.

Q. He says: " A mobile column arrived from Jhelum and proceeded to Malakwal and everything was found quiet. The police arrested several persons in connection with the recent disturbances." Further on he says:—" The Deputy Commissioner received orders that Martial Law has been extended to the Gujrat District; it was not proclaimed, as the Deputy Commissioner thought it was a mistake and meant for the Gujarat district near Bombay."

A. I do not know what authority Captain Churchill has for saying that no proclamation was made.

Q. You thought it was for Gujarat near Bombay?

A. I did not say it anywhere.

Q. You did say it to Captain Churchill?

A. I was not aware of it.

Q. You thought that it might be for Gujarat near Bombay.

A. So I thought, but that is not evidence.

Q. It is evidence. I want to know whether you thought that it was meant for the Gujarat District near Bombay?

A. I thought so. It is a private thought; it is my own.

Q. Do you think so?

A. I did for a few minutes.

Q. And you communicated it to Captain Churchill?

A. I was not aware of it.

Q. How was he able to know what was in your mind?

A. Captain Churchill stayed with me for one or two days as a guest. I cannot say any more than that.

Q. It was a communication published on the 23rd April that the Deputy Commissioner wanted Martial Law to be suspended in his district. It is in the War Diary?

A. Whose War Diary?

Q. The War Diary of the Rawalpindi Division?

A. I know nothing of it.

Q. Did you communicate to any officer on the 23rd April that you wanted Martial Law to be suspended in your district?

A. I do not know the page to which you refer. I must see the War Diary.

Q. It does not matter what paper I am referring to. I am reading it to you " the Deputy Commissioner wants Martial Law to be suspended within his district?" It is dated 23rd April 1919.

A. I told the Punjab Government at that time that it was not necessary. That is all I could say.

Q. There was only one accused tried by the Tribunal from your district?

A. Several cases were tried.

Q. By the Tribunal? How many?

A. Of the number I am not sure. Three cases were in Gujrat.

Q. Two or 3 combined into one?

A. I think so; the investigating officer is here; he can give you details.

Q. There was a case on the day when the Conference was held?

A. On the 15th April.

Q. You remember that in that case Sayad Faizul Hassan Shah, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and the Senior Sub-Judge Asad Jan were witnesses?

A. Yes; they were present that day and asked many questions.

Q. In that case, about 22 persons were tried?

A. I do not remember the number.

Q. Do you know that more than half the number were convicted by the Tribunal?

A. I do not remember the details. It did not come to me.

Q. You know that one of the accused persons was a barrister of your district?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know that in their judgment, dated 7th May, the Tribunal have passed this remark: " In some instances, there is no evidence which even if believed would justify conviction and in some others evidence is very thin: in many more, personal and party animosity clearly played a very large part

Much of the evidence, even that of the officials, is tainted in that way and there has always been very much of perjury." Was this brought to your notice?

A. I read the judgment of the commission.

Q. Do you know that subsequent to this, this barrister filed an application before the local Government for prosecuting those two officers of perjury and that application was not granted?

A. I have no knowledge of it.

Q. Have you taken any steps to enquire into this allegation, *viz.*, that they committed perjury, and they were actuated by personal animosity?

A. I asked the Commissioner whether the Martial Law Commission could inform me by whom the perjury was committed. I received no reply.

Q. You know in this case one Mr. Ram Chand appeared as a defence witness?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Then, after he came back from giving his evidence, do you know that he was removed from his Municipal Commissionership?

A. He was.

Q. He has been removed from his Municipal Commissionership?

A. He has been removed.

Q. The name of that barrister is Hargopal?

A. I do not remember that.

Q. I want to know whether this barrister is Hargopal?

A. Yes.

Q. Then do you remember that, as a matter of fact, on the 15th he was asked by you to get the shops opened, and that he went there and mud was thrown at him.

A. Do you refer to Lala Ram Chand or Hargopal?

Q. You asked him to help you in getting the shops opened and he tried to get the shops opened?

A. I do not remember asking Ram Chand to do anything.

Q. Then some indemnity has been assessed on him to meet the cost of the additional police. You had assessed one-fourth on this man, Rs. 3,168, on Ram Chand.

A. I have assessed neither one-fourth nor any other thing. I have assessed him whatever he was due to pay under the general scheme.

Q. May I know what this amount is?

A. He pays the amount according to his income-tax.

Q. I say Rs. 3,168.

A. That is approximately the correct figure.

Q. Before he gave his evidence, was he *challaned* or was he implicated in any case?

A. I do not think so.

Q. Do you remember the case of one Muttra Das?

A. No.

Q. The man was *challaned* for a breach of Martial Law, for selling sugar or something else at a higher rate than what was put down under the regulation?

A. I do not remember his name.

Q. The man was *challaned* for the breach of Martial Law regulations. At the time, he was suffering from kidney disease?

A. I have no idea.

Q. You know he was kept under arrest for 3 days?

A. I have no idea.

Q. You know he applied for bail, and bail was refused?

A. I do not remember.

Q. He was fined for breach of Martial Law?

A. He was fined; I do not remember the amount of fine.

Q. About this Malakwal affair, it is given as an opinion in these diaries before this committee that it was the work of expert men—the damage that was done to the railway.

A. Did I give that opinion? I can only say with regard to the taking up of the line that some time later when I went to Malakwal where they were reconstructing certain portion, I saw a certain number of people taking the section of the railway. They were ordinary men. Whether they were experts or not I cannot say. They took it up and reconstructed the whole scene.

Q. That was the station where there was a great deal of discontent among the railway people?

A. As I understand, yes.

Q. It is put down in these words: it is from the War Diary; Diary of the Rawalpindi Division?

A. I cannot make any comments on it.

Q. It must be written under the order of the Commanding Officer?

A. I cannot say. I have not seen it.

Q. Here it is put down "the taking up" of the Malakwal line was undoubtedly the work of experienced railway men.

A. I presume that is the opinion.

Q. I am reading word for word.

A. I cannot criticise his opinion.

Q. You do not agree with me?

A. May or may not, I cannot say. It was done by persons who had possibly worked on the railway. To the extent of calling them experts, I do not know how long it took them. An ordinary man is quite enough.

Q. With regard to the boycott, were you really shown the letters of any firms which threatened to boycott the shop-keepers?

A. No.

Q. Was any oral statement made by some shop-keepers?

A. Not by any shop-keepers.

Q. Who gave you that information, that outside pressure was brought to bear upon these shop-keepers?

A. I cannot give you the name. I talked with them, and understood that such was the case. I can gave you no proof.

Q. Any actual shop-keeper who was threatened?

A. I have got no proof. If any letters were received, they would probably have been destroyed long ago.

Q. What I wanted was whether that was second hand information or any person who was threatened came to you and informed you?

A. Second hand information. I naturally formed my opinion on what people told me.

Q. I want to know whether it was first hand information or second hand information given to you by somebody else who obtained the information?

A. No, that was my general impression. I can give no definite proof.

Q. Did at any time in the Gujrat District an occasion arose when in your opinion it was necessary for the civil authorities to surrender its functions to the military?

A. Affairs did not reach that stage.

Q. This introduction of Martial Law practically did not affect the rural population and did not reach them?

A. To a very small extent.

Q. I think you will agree with me that throughout the province of Punjab, that was the harvesting time?

A. It is the normal harvesting time.

Q. It will be a time when the rural population would not co-operate with anybody else and their first concern would be to reap their crops and be engaged in that work. It will not be the proper time for any propaganda to take root and make them rebel against any authority?

A. I could say nothing about rebellion. That was the normal time for reaping the crops.

Q. The man who arranged all this at Malakwal, I think, is Raja Ram?

A. Raja Ram was one of the chief offenders.

Q. The head of one gang was Raja Ram and the head of another was Sarwar?

A. Yes.

Q. Both of them asked for volunteers and their party was 10 strong?

A. It was probably a dozen. The actual number I cannot say. At one time it was reported that there might be anything up to 20 men.

Q. And is it true that even out of these ten men who were with these 2 leaders, some, when they ac-

tually found what they had to do, turned back. You yourself said that 6 men out of the 10 that Sarwar brought turned back on learning what they were to do.

A. They joined another party.

Q. Out of 10, 6 refused to do what he ordered them to do?

A. Yes.

Q. According to your statement, these two young men got into their heads to emulate some people, and they asked for volunteers and these were supplied by the *maulvi*. They were formed into two parties and they were out to do mischief at Malakwal. Out of this party, six refused to do anything and went away.

A. The six referred to one part of the gang.

Q. There were 20 men, 10 in each party?

A. Probably.

Q. At Malakwal, there never arose any need for using military force?

A. Certainly, if you are able to find gangs of men committing very serious crimes like that, military force is necessary.

Q. I do not see that actually any need arose for the military force. The military were there. There was no occasion for their help?

A. It depends upon the occasion. If there is a derailment of trains, there is necessity for action by preventive force.

Q. There were actual disturbances?

A. There were riots. That is distinct from derailment.

Q. Had you at any time to quell a disturbance?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that their presence was sufficient to quell it?

A. That I cannot say.

Q. Their very presence at the railway station was sufficient to stop disturbances?

A. That I cannot say. There were no more riots, whether they intended it or not.

Q. You say that the presence of the troops at the station was adequate precaution against riot and against further disturbances and crimes?

A. Yes.

Q. At the meeting of the 5th or 6th I would like to know the worst possible thing in your opinion that was said at the meeting?

A. I do not know whether there was any meeting on the 5th or 6th.

Q. There was a meeting and certain speeches were made on the 6th.

A. Can you refer me to the paragraph?

Q. On what day were the speeches made?

A. On many days.

Q. The first day was on the 6th?

A. I do not follow your reference.

Q. A meeting was held and certain speeches were made by some pleaders or someone in Gujrat?

A. That I cannot say. If you tell me which paragraph in the report you refer to, I will be more precise.

Q. You say that pleaders instigated this. It is in Section V. The persons who instigated were pleaders among others?

A. There is no reference there to the 6th April.

Q. Either the meeting was held on the 6th or on the 12th and 13th?

A. I was on tour on both occasions.

Q. You do not know?

A. I was not there.

Q. Have you read those speeches?

A. No.

Q. By what other means do you accuse pleaders of instigating people to observe *hartal?*

A. I have got no definite report.

Q. There you say that the pleaders were the prominent persons who instigated people to observe *hartal* and caused these disturbances?

A. They were among the people who did it.

Q. Therefore by this I understood that they were instigating by means of certain meetings and certain speeches which they delivered?

A. I did not say they instigated by means of speeches.

Q. By what other means did they do that?

A. It was done in various ways which I did not specify.

Q. I would like to know whether you are in possession of any other facts at all?

A. No; I was on tour at the time. I think if you ask Sayad Faizul Hassan who was in charge in Gujrat at the time and investigated, you may get the information.

Q. Therefore you are not in possession of any tangible facts to show that the pleaders instigated others?

A. I can give you no definite written proof.

Q. Neither anything about the traders and cloth merchants?

A. I have no definite proofs. These are my general conclusions which are put down there; they are not in the form of proofs.

Q. Do you know that at Lala Musa station about 300 passengers were stopped at the instigation of the authorities? Are you aware of it?

A. On what day?

Q. Between the 6th and 14th.

A. Were they stopped, 300 passengers all from one train?

Q. From these papers it appears so.

A. I have no knowledge of it.

Q. Did you ever ask the military authorities to stop third class passengers at Lala Musa station or any other station?

A. I did not ask. There were certain regulations about permits to travel. They were not issued under my orders; so I cannot give you any details.

Q. Was Gujrat station ever damaged?

A. I described it before. It was damaged.

Q. Some papers were burnt inside that room?

A. Which room are you referring to? There are four rooms there. There was considerable damage. The four rooms included the station master's office in which the instruments of communications were situated and they were all broken.

Q. Here it is put down that a mob of 200 or 300 boys were in possession of the station; 20 constables attempted to keep order. Mob fired on, four casualties and they dispersed.

A. That is not my report.

Q. I only want to know whether that report is true.

A. The details of this are incorrect, because there were no casualties.

Q. Here it is put down that the mob was fired on and there were four casualties.

A. As far as I am aware, there were no casualties.

Q. Whose report is that?

A. It is page 29, War Diary.*

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. There were no casualties. Was there no firing at all?

A. There was firing, but there were no casualties.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan –

Q. On what date did the news of Amritsar reach Gujrat?

A. I do not know. What news of Amritsar?

Q. News of the 13th?

A. If you will ask me more precisely, I can answer.

Q. There was only one important thing that happened at Amritsar on the 13th, and that is the firing at Jallianwala Bagh. When did it reach Gujrat?

A. I cannot say.

Q. When did you yourself become aware of it?

A. I cannot remember the date. It was some days later when I saw it in the newspapers. So far as I remember, I cannot be precise after this lapse of time.

Q. Do I understand that these different officers that were coming to Gujrat never gave you information until you saw that in the newspapers?

A. I am not aware that I received any information from any military officer on the 13th or 14th. I did

* Not reproduced.

not reach Gujrat till the afternoon of the 14th. I was not in touch with any military officer until the 14th.

Q. At the time when damage was done to the railway line at Malakwal station, there were troops at the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Because the damage was done by a very few men, they could not get hold of the persons?

A. The crime committed by this gang of men at night was done by a small number who could naturally get past the sentry.

Q. Therefore they got past the sentry and the military were not able to discover them at the time they were committing the offence?

A. No; that does not excuse their crime.

Q. Then you say that this movement was anti-Government?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you base your opinion on the speeches that were made or anything else?

A. No; on the facts recorded and crimes committed.

Q. The crimes that were committed were—(1) the cutting of wires, (2) removal of the line at Malakwal station, and (3) the burning of papers in the ticket collector's office?

A. There were various things. Why do you minimise the crimes committed at Gujrat? They were very much more serious; the burning of papers and the breaking of lines of communication were deliberately done.

Q. Therefore in addition to the cutting of wires and removing line from Malakwal station, the crime in Gujrat was the damaging of instruments of communications and setting fire to the office.

A. They probably would have done very much more, had they not been stopped.

Q. Don't you think that if the railway staff are not satisfied and they were about to strike, then practically they would make common cause with these persons who were not well disposed inside the city and all these things could have happened?

A. I cannot say what the railway staff could have done, and I cannot say anything about common cause.

Q. But so far as the intention of the mob was concerned, you base your opinion upon the acts that were done by them, not upon anything that was said?

A. Yes, upon the crimes committed.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. I gather that the people in Gujrat were rather apathetic about the *hartal*. Were they not?

A. Not about the *hartal;* practically all the shops were closed as far as I know.

Q. But stories of what was happening elsewhere had worked them up seriously?

A. I would not say that. It was done quickly and obviously spontaneously, because the Superintendent of Police was told on the morning of the 14th that there would be no *hartal*, but after some time, the *hartal* was observed obviously quite quickly and it was very complete.

Q. You did not find it difficult to guard the bridges on the lines of railway with the assistance of the villagers?

A. With the assistance of the villagers I had patrols.

Q. They did their duties to your satisfaction?

A. They worked very well.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Mr. Williamson, you have told us that you wrote to the Punjab Government in regard to the introduction of Martial Law, that you did not think it necessary for Gujrat. Having regard to what you now know as facts as they transpired in the Punjab as a whole do you now think that Martial Law was not justified in Gujrat?

A. I was referring at that time to the state of affairs in my own district. It was a very wise precaution.

Q. Quite apart from anything in the other districts?

A. It was my duty to report the state of affairs in my own district.

Sardar ASAD JAN, Senior Sub-Judge, Gujrat.

By the President—

Q. You were the Senior Sub-Judge, Gujrat?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. There is just one point that we have not got out quite clearly, and that is as regards the firing at Gujrat railway station. Do you remember when that occurred?

A. Yes.

Q. On what date was that and at what time?

A. On the 15th April.

Q. At the time when firing took place, what was the mob doing?

A. The mob actually broke the doors, windows and glass panes and were setting fire to the building.

Q. Did you endeavour to get them to disperse?

A. Yes.

Q. Would they disperse?

A. No, they would not.

Q. When they would not do so, what did you do?

A. I ordered the police guard who was arriving at the time to fire at them.

Q. Were shots fired?

A. Yes.

Q. How many?

A. About 25.

Q. Were there any casualties in consequence?

A. None.

Q. How was that?

A. Because people were inside the railway station and the guard was outside. These people had entered the building inside and the guard was outside and fired through the railing which was of about a man's height.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Did you order the police to fire on the mob while the mob was in the act of attempting to burn down the station?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you any other means at your disposal of putting an end there and then to this attempted arson without firing?

A. None whatever.

Q. The mob all day, I think, had been roaming about the place?

A. Yes.

Q. They had numerous warnings both on this and previous occasions?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the police fire buckshot?

A. Yes.

Q. They did not either kill or wound anyone?

A. Not at all; nobody was even wounded.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You were one of the witnesses before the Commission?

A. Yes.

Q. There were other official witnesses from this place?

A. Yes, Diwan Sita Ram, Lala Vidyadhar and Sayad Faizul Hassan.

Q. You know what the Tribunal has stated about official witnesses?

A. They have said about both sides.

Q. There were six officials?

A. There were two sets.

Q. If your evidence had been believed, that barrister would have been punished?

A. They did not say anything about believing.

Q. Your evidence was that this barrister was in the mob and that he was not present at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow?

A. Yes.

Q. What was his defence, why was he *challaned*? Was it because he was one of the mob?

A. Because there was evidence that he was instigating people.

Q. The main reason was that he was one of the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. That was also the evidence of Faizul Hassan Shah?

A. Yes.

Q. His defence was that he was at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow and was not one of the mob?

A. That is right.

Q. And he was acquitted?

A. Nobody knows on what grounds he was acquitted. Of course, he was acquitted.

Q. There were other officials who said that he was not in the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. You were the only two officers who said that he was in the mob and he was not present at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow?

A. There were 13 persons.

Q. I am talking about officials examined in this case?

A. The Deputy Commissioner held an enquiry afterwards and there were 13 persons. The police sent up only two men.

Q. In the trial before the Tribunal you were the only two officials who made that statement?

A. Yes, who were sent up.

Q. And you know in that Tribunal what the Judges have said?

A. There were two sets, one set said that he was not in the mob and the other said he was.

Q. It is not a question of doubt. What they say is this: "Much of the evidence, even that of the officials is tainted and there has been deliberate perjury."

A. Yes; there had been. There were two sets, one set said he was there and the other said he was not there. There were Hindu officials also who said he was not there.

Q. So far as the facts of the 15th were concerned, you were not with the mob?

A. I was with the mob.

Q. You were sent for later?

A. I was with the mob, but not all the time with them because, when we approached them, they used to increase their lamentations. So we kept at a distance from them, but we were watching their movements.

Q. Were you present at Shah Hussain shrine?

A. I was not there.

Q. When did you go to the railway station?

A. I had posted my men who came and told me that they were first going round the city and Circular Road. When they took that route he came and informed me.

Q. Therefore when the mob started from the Shah Hussain shrine to the railway station, you were not with the mob. You were subsequently informed and then you came to the railway station?

A. Not to the railway station, but to a place half a mile away that way. They had not arrived at the station yet.

Q. You were outside the railway station when you ordered firing?

Q. You were not inside the railway station?

A. No.

Q. You were inside the room where papers were burnt?

A. Not then, but after they dispersed and ran away, we entered.

Q. You had not seen what the mob was doing inside?

A. We could see very well as the windows and doors were open.

Q. Is it not a fact that not more than half a dozen were inside that room?

A. There was not only one room. There are several rooms. I do not know which you mean.

Q. The room where papers were burnt?

A. I cannot say how many there were, but I could see simply through the windows. We could see some men. I cannot give the exact number.

Q. Therefore the room which was burnt you could see from the outside of the station?

A. Yes.

Q. How long is the window?

A. About 4 feet in length.

Q. You arrested some men then?

A. Yes, 7 men.

Q. After that, the fire was extinguished?

A. Yes.

Q. Were any doors or roof of any room burnt?

A. Not burnt, because we were inside the room and attended to it at once.

Q. When you reached the inside of the room, were all the things inside the room burnt?

A. Papers, packets and everything which was lying inside the room were ablaze.

Q. I want to know what you mean by everything. I can understand papers and packets being burnt.

A. Some papers, packets were burnt and some chairs and tables were put on the fire.

Q. Therefore when you say that the station was burnt, you mean that inside the room there were some broken chairs which were burnt.

A. The chairs, papers and everything.

Q. You went inside as soon as the mob dispersed and the fire had been extinguished?

A. Yes.

Q. At Jalalpur Jattan also you made arrests?

A. I did not go there.

Q. You sent orders?

A. Not I.

Q. Then the Superintendent of Police did?

A. He might have.

Q. You know nothing about that?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. About the point which was just put to you about a case, the judgment said that the evidence of the officials was not free from taint and there had been perjury?

A. Yes.

Q. How many official witnesses were there?

A. There were 5 of us.

Q. May I know them?

A. Diwan Sita Ram, Junior Sub-Judge, Lala Vidyadhar, and Chaudhri Kesari Ram, revenue assistant, were the three officials who said he was in the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow.

Myself and the Deputy Superintendent of Police were the other two witnesses who said he was not there.

Q. You personally were never named as having given that misleading or tainted evidence?

A. No.

Q. You were never called upon officially to make any reply to such a thing?

A. No.

Q. Your evidence was to the effect that he was amongst the crowd?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore that judgment could not apply to you?

A. No.

By Mr. Abdul Kadir, Assistant Government Advocate—

Q. This thing, My Lord, has been cleared by the Hon'ble Mr. Smith, but if there is anything necessary I can put another question to clear up this point. I know something myself about these things.

The President—It is quite fair that there should be no stigma.

Q. With regard to this question of Mr. Hargopal, Barrister-at-Law, being present at the house of the Deputy Commissioner or not at a certain time on the 15th, your evidence was simply to the effect that you did not see him at the conference at the Deputy Commissioner's house?

A. Yes.

Q. Some other officials, all Hindus, came forward to say that they did see him at the Deputy Commissioner's house?

A. Yes.

Q. All those Hindus came forward to say that they did see him at the Deputy Commissioner's house? There were other witnesses apart from these officials who said that they did see him in the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. This was a side-issue. Was this not his evidence that he was just about the Deputy Commissioner's house at that time? Your evidence was that you were at the Deputy Commissioner's house in a small room and you never saw him there, and none of the witnesses who swore that he was there could tell the court anything as to what Mr. Hargopal said or did at that conference?

A. Yes. Mr. Williamson held an enquiry afterwards, and some Hindu leader supported us and said he was not there.

Sayad FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujrat.

By the President—

Q. You are a Deputy Superintendent of Police?

A. Yes, my Lord.

Q. You were at Gujrat I suppose?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you present on the occasion when the firing, which has just been referred to by the other witness, took place?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree with the account that was given by him?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you also a witness in that case in which Mr. Hargopal was involved?

A. Yes.

Q. Was one of the issues of fact involved in the case —the question as to whether he had been at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow? Did you testify to the fact that you did not see him there?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you give any other testimony in the case as regards his being implicated in the rioting?

A. That was enquired into and investigated by the Superintendent himself and he gave the order for that man's arrest.

Q. I see in your statement you refer to an incident which occurred on the morning of the 15th under an "artificial funeral"?

A. Yes.

Q. That is a different occasion from the one on which the firing took place?

A. Yes, this occurred on the 14th and the firing took place on the 15th.

Q. I see that that incident was earlier in the morning. Were the mob in a very unsettled state of mind?

A. Yes, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. What was Mr. Hargopal accused of?

A. Simply of abetting the mob. When the first mob went and rushed into the Mission School at that time it was stated that Hargopal was there and was abetting the mob to enter into the Mission School to loot the place and break things, etc.

Q. On what date?

A. On the 15th morning.

Q. Was he tried by himself or was he one of the batch of accused tried all together?

A. He was tried with other people.

Q. How many people was he tried altogether with, approximately?

A. There were 23 of them.

Q. Were these all tried together as one case?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Now apart from the defence of other accused in that case, I understand that one of the defences of this individual accused was an *alibi* that he had been at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow and I want to find out from the judgment whether that reference of perjury would implicate this individual man or all the accused generally. The judgment says—"So far as the general facts are concerned the cases are simple enough, but the matter is different as regards individuals. In some instances there is no evidence which, even if believed, would justify conviction, and in some others the evidence is very thin. In a good many more personal and party animosities have clearly played a very large part. Much of the evidence, even that of officials, is tainted in this way, and there has also been some deliberate perjury. We do not intend to discuss individual cases, but for various reasons we are not satisfied of the guilt of the following, who are, therefore, acquitted." Has it ever been suggested to you before that that sentence has any necessary reference to Hargopal's case at all?

A. No.

Q. Who were the Tribunal? Who were the Members?

A. Justice Leslie Jones, Mr. Harrison and Sheikh Din Muhammad, Extra Assistant Commissioner.

Q. That is to say, a Judge of the High Court, a gentleman who acted as Sessions Judge and an Extra Assistant Commissioner?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you think it at all likely that a Judge of the High Court if he intended to find a senior sub-judge of the same Province or a Deputy Superintendent of Police guilty of perjury, he would have been able to let the matter stand like that?

A. No.

Q. And so far as you are concerned, until this afternoon have you ever heard it stated that it was a part of the intention of this Tribunal to make an imputation of perjury against one of the senior sub-judges of the province?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Do you know that before to-day an application was put in by Hargopal for the purpose of obtaining sanction to prosecute a Sub-Judge?

A. Never.

Q. Here is some mention about there being two parties. It was stated by the defence that at the head of one party were yourself and the senior sub-judge? Here it is said: "there are a good many personal and party animosities which played a very large part." Now the ordinary parties in this judgment just now referred to were the two parties set up by the accused Hargopal?

A. There were no parties so far as I am aware.

Q. Was there not an allegation made that there were two parties?

A. They were giving out rumours that the senior sub-judge and the Deputy Commissioner made up the case.

Q. There was no mention of any party?

A. No.

Q. No evidence was adduced by him?

A. No.

Q. Now the reference to this party in this judgment is a wrong reference?

A. I do not know what he means by that party.

Q. His defence was—"The case was engineered against him and his allegation was that he was not at the conference, but at the Deputy Commissioner's

house, and that he did not go near the mission school." So the charge against him was that he was one of the crowd which went to the mission school and he there beat the headmaster?

A. Yes.

Q. And the first witness in this case was Yusaf Ali Khan, sub-inspector of police?

A. Yes.

Q. He was all alone with the crowd. He submitted a report in which he stated what happened on the 15th, but nowhere in that report was this barrister's name mentioned—in fact even in the witness-box?

A. Yes.

Q. He stated on oath that he knew Hargopal very well, but he did not see him on any occasion with the crowd?

A. He was not with the mob. The witness who appeared before the Superintendent said that he was far away, nearly 200 paces.

Q. Then it was alleged that there was a dispute between you and the sub-judge and one Chiragh Din and this man was a friend of his?

A. Chiragh Din made a false affidavit and I asked permission to prosecute him. That is true.

Q. And this was brought out in your cross-examination by Hargopal's pleader?

A. Yes.

Q. And Hargopal was not arrested with the others, but subsequently on the 26th?

A. Yes.

Q. And before he was arrested by you, Dewan Sitaram, junior sub-judge, and Vidyadhar, Extra Assistant Commissioner, both these two officers had already informed you that at the time the mission school was being assaulted this man Hargopal was in the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow.

A. It was subsequently said that they had seen him at the conference.

Q. Then further on, you know that before this matter there was another case in the court of the sub-judge in which an application was made for a transfer?

A. No, I do not know anything about that.

Q. I believe that Seth Tarachand, Hargopal and Chiragh Din are close friends, and Hargopal and others filed an affidavit asking that the case be transferred from that court?

A. That was not Hargopal's case. It was another case.

Q. And that the accused was attending the court of the previous witness—Dewan Sitaram—who was also a witness and had deposed that he was with the Deputy Commissioner at that time?

A. He said Chiragh Din was not there and Hargopal was also not there, while some others said just the opposite.

Q. Here is an allegation made by one of the counsel for Government that he was present in the case and the witnesses who deposed to the effect that Hargopal was at the Deputy Commissioner's house gave no details or reasons when cross-examined and therefore their statement was not considered reliable. This is the statement of the sub-judge. He says: "Hargopal was seated opposite me at the conference. I have known Hargopal for some years and believe he is loyal. On the morning of the 15th I was trying to open shops. I tried to get that of Ram Chand opened, but the mob threw mud at him. Hargopal was one of those who were at that time collected at the Octroi Office and were trying to get shops opened. Hargopal accompanied me to Asmat Ullah's house and from there we went to the Deputy Commissioner's. He was there when news came about the Mission School. There are parties in Gujrat. Hargopal, Tara Chand and Chiragh Din are on one side and Karamat Ullah, Asmat Ullah, Shahzada Muhammad Yusaf and Chaudhri Abdullah, municipal commissioner, on the other. Hargopal was holding the rival candidate against Karamat Ullah in the Municipal election." Who is Karamat Ullah and how is he related to the previous witness? Anyhow was this statement made by the sub-judge?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore he practically says there were two parties. Then further on in his defence Hargopal also produces certain respectable witnesses to prove that he was at the conference?

A. Yes.

Q. With regard to what happened at the station. According to the statement of this man, he was actually with him—I mean Yusuf Ali Khan. He says that it was he who informed you that the mob was doing damage on the station and then you came?

A. Yes.

Q. The damage that was being done by this mob was the throwing of stones and breaking of windows.

A. First of all they rushed into the office of the Station Master and all the other rooms.

Q. And they damaged the telegraph instruments and burnt the forms of the booking office?

A. Yes.

Q. He was the man who was all along present with the mob?

A. Yes.

Q. And he gives details of the damage that was done by the mob at that time. What he says is this, that the mob broke windows with stones, destroyed telegraph instruments and burnt the forms of the booking office. He says nothing else.

A. Then what else do you want to know?

Q. Did you see anything more? He only gives these three things?

A. I was outside when the mob was inside the railway station. They were breaking the panes of glasses inside and setting fire to all things. I was outside, because under the orders of the magistrate independent fire was opened. I saw only the telephone instrument being broken by a *lathi* by Najimuddin.

Q Inside the room?

A. I did not go inside the room at that time.

Q. After the mob had dispersed, you went inside. What things did you see burning?

A. One door of the booking office, one chair, a table and some books and packets of papers were burning.

At Lahore, Saturday, the 20th December 1919.

PRESENT:

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
The Hon'ble Pandit JAGAT NARAYAN.
The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.
Sir C. H. SETALVAD, Kt.
Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Mr. V. H. BOALTH, Traffic Manager, North-Western Railway.

By the President—

Q. I think you are Traffic Manager of the North-Western Railway?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In connection with the disturbances and riots that took place, was your railway system considerably dislocated?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. The first incident was at Delhi on the 30th?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. After that incident, what was the first thing that occurred in the Punjab?

A. The disturbances at Amritsar on April the 10th.

Q. So far as the destruction to railway plant was concerned, you might say what damage was done on that day. We do not want the incidents themselves because we have got them from other witnesses.

A. There was damage done to the Amritsar goods shed and property burnt on the goods platform. Telegraph wires were also cut on that afternoon.

Q. Was damage done to Bhagtanwala station. What date was that? On the 10th?

A. On the afternoon of the 10th.

Q. On the same day did a mob collect at Chheharta station?

A. Yes.

Q. How far is that from Amritsar?

A. It is about 3 miles from the station. It is on the outskirts of the city.

Q. At Chheharta did a mob break the seals of some wagons?

A. Yes, they broke the seals of some wagons and looted some piece goods, on the night of the 10th.

Q. Was the cutting of telegraph wires a frequent occurrence during that time?

A. From the 10th onwards for some days reports were coming in from all directions about the cutting of telegraph wires.

Q. Did that interruption of the telegraph system interfere with goods trains being run?

A. Yes, they interfered considerably with the running of trains, but we managed to get the passenger trains through though they were running late, but the goods trains were hung up.

Q. The next day I think much did not occur so far as the railway system was concerned?

A. No.

Q. Then on Saturday the 12th, there was considerable destruction to railway property at Kasur?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that exactly?

A. They smashed up all the telegraph instruments, burnt all things that could be burnt like furniture, records and some goods in the wagons. Our stations are pretty solidly built and so they did not lend themselves to total destruction, but all the furniture and things of that sort were burnt.

Q. Khem Karan station was also looted?

A. Yes.

Q. What distance was it?

A. 5 or 6 miles from Kasur.

Q. On the same day Patti station was burnt?

A. Yes, the station was attacked, the goods office doors were broken and signals were damaged.

Q. What is the distance?

A. It is between Kasur and Amritsar, I think it is about 25 miles.

Q. In addition to this destruction of plant, did you experience difficulty in getting men to work?

A. Not at first. For two or three days the staff worked, but they were all agitated.

Q. What was it that was interfering with the staff and preventing them from doing their work?

A. They complained that people from the cities and towns were inciting the staff not to do their work, but to stay away from their work and if they did go to work they would be molested.

Q. And on the 12th, I think a large proportion of the men in the Locomotive shops failed to turn up?

A. Yes, there was a lot of unrest on the 12th.

Q. At this time were you keeping the line clear by the assistance of an armoured train?

A. The armoured train went out, I think, on the night of the 10th or the 11th. I think the military authorities will be able to tell you the exact date. I think the armoured trains went out soon after the disturbances started.

Q. Was there a good deal of talking over telegraph wires by station signallers?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you discover that?

A. The telegraph inspectors and telegraph masters reported that there was a lot of unauthorised talk going on. They had a number of code words and sentences which they used.

Q. Were these station signallers in an unsettled state?

A. Yes, they were more or less unsettled after the 10th.

Q. On the 13th April, I think there was a considerable amount of telegraph signal wire cutting at Patti, Tarn Taran and Gohlwar Varpal?

A. Yes.

Q. On the afternoon of that day, was there a considerable amount of railway track removed from Chheharta and Khasa?

A. It was not a considerable amount, but it was sufficient to make the trains impassable. The joints were removed.

Q. Was the engine of a goods train derailed?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that train looted?

A. There was some looting on that train. Certain wagons were broken open and stuff taken away.

Q. Did you learn that there were designs to burn a number of stations at this time?

A. There was a lot of talk and rumours were afloat that they wanted to attack and burn stations.

Q. I think at Bahawalnagar there was a decision to strike on the next day?

A. Yes, on the next day there was trouble.

Q. I think at Shakurpur on the 13th, the locomotive, carriage, wagon and traffic staff struck work?

A. Yes.

Q. It was on this day that a stone was thrown at one of the Mail trains and injured one of the passengers?

A. Yes, the train was passing through Kot Radha-Kishen.

Q. On the night, did the Wagah mob make an attempt to loot the station?

A. Yes, that was on the night of the 13th.

Q. I think one armoured train went through?

A. Yes, it was patrolling the line.

Q. After the train had passed, did the mob start looting again?

A. Yes, the mob looted the station, broke the telegraph instruments and furniture and other things were burnt.

Q. Was the station staff turned away?

A. Yes.

Q. They were allowed to take their property?

A. Yes, but occasionally they lost some of their private property.

Q. Wires were cut?

A. Wires were cut the whole time after the 10th till about the 18th or 20th in all directions.

Q. Then the armoured train returned again and the mob hid themselves for a time?

A. Yes, in the crops by the side of the line.

Q. When the armoured train again passed on, they went to the permanent way huts?

A. There was derailment to the armoured train. The mob had pulled out the rails.

Q. Did they do damage to the permanent way?

A. Yes, they had shifted some rails.

Q. I think the armoured train itself was derailed?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know how it happened?

A. They had not actually uprooted the rails, they had removed the joints and that was sufficient to cause derailment.

Q. Was this derailing done with skill?

A. It did not want much skill to derail a train or open out rails. There were a lot of men who had been working in the gangs who knew these things.

Q. On the 14th there was damage done at Gujranwala. What was the exact damage done to the railway?

A. The whole station building was burnt, the goods shed was set on fire and a lot of property was burnt in the goods shed. The station building is still in ruins. There was a lot of wood work about it so it was burnt down easily. They set on fire the railway overbridge, they burnt the timbers of two more small bridges.

Q. At Bahawalnagar a strike occurred on that day?

A. Yes, there was a strike.

Q. Did the strikers, helped by the people in the city, refuse to allow an engine to pass?

A. Yes, they sat on the line and said that they would be cut if the engine went over them.

Q. At that place I think the situation was well kept in hand?

A. It was well kept in hand by Captain Watson.

Q. What departments struck on that day?

A. Well, practically all departments but the Loco. men said that the Traffic men would not work and they would not allow them to work, while the Traffic men said that the Loco. men were interfering with them.

Q. You refer in your statement to one of the strikers inciting the mob to assault Europeans. How did you get that information?

A. It was reported by the officer in charge, A. T. S. and the Traffic Inspector.

Q. On the 10th there was damage done to telegraph wires?

A. Yes.

Q. Did anything happen on the 14th at Lahore itself in the way of destruction to railway property?

A. Very little was actually done at Lahore. I don't think much damage was done. They merely tried to throw over some of the points, they were very much excited.

Q. Was there a strike at Shakurpur?

A. On the 13th and 14th.

Q. Were telegraph wires cut there?

A. Yes, there were interruptions.

Q. Then at Bahadurgarh was an attempt made to tamper with a bridge and the permanent way?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the strike at Shakurpur spread to Delhi Kishengunj?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is it?

A. That is the next station to Delhi, it is 2½ miles from Delhi.

Q. That is outside the Punjab?

A. That is in the Delhi Province, I believe.

Q. Was any damage done to telegraph wires at that place?

A. Yes.

Q. I see you note that it was done by the station staff?

A. That is what they reported at the time, that the station staff was mixed up with the people doing damage.

Q. Did minor damage and destruction occur between Bahadurgarh and Gheora, at Okara, Hafizabad, Akalgarh and Mansurwali?

A. Yes; from all these places reports came in of destruction and damage.

Q. What sort of destruction?

A. They tried to pull out the line; iron shackles were put on at Okara over the line, but they were all removed promptly by the staff.

Q. It was on this day, I think, that a mob made an attempt to attack some passenger train at Hafizabad?

A. Yes.

Q. Were restrictions on booking put on intermediate and third class passengers?

A. Yes, on the 14th restrictions were put on.

Q. Looking to the difficulties with which you were faced in running your traffic, were these restrictions necessary?

A. Yes, they were necessary.

Q. During the night of the 14th/15th, did a mob begin to attack Wazirabad, and were the signals broken down?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they do any damage there?

A. Yes, they broke the signal lamps and some lamp posts.

Q. On the 15th, what occurred on the railway system? You say there was extensive cutting of telegraph wires, and minor disturbances occurred at Kundian, Lala Musa, Qila Sheikhupura and Bahalike. What sort of disturbances do you refer to?

A. At Kundian there was an attempted strike. The mob came up there and refused to let the train pass. At Lala Musa they burnt the goods and the mob kept a train outside the station.

Q. I see you mentioned that the train service was disorganized at certain places at Narwana, Dhanithan and Tohana?

A. A driver reported that there were mobs inside and it was unsafe to go in the night and hung up the Mail. They stayed back at the station.

Q. Did you receive a report that threats were being made to fire at any train leaving Bahawalnagar?

A. Yes; Captain Watson and our Assistant Traffic Superintendent reported that there was a rumour that the train would be fired upon.

Q. Were measures taken to prevent that?

A. Yes, Captain Watson took steps.

Q. At Ambala there was a short strike of the Traffic staff?

A. Yes, there was an attempted strike, it was not very serious.

Q. At Sialkot after dark was a third class carriage found to be burning in the station yard?

A. Yes.

Q. How was that damage done?

A. There were crowds about, and it was believed that they did it as they were all very much excited.

Q. Was trouble threatened at the same time at Lala Musa?

A. Yes.

Q. On that day was Chuharkana Station destroyed?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you describe what was the extent of damage done there?

A. They collected all the moveable property, put it into the Station Master's Office and set fire to it and burnt everything.

Q. They not only destroyed the station but they uprooted the line?

A. They pulled out a rail near the distant signal near the canal bridge.

Q. How did they do it?

A. The crowd must have got together, it is easy enough to get hold of spanners and open out the line.

Q. In this case had they taken the tools from a hut?

A. Yes; most of the men in the villages have worked on the railway line, and it was quite easy for them to find a few who could understand the dismantling of rails.

Q. Had any material been used in the burning of the station?

A. They generally poured kerosene oil on the top.

Q. I see they also tried to smash a train?

A. They smashed it, broke all the windows and smashed all the sieves and tried to burn it. But the damage was not very excessive.

Q. Were the rails in a bridge approach removed?

A. Yes.

Q. Canal bridge timbers were also burnt?

A. Yes.

Q. Another bridge was burnt and rails in its approach removed?

A. Yes, two canal bridges were burnt one after another.

Q. Was the station cash safe on that occasion?

A. There was a small safe at the Station Master's office which contained some money. The Station Master however managed to hide the money in his house which he afterwards made good. The cash safe was rifled.

Q. Were tickets and racks destroyed?

A. All the moveable property like tickets, racks, etc., were thrown on the fire.

Q. During that night was a rail removed at Kala?

A. It was reported that a rail was removed at Kala, just north of Jhelum.

Q. Was a passenger train derailed?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any casualties?

A. No, they were very careful.

Q. I suppose the derailment of the passenger train might have been more serious?

A. Yes, it might have been very serious.

Q. Was a troop train expected about that time?

A. Yes.

Q. I see you say that the intention was obviously to derail a special troop train, containing 20 motor lorries?

A. Yes; from reports we received, we had reason to believe that that was their intention.

Q. That troop train would have had a higher speed?

A. It was coming down the line, the damage would have been much more serious.

Q. Did the mob from Chuharkana proceed towards Sangla Hill on the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they burn and loot Dhaban Singh and Moman stations?

A. Yes, they burnt all the property, but the station building being *pakka* did not suffer much.

Q. Was a canal bridge fired on about two miles beyond Dhaban Singh?

A. Yes.

Q. You refer to Mr. Wait being injured in a collision?

A. It is Mr. Wale, the Telegraph Master, it was the same occurrence. It was not a collision.

Q. I think in the meantime an armoured train visited the place?

A. Yes, after the 13th we began to put on military guards.

Q. You considered it safe to put on armoured trains on various sections?

A. The military authorities considered it safe, as the people were getting very nervous.

Q. In addition, was there a number of armed trains?

A. There were armoured trains and armed trains and these are two different things.

Q. Were guards placed on bridges and tunnels on the main line?

A. Yes.

Q. As far as the Indus?

A. Yes.

Q. And an armed train patrolled the district for the purpose of rationing the guard?

A. Yes.

Q. That train worked daily through the period of the riots?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 17th of April, was some *bhusa* burnt at Lyallpur.

A. Yes and it was Government *bhusa*.

Q. At Malakpore was a train wrecked and a pair of rails removed?

A. Yes.

Q. Were an engine and a loaded wagon of the passenger train overturned?

A. Yes.

Q. And two people killed and two injured?

A. Yes.

Q. Were telegraph wires cut at a number of places on this date?

A. Yes.

Q. On the 18th April, did the situation somewhat ease?

A. Yes.

Q. How was that?

A. By that time the situation was well in hand as military columns were travelling about and guards patrolling the country and the people also understood that the Government had not come to an end at Lahore.

Q. During the night of the 17th and 18th, was Sidhwan Station burnt?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that a small station?

A. A very small station.

Q. Were there few instances of telegraph wires being cut on that day?

A. Yes.

Q. Were obstructions placed on the line between certain points?

A. Yes, between Ladhuka and Bahmniwala. Sleepers were reported on the line.

Q. Were these obstructions such as to overturn a train?

A. It might have been serious but the lines were patrolled by gangmen who pulled them away.

Q. On the 21st April, there was one successful attempt to cut wires and one unsuccessful?

A. Yes.

Q. After that date there was no incident worth reporting?

A. Things calmed down considerably after that.

Q. Can you give me roughly an idea of the amount of damage that was done to the railway system during these days by the action of the mob?

A. It is difficult to estimate exactly the amount of money actually paid out but so far one lakh has already been paid, in addition we have to restore Gujranwala.

Q. And will that amount to several lakhs?

A. Well it depends; if we have to rebuild it as it stands it will cost less, on the other hand if we have to rebuild the whole structure it will cost considerably more.

Q. Did the effect of disturbances paralyse the railway and commercial system from the 10th to the 21st April?

A. It practically did in the disturbed areas.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. If I follow you rightly the great bulk of the damage to the railway, including the telegraph and signal lines, was done by outside mobs rather than by railway people?

A. I think they were all done by outside mobs; though quite often some railway people assisted them but as a rule by outside men.

Q. Therefore is that the reason why you say here that it is impossible to regard the movement as

merely industrial or commercial as distinct from political?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose you have had threats of a strike before on this railway?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever found in your past experience that an ordinary strike takes form at its beginning by attempts to cut the lines of communication?

A. No.

Q. I see that the Assistant Station Master and the signalling class were apparently the most active among the railway employees?

A. The men who were most agitated were the signallers as they talked a lot on the wires and a certain number of the Station Masters.

Q. Can you tell me whether at this time—about the beginning of April—some of the railway employees had legitimate grievances about pay and so on—at any rate what they thought were legitimate grievances?

A. They had sent in a memorial for more pay on account of the increased cost of living.

Q. Take the signalling class first—was that the class which had some special economic reason?

A. Not more than any other class.

Q. The Assistant Station Master class—is that a class of exception?

A. They were the same class of men as the signallers.

Q. Would it be right to say that those two classes of people would be about the best educated type of railway servant?

A. They are more or less better educated than the other lot but the Station Masters are the best educated.

Q. Apart from the people at the top they would come perhaps in the second class?

A. Most of the railway staff of Assistant Station Masters and signallers are all entrance passed men.

Q. How do you account for these two classes of people being particularly prominent in this work of destruction?

A. They were not prominent—they were agitated and disturbed more than others. They actually did not do much damage or very little, but they were the most disturbed and agitated.

Q. I want to get that clear from what you say—if I follow you you do not say that these two classes of people were prominent either in committing offences or directly inciting people to commit those offences?

A. All they used to do was to talk about strikes and also talk on their instruments.

Q. Of course with regard to the signaller class—they have a speciality about them in that they have the means of communicating with one another?

A. Yes.

Q. There is a station called Wagah—where is that?

A. The third station down from Lahore, between this and Amritsar.

Q. How far from Lahore?

A. About 14 miles.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Was the dissatisfaction among the railway employees—the signallers, the Assistant Station Masters and the Loco men—of long standing with regard to their salaries?

A. It was not of long standing. They sent in applications in February or March.

Q. In February or March they were agitating for more pay?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was before any indication of these disturbances?

A. Yes.

Q. When were salaries last revised?

A. In January and April 1918.

Q. Were they demanding more pay?

A. Yes.

Q. All these classes—the Loco, the signallers and the Assistant Station Masters?

A. Yes; some of the other classes too.

Q. Almost all the railway employees?

A. Yes; practically.

Q. Had they sent in memorials in large numbers?

A. Yes.

Q. And that in February or March?

A. Yes.

Q. When these disturbances came on in April, at what stage was the consideration of those applications?

A. They were under consideration. The office class had been given some increment.

Q. They had not been finally disposed of?

A. No.

Q. Therefore anterior to these disturbances, there was considerable dissatisfaction among the railway employees?

A. There was some dissatisfaction. I would not say considerable. They had already received an increment and those applications came in February.

Q. Although they had got an increase in 1918, still in February and March 1919 a very large number of them were persistently asking for more salary—whether that demand may be reasonable or unreasonable—the fact remains that they had—at least they thought they had—considerable reason for dissatisfaction?

A. I do not think there was considerable reason. They said they wanted more pay on account of the high cost of living.

Q. Were they very united in their demand?

A. Appeals came from all over the line. Individually I could not say if they were all united.

Q. But appeals came in generally?

A. Yes.

Q. About these restrictions on travelling, they were put on somewhere on the 14th?

A. Yes.

Q. You say that looking to the traffic exigencies they were necessary?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did these traffic exigencies last?

A. In the coaching conditions they lasted up to about the first week in May.

Q. After that so far as the railway exigencies were concerned there was no necessity to put any restrictions on travelling?

A. No; after that except north of Lahore when the Afghan War started. According to the military programme the whole of the line had to be made over to the military authorities and we had to put on restrictions for all classes. The further exigencies came on account of the Afghan War.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Is it not a fact that before the 14th the military authorities for their own reasons repeatedly pressed for putting restrictions on third class and intermediate travelling?

A. They did not ask me. They might have asked local officers.

Q. Are you not aware that they were making repeated demands to place restrictions on travelling?

A. I am not aware of that but the district officer told me that they wanted to control the traffic.

Q. Do you know that at Lala Musa at the request of the military authorities about three hundred third class passengers were stopped?

A. I am not aware of it.

Q. So far as your report is concerned, you yourself did not personally enquire into the cases of any of these men?

A. No reports were sent to me.

Q. With regard to Sidhwan station—it was practically a sleeper hut?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was probably burnt by the station master himself?

A. We could not say so but we presumed that he had done it.

Q. Anyhow it was possible?

A. At the time it was reported that the station master probably burnt it.

Q. You say that the injury to Mr. Wale was due to a collision between the mob and the military?

A. I think I have explained that. A man came and struck him in the office.

Q. Even before these disturbances, was it not known to the authorities that a day was fixed for a general strike throughout the North-Western Railway?

A. There were some rumours but we heard nothing definite from our men.

Q. But rumours were there?

A. Yes.

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN, Member, Punjab Legislative Council.

By the President—

Q. You are a member of the Punjab Legislative Council?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You have expressed a desire to make a statement to us about the subject of our inquiry?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. During the period of the riots where were you?

A. I left Lahore on the afternoon of the 10th for Sialkot by motor to keep a professional engagement on the 11th. On the 11th I was at Sialkot. I left Sialkot about two o'clock on the 11th for Lahore in order to proceed to Ambala for the 12th where I had to keep another professional engagement. On the evening of the 12th I returned from Ambala to Lahore by train but the train was detained on the morning of the 13th at a railway station near Amritsar. I did not reach Lahore till the evening of the 13th.

Q. May I take it that you have no personal knowledge of the occurrences at Lahore or elsewhere?

A. None from the evening of the 10th to the evening of the 13th.

Q. As regards the period subsequent to the 13th have you any personal knowledge?

A. I was in Lahore from the evening of the 13th right on to the morning of the 16th when I left for Delhi and on the evening of the 16th I proceeded from Delhi to Simla. I stayed in Simla for three days and then returned to Lahore. I believe it was on the 20th that I returned to Lahore. I remained here straight on.

Q. I believe you wish to place your views before us as to the causes of unrest?

A. Those that I have stated in my statement.

Q. Do you wish to supplement the statement you have made?

A. No, I do not think I have got any supplementary statement to make.

Q. I think we may take your statement as giving your account of the causes of the disturbances?

A. Quite so.

Q. In connection with the working of Martial Law I think you considered that certain of the measures adopted were unfortunate?

A. Yes.

Q. And that they were unnecessarily harsh?

A. Yes.

Q. I see that you have particularised a number of these and the first thing you mention is as regards night passes; but under Martial Law it is quite a usual thing to have a period of time when the people are not supposed to be out?

A. Yes.

Q. So the question of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of night passes depends very largely upon whether it was properly carried out under Martial Law?

A. Except that the passes were regulated on national grounds. On the ground that Indians had to apply for passes and Europeans did not require passes—that was a racial distinction.

Q. Then as regards passes for travelling your objection is very much on the same lines to this?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose, however, you admit that during the period at all events when the railway system was dislocated, owing to the occurrences on the railway system some restriction was essential?

A. Absolutely, that was very natural, but I saw in several cases empty carriages proceeding from one place to another.

Q. But here again, as I understand, you think restrictions were unfortunately placed upon Indians so as to particularise them as compared with Europeans?

A. Yes.

Q. You have an objection I see about notices that were placed outside doors?

A. Yes.

Q. You were yourself unfortunately selected?

A. Yes.

Q. I suppose you did not suffer much inconvenience from that?

A. No, it was only a matter of a couple of extra *chaukidars* to watch over them.

Q. To watch the notices to see they were not destroyed?

A. Yes that was essential.

Q. You say the places selected for the exhibition of these notices were not selected with a view to promulgation of the notices, but rather with a view to selecting certain individuals who might not happen to be on very good terms with the Government?

A. Quite so.

Q. You mention one case where there were three notices?

A. That is Fane Road in Lahore where the lawyers live. It is a short road; there are I believe about 6 or 7 houses on it, and three of them had these notices, and so I thought it was possibly too much for promulgation in that particular street.

Q. I see lawyers in India, just as lawyers in England and Scotland, get the credit of being exceptionally active in political propaganda work?

A. But in that case only one notice might have sufficed; they could have shared it.

Q. That may have been either an oversight on the part of the military administrator or it might have been done intentionally?

A. Quite, there is the possibility.

Q. You are inclined to think it was done intentionally?

A. Yes, knowing Fane Road has so very few houses and the people selected were persons—at all events two of them—who had taken part in political propaganda.

Q. But as I understand, the Military Administrator in Lahore Civil Area was not very familiar with Lahore itself?

A. It is generally believed that the inspiration came generally, if not invariably, from the Civil authorities.

Q. I am reminded that Colonel Johnson practically indicates that people on whose doors notices were put were the people who were supposed to be not too conspicuous for their loyalty?

A. Quite so.

Q. You refer to the regulations as regards students. We had the views of some of the principals or educators upon that question. Probably their views very much coincide with your own?

A. Yes.

Q. You also mention as a matter of complaint this salaaming order. We have heard a good deal about the salaaming order and I quite appreciate your point of view if it is that unnecessary *salaaming* was imposed upon all gentlemen of Indian nationality. Do I understand that the *salaaming* of British Officers was imposed only on Indians?

A. That is so.

Q. And was it imposed upon all classes of Indians?

A. The instance I have given is of *salaaming* by Mr. Bashir Ahmad, a graduate of this University as well as of Oxford, who was made to *salaam*, not

any European Officer, but a row of young recruits of mixed classes.

Q. Surely there must have been some error about that, because I thought at all events so far as the Administrators of Martial Law are concerned, the intention was merely to impose the duty of *salaaming* so far as officers were concerned?

A. Then in that case their orders were very generally misunderstood by their subordinates.

Q. Then I also understand from your point of view that this method of *salaaming* that was adopted is practically archaic, even among Indians themselves?

A. Quite.

Q. You think it was unfortunate and unfair that this method of *salaaming* should be resorted to for this particular purpose?

A. Yes.

Q. In your opinion it serves no good purpose to have such an order as that?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. I do not think I need ask you about whether Martial Law should have been imposed because, after all, you are not familiar with the events at the time, but you have expressed the view that Martial Law was continued longer than was in the circumstances necessary. That is your view based upon your knowledge of the situation in Lahore from the 20th from which you were continually resident there?

A. Yes.

Q. But I suppose you will admit that the question of the continuation of Martial Law would not have been so serious a question if it had not been for some of the more objectionable regulations connected with it?

A. My opinion is that, inasmuch as it means setting the ordinary law more or less in abeyance, Martial Law is a bad thing in itself, even if it is not accompanied by objectionable Martial Law Orders.

Q. Of course all of us with civil rather than military ideas prefer the civil to the military administration, that is natural enough, but if a situation has arisen in a country where military requirements necessitate the existence of Martial Law, the objectionable character of Martial Law may not be very great?

A. Yes.

Q. If the regulations are eased off and the special courts try only cases that have actually occurred during the period of riot and disturbance, there would be, in your opinion, much less objection then?

A. I am distinctly of opinion that if Martial Law were really needed in the interests of peace and order in the country, there would be no objection to it, but the whole difficulty came from the feeling that it was continued, not because it was really necessary, but in order to carry on what was begun. It was that feeling which made things so difficult.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Would you mind explaining your last answer to me a little further? You say there was a feeling that Martial Law was continued not because it was really necessary but to carry on what was begun. Will you put that with a little more in detail for me?

A. It was felt that there was really no need for the introduction of Martial Law in order to restore peace and order; that in the very beginning certain acts were done by the authorities which acts were, in the opinion of the people, not easily defensible; that it was found necessary to carry on a wrong which had begun possibly in haste, but which could not be corrected easily afterwards. Have I been able to convey my meaning?

Q. Do I understand that you are speaking now not so much of the introduction of Martial Law, but of its continuance? Apart from the question, as I understand, that you don't think it ever ought to have been introduced at all, do you think, for instance, that it was kept on after, let us say, the middle of May simply because it had been introduced and nobody wanted to go back on it?

A. Simply because certain proceedings had begun which they wanted to finish before Martial Law was removed.

Q. Do you mean the proceedings before the Summary Courts?

A. Yes.

Q. You think that, in order that the administration which had been set up might have time to do the work for which it was originally intended, Martial Law was carried on, although it might have been abrogated earlier?

A. Yes.

Q. Your view then on the assumption that Martial Law was introduced, was that some arrangement should have been made for carrying on that judicial work without Martial Law itself going forward?

A. Quite so.

Q. I suppose if Martial Law had to be introduced at all, it would have to be introduced for a reasonable time; you could not introduce it for a week or a fortnight or three weeks?

A. I am afraid that is not my opinion. As I understand, the need for the introduction of Martial Law comes to an end as soon as peace and order is restored.

Q. That is quite sound if I may say so, but do you think that is the same thing as saying it ought to have come to an end the moment the last riot had occurred?

A. I should say, as soon as the riot, if it had occurred, had been put down.

Q. May I suggest this to you because I want you just to consider it with me for a few moments? Assuming, for the sake of argument, that what we have heard about all this wire cutting along the line, of these various mobs and these disturbances taking place any time between the 10th and about the 21st of April are true, you will agree with me that such a widespread movement as that would have to be dealt with very cautiously?

A. Undoubtedly.

Q. A thing that has spread itself so wide would be very likely to recur at individual points for some time afterwards? And you will agree with me that the communication system of the Punjab is a thing which no Government of India can deal with otherwise than on the principles of the greatest urgency? Well now, considering those facts and assuming it to be the case that Martial Law was rightly introduced and should have been kept on until it was clear that this movement had come to an end, do you think you could put the time within which it would have been safe, on those assumptions, to bring Martial Law to an end earlier than, let us say, the middle of May?

A. Of course the difficulty in answering this question that I feel is whether it was to be removed from all parts wherein it was introduced, or whether it could be removed piecemeal. With reference to the wire-cutting and the railway breaches, the easiest thing would have been to restrict Martial Law within those areas and not have it in outlying districts and in cities.

Q. Now have you considered that, Mr. Hussain? Because if as a matter of fact the cutting of the wires and the railway breaches were due to the political and other discontent of the people in the surrounding country, do you think that military law merely on the railway lines would have been effective for that purpose?

A. This is actually what the Government did.

Q. They did it afterwards?

A. Yes.

Q. But I am speaking now of whether you think that at any time before the middle of May it would have been of very much use to have Martial Law simply on the railway line?

A. So far as, I may say, Lahore, Gujranwala, Gujrat Districts are concerned (I am not in a position to say with reference to Lyallpur, as I have not studied that), the end of April would have been quite safe to put an end to this Martial Law.

Q. Now there is just one other thing, and that is about the compulsory *salaaming* by respectable

people. You mentioned two gentlemen's names. What exactly happened? You mentioned Mr. Shah Nawáz as one who knew about the case?

A. It was the case of Mr. Bashir Ahmad. What happened in Bashir Ahmad's case was that he was going out for a walk and at that time there was an officer with a small body of volunteers, Anglo-Indian boys.

Q. Cadets of the Indian Defence Force?

A. They may have been. He was going out for a walk and an officer with some of these men was near the village of Bhagwanpura and was calling out men to *salaam* this company, and several men were called up to do that.

Q. You mean there was a crowd of the population standing by?

A. No.

Q. Who were being called out to *salaam?*

A. Different people of the village. Not that they were passing by and were told to *salaam*, but they were actually being called up with the object of *salaaming* on purpose.

Q. You mean he held a parade and then called out people from the villages and made them come up and *salaam?*

A. Yes. And as this gentleman was going out for a walk, he said "Who is this?" People told him and he said "he may as well *salaam*."

Q. You mean they took him from where he was and made him *salaam?*

A. Yes.

Q. Of course there is nothing within a thousand miles of the Martial Law Order that would justify that?

A. No.

Q. Would you mind telling me where is the place where that happened?

A. Near the Shalimar Gardens.

Q. This gentleman is, I see you say, a graduate of the Punjab University and of Oxford?

A. Yes, he was the son of Mr. Justice Shah Din.

Q. Is he in India now?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whether he has ever made a complaint either to a superior officer or anybody else about this treatment?

A. He has mentioned it to his friends; I don't think he has put in any complaint.

Q. You see the trouble is that he has not put in that complaint to us and you, of course, were not present at the time, and there is an officer concerned; one wants to get at the facts?

A. Quite so.

Q. You say the case there is not a compulsory *salaaming* by a person who passed an officer, but a compulsory hauling up of some one to *salaam*, for which there is no justification?

A. Yes, that is it.

Q. There is just one thing on your statement as a whole that I would like to put to you without going into details. I rather gather from it that the general effect, according to your opinion, of the way in which the Government has attempted to deal with these disturbances has been apparently to undermine the faith of the people in British justice, and I rather gather that you give that, not only as a general opinion, but as your own opinion?

A. That is so.

Q. Don't you think there is a confusion there between a difference of opinion as to the right way to tackle a very difficult problem, and a difference of opinion as to principles of justice?

A. So far as the introduction or non-introduction of Martial Law is concerned it is possible that it may be that there is a difference of opinion as to that, but if we put all things together and see the effect on the people at large, one cannot escape the conclusion that the result, however, unforeseen it may have been, is there.

Q. Now just let me put this to you. Taking the disturbances as a whole, do you agree that they took a turn that was not only violent, but was anti-Government and anti-European; you agree with that?

A. The disturbances as a whole, yes.

Q. And do you agree that that makes a problem for the Government of India as at present constituted which goes absolutely to the root of its existence?

A. It does.

Q. Now so far as any persons who were directly or indirectly connected with those disturbances or murders or riots are concerned, I take it you do not feel any particular sympathy for their being subjected to Martial Law?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. And the difficulty and hardship about Martial Law is that because a certain part of the community thoroughly deserves certain treatment, a good deal of hardship has to be imposed also on other parts of the community; that is the real difficulty about Martial Law after all?

A. That is exactly the position so far as the feeling of the people is concerned.

Q. Well now that is, is it not, what is really pointed to? When people talk about the principles of justice or of law not being applied any more to them, they are feeling the pinch of the fact that, in order to deal with one large section of the population, you have unfortunately to bring the whole population under a particular system of administration. That is the point?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't you think that to that extent, and assuming that Martial Law was imposed in good faith, it is up to all educated Indians in India to do their best to point out to the people who think that it is a slackening in the belief in justice that has brought this about, that there is no such question at the bottom of it? Don't you agree with me?

A. The difficulty in the task of educated Indians lies in this that, just as for the faults of a few, a large number is suspected, similarly for the faults of a few who rule badly, the Government in its entirety is being blamed.

Q. You mean that because people may have been unnecessarily or indiscriminately flogged by individual officers, it is those kinds of mistakes that get the whole Government into bad odour?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you think that the educated portion of the community in the Punjab (I refer to barristers and people like that) have done very much, or done their fair share in trying to point out to their fellow countrymen that the fact that Martial Law necessarily means hardships upon the whole community, and even the fact that particular officers abuse in particular cases their authority, does not in the least mean that British law and justice is not as much as ever it was at the basis of British rule in India? Do you think that they have done their fair share in pointing that out to the community as a whole here?

A. No, it was impossible for them under these circumstances to do it with any success.

Q. It would be difficult to do it at the time people's passions were up and so on?

A. Not only that, that the people's passions were up. I think one should attempt it even if the people's passions were up, if it was clearly one's duty to do so. What I meant to convey was that, instead of the Government finding its way to discover what sort of people they were who did actually create the disturbances and what it was that led them to commit those disturbances, they, without any adequate enquiry, fastened the blame on to the educated classes and practically turned that educated class into a sort of opposite party or the enemy. Then how can you expect, under those circumstances, this educated class, after they had finished with them to start a campaign of preaching that it was all right and that really no harm was intended?

Q. I quite appreciate the force of what you say there; there is a great deal of force in it, but just tell me, the educated class in this part of India are very largely represented, are they not, by the barrister or pleader class?

A. They are.

Q. And a great deal of the antipathy to and censure of the pleader class, if I follow your view, simply arises from the fact that an educated class in India which has become politically minded, is apt to become a bit of a nuisance to the local administration in some of its phases?

A. Quite so.

Q. And although it is absolutely legitimate and absolutely necessary to the country, the pleader class gets abused simply because it is the educated class and India is what it is?

A. That is the unfortunate position.

Q. And you say the attitude of some of the officials has made it particularly difficult for that same class to do its fair share in explaining what it is necessary to explain?

A. Quite so.

By Sir C. H. Setalvad—

Q. Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, how many years have you been in Lahore?

A. 14.

Q. You are a permanent resident of Lahore?

A. No.

Q. From what place do you come?

A. Gurdaspur district.

Q. And you are settled down here for the practice of your profession?

A. Yes.

Q. And all these 14 years have you been taking a prominent part in public affairs?

A. Yes, public affairs.

Q. You have been connected with the Congress?

A. Yes, intimately for the last four years.

Q. Before that you were not connected with them?

A. Not much.

Q. Were you connected before that with any active political association in the Punjab?

A. Yes, three or four years before that I was connected with the Muslim League.

Q. The Muslim League is a Muhammadan institution?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you connected with any general political association or activity?

A. Well I believe I was a sleeping member of the Provincial Congress institution since my arrival in Lahore.

Q. And when the Rowlatt Bills came on, did you take part in the agitation against those Bills?

A. I did.

Q. Took a very active part?

A. Yes, fairly active I should say.

Q. And when the *Satyagraha* movement came on, did you join in that?

A. No, I did not.

Q. You did not take the *Satyagraha* vow?

A. No, I don't believe any one in Lahore did.

Q. No one in Lahore took the *Satyagraha* vow?

A. That is my impression.

Q. Mr. Gandhi's propaganda in that behalf, was that not taken up in Lahore?

A. No.

Q. Was not his propaganda about what is called civil disobedience of laws taken up in Lahore?

A. We did not adopt it.

Q. With regard to the Rowlatt Bills you had many meetings I suppose in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take part in meetings outside Lahore?

A. No.

Q. You are aware that there were considerable misapprehensions in the minds of the general public as regards the actual provisions of those Bills, you have heard of that?

A. Yes.

Q. For instance people thought that their marriages would be interfered with, or they would be deprived of half the produce of their lands, or that 10 people or 5 people could not meet together without making themselves liable to be arrested by the police, and things of that kind? Did it come to your notice that these beliefs had been in the minds of the people in the Punjab?

A. I did not hear these rumours before April.

Q. In April you did hear them?

A. I did hear in April, I cannot say definitely when, but it was either during the disturbances or after the disturbances, or it may be immediately before the disturbances, I cannot be definite.

Q. It did come to your ears that the ignorant people were believing these things about that legislation?

A. I cannot say that they were believing; I did hear that there were rumours to that effect.

Q. Were any steps taken by what you call the educated classes in Lahore to disabuse the minds of the people of those rumours and place before them what the actual provisions of the Bill were, however, objectionable they might otherwise be?

A. So far as I remember, between the time that these rumours were afloat and the time troubles came on in the Punjab, there was hardly breathing time between the two to do anything.

Q. Immediately after this came to your notice, that is yourself and your coadjutors, these disturbances broke out?

A. Either immediately after or at the same time, I cannot say.

Q. There was hardly any time for you to take any action?

A. Quite.

Q. In your statement you go into what you believe to be the causes of the unrest in the Punjab and the disturbances. There you refer to what you call causes in common with other parts of India, and you mention the ferment in political thought due to the principles enunciated by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, what do you mean by that?

A. The importance given to the question of self-determination.

Q. You mean the new outlook that came to all parts of the world with regard to freedom and liberty?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you refer to the economic conditions?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you refer to there?

A. High prices, expectations of alleviation in the immediate future in those prices.

Q. They did not go down, they possibly went up.

A. Yes.

Q. That caused considerable disappointment?

A. Yes.

Q. And dissatisfaction among the ignorant classes?

A. Naturally.

Q. When you speak of the war strain, what do you refer to there?

A. Recruitment, monetary and financial help.

Q. These are causes which you speak of as peculiar to the Punjab.

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore you call it as special war strain and you specify underneath that head recruitment, war loan and charity. You say 'the circumstances attending upon these were such as to undermine the faith of the people in British justice.' What do you mean by that?

A. I mean thereby what they call compulsory voluntary aid.

Q. Compulsory voluntary aid? That is a contradiction in terms?

A. That may be, but it is expressive and it is a Government phrase, I understand. If aid is voluntary or if it is legalised, then there can be no reasonable objection to its being given, but when the thing is not put on a voluntary basis then those who are not poor or weak they escape.

Q. Those who are not poor?

A. Yes; those who are not poor or weak, they escape the liability to pay. For instance . . . .

Q. Let us first confine ourselves to one head. With regard to this compulsory voluntary aid, I understand you to say that if there is compulsion throughout, that

would have been a different thing. Do I understand you to say that you would have welcomed conscription in the Punjab?

A. Yes; as a matter of fact, I supported the movement for conscription in the war conference at Delhi in 1917.

Q. In your own view, it would have been much better to resort to conscription?

A. To resort to honest conscription.

Q. What is your opinion with regard to the recruitment?

A. The burden of recruitment, as I saw, fell on persons who were not in a position to resist it. Those living in towns who were in a position to resist it and pleaded law in their favour escaped it.

Q. You say it being voluntary the townspeople escaped it?

A. Yes.

Q. They could stand on their own rights and say 'it is voluntary, we won't go' but the village people, poor and comparatively ignorant had to submit to it although they were not willing?

A. In some cases, yes.

Q. People were impressed into service against their wish?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you yourself anything to do personally with recruiting in the Punjab?

A. No.

Q. Then on what do you base this statement that people in the villages were impressed against their wish, they were compelled to go into recruitment against their wish?

A. I did two cases which arose out of recruitment incidents.

Q. You appeared in 2 cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How did those cases arise?

A. In the Shahpur district. One arose out of conscription. I believe 150 people were prosecuted for rioting and so on.

Q. 150 people were prosecuted for rioting?

A. Yes.

Q. You appeared for the defence?

A. Yes.

Q. How did the rioting take place?

A. They were again and again asked to give recruits.

Q. These 150 people?

A. Yes. I forget the name of the village. It is in Shahpur district about 10 miles from Sargodha. None of those people was even literate and I find that only one, since the introduction of British rule in the Punjab had ever occupied a place in Government service. They were altogether opposed to give any out of their village.

Q. These 150 people—were they asked themselves to recruit?

A. No, out of 1,000 in that village, 150 came forward.

Q. The villagers were asked to supply recruits?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the number fixed?

A. No; and they supplied none. Then again and again, the authorities persuaded them but to no purpose, then it was considered that these people had conspired together and opposed recruitment in their own village as well as in the neighbouring villages. On the basis of that, action was taken under the Defence of India Act.

Q. Action against the village?

A. Against some men of the village.

Q. That they were obstructing the recruitment?

A. Yes. Warrants were issued against these persons. When villagers would not surrender those persons it was found necessary to send a force against them, to capture those against whom warrants were issued.

Q. When they went there, the result was rioting?

A. Yes.

Q. For this rioting, the 150 people were arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened to them?

A. Most of them got convicted. It was found that they had taken part in the actual riot.

Q. This is one case in which you were concerned?

A. Yes.

Q. You said there was some other case?

A. There was another case in which the recruiting Tahsildar was murdered.

Q. Did you appear in that case?

A. Yes.

Q. For whom? For the accused?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened.

A. That case arose out of deserters capturing a column. There were a number of deserters in that *thana.*

Q. What is *thana?*

A. Thana is a police station having certain jurisdiction within the area of a tahsil.

Q. Who deserted? People who offered for recruitment?

A. People are recruited, they join the regiment and then they run away.

Q. After joining the regiment?

A. Yes; when they are called deserters.

Q. These recruits come from a particular part of the country?

A. Yes; a good number of them deserted.

Q. What happened?

A. Then they had to be captured.

Q. What happened then?

A. This Tahsildar was going about in order to secure more recruits and capture such as had deserted, at that particular village. That is a village from which not a single recruit has been obtained. When he was putting up there he was set upon by a large number of people and eventually murdered.

Q. What facts came to your knowledge in the course of the trial?

A. These facts: that in that *ilaka* recruitment was being done after bringing a good deal of pressure on the people; and that such persons when recruited were deserting the regiment to which they had been allotted, in larger numbers than before. That was in 1917-18. Of course, there was a mass of evidence as to the ways in which recruitment was done and so on in that case.

Q. Objectionable ways were alleged to have been adopted by the authorities?

A. Yes.

Q. What did the court find on them?

A. As a matter of fact, on that point the Government pleader had taken up the position; that inasmuch as there was pressure brought to bear in recruitment on the people, therefore there was a feeling of resentment amongst the people and that was the motive for the people to attack the Tahsildar.

Q. Those are the two cases that came to your notice. Nothing else?

A. Nothing else?

Q. Are you aware that in various cases people who were unwilling had been brought as recruits, they were ordered to be released and sent back by the higher authorities?

A. Undoubtedly; in a large number of cases.

Q. You would not impute to these higher authorities any intention to impress people against their wish?

A. No. In fact there was more of unfair recruitment under Indian officers than under European officers. The fact was that over-zealous subordinate Indian officers resorted to these objectionable methods of recruitment, and in individual cases when the matter was brought to the notice of the higher authorities, it was set right.

Q. That won't be quite accurate. You specify Indian subordinate officers. Complaints against the European officers also existed?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were they?

A. District officers. They winked during those days. They would not have winked in other days.

Q. What do you say was the position of the Central Government in the Punjab. Had Government themselves any desire to impress people against their will?

A. The local Government knew of it.

Q. And when they came to know of it did not they dissociate themselves from those methods and express themselves to that effect?

A. They have no doubt warned their officers that it is not the right thing to do.

Q. If that is so, you would grant that the Government themselves were no party to these objectionable methods and they were in that particular badly served by their subordinate officers?

A. That might be so.

Q. What do you think?

A. In my opinion, if there had been any strong condemnation by the authorities that could have been stopped.

Q. You think that the condemnation of these practices by Government was not sufficient?

A. Not sufficiently strong. In fact, I may add that it was in view of these very reasons that the local Government was very readily in favour of legalising conscription and moved the Government of India to let them do it.

Q. The local Government themselves were taking quite a correct view, in your opinion, about the situation?

A. Yes.

Q. Any way, according to you, the position is this: whether the local Government took or did not take efficient steps to condemn what was done by some individual officers, the effect of the operations of those officers created certain amount of discontent among the people?

A. Quite.

Q. Then you refer to war loan and charity. What happened with regard to that which caused discontent?

A. An enthusiastic gentleman takes it into his head that all *zamindars* should pay so much loan or so much money towards a charity. He places the matter before the officers of his district and at once proceeds to make a collection.

Q. You have no knowledge of any particular officer who has done this?

A. Yes.

Q. To your knowledge?

A. Yes. I paid myself towards it.

Q. In what capacity?

A. As a *zamindar.*

Q. In what place?

A. In Lyallpur district.

Q. Who was the officer who made this order?

A. Not the officer. The man who collected money was Rasildar Pratap Singh.

Q. Every person holding land was to pay so much?

A. Yes. And the Tahsildar wrote out letters saying that this is being done and you should pay so much.

Q. He did it with the co-operation of the Tahsildar?

A. Yes.

Q. You got a letter that as you as a land holder of that particular locality you must pay a particular amount?

A. He pointed out to me that in his tahsil I was one of the few who had not paid up and it was a great pity and so on and he expected a better example to be set. I at once wrote to my *Mukhtar* that it should be paid early.

Q. You did not disapprove of it?

A. I did not inasmuch as I could afford it. There were other *zamindars* who were not able to afford it.

Q. You were aware of this, that you were in a position to afford it and there were other people holding lands who were not; and did you when this came to your notice raise any objection?

A. No.

Q. Why did you not do that?

A. I felt that it was a good thing that was being done so far as collecting money was concerned. No doubt, there were poor victims to it, but I could not very well take up the cudgels on their behalf in those days.

Q. When was this?

A. In 1917-18.

Q. On the whole you acquiesced? You thought that it was not such a bad thing as to require a protest?

A. As a matter of fact, I had made two or three protests already.

Q. Prior to this?

A. Yes.

Q. With reference to this locality or any other locality?

A. With reference to the recruitment.

Q. Not with reference to the war loan?

A. With reference to the war loan, I had mentioned the method; the Jhelum incidents I had brought to the notice of the Government.

Q. The one you spoke of?

A. That is not Jhelum.

Q. What about Jhelum?

A. There was an officer who was assessing different people to income-tax.

Q. I do not follow you?

A. Under the Income-tax Act, people have to be assessed in order to pay a particular amount of income-tax. In Jhelum, there was a complaint that those people who never paid income-tax and had paid no war loan or any amount towards charities were being assessed now. Their complaint was they were being assessed not because they were liable, but because they did not pay anything to the war loan or the charities. They brought a number of judgments of the income-tax officer.

Q. You saw them?

A. Yes. On that matter Government did take some action later on.

Q. You represented matters to Government on their behalf?

A. No.

Q. In your public capacity?

A. I simply wrote a letter.

Q. On that Government took action?

A. With reference to that particular case.

Q. They instructed the Income-tax officer not to do that?

A. They instructed the Income-tax officer to the effect that he should not put down in his orders that this amount was paid under war loan and so on.

Q. They instructed that he should not record that as a circumstance or reason for arriving at his decision with regard to income-tax?

A. Quite.

Q. The Government did what was the right thing to do?

A. Quite.

Q. There again it comes to this; that certain overzealous subordinate officers, in order to get the favour of Government, behaved in this manner?

A. Quite.

Q. And not that it was the policy of Government that that should be done?

A. Oh, no.

Q. With regard to recruiting, the efforts of the subordinate officers produced certain amount of discontent among the people?

A. In certain districts.

Q. Then you refer to what you call the attitude of the local Government towards political movements and Indian leaders. What do you mean by that? What do you refer to there?

A. Well, for instance, take the Reforms Scheme movement. When first it was launched, certain meetings were held here in Lahore. Immediately after that, the first pronouncement made by the local Government was to the effect that these people who have put forward the schemes are no less revolutionary than the persons who committed the outrages, and those emigrants who returned from America.

Q. That is the *Ghadr* movement?

A. Yes.

Q. When was this?

A. That was after the Lucknow Congress meeting in 1916.

Q. Was that after what has been called the memorandum of the 19 members of the Imperial Legislative Council?

A. When was it?

Q. That was in 1916.

A. Yes. This pronouncement was in 1917. The memorandum came up for consideration in December 1916.

Q. After that memorandum was published there was a meeting called in Lahore to support that?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was after that meeting that this pronouncement was made?

A. Yes. Similarly, the attitude of the local Government, with reference to the Reforms Scheme and the agitation in support of that scheme had been expressed in fairly violent language. It was in connection with that very scheme that here a provincial conference was held.

Q. There was a provincial conference held in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. After the memorandum of nineteen?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened?

A. Naturally the organisers of that meeting . . . .

Q. Were you one of the organisers?

A. I was President of that Conference.

Q. What happened?

A. Invitations were issued to a large number of Indian leaders. The Government said that they should not come in and attend the meeting. That was the attitude adopted by them.

Q. When you say the Government adopted that attitude, had you any personal communication with regard to that matter with any official?

A. I had.

Q. With whom?

A. The Chief Secretary.

Q. Mr. Thompson?

A. Yes.

Q. You saw him with regard to that or did he call you?

A. He called me with reference to that meeting and pointed out that it was undesirable to call in the men to whom invitations had been issued.

Q. Who were they to whom objection was taken?

A. The Raja of Mahmudabad, Mr. Jinnah, Dr. Sapru, Mr. Sastri (he was allowed a permit; I think an exception was made in his favour) and others.

Q. All others were objected to except Mr. Sastri?

A. Yes.

Q. Then what happened?

A. As a matter of fact, most of these gentlemen were laid with some sort of epidemic or were unable to come. Therefore that did not come into effect.

Q. Is that the incident you refer to when you speak of the attitude towards the Indian leaders?

A. That was the one glaring instance in my mind; then the orders of externment that have been passed from time to time and the further position taken up by Government.

Q. To whose externment you refer? Mr. Tilak's?

A. Yes; Mr. Gandhi's.

Q. Mr. Gandhi's was later on?

A. Yes.

Q. But you are now speaking of the period anterior to the disturbances; you put them down among the causes? The order against Mr. Gandhi did not come on the 10th April?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it only Mr. Tilak you refer to?

A. That is the one in my mind at present. I do not recollect anybody or whether there were any other orders to that effect.

Q. At the time the order against Mr. Tilak was made you had in the Punjab the unrest over the *Ghadr* movement?

A. I cannot say.

Q. About that time?

A. Might have been, I do not recollect.

Q. It was risky I suppose at that time to have any political ferment? That was the idea I take it when the order was made.

A. That was the very reason given for the exclusion of the persons I have mentioned.

Q. That movement was in 1915?

A. Yes, the reason was the same; whether other movements existed or not, the reason given by the local Government was the same that there should not be any ferment or excitement in the Punjab.

Q. Particularly because it was the field from which army was recruited?

A. Yes; that was one reason.

Q. Anything else you refer to in this attitude?

A. No. Nothing I can think of.

Q. Then you say that the educated classes were being put back. What do you mean by that? How were they put back?

A. The idea with reference to this war period has been that the educated classes are a sort of obstruction.

Q. I do not follow you?

A. That the educated classes have been a sort of obstruction. That was the view the local Government took.

Q. Where did you get that?

A. I will explain presently.

Q. Yes.

A. That the urban classes did not do their part.

Q. In the recruitment for the war?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it a fact that the urban population did not do their proper share?

A. I do not think it is quite fair to say that. There is some truth in it no doubt, but it is not entirely correct.

Q. Yes.

A. And that in the Punjab there existed no such opposition or distinction, as has been brought about afterwards, between the urban and rural population. You might have noticed that that has been accentuated in the Reforms Scheme, so far as our province is concerned.

Q. I do not quite follow that. There was no distinction between urban and rural before that?

A. There was no clashing between urban and rural interests; there was no opposition between each other or any feeling of hostility or anything of that kind.

Q. Then what was done?

A. It is during these 3 or 4 years that the idea has been steadily brought forward that really the persons who should be looked after are the rural classes; they represent the masses of the country, and it is in their interest that a great deal should be done. It is an abstract proposition to which no one can possibly take any exception. In the course of developing this policy steadily, the educated classes have been put back.

Q. What was done to put them back?

A. For instance, take the case of different constituencies for returning candidates to the Legislative Council. It is ruled no one from a borough or a city or urban area can stand outside that area to represent a rural area.

Q. That restriction, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, is not inflicted only in the Punjab; the Reform Scheme has inflicted it upon us in Bombay too?

A. Perhaps you have to be grateful to us for it.

Q. That is possible. You suggest that the policy was to bring about arrangements by which the importance of the educated classes should be minimised. Is that what you mean?

A. That is so.

Q. Then you speak of certain causes, which you call the immediate causes, and you first put down the Rowlatt legislation and the agitation attendant upon that?

A. Yes.

Q. You have already told us that after the introduction of the bill there was considerable agitation throughout the country against that; in Punjab had you

the same opposition as you had in the other parts of the country against this bill?

A. Yes.

Q. Were meetings held in various parts of the Punjab to protest against the bill?

A. Yes; I believe so.

Q. Then you know that Mr. Gandhi entered the arena somewhere in February?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was, I suppose, made known to the people in the Punjab?

A. Yes.

Q. He preached what is called passive resistance civil disobedience to laws, etc.?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that propaganda of Mr. Gandhi accepted in the Punjab?

A. This led to some difference of opinion; so far as I know the educated classes, or rather the majority of them, did not accept it.

Q. Was not the *hartal* movement really a part of Mr. Gandhi's propaganda?

A. It was.

Q. That was accepted in the Punjab?

A. There again I beg to make a distinction between the different schools of thought. At all events the large majority of the educated classes were not in support of it.

Q. When you speak of the educated classes, I take it that you speak of Lahore itself?

A. I am talking of Lahore itself.

Q. A large majority of the educated classes were not in favoud of the *hartal* movement or in favour of either the passive resistance movement or in any way organising a *hartal* or doing anything of that kind?

A. Yes.

Q. Then how do you account for the *hartal* taking place in Lahore?

A. I have thought over it and the conclusions I have arrived at are that it was something novel and as such its novelty by itself was one of the causes of its success, and secondly that it caught the imagination of the people.

Q. Do you mean to say that people resorted to it in spite of the educated classes?

A. Not in spite of the educated classes, but without consulting them, or taking their advice. They did it on their own.

Q. The educated classes were not able to restrain them?

A. I should not say that; the educated classes took no pains to restrain them. The educated classes did not start a counter movement to that effect.

Q. You told me that the educated classes or the majority of them were against passive resistance movement and the *hartal* movement here?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they express that view or did they try to impress that upon the people?

A. You might say that they passively resisted passive resistance movement.

Q. I do not quite follow. We are getting very much mixed.

A. They showed their attitude by not actively opposing passive resistance movement, but by abstaining from it themselves.

Q. Though the view of the educated classes or leaders, whatever you call them, was that passive resistance and *hartal* movement should not be followed, they did not give active expression to that view, but they merely abstained from joining it?

A. That is fairly correct.

Q. The educated classes did regard that the passive resistance movement and the *hartal* movement was not a desirable thing to be adopted?

A. That is it.

Q. They apprehended that if that was adopted, it may lead to undesirable results?

A. Yes, after the 30th, such apprehensions were entertained.

Q. In the beginning they were against adopting that in Lahore?

A. Yes.

Q. They got more firm in that view after the 30th March?

A. Yes.

Q. They then were of the view that these movements were unsuited to be adopted with regard to large masses?

A. Yes.

Q. And that if adopted, they must inevitably or more or less certainly result in undesirable developments?

A. Yes.

Q. That was their view?

A. Yes.

Q. If that was their view, do you think they did what they ought to have done merely by themselves abstaining from it or should they not have as leaders of the people tried to impress their view, as you have described it, on the people?

A. There is no doubt they could have attempted to do so.

Q. They may not have succeeded?

A. My idea is that the movement had taken the shape of a mass movement, and as such the chances of their successfully carrying out a campaign against it were very poor.

Q. They would have carried on a campaign against it if they had felt that they could have done it with some success?

A. With any success.

Q. They felt that the masses were so taken by Mr. Gandhi's propaganda that the educated people in Lahore, though they did not approve of it, did not feel that they could keep back the masses from joining it successfully. Is that the position?

A. That is fairly correct.

Q. Then did they do anything? Though they may have felt that they could not induce the people to abstain from it successfully, did they themselves clear their position by declaring in any open manner that in their view those were movements that were undesirable to be adopted?

A. Well, as a matter of fact, somewhere about the middle of March there was a public meeting held in Lahore on this very question, and there was a great demand for adopting Mr. Gandhi's vow and other things.

Q. Did you preside over that meeting?

A. Yes, I presided over it on the 9th March, and I was able in those days to pass a resolution after discussion to the effect that we cannot adopt Mr. Gandhi's vow. It was I believe when the Bill was not passed. After the Bill becomes law, then we should consider whether any plan of passively resisting it could be adopted or not. There was a great demand then to adopt Mr. Gandhi's vow; in preference to doing that we passed this resolution, more or less to tide over the difficulty.

Q. Because you thought that was the line of least resistance for the moment?

A. Yes, exactly, and that was actually adopted. After that politically minded persons considered this matter several times, with the result that Mr. Gandhi's movement was not adopted in any meeting whatsoever, neither of the Congress nor any other political institution.

Q. You took up the position that you could not consider this or adopt this till the Bill was passed. Did you consider the situation again after the Bill became law?

A. Yes.

Q. After the Bill was passed, did the educated classes including yourself still continue to hold the old opinion that the passive resistance movement and the *hartal* and the *Satyagraha* movement were not desirable to be adopted?

A. I do not believe any meeting was held till the 6th.

Q. True, but in your own mind what was the attitude?

A. As I said, the mind of most of the educated people in Lahore was still the same.

Q. Even after the Bill was passed, it still continued to be of the view that Mr. Gandhi's propaganda of

Satyagraha and *hartal* should not be adopted, and it was undesirable and unsuited?

A. Yes.

Q. Then holding that view did you do anything to give effect to it or did you feel that the forces against you were so rising that you could not do anything?

A. Nothing definite was done.

Q. You took no steps to give effect to your views?

A. No.

Q. Did these leaders including yourself hold a meeting and consider about this view?

A. I was not present at the meetings wherein this was considered, but I knew it was considered, and the view taken was not to adopt it; I was not present myself at those meetings.

Q. That was the view you were told was adopted by the leaders?

A. Yes.

Q. When was this?

A. That was before the meeting of the 6th.

Q. And you still hold the same view that this passive resistance and *hartal* are undesirable to be adopted?

A. So far as passive resistance is concerned, I am absolutely clear but I do not think that *hartal* by itself comes into the same category.

Q. Let us take one by one. You are clearly of opinion that the passive resistance movement as started by Mr. Gandhi in this connection is undesirable?

A. Yes.

Q. And that it is unsuited to the conditions generally obtaining in this country?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you say that the *hartal* in itself is not undesirable in your view?

A. Quite.

Q. But you see, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, that if you have a *hartal* on as large a scale as you had in those days, then you have a large number of people idle, not all of them very discreet or wise, and it must lead to undesirable results?

A. Quite.

Q. From that point of view, don't you think that the *hartal* more or less stands on the same footing possibly as the other, *viz.*, civil disobedience movement?

A. To my mind there is a clear distinction between the two. The civil disobedience movement is a breach of law. The *hartal* is not, and as such it cannot be the same. It is undesirable, I agree, but it cannot be condemnable to the same extent.

Q. I quite agree with your distinction. With regard to the civil disobedience, you grant or I take your view to be that if you place that ideal before the ordinary mind, it is dangerous in this way, that it is unable to understand the limitation of it, and is merely carried away by the idea that you have to disobey laws?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore it is an undesirable ideal to place before the masses such as you find them?

A. I should say even before other minds.

Q. Your view, I take it, is that there are very few people indeed who can grasp or practise the idealism of Mr. Gandhi?

A. Yes; I should think I know of none else.

Q. Therefore it is very unpractical and fraught with danger to push it among the people generally?

A. Yes.

Q. You do not think the same about the *hartal*?

A. No; I think it is different.

Q. I quite see that, but you do grant that to have *hartal* on a very, very large scale for days and days, though initially not meant for mischief, creates a situation eminently fitted for undesirable results?

A. Very.

Q. And from that point of view I take it that you would not encourage a thing of that sort under those circumstances?

A. No.

Q. Then the *hartal* that was continued in Lahore was not a thing that was encouraged or engineered by the educated classes?

A. Which *hartal*?

Q. When did *hartal* start here? On the 6th?

A. Yes.

Q. It stopped, there was no *hartal* after the 6th?

A. None whatsoever, it came to an end on the 6th.

Q. Then it came to an end?

A. Absolutely; and, as a matter of fact, I may confess those who were in support of the idea of the *hartal* on the 6th, had the best of others who thought there should be no *hartal*, inasmuch as it was a very passive one. We all recognised that.

Q. Then among the other causes, you speak of the Government policy of repression having strengthened to meet the Rowlatt Act agitation. To what particular action of the local Government do you refer to?

A. Not only the instance that I gave you already, but even in the matter of publication of reports of proceedings of public meetings.

Q. Public meetings in connection with the Rowlatt Act?

A. Am I to speak of things subsequent to that?

Q. You say among the causes—

"(*a*) Rowlatt Bill legislation and the agitation which attended upon it.

(*b*) Local Government's policy of repression further strengthened to meet this agitation."

A. Yes.

Q. I want to know what particular acts of repression by Government you refer to with regard to this agitation?

A. I cannot specify any particular act subsequent to the passing of this Bill.

Q. Or before?

A. So far as the previous period is concerned, whenever there was a public meeting held, the chances of its proceedings being published were never very hopeful.

Q. Publication in the papers was prevented by any order?

A. Yes.

Q. Were any orders actually issued in that behalf?

A. Yes, whenever there was a meeting one never knew whether the proceedings were going to be published or not. I remember one instance.

Q. You say one never knew. I do not follow you. What do you refer to?

A. I am going to give you an instance. A meeting was held. The proceedings of that meeting would have appeared but for an order to the effect that no proceedings were to be published by paper, and that order was served on all the papers in Lahore.

Q. When was this?

A. In 1917.

Q. Was it a general order on all papers?

A. Yes, served at midnight.

Q. Not to publish the proceedings of that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. For what purpose?

A. I think it referred to Mrs. Besant.

Q. About Mrs. Besant's internment?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you refer to the Amritsar deportations. We know about that?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you refer to Mr. Gandhi's exclusion from the Punjab and Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you disapprove of that?

A. Yes.

Q. You think that was unnecessary?

A. Yes, quite unnecessary.

Q. And you think that led people to great excitement even by itself?

A. I believe but for that nothing would have happened.

Q. If Mr. Gandhi had not been turned back on the 9th or 10th, you think nothing would have happened?

A. No. Why should anything happen, considering that on the 7th, 8th and 9th the place was absolutely quiet?

Q. In Lahore?

A. Throughout the Punjab. The two things that happened on the 10th in the Punjab were the Amritsar deportations and news of Mr. Gandhi's internment.

Q. That may be the immediate events, on which the disturbances immediately burst, but, you will grant, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, that the preceding excitement for various reasons was of such a character that any event of importance like this or any other event would have brought about the burst?

A. I cannot agree to that, unless you suggest any other event of that kind about which I could express opinion that it would have brought about the same result.

Q. What you mean to say is that although there was excitement existing over the Rowlatt Act, it would never burst into a great thing in the manner it did, but for these deportations?

A. Yes, it may not burst at all. Is it not possible, Sir?

Q. If there were considerable apprehensions based on misrepresentations with regard to the Rowlatt Act?

A. I am not clear that they were there before.

Q. When did they come in according to you?

A. I cannot say.

Q. They were there, you will grant, in March?

A. I cannot say.

Q. In April?

A. Yes, in April, whether they were there in the first week or second week, I am not clear.

Q. They were certainly there before these deportations and Mr. Gandhi's arrest?

A. As I submitted before, I am not clear about it. Whether they preceded it or not, I am not at all clear.

Q. Then, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, so far as you know, do you know whether these disorders in the Punjab were the result of any conspiracy?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Was there any conspiracy at all against Government?

A. I should have known it had it been amongst the educated classes in Lahore.

Q. In Lahore, you are able to say positively, there was no conspiracy at all?

A. None whatsoever.

Q. Against the Government?

A. No.

Q. Before these events, or rather before the Rowlatt Bills came, was there in the Punjab, in Lahore particularly, any anti-British feeling?

A. None.

Q. As you say, in Lahore even before the 10th, there was no anti-British feeling?

A. None.

Q. Then how do you account for the disturbances actually coming on? You know that there were anti-British demonstrations and Europeans were killed?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you account for the sudden turn that the public demonstrations and outbursts took?

A. Where?

Q. For instance in Amritsar and other places?

A. So far as I have been able to analyse the position, it seems to me that it has been a mistake on one side giving rise to another mistake on the other side, and that was growing worse and worse. In other words, people at Amritsar appear to have taken the deportations of their men as illegal acts, and then it appears that at the time when they were fired on, they lost their heads absolutely.

Q. Then you say, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain: "Why Martial Law introduced? Martial Law appears to have been introduced not to suppress revolt, rebellion on even disorders, but to punish political workers suspected of having directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, contributed towards the creation of an atmosphere which was favourable to disturbances." What reasons have you for saying that? You will grant, Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, that at the time when Martial Law was introduced, there were considerable disorders in various parts of the country?

A. Martial Law was introduced in certain districts and not in the Punjab as a whole.

Q. Yes, in the districts in which disorders of considerable magnitude took place?

A. So far as Lahore is concerned all the disorders were over.

Q. But why do you suggest that the introduction of Martial Law was not for the purposes of dealing with the disorders that took place, but with a view to punishing particular people?

A. I do not think I said this.

Q. You make this statement that because there were no disturbances immediately before the introduction of Martial Law?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree that after the disorders took place those in authority had to make themselves secure, also the people, against any recrudescence of such disorders?

A. I agree.

Q. Therefore why do you attribute the introduction of Martial Law solely to the object you suggested?

A. I never thought that the introduction of Martial Law could be justified as a protective measure or a preventive measure. Martial Law in its essence is for removing such rebellion, or disturbance, or riot, as exists, not as a sort of defence against the possible repetition of it.

Q. But if the situation is of such a character that a repetition is apprehended, then surely you do not disarm yourself of the weapon you have got, for the purpose of dealing with the situation?

A. That is a point on which I cannot give a very definite answer, but I feel doubtful as to its justification on that ground.

Q. You were asked about this matter by Justice Rankin; when you say "the administration of Martial Law has shaken faith in British justice," all that you mean is that in the actual administration of the law there were such hardships suffered by the law abiding portion of the population that they felt they were not justly treated. Is that so?

A. Yes.

Q. And was it also felt that some of the educated leaders who had not actually taken part in the disturbances were arrested and tried by the Summary Courts with regard to their utterances or their doings long before these disturbances, and they were prejudiced by not being given a trial in the ordinary way?

A. Yes.

Q. Did that create a feeling in the public mind?

A. As a matter of fact that applies not only to the cases of the educated or suspected accused persons, but also to all trials. The villager in the Punjab had a very deep-seated faith in the administration of justice, and the way in which the Martial Law Courts acted had caused them to be shaken in that faith. It had really shaken the faith of the ignorant people rather than that of the educated people.

Q. What do you mean thereby? Is it that instead of being tried by the ordinary courts, these villagers were tried by the Summary Courts?

A. Yes.

Q. How is that possible when you have Martial Law? Surely it is no grievance to say that they were not tried by the ordinary courts, when these people who were committing murders or arson, destroying property, were tried by the Martial Law Courts?

A. As a matter of fact I cannot say that it is a grievance, or a good grievance. What I mean is that the usual way in which accused persons are tried and given opportunities of defending themselves, was set at naught.

Q. Do I understand you to say that there is a considerable feeling on the part of the educated classes that certain leaders were tried by the Courts of Martial Law and not by the ordinary courts with regard to charges not connected with actual disturbances?

A. Yes: there is a very strong feeling on this subject.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. You have given your opinion about recruiting in answer to Sir Chimanlal's questions. I want to know why should recruiting be a ground for complaint so far as the urban population is concerned when practically they did not contribute to it? It is said that these dis-

turbances have taken place principally in towns. Take, for example, Lahore and Amritsar. These towns did not contribute their *quota* at all. They did practically nothing so far as recruiting is concerned. Therefore why should there be any resentment so far as the inhabitants of Lahore and Amritsar are concerned?

A. I should not say that there is any resentment on personal grounds amongst the urban population at all.

Q. Why then should you mention it as one of the contributary causes?

A. Because of the feeling that spreads.

Q. That is, you mean to say the educated classes practically take up the grievances of the rural classes?

A. Not exactly. There is a wave of feeling that spreads over all parts, and it is because of the effect it has on them.

Q. There is a second point which I wish to make clear. You will admit that Mr. Gandhi cannot speak Punjabi. There are thousands and thousands of persons in the Punjab, and a large majority of those who were employing themselves in these disturbances had never seen the face of Mahatma Gandhi?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore, why do you say that the extradition of Mahatma Gandhi was not justified, and that as a matter of fact it was a contributory cause to the excitement of feeling that prevailed and also of what subsequently happened? I mean to say the contention is when Mahatma Gandhi was not known to the majority but only to very few people, if he was excluded from the Punjab, how did it excite the feelings of those who did not know him?

A. Probably they were so fond of him because they did not know him then.

Q. What is your opinion for the fact that notwithstanding that he was not known by the great majority of the people, he was wielding such power over the younger generation?

A. It was a matter of sentiment. If a man is made into a saint that is one sure sign that those who have made a saint of him, do not know him well.

Q. He was made a saint and he had got that control. That is my point. Whether he was known or not is immaterial.

A. Quite so.

Q. You said something about the meeting that was held in support of the Memorandum of the 19—the so-called Reforms Scheme. Do you know anything personally as to what happened to those who supported the Reforms Scheme? There was a meeting at which Ram Saran Das and others were present?

A. Yes, they got reprimanded for it.

Q. By whom?

A. By the Chief Secretary.

Q. During all these days and all these meetings, there was an unusual fraternisation of Hindus and Muhammadans, and it is said that all this was not genuine at all. What is your opinion? First of all do you think that the relations between Hindus and Muhammadans had improved in the last 2 or 3 years or not?

A. There had been a distinct improvement, and the feelings towards each other—of the two communities, and not of individuals—are distinctly better than they had ever been before. But I think it would be saying too much if one went so far as to say that by themselves they are bound to last. No doubt the causes that brought about this *rapprochement* were largely political. So it is possible that if those causes are removed, then the union may not remain effective to some extent. But otherwise I do not think it is incorrect.

Q. Are you prepared to subscribe to the opinion that this fraternisation was the result of some sinister conspiracy against the British Government?

A. That is not correct at all.

Q. Was it the result of the Reform Scheme and the communal representation of classes that have been discussed for the last 2 or 3 years?

A. Quite.

Q. It appears to me to be the suggestion that in the Punjab the Muhammadans are the dupes of the Hindus, and consequently the former are in the meshes of the latter, and that is the reason for the fraternization?

A. I do not think it is quite correct.

Q. It is said that the Muhammadans excited the religious feelings and *vice versâ*, and that is why the Muhammadans have joined the Hindus?

A. That is not quite correct.

Q. So far as the Muhammadan feeling about Turkey is concerned, the Hindus have nothing to do with it. Have the Hindus excited this feeling? It is said that the Hindus have practically taken advantage of this position, and they have excited the Muhammadans to resent all these things, and therefore the latter ultimately became the dupes of the former?

A. I should not admit being in the position of a dupe in this matter at all, but there seems to be no definite school of thought amongst Hindus to that effect.

Q. My point is whether, so far as Turkey is concerned, it is a genuine movement or have they been excited by the Hindus?

A. I believe it is genuine.

Q. Are you quite sure in your mind that if Gandhi had been allowed to come to the Punjab nothing untoward would have happened? It is said that having regard to the martial nature of the inhabitants of the Punjab nothing untoward would happen. Or would it have had a contrary effect?

A. I think by Gandhi's advent nothing would have happened in the way of creating disturbances. Probably the effect would have been just the other way.

Q. At several places you have mentioned that tact has not been used in dealing with the mobs. I would like to ask one general question. Supposing it is proved that a mob consisting of about two or three thousand persons were requested to disperse, but they defied the authorities, and that soldiers or the police were hit and injured, and after exercising patience for one or two hours they were ultimately fired upon, would you say that no tact was used?

A. No. In that case I would not say so.

Q. Now, I am going to ask you this question—others have also asked it. Now as a barrister, knowing what was happening in the Punjab, was it possible, or would even the educated persons, much less the uneducated persons, during these days of Martial Law, have dared to go before any of the authorities and complain of what was happening? What is your opinion?

A. They would never.

Q. As a barrister of 18 years' standing is it not your knowledge, even in ordinary times, that when there is police oppression with regard to these villagers, perhaps one out of a hundred goes and makes a complaint?

A. Yes.

Q. You were in Lahore on the evening of the 13th?

A. Yes.

Q. You left Lahore on the morning of the 16th?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore from the 13th to the 16th you were cognisant of what was happening at Lahore. What was the feeling of the people? How were things being managed? What was decided at the different conferences that were held between the leaders and the authorities?

A. None were held.

Q. Considering the position between the 13th and 16th, from your own personal knowledge can you say that there was any occasion for the introduction of Martial Law so far as Lahore was concerned?

A. I was in Lahore on the 14th and 15th and left on the 16th, and I was astonished when I heard that Martial Law was going to be introduced.

Q. Did you see any European ladies cycling and walking in the streets of Lahore on the 14th and 15th?

A. Yes.

Q. In what portion of the city?

A. All over Upper Mall.

Q. Only in the civil lines which was protected by the presence of the military?

A. Yes, it was either on the afternoon of the 15th or the 14th, the military were conspicuous by their absence even in the civil lines. I remember that distinctly well inasmuch as I noticed that things were improving.

Q. Now with regard to the political aspect of the question. Have any new associations come into existence in Lahore recently?

A. I think Secretary of State's visit brought into existence one association—The Muslim Association.

Q. I am talking of the last 2 years.

A. The Hindu *Sabha.*

Q. How long is it in existence?

A. It is an old thing.

Q. Any other?

A. The Muslim.....

Q. Any other?

A. None, that I remember at present.

Q. Do you think there was any danger to life and property on the 14th, 15th and upwards either to the British soldier, to the so-called Army of Occupation, or to any of the inhabitants, for the purposes of introducing all these Martial Law precautions which are enforced in an enemy country?

A. No, not in my humble opinion.

Q. Therefore I take it that so far as the introduction of these Martial Law orders is concerned, it was not necessary for the maintenance of peace and order at all, or for the safety of His Majesty's Forces?

A. Not at all.

Q. Or for the safety of the life and limb of the civil lines?

A. Not at all.

Q. Or against any rebellion?

A. Not at all.

Q. Can you give me your opinion as to why they were at all introduced?

A. I have already submitted in my statement that it was either to demonstrate to the people that they should not always rely upon the letter of the law or to show that they should not be anxious to expect too much in the future. There is no other explanation.

Q. There is one sentence in your evidence which I do not understand. I understand you wrote that certain things had already been done by the introduction of Martial Law, and as those things were considered to be wrong, therefore in order to justify that wrong Martial Law was continued. Was that the position?

A. Yes.

Q. Now you say that even Mr. Shafi and Justice Abdul Rauf could not get a pass for travelling without their being recommended by their chauffeur or clerk if he happened to be an Anglo-Indian?

A. That was what Mr. Shafi told me.

Q. With regard to travelling, *i.e.*, the restrictions that were placed on travelling. Is it your opinion that the restrictions were due to there being some difficulty about traffic or was it merely political in order to prevent outsiders from coming inside?

A. I believe one of the Martial Law orders states that it is necessary in the interests of Martial Law administration to make these restrictions.

Q. It has nothing to do with the traffic on the lines?

A. That of course is a matter on which I cannot give an opinion.

Q. You say that members of the legal profession were subjected to greater annoyance and animosities than others. What do you attribute that to?

A. That is with reference to those posters, carriages and specially restricting the movements of their cars.

Q. Now, what do you mean when you speak of these students? You say "under the shadow of bayonets and machine-guns." Do I understand that at these places of roll-call, machine guns used to be placed?

A. Yes, at the parades of the students.

Q. But they would be naturally placed there?

A. I do not understand you. You call a roll-call of the students and at the place where you are having it, there would be soldiers between each row of the students.

Q. And machine-guns too?

A. Not between the rows, but at the ends.

Q. Now you make a complaint about the subordinate police officers. You say there is no complaint against the superior officers of the service. But the subordinate police were guilty of certain things. Is that information of your's hearsay?

A. Yes, hearsay.

Q. We have been told by other witnesses that have expressed opinions that Afghanistan took advantage of all these things and declared war. Is it not a fact that the Afghan Envoy in his reply to Sir Hamilton Grant said that because Martial Law was introduced in the Punjab and these things came to their notice, it encouraged them to declare war.

A. Quite. That is what I said. As a matter of fact the introduction of Martial Law in the Punjab was a contributory cause of the Afghan War.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Do you know Dr. Kitchlew and Satyapal?

A. I know Dr. Kitchlew, but not Satyapal.

Q. Were they not acting against the authorities in Amritsar?

A. It is impossible for me to say one way or the other.

Q. They were instrumental in bringing about some trouble?

A. In all probability, but I know nothing definitely.

Q. But assuming that they were, and if the authorities told them that they were not acting as they ought, then would they (the authorities) not be justified in deporting them?

A. Deportation is a measure that I do not approve of even if they were doing something wrong or not. If they were doing something wrong against the Law, there is no reason why they should not have been proceeded against.

Q. Well, they may not have been doing anything strictly illegal, but at the same time their actions and movements may have been designed to certain things which may not have been very satisfactory.

A. Even then I do not subscribe to deportations.

Q. Then according to your view, the introduction of Martial Law was due not so much because it was needed for the sake of law and order, but because certain action has been taken by the authorities which were not legal actions, so it was necessary to enable them to cover themselves?

A. That is the view to which I am inclined.

Q. You must be aware of the fact as to whether educated people in Lahore and the Punjab generally subscribed or not to the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. Yes.

Q. And a very large crowd did collect at Lahore on the 10th?

A. Yes.

Q. And they were marching towards Government House, but they were prevented from going.

A. Yes.

Q. How do you account for wire-cutting and to the rails being damaged in many parts of the province? Are not these factors enough for the authorities to deal distinctly and summarily, *i.e.*, by introducing Martial Law.

A. The view I take of these occurrences is very briefly put. First the firing at Amritsar led to the whole thing, and the rumours of what had happened at Amritsar practically created a feeling of ill-will in other districts. It having come into existence, then the question was whether, with the help of the ordinary law and the co-operation of the saner portion of the population, which was by far the larger portion, the authorities could not have maintained peace and order and prevented wire-cutting and things of a similar nature without bringing in Martial Law.

Q. So you mean to say with all these disturbances, the situation could have been controlled without recourse to Martial Law?

A. Certainly.

Q. You will agree that the people of the Punjab generally are different from other provinces, being more martial and more virile?

A. Yes.

Q. And therefore the Government of the Punjab is forced to take this factor into consideration and also the situation on the frontier?

A. Yes

Q. In view of what happened on the frontier, and the character of the people of the Punjab, would they not have been justified in associating themselves with the authorities?

A. I did not know when the trouble on the frontier actually commenced. The Government may have known the time. It is difficult to say what view one could take at a juncture such as when the frontier disturbances came into consideration.

Q. Assuming that there was fear of Afghan invasion?

A. That would depend entirely upon the seriousness of the frontier problem. I have already submitted my view independently and that is, Martial Law as a preventive measure is not justified. It is a curative thing and not a preventive thing.

Q. As regards the *hartal* there was some meeting I understand and notices were issued under the signatures of educated people in Lahore for the *Satyagraha* movement?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Was there no meeting held after Mr. Gandhi came to Lahore?

A. There was a meeting on the 6th.

Q. What happened at that meeting?

A. I was present at that meeting for merely half-an-hour. I could not tell you what happened after that. But during the time I was there a resolution was passed condemning the Rowlatt Act and passing the usual resolution. The proceedings are I believe to be found in the Conspiracy Trial.

Q. Was anything said about holding the *hartal*?

A. Not during the time that I was there. I believe no resolution as to the *hartal* was passed throughout the meeting.

Q. And to your knowledge, nobody sent notices of the *hartal*?

A. No.

Q. Have the people of the Punjab been generally loyal to the British Government?

A. Absolutely.

Q. In all difficult circumstances they have stood by the Government?

A. Yes.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Did you appear as a witness for 5 or 6 practitioners in the main Lahore Conspiracy Case? And did you make this statement:—

"I am a member of the Managing Committee of the Anjuman Islamia which controls the Badshahi Mosque. Mr. Shafi is also a member and Nawab Fateh Ali Khan is the President. I have lived in Lahore during the last 12 years. Have never heard of any political meeting being held in the Badshahi Mosque. Have never heard of any non-Moslem addressing the congregation from the pulpit. It is permissible to discuss social questions after Friday prayers, but in practice this has never been done. The pulpit is for religious use. It came as a great shock to Moslems that it was used for other purposes. My view is that the use to which the Mosque was put on the 11th and 12th practically amounted to sacrilege, and was improper."

A. Quite correct.

Q. This statement was purported to be made on the 29th May 1919. You also said then that you had not quite decided up to that date whether you were an Extremist or a Moderate?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you decided yet?

A. I will probably decide by the end of this year.

Q. Well you told us that if Mr. Gandhi had not been stopped from coming into Punjab, nothing would have happened?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you be surprised to hear that before the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest reached the people of Amritsar, murders, arson and the like had been committed there?

A. No, I would not.

Q. Then will you withdraw that portion of your statement in which you mention this?

A. That was only local. In Amritsar there was merely a local grievance.

Q. Then you stated at another of the meetings, that so far as you were aware Mr. Gandhi's propaganda of passive resistance was not preached, adopted or expounded. Would you again be surprised to hear to the contrary, according to a resolution which was passed at a meeting at which you presided? The resolution ran thus:—

"That in the event of those Bills being passed into law, in spite of the united opposition offered to them by Indians of all shades of opinion, the Indian people will be justified in having resort to such form of passive resistance" and was carried unanimously.

A. As a matter of fact the resolution which was proposed by Pandit Ram Bhaj Datt was framed by me.

Q. Then of your speech at that meeting a summary is given below:—

"The chairman, the Hon'ble Mr. Fazl-i-Hussain, before putting the last resolution to vote in his concluding remarks said he was glad to notice that the resolution (on passive resistance) had been put before them very carefully and that they had received it with that calmness which the seriousness of the subject deserved.

"Referring to the point brought out in the speeches at the meetings, he said the laws proposed were supposed to be for the good of the people, the dacoities were directed against the Indian people, and the Bills were, it was said brought forward for the protection of the people. But, asked the speaker, had the people who admittedly would be the sufferers come forward to ask for these Bills? On the other hand, was it not a fact that all those who had been opposing the Bills were men of property—the class who would suffer from anarchical crime? If anarchical crime became rampant, they were the people who would suffer. And yet they had no such fear, and had not come forward to ask Government to come to their help.

"The next point brought out in the speeches was that this was the second time, if not the first, when there was absolute unanimity among Indians. When Mrs. Besant was interned there was unanimity among the people, those who agreed with her and those who did not, were alike of one mind. This unanimity was shown in the meetings held. The present was an occasion when the unanimity was brought out in the Indian Legislative Council where all non-official Indian members had united to oppose the Bills. In their report on reforms Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford had stated that there was good reason for the complaint that non-official members did not see eye to eye with the elected members. This was an occasion when Moderates, Extremists and even reactionaries, had agreed to oppose the measures. The law enacted would thus be one which was forced from outside, and not based on the will of the people, and to which, therefore, they were not bound to subscribe. That was a principle imported from the west which they had been taught to accept as a recognized maxim of Law. Here was a measure to which the Government could not induce even a nominated member to extend his support. This was not a law, therefore, which in the eyes of law-abiding people would have the force of law.

"The matter, the speaker went on to say, was simple but serious. The law if enacted was not going to apply to most people in that Hall, and there was no merit in taking credit for being ready to resist it. Therefore the resolution (on passive resistance) was left in that form so that they could calmly and coolly deliberate on it with that common sense and sanity for which they had somehow acquired a reputation (laughter), and consult their friends and relatives, and then come to a decision for themselves, if the need for it arose. The resolution was theoretically sound, and it left them to decide when the occasion arose how to carry it into practice. (Loud applause.)

"The resolution was carried standing.

"The proceedings concluded with a vote of thanks moved by Mr. Manohar Lal, M.A., Bar.-at-Law, to the Chairman for his able conduct in the chair and car-

ried by acclamation." Is it not a correct description of what actually transpired there?

A. That is correct, but as for the speech I do not actually recollect; I think the resolution was deliberately framed with the object of not taking Gandhi's vow of passive resistance. We said that only when the Bill is passed into legislation would we decide whether passive resistance should be adopted or not.

Q. When the Act was passed there was no further resolution passed subsequent to that?

A. No.

Q. At this particular meeting of the 6th, I think you said you were present?

A. During the time that I was there, there was one resolution about cabling to the Secretary of State, which was passed.

Q. Now, at either of the meetings of the 6th April and 9th March at one of which you presided and at the other of which you seconded were the provisions of the Rowlatt Bill explained to the audience?

A. I think some of the provisions were.

Q. Can you recollect any particular portion?

A. No.

Q. Well, then we will take it that the Bill as a whole was not explained? You also said I think that you were not aware of any rumours afloat misrepresenting the provisions of the Bill. Have you read the papers?

A. I did not say that. I cannot be quite sure whether immediately before the 10th or subsequent to the 10th I had heard the rumours were afloat.

Q. You were aware that the rumours were afloat, but cannot indicate the time?

A. Yes.

Q. Then you also said that there was a pronouncement by the local Government in 1916 in connection with the Reforms Scheme?

A. 1917 if you do not mind, Mr. Herbert.

Q. Well, 1917?

Q. Where, when and by whom was this pronouncement made?

A. This pronouncement was made by the Lieutenant-Governor in the Council Chamber of the Punjab Legislative Council in his speech.

Q. When was that?

A. In 1917.

Q. Can you give us a copy?

A. I have not got it at the moment, but I can certainly let the Committee have a copy of it.

Q. Did you also have the pleasure of presiding at some other meeting recently in Lahore?

A. Yes. I presided over the Khilafat question at the public meeting.

Q. One of the resolutions passed was that all Muhammadans should refrain from participating in the peace celebrations?

A. Yes.

Mr. H. K. TREVASKIS, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Trevaskis you are Deputy Commissioner of Gurgaon district?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is that close to Delhi?

A. Yes, Sir, it is on the south.

Q. Was there any indication in the district itself of unrest prior to these disturbances?

A. No, Sir, it was a particularly quiet district.

Q. What sort of *hartal* was held in the Gurgaon district?

A. Originally the first *hartal* was at Rewari on the 6th. In the rest of the district there was no *hartal* on the 6th. Then the next *hartal* that took place was after the 11th or 12th, but there was no *hartal* immediately on the arrest of Mr. Gandhi which took place on the 9th in the Gurgaon district. That goes to show that there was no spontaneous feeling in the district about *hartal* and that it was engineered from Delhi.

Q. Have you any evidence that Delhi influence was brought to bear upon the people of your district to observe *hartal*?

A. Yes, I have got reports made to me at the time. I have got evidence of witnesses who can come forward, and I think you have selected some of them. All this evidence goes to show that influence was brought to bear from Delhi. I have a few other witnesses who are not selected, but who will come forward to give evidence.

Q. But that Delhi influence was confined to getting the people of the district to observe *hartal*. It did not go beyond that, did it, or have you any information that leads you to believe that pressure was brought to bear upon the district from Delhi to get them to go beyond holding a *hartal*?

A. There was a meeting of the *zamindars* at a place in the Delhi Province to try and get them to stop paying land-revenue and I think income-tax too, and one or two emissaries travelled up and down by train, and I think they tried to induce people to stop income-tax and land-revenue. I believe Surendranath Sarma also preached to that effect.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Where does Surendranath Sarma live?

A. I don't know, Sir.

Q. And have you got any notes of his speech reported by the C. I. D. or by the regular police?

A. I had reports made to me at the time.

Q. Have you any extracts from his speech? What did he say?

A. He told people to refuse to pay land-revenue and income-tax. He also said that Government intended to throw beef into Hindu temples and swine flesh into Muhammadan mosques at a meeting.

Q. What evidence had you to believe that he was sent by any of the Delhi leaders?

A. That is not alleged. I only say he was an emissary. He came from Delhi.

Q. He might have come from Delhi without being sent by any of the Delhi leaders. The mere fact of his coming from Delhi does not prove that he was sent by the leaders of Delhi?

A. I understand that the people of Gurgaon realised that he came from Delhi with some sort of authoritative powers.

Q. Was anything known as to who had sent him?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. You did not record any evidence to the effect that either Shraddhanand or Dr. Ansari or anybody else sent him?

A. No.

Q. Then with regard to the other evidence on this point, can you give me the name of any other person who came to your district *from* Delhi as an emissary?

A. I have got evidence *more or less of 30* people. Some were identified by name.

Q. Surely in those days there was no restriction on travelling, and therefore naturally people from Gurgaon would go to Delhi and from Delhi to Gurgaon. But is there any evidence to show by whom these emissaries were sent to Gurgaon and as to who asked the people of Gurgaon to do anything more than observe *hartal*? Is there any evidence before you of any person having come and induced people to commit violent acts or anything like that?

A. There was a big meeting held by the *zamindars* at a place called Moulabund in the Delhi province, and a man, whose name was not known but who, it was subsequently ascertained, belonged to Jeypur village, publicly announced that people should not pay land-revenue to the Government even under pain of death.

Q. This meeting was held not in Gurgaon?

A. But the Gurgaon villagers were invited to it and there was an attempt made to hold another meeting at Salapur village.

Q. Even the police were not able to find out the name of this man?

A. This evidence was given to me by a Muhammadan gentleman of Faridabad and not by the police.

Q. And, therefore, so far as you are concerned, there is no evidence in your possession to connect this man with any of the leaders of the Delhi movement?

A. Not definitely. Everyone understood that these people were speaking with authority, otherwise the public would not have listened to them in any other way. There is our telegram which at some stage I should like to produce.

The President.—What is that telegram?

A. It purports to have been sent by Dr. Ansari, to the Secretary of the Panchayat, Faridabad, and the evidence that was given by Dewan, son of Chiranjilal, was to this effect, that the people of Faridabad were boycotted by Delhi because they had not observed *hartal* on the 6th April, that they had to suffer a good deal from this boycott, and finally, on the 12th April after consultation they asked Delhi for what period the *hartal* should remain and when it should discontinue. Then this telegram was received saying "Delhi market opening definitely to-morrow, hope Faridabad follow example. Signed Ansari."

The President.—That is encouraging them to open, and not to close?

A. Yes, Sir, but it shows a form of connection between Delhi and the district.

The Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith.—What is the date of that telegram?

A. The 12th.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. You say in your statement "though this propaganda failed in its intentions and found Gurgaon an unsatisfactory breeding ground, the latter district was not entirely without predisposing causes of unrest, which primarily affected the municipal areas and only secondarily and through them, the villages." What do you mean by saying "this propaganda failed in its intention?" What was the intention?

A. I wrote that quickly, I mean the presumed intentions, namely, spreading unrest in the district generally mainly by means of *hartal* and resistance to Government, such as not paying land-revenue.

Q. Who were the organizers of this propaganda at Delhi?

A. That I don't know. But I know that Dr. Ansari was one of them and Shraddhanand Swami was another.

Q. What did they preach or say?

A. In Gurgaon one only observed the results of the propaganda. We do not know what they were saying originally.

Q. Here you say that the propaganda at Delhi failed in its presumed intentions. What were they?

A. I say I may have written it. I wrote this as part of a report at the time. By intentions I mean what people understood to be the intentions, namely of spreading unrest generally.

Q. Either from their speeches or from leaflets?

A. From these emissaries who were coming in the district.

Q. Only from the emissaries?

A. Yes.

Q. What ground had you to connect these emissaries with this unrest unless they preached similar doctrines that might possibly be a ground for connecting them, though not necessarily?

A. The only thing is that when you have got about 30 emissaries of some kind all going from one place, you may deduce that there was some organization sending them. Of course it is only a matter of deduction. I am not prepared to give any proofs that they came from a central organization there.

Q. Is it not possible that they might have felt in the same way as Gandhi who started this movement?

A. I think it is conceivable, but I think that people in Gurgaon generally understood that there was an organization and the fact that they were sent from Delhi to Faridabad to give instructions points to this.

Q. And these people did not preach any resistance to authority in the Gurgaon District?

A. Yes, this man Surendranath Sarma preached it, but as I said it was difficult to find out before what these emissaries were saying. I mean we only got vague reports at first, but there is no doubt they were generally preaching resistance to Government. For instance, in Gurgaon itself one of the *banias* refused to give any supplies for the rallying posts and in other ways.

Q. It is from those things that you drew the inference that probably it was due to some influence from Delhi?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. There is no evidence of any sort that it is the general condition which produced that impression?

A. No.

Mr. R. C. BOLSTER, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak.

By the President—

Q. You are Deputy Commissioner of the district of Rohtak?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Is that a large district in the Punjab?

A. It is one of the smaller districts, it is a three-tahsil district.

Q. Is it situated near Gurgaon?

A. It is 44 miles west of Delhi.

Q. Now as regards the events in your district, was a *hartal* held in any of the towns?

A. Yes, Sir. You will see a list of the places where *hartal* was held in paragraph 3 of my evidence. In addition to that I find from police reports and the evidence of witnesses that *hartal* was also held at Jhajjar on the 6th April and at Gohana on the 15th April.

Q. The first one that was held at Rohtak was on the 6th?

A. There was one held at Sonepat on the 6th, at Jhajjar on the 11th, at Beri on the 12th, and at Sonepat on the 15th?

Q. On later dates were there *hartals* held?

A. No, Sir, nothing later than that.

Q. Did you notice in your district any disturbing incidents indicative of violent behaviour on the part of the people throughout the period of April?

A. I only joined the district on the 18th March. During the last week of March, I was out on tour.

Q. I would like to know what occurred in your district in the nature of rioting?

Mr. Herbert.—The witness is produced in connection with the pressure exercised from Delhi, which caused excitement in the Rohtak District.

The President.—Now what caused the people in your district to hold a *hartal*?

A. Pressure from Delhi, Sir.

Q. What makes you say that?

A. I have a number of facts to show that pressure from Delhi was exercised or that people sought inspiration from Delhi.

Q. You might shortly enumerate them.

A. I got a report which I have noted in paragraph 3 of my printed evidence from the Deputy Superintendent of Police. He had been sent to tour on the Delhi border, and he reported that a big meeting would be held at Delhi, the object of which was to send emissaries from Delhi to the adjoining districts to take up *hartal*. Then I was told in a Police report that Jhajjar was urged by pressure from Delhi to take up *hartal* before the 3rd April. I am told that at Gohana *hartal* was observed on the 15th April.

Q. These are very vague reports. Have you anything definite in the way of information about Delhi influence?

A. Yes, Sir, I have in the judgment of Bahadurgarh case. I have made reference there to the speeches made by Bashir Ahmad who came from Delhi.

Q. Is that the only thing?

A. He was a Delhi man and he was also collecting subscriptions in aid of those who were wounded or killed in the riots.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Before Delhi became the capital, it was part of the Punjab, was it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. For this district of Rohtak, I take it, Delhi would be a principal town for business purposes?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. I suppose naturally Delhi being within easy reach, people of your district would frequently visit the place?

A. That is so.

Q. And of course in ordinary times people go to and from between Delhi and Rohtak in the ordinary way?

A. Yes.

Q. And you would expect, apart from supposing that there was anything by way of a conspiracy, that Delhi even now, and all the more so because it is the capital of India, would exercise a certain amount of influence on the surrounding districts?

A. Yes, Sir.

Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate.—Have you anything tangible to show that pressure was brought to bear from Delhi?

A. I have one thing which I think is important, and it is this. A deputation of Jat *zamindars* from some eight villages to the south and west of the district went to some Muhammadan Rajput village and preached doctrines which they said they had got from Delhi, and the object of that deputation was to make the residents of that place who had till then stood out join the disorders or in the protest . . . .

The President.—Protest against the Rowlatt legislation?

A. I can tell you exactly what they said. I have an abstract from the police report.....

The President.—At the present moment I am not satisfied with the material so far laid before us.

Witness.—40 or 45 people came from the villages of Duran, etc., on the 11th April and at a mass meeting Ramlal, Jat, preached Hindu-Muhammadan unity and advised Muhammadans to give up cow-killing. Another man also got up and gave a vehement harangue and said that when Hindus went into mosques and Muhammadans into temples it would be a good thing. He exhorted unity and said that Hindus and Muhammadans had drunk water out of one glass at Delhi. He also asked for subscriptions for the wounded in the Delhi riots.

Q. Is Bahadurgarh in your district?

A. Yes.

Q. Was really a great attempt made to wreck a Mail train?

A. Yes; an attempt was made on the morning of the 14th April to damage a bridge in order to wreck the No. 4-Down Mail from Lahore which was supposed to carry European wireless operatives or troops.

Q. Was there any evidence produced in the case to show that this was incited by people from Delhi?

A. The court in its judgment says that Bashir Ahmad came from Delhi and preached to a meeting on two occasions.....

Q. Preached to what effect?

A. I can show you the judgment.

The President.—That is only about the speech that was made, but there is nothing to show that there was anything behind this movement to instigate people in the neighbouring districts.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. This Bahadurgarh case is still under appeal before the Chief Court?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In this case the Assistant Station Master and the Railway employees were the chief culprits? The first three or four persons were employed at the station?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And is it not a fact that even according to the evidence of the approver in that case, it was alleged that it was expected that no train would come?

A. No, Sir, I cannot say that.

Q. Is it not a fact that according to the evidence in that case it was expected that no train would come?

A. I do not know. I am not aware of it.

Q. Is it not a fact that in that case it was said that the whole trouble was due to a certain thing done by the Assistant Station Master?

A. I understand a private message came through on the 13th April saying that a strike was taking place at Shakurpur station.

Mr. R. B. WHITEHEAD, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Ambala.

By the President—

Q. You are Deputy Commissioner, Ambala?

A. I am Settlement Officer. I officiated from the 11th April to the 19th June during an interregnum.

Will you allow me, Sir, to give my evidence in the form of a brief statement?

The President.—You may take it for granted that I am not going to ask you about everything in your statement. I want to ask you about one or two things only. In the first place, on what dates did a *hartal* take place in your district?

A. There was a *hartal* on the 6th April, and a solitary *hartal* on the 13th April at Ambala Cantonment.

Q. Then your district includes the cantonment and seems to have 26,000 inhabitants?

A. The city has 26,000 inhabitants, while the cantonment has about 52,000 inhabitants.

Q. How do you account for the *hartal* that took place in your district?

A. The *hartal* on the 6th was part of the general *hartal*, that is the All-India *hartal*. I took over charge on the 11th. On Sunday morning of the 13th, I rode through Ambala City and found business was going on as usual. But I was told that there was a complete *hartal* in Ambala Cantonment. So it appeared that on the 6th April there was a *hartal* in Ambala City and not a single shop was closed in Ambala Cantonment. On the 13th April not a single shop was closed in Ambala City and there was a complete *hartal* in the Ambala Cantonment. This struck me as rather a curious thing and I was keen to enquire into it. I was told that the *hartal* on the 13th April in Ambala Cantonment was entirely due to pressure from Delhi. This was the common opinion and this was communicated to me by all my informants and these opinions are supported by the following facts. The Ambala Cantonment Sadar Bazar has intimate business and social relations with Delhi. At least five prominent dry-goods merchants whose names I can supply, are residents of Delhi doing business in the Cantonment and get their stores from Delhi. I can give the names of 10 cloth merchants who get their supplies from Delhi and one or two have, it is alleged, admitted that the influence from Delhi consisted of social pressure and also threats of boycott by the Delhi wholesale firms. I am informed that threatening letters were received between the 6th and the 13th April by various cloth merchants whose names I can give if required. On the afternoon of the 13th April there was a mass meeting held in the Ambala Cantonment, the chairman of which was Rai Benarsi Dass, mill-owner.....

Q. As I understand, the influence you refer to was the influence brought to bear upon the traders of your district by shop-keepers in Delhi and it does not go beyond that?

A. Well, beyond the fact that the usual run of sinister rumours were floating about the districts, and I never caught them up though I pursued them as hard as I could,

Q. In your district were there any riots or disturbances?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Well, you have been very fortunate?

A. Yes, I admit that.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Ambala is on a direct straight line by railway from Karnal?

A. Yes, it is on the main lines of both the East Indian and the North-Western Railway.

Q. It has very good communications with Delhi?

A. Yes.

Q. It looks upon Delhi as a sort of capital city?

A. No, I don't think so, but there are very good communications with Delhi.

Q. Don't these traders you were speaking of get their stocks from Delhi?

A. Ambala City is a small country town whose chief business is collecting grain for export, but the Cantonment Sadar Bazar is the bazar of the Cantonment and was founded to supply goods to the soldiers and people of Ambala Cantonment, so they import European stores and imported cloth, and they get practically all these from Delhi; so the circumstances of Cantonment Sadar Bazar are rather unusual.

Q. And it was the Cantonment Sadar Bazar that was affected and it was the ordinary city which was not?

A. The ordinary city was only partially affected.

Q. The Delhi emissaries made very little headway in the city?

A. I do not think they were necessarily emissaries, but the Delhi influence was, I think, undoubtedly manifested in what took place in Ambala Cantonment on the 13th of April.

By the Hon'ble Pandit Jagat Narayan—

Q. Were these letters produced before you?

A. No.

Q. You have never read them?

A. I as Deputy Commissioner had nothing to do with Ambala Sadar Bazar.

Q. Therefore the boycott letters have never been produced?

A. No.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. I suppose you have a fairly strong garrison at Ambala?

A. Yes, it is a very big Cantonment.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Ambala was in the old Delhi Division before the creation of the Delhi Province?

A. Yes.

Q. And it is a great centre of railways? Railways go to Kalka, Lahore and elsewhere?

A. I would not call it a great centre; it is a big junction. There is not a large railway colony there.

Q. It may not be like Lahore, but it is one of the large junctions?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. The main lines of the East Indian and North-Western Railways go through Ambala to Delhi *viâ* Karnal and *viâ* Saharanpur?

A. Yes, the Delhi-Saharanpur and the Delhi-Ludhiana lines cross there.

Q. There were no attempted derailments of trains and wire-cutting?

A. There was one case of wire-cutting near Barara station.

Q. How far is that from Ambala?

A. It is the second station from the Cantonment towards Saharanpur.

Q. It took place on the Cantonment side?

A. It took place on the Saharanpur side of the Cantonment.

Q. You say some butchers came from Delhi to stop cow-killing at Ambala, but it produced no effect whatever?

A. I have no proof of that, but I have no reason to believe it is untrue.

Q. You say "about the middle of April a deputation of Delhi butchers came and endeavoured to stop 'cow-killing.'" That came to your notice?

A. It came to my notice.

Q. Also you say at this time an emissary of Swami Shraddhanand arrived, presumably from Delhi, but had a cold reception at Ambala?

A. Yes.

At Lahore, Monday, the 22nd December 1919.

PRESENT.

The Hon'ble LORD HUNTER.

The Hon'ble Mr. Justice RANKIN.
The Hon'ble Mr. W. F. RICE, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.
The Hon'ble Mr. THOMAS SMITH.
Sardar Sahibzada SULTAN AHMAD KHAN.

Mr. H. WILLIAMSON, M.B.E., I.P., *Secretary*.

Mr. L. L. TOMKINS, C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General of Police.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Tomkins, you are Deputy Inspector-General of Police?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Were you asked to deal with the question of securing the conviction of the promoters and leaders in the disturbances?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And had you also to explore the organisation, if any, underlying the disturbances?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You made your investigations I think in conjunction with Mr. Cocks, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department?

A. That is correct, Sir.

Q. And did you utilise the staff of that department as it stood?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Was that in order not to dislocate the existing organisation?

A. Yes, Sir, and to avoid the delay of getting extra men.

Q. Did that arrangement work smoothly?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you divide the disturbed area into three sections—

(*a*) Amritsar and country south of Lahore, including Kasur and Khem Karn, etc.,

(*b*) Lahore headquarters, and

(*c*) Gujranwala and places north of Lahore?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. Did you then divide the staff of the Criminal Investigation Department into three equal sections?

A. Yes.

Q. To the first section were deputed Mr. Howell, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Branch, and Sardar Bahadur Sukha Singh, Deputy Superintendent?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And they had one-third of the staff of Inspectors, sub-inspectors and subordinates of the Criminal Investigation Department?

A. That is correct, Sir.

Q. To the second section were deputed Mr. Bowing, Superintendent of Police, Political Branch, and Khan Sahib Abdul Aziz, Deputy Superintendent, with a similar staff?

A. Correct, Sir.

Q. And to the third was Mr. Ikram-ul-Haq, Deputy Superintendent, detailed? I think Mr. Isemonger was originally selected to take charge of the third section, but he had other work to do?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And did you issue instructions to the Superintendents of Police of the districts concerned?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What instructions did you send to them?

A. I sent them the names of the people who were to help them, that is, the Criminal Investigation staff, and asked that they should assist the enquiry. I gave them the lines on which the enquiry was to be held and I asked that the cases which were complete should be sent in without delay; and that the cases which required further investigation should be kept until they were ready.

Q. As we know, two Special Commissions were set up in order to try the more important cases. Did you detail certain officers for work at these Commissions?

A. There were four Special Commissions in all.

Q. Did you detail certain officers to attend to them?

A. I got them deputed by the Inspector-General, court inspectors and a court staff.

Q. What arrangements did you make in connection with the work?

A. One court inspector and one court sub-inspector, together with clerks and orderlies, were deputed to each court and they were instructed to carry on the ordinary court duties in accordance with the requirements of the courts.

Q. What were the duties of those officers?

A. They had to arrange for the summoning of witnesses, to get the processes issued, to have the papers and exhibits and every other document or article in connection with the case present at the time required, and they had to keep those documents when the courts were not sitting, and they had to maintain a register of the cases sent for trial and the results.

Q. In consequence of the numbers of people involved, were the lockups in a congested state?

A. Yes, Sir, they were at the beginning, and it was in order to relieve them that I called upon the police to send up the cases which were complete immediately.

Q. And were those cases dealt with as soon as possible?

A. As soon as possible.

Q. The cases that were dealt with at first were cases where the evidence was readily available?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. But if further investigation was required?

A. Then they could not be immediately sent up for trial and had to wait till the investigation was complete.

Q. Was there any case purposely delayed?

A. Not to my knowledge, except for the completion of the investigation.

Q. You issued instructions explaining the new procedure to be adopted and the method of preparing the précis of evidence?

A. I did, Sir.

Q. And each case with its précis of evidence was to be accompanied to the office of the Criminal Investigation Department by an officer of police who had taken part in the investigation and by the accused persons?

A. That is correct, Sir.

Q. What procedure then followed?

A. The case was brought by the officer who had investigated to the office of the Criminal Investigation Department, where I was sitting, and I vetted it with him, asking questions which were necessary to elucidate information which was not readily available from the papers, and if I was satisfied that the case was a good one, I either took it personally or, where it was a plain case, I sent it to the Legal Remembrancer, who again vetted it from the legal point of view, and if he found there was a *primâ facie* case, he framed the charges and sent it for trial to the Commission.

Q. Looking at the situation as a whole, what view have you to express as to the efficiency of the officers?

A. I found them extremely good. The police did their work extremely well as far as I am aware.

Q. And you yourself closely examined them upon the different cases?

A. In every case, Sir.

Q. I think you were faced with a considerable difficulty in consequence of the magnitude of the cases?

A. That is so.

Q. Did that render it difficult to place the cases before the courts in a form that would not lead to confusion?

A. It did, that was a difficulty.

Q. I think the procedure in the Commissions, although they were Summary General Court-Martial in a sense, had a pretty lengthy procedure?

A. It was very lengthy, very detailed and very careful.

Q. In some cases, as we know, large numbers of people were charged with the same offence, and in the same indictment?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And particularly in the Lahore and Amritsar conspiracy cases?

A. That is so.

Q. Did you find in these cases it was difficult to deal with the people separately except in the group system?

A. The difficulty was to keep the cases down in point of size and so prevent complication at the trials. There was a mass of identification evidence which was very difficult to deal with.

Q. As the work increased, were more cases sent to be tried by Summary Courts-Martial than had originally been the case?

A. That was the case.

Q. Why was that?

A. Because the Commissions were unable to take any more work.

Q. And the Commissions I think were limited in the sentences they were entitled to pronounce. They were not entitled to pronounce sentences of short imprisonment?

A. That is also the case.

Q. I suppose you came to consider the sentences that Summary Courts-Martial could pronouce adequate for the less serious offences?

A. That is so, Sir.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Did you notice any difference in the procedure in the three different sections, or were they all the same?

A. In the three different sections. I am not quite clear.

Q. You told us you divided the work into three different sections and had a staff for each?

A. No, I noticed no difference.

Q. When you began your work, I gather that the local magistrate had already arrested everybody he thought there was evidence against and these people were under arrest at the time you began; is that so?

A. Most of them.

Q. Now with regard to these three sections, in some places is it not the case that people, before trial, were taken before a magistrate for remand from time to time and in other places that system was not adopted?

A. I have no knowledge of that, Sir; I was not there.

Q. Had you anything to do with considering the question whether persons whose cases could not be investigated in a short time should be admitted to bail?

A. No, I had nothing to do with that. No question of bail came before me at all.

Q. Had you any difficulty as regards the question of commitment of accused persons owing to the large numbers of witnesses concerned?

A. There was difficulty in several cases in the courts and in some instances the courts required the accused to show cause for which they wanted the witnesses. It did not come really within the scope of my work, but I knew of it.

Q. Could you tell me from your knowledge whether it was the general practice in the Summary Courts to refuse to summon, on behalf of the accused, witnesses except from the immediate neighbourhood?

A. I had nothing to do with the procedure of Summary Courts because I was working at the provincial headquarters, and the Summary Courts were working at the headquarters of the different districts. They did not come within the scope of my work.

Q. The decision whether some witnesses should be examined or not rested, I take it, with the court?

A. Yes.

Q. And the officers deputed simply carried out the orders of the court in that respect?

A. Quite so.

Q. Did you have occasion ever, in the course of your duties, to visit any of these lockups or places where the persons accused were being detained?

A. I went down to the City Kotwali on one occasion in Lahore.

Q. On that occasion was the accommodation for prisoners reasonable according to ordinary standards?

A. I think so; the lockups were full, but they were not overcrowded.

Q. The men you saw there, were they kept in solitary confinement?

A. No, Sir.

Q. Was any temporary accommodation employed at that place or was it the ordinary accommodation?

A. The ordinary accommodation was used.

Q. As regards the Summary Courts, first of all they tried cases of alleged offences against the Martial Law proclamations?

A. Yes.

Q. Apart from that, certain officers had power to try cases for offences committed before Martial Law came into existence?

A. I do not know. My duty was principally with the Commissions sitting in Lahore, and I have very little, or practically no knowledge of what the Summary Courts-Martial did at the headquarters of the districts. I was unable to visit any of the headquarters or districts owing to the pressure at Lahore.

Q. When the investigation of a case was completed and it came up to you and you did not think it very serious, did you decide or did the Legal Remembrancer decide to send it back for instructions to the Summary Court?

A. He and I in consultation.

Q. As regards cases you returned for trial by Summary Court, were they cases of offences committed before the introduction of Martial Law?

A. They were cases in which no overt act had been committed.

Q. Yes, but in cases where you determined that the men should be tried by a Summary Court, were they cases of alleged offences committed during the riots and before Martial Law, or were they cases of offences committed after Martial Law had been introduced?

A. I think they all came into the jurisdiction of Martial Law.

Q. I dare say they did, but I am trying to get my mind clear on the question whether the bulk of these people would be people arrested in connection with the riots?

A. Yes.

Q. Some of them would be arrested no doubt after the introduction of Martial Law, but other offences were offences committed before Martial Law had been proclaimed in that area?

A. There must have been men like that amongst them.

Q. And among the cases you returned to be tried by Summary Courts you included a good many cases where the offence triable was committed prior to the introduction of Martial Law?

A. It may have been so. I kept no notes regarding that particular point.

Q. Then when an accused was returned to the Summary Court, was he returned with the charge framed under the Indian Penal Code?

A. No, I think they were sent back without the charge being framed. We decided whether they were fit cases to go before the Commissions, and if they were not they were returned without a charge being framed.

Q. But for purposes of the investigation before you I take it the investigation was always with a view to showing whether there was a case or not under some section of the Indian Penal Code or other statutory law?

A. That is so. The police put their own sections or according to their lights.

Q. Was it the fact that the Commissions were very busy that induced you to send a good many of these cases to Summary Courts?

A. If the Commissions had had the time to take them, we should undoubtedly have sent them all to the Commissions, but we found the Courts so congested and their time booked up so much in advance that Mr. Ellis and I came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to return all cases in which no overt act had been committed.

Q. Of course certain offences you would always send before the Commission, graver offences?

A. Yes.

Q. Any question of waging war?

A. That would always go to the Commission.

Q. Any question of sedition?

A. Quite so; the only cases that were returned on that account were those in which it was sought to prove that the man had been a member of an unlawful assembly, where no overt act had been committed, and for that it was considered that a sentence of two years' simple imprisonment would be ample.

Q. The Summary Courts had no cases before them charged under the section about sedition?

A. No cases that came through me. In fact I may say they never had them.

Q. There were some cases, I think, where the charge ultimately alleged was that of being a member of an unlawful assembly and committing mischief by fire?

A. There may have been cases of that nature.

Q. Was that a charge which you would send before the Summary Courts or before the Commission?

Q. If the mischief committed by fire was the portion of a building, it was invariably sent before a Commission. That would come into the category of an overt act.

Q. In connection with the attacks upon communications, I think there were a good many persons tried under sections of the Railway Act or Posts and Telegraphs Act?

A. Yes.

Q. Those I think were mostly tried locally by Summary Courts?

A. Some of them were.

Q. Some were not?

A. Some of them. A large majority of them went before the Commission.

Q. I rather gather from the printed statement put before us by the Legal Remembrancer, Mr. Ellis, who is not in India at the moment, that, in spite of the fact that it was considered that every person who took part in agitation leading to riot might be held to be guilty of conspiracy, the only persons who were charged with conspiracy in that sense were the accused in the three conspiracy cases, the Lahore, Amritsar and the Gujranwala conspiracy cases, is that so?

A. I have no notes upon the point, but I think that is the correct statement.

Q. I understand that the reason why that statement was made was that it was desired to have a judicial finding upon the question whether there had been a conspiracy in fact or not in these three different cases?

A. I know he held that view, but it really does not come into the scope of my police work.

Q. You were not the person who decided it?

A. I had nothing to do with the framing of the charges; it did not come into the scope of my duties at all.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. How long have you been connected with the Punjab?

A. Since 1901.

Q. How long have you been at the head of the C. I. D.?

A. Over four years.

Q. Were you in the C. I. D. before also?

A. I took over charge in the C. I. D. in September 1914, and in one capacity or another I was in it till January 1919, about 4 years and 2 months.

Q. Then in your capacity as head of the C. I. D. you were in constant touch with what was going on in the province?

A. I am expected to be.

Q. Taking these various districts of Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala where Martial Law was proclaimed, what was the state of the political parties in those places?

A. At what time?

Q. Before the disturbances, say in February or March

A. It was apparent that there was a distinct feeling working up. Up to the time I left the C. I. D. in January, I noticed there was a growing feeling of unrest.

Q. You left in January this year?

A. Yes. When I gave over charge, I had already observed a growing unrest in the principal towns of the Punjab, especially in those you mentioned.

Q. Throughout the province?

A. No. I won't go so far as that. It was apparently Lahore, Amritsar—these two certainly.

Q. What was that due to?

A. It was due in part to economic causes; apparently, I think, to the Turkish question, also to, I think, the general unrest caused by the war.

Q. In what sense was it a general unrest?

A. I think the war has upset the whole world. It was apparent in every country in the world.

Q. Were there any political or other organisations with the object of subverting Government?

A. I do not think there was any organisation in connection with the subverting of Government. But there was certainly an organisation organised against the constituted authority.

Q. In what way?

A. It was apparent in the newspapers; it was apparent in the speeches made from the platforms.

Q. I asked about some organisation?

A. The organisation was apparent in the newspapers.

Q. That was the inference from what you read in the newspapers?

A. Yes.

Q. I think you are not aware of any organisation?

A. Not in the Punjab.

Q. You mentioned two places?

A. There was no organisation in the Punjab; not so far as I am aware of, but later on of course there were local conspiracies which were started in the principal towns.

Q. Local conspiracies in the principal towns?

A. Not in all the principal towns. In Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala.

Q. In three towns?

A. And I may also include Kasur.

Q. What was the nature of these conspiracies? Let us take, for instance, Lahore?

A. The conspiracies were constituted by the leading agitators who were subsequently convicted.

Q. What did they do?

A. They conspired.

Q. Conspired to do what?

A. To agitate and excite people against Government.

Q. In what manner?

A. By holding meetings, making speeches.

Q. Which meetings you refer to?

A. Those held in Lahore. There were several held in Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala. There were two, I think, in Kasur.

Q. You were aware as to what was said in those meetings?

A. I read the speeches during the enquiries. I have not got the reports here.

Q. What was said in those meetings?

A. To sum up, generally, the speeches were very wild and violent.

Q. And who were those speakers who made violent speeches?

A. I cannot give you the names. I have not got the reports of the meetings here. I went through them at the time of my enquiry, when the information was put forward in the précis of evidence.

Q. May I take it that the conspiracy, in your opinion, consisted of holding of meetings and making of speeches?

A. Yes.

Q. Nothing beyond that?

A. In various places, emissaries were discovered. They were sent out from the different centres. For instance, emissaries from Amritsar visited Kasur.

Q. What did they do there?

A. They went there to spread sedition.

Q. What did they do there?

A. I do not know; we never got them. Their presence was reported. They came there and spread unrest by means of threatening the shopkeepers that they would boycott their shops.

Q. They told them to shut their shops?

A. That if they did not fall in with them, their supplies would be cut off.

Q. What is the agitation you refer to?

A. The holding of the *hartal.*

Q. That is, if the Kasur people did not hold a *hartal* their supplies would be cut off?

A. It was done in Kasur, and also in Ambala and in Rohtak.

Q. By whom?

A. By people from Delhi. People from Lahore also visited Karnal.

Q. Those are Delhi people who went to Amritsar?

A. Delhi people.

Q. The Amritsar people only went so far as Kasur?

A. So far as I know, they certainly went to Kasur; they might have gone to other places also.

Q. We were just talking about Lahore. Nobody went from Lahore anywhere?

A. I cannot say; they might have done.

Q. You would know it?

A. I should not necessarily know it.

Q. Then may I take it that so far as Lahore and Amritsar are concerned, the only form of conspiracy that took place was agitation started at these meetings and also the inducing of people to shut their shops?

A. I include also the newspaper articles, speeches from platforms, and emissaries.

Q. Emissaries to ask people to shut their shops?

A. Yes, under threats that they would cut off their supplies if they did not obey.

Q. Nothing more happened?

A. Something more might have happened.

Q. What about Gujranwala?

A. Emissaries had been present at Chuharkana in the Gujranwala District and the probability is that they also went up to Lahore which is quite close to Gujranwala.

Q. Did the Gujranwala people come from Gujranwala to Lahore and induce the people to shut their shops there?

A. I cannot say; the two places were so close to each other.

Q. You have no definite knowledge.

A. We have not got emissaries there.

Q. In Gujranwala, did any conspiracy take place? Any agitation, any meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. Are there any newspapers there in Gujranwala?

A. The newspapers from Lahore circulated in Gujranwala.

Q. So far as the people of Gujranwala were concerned, the form of agitation that took place there was through meetings only?

A. No; I think they had access to Lahore newspapers.

Q. They also wrote to the Lahore newspapers?

A. They had access to the Lahore newspapers. That is to say, the Lahore papers circulated in Gujranwala.

Q. The Lahore people agitating and the Gujranwala people reading the reports of the agitation in the newspapers are different things. What did the Gujranwala people do except reading the newspapers?

A. I think they agitated by means of meetings and by wild and violent speeches.

Q. In the meetings?

A. In the meetings; as I said before, there was a local conspiracy, agitators pulling the wires and so on.

Q. How did the conspiracy show itself? Was it through meetings?

A. Through meetings; through the secret meetings that were held there.

Q. Were there secret meetings?

A. There were secret meetings in Gujranwala to which the public would not be admitted. Just the same in Amritsar and Lahore too.

Q. And you have got the reports of these?

A. All the information that we had was put forward at the trials.

Q. The speeches of the secret meetings were put forward?

A. Yes.

Q. Besides the three districts, according to your information, in your opinion, was any other district or headquarters where there was any agitation against the Government, or any sedition?

A. Because a *hartal* constitutes the cutting off of unrest and as I have just said emissaries went from Delhi to Ambala and Rohtak.

Q. At Ambala? Was there any disturbance at Ambala?

A. A *hartal* was held there much against the wish of the shopkeepers.

Q. And that was in connection with a conspiracy?

A. I think it was the beginning of it.

Q. *Hartal* was the beginning of the conspiracy?

A. I do not quite follow.

Q. *Hartal* was not the result of conspiracy?

A. It depends how you look at it.

Q. You said there were other districts beyond these three where there was some conspiracy? You mentioned Ambala and Rohtak?

A. I would say that they constituted the *hartal* against the authority of the Government; that probably constituted the beginning of the conspiracy.

Q. A *hartal* against the constituted authority of Government?

A. A general *hartal.*

Q. How is a *hartal* against the constituted authority?

A. Because a *hartal* constitutes the cutting off of supplies which is a recognised form of warfare.

Q. Cutting off of supplies from Government officials?

A. That is a well known form of warfare.

Q. And *hartal* takes that form?

A. It naturally does; because the shopkeepers shut their shops.

Q. They may do so on account of sorrow or any other thing?

A. That might be for a short time. Here the motive is absent.

Q. That is, cutting off supplies?

A. They would open their shops after a short time; besides the whole city would not do it at once, and that for a long period.

Q. *Hartal* then means that everybody should shut their shops?

A. Yes.

Q. Then the general closing of shops would constitute defiance of authority?

A. If it is done with the object of cutting off the supplies from Government officials.

Q. That was the object imported into it when they held the *hartal*?

A. I think it was done with the object of starving the Government officials.

Q. *Hartal* is also observed on other occasions?

A. It may be.

Q. It may not be to cut off supplies?

A. If the *hartal* is held with some other object it results in the cutting off of supplies.

Q. Is it also not a form of protest if there is any ground to show their displeasure or certain other thing?

A. It might be.

Q. Are you not aware that a *hartal* was started with the object of protesting against the passing of the Rowlatt Act?

A. This particular one.

Q. All these *hartals* which resulted in some places in disturbances were held because Mr. Gandhi started the movement?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. It was with the object of protesting against the Bill and not of waging war or cutting off of the supplies?

A. I think the prolonged *hartal* which he organised and which went on here in Lahore for some 15 days or so, was done with the object of preventing Government officials and Europeans generally from obtaining supplies.

Q. It caused inconveniences to everybody, naturally.

A. Yes.

Q. This *hartal* you regard as making war against Government because it cut off supplies?

A. Yes.

Q. How many lockups did you visit during the period?

A. I think only one—in Lahore.

Q. You do not know anything as to what was done in Amritsar?

A. Not in regard to the lockup.

Q. Was there sufficient room for the people who were put in there?

A. I could not say. I had no complaints made to me.

Q. You had no complaints as to the conditions prevailing there?

A. Everybody who came before me had an opportunity of doing so.

Q. Did they come before you.

A. Practically all did. Except those cases in which from papers it appeared that it was unnecessary to send to the Commission.

Q. Only those cases which came up before you?

A. There were those cases which from an examination of the papers I thought unnecessary to send to the Commission on account of the Commission being over-worked; I took the papers for having them put to the Legal Remembrancer, and in those circumstances I did not see them.

Q. Do I understand that you had dealt with more important cases, more serious cases?

A. All those that were brought in to me I had to deal with.

Q. I understand you to say when you first dealt with a case if you had any legal difficulty you sent it to the Legal Remembrancer?

A. Not necessarily: two of the important cases I took to him and discussed with him.

Q. Whether to send them to the Commission or not?

A. It might be a legal point. I might want his advice from a legal point of view. I saw him most days; sometimes 2 or 3 times a day.

Q. What were the cases which you regarded as serious offences in your opinion and which you thought necessary should be tried by a Commission? Which were the cases?

A. All those in which rioting was committed.

Q. So if anybody took part in rioting, if he helped the burning of railways, that case would be sent to a Commission. If a man had looted a railway train he would be sent for trial before a Commission. Under what charge was he sent in?

A. I do not quite follow the question.

Q. If any person committed any offence, destroyed any railway, or cut the wires or burnt anything, you said you would send him to the Commission?

A. Yes.

Q. Suppose a person had gone and helped in derailing trains, the matter came before you and you thought it a serious charge. Under what section of the Penal Code did you charge him?

A. That would be for the Legal Remembrancer to settle. I had nothing to do with it. I merely put the facts before him and he applied the law.

Q. You simply put the facts?

A. I had nothing to do with the framing of charges.

Q. You gave him facts and he framed the charges.

A. On his own account; I had nothing to do with it.

Q. So, every case had to do through him, I presume.

A. Yes. Go to him, not necessarily through him, because some he sent back.

Q. Had to go to him, and then he had to decide whether it was to go to this tribunal or not?

A. Yes.

Q. You also stated that there was some difficulty about the identification of these persons?

A. I had nothing to do with identification. When the cases came, the investigations were completed and the identifications had already been held.

Q. Then you transferred the case to the Legal Remembrancer?

A. Yes.

Q. And were you ever present in court when the cases were on?

A. I attended several cases, not for a lengthy period, just to see how things were going on. Some of course were held in the same building where Mr. Ellis's office was, only in another part of the building. Usually after I had settled anything, I walked round just to see how things went on.

Q. Otherwise you did not go?

A. I was constantly in the courts some time each day.

Q. To see whether the accused were given sufficient time to produce witnesses and other things?

A. That is matter for the court to decide.

By Mr. Herbert, Government Advocate—

Q. Were you aware of the special instructions issued in regard to the treatment of the under-trial prisoners in jail?

A. Certainly. Under-trial prisoners in jail were allowed to take their own bedding and have their own food.

Q. You saw them yourself?

A. I think I went through them.

Q. There were four Commissions appointed by Government. Was the Lahore Leader Case tried in one of the Commissions by Mr. Justice Leslie Jones?

(The question was disallowed by the President.)

Q. Is it a fact that most of the cases dealt with by Mr. Ellis were discussed by you and him together?

A. Invariably.

Q. Have you read Mr. Ellis's statement?

A. I have.

Q. Can you say whether the facts as arranged by him are quite correct?

A. I think they are quite correct. I went through them carefully.

Q. Mr. Ellis has also annexed a tabular statement showing the particulars of cases tried by Commissions and of punishments inflicted in each case. Were those correct?

A. They may be taken as correct.

Q. It is quite sufficient to bring the statement on record. (With the approval of the Committee, the statement was put on record.)*

A. I may say this statement was compiled from the Court registers.

* Printed in Volume VI.

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND, I.C.S., Director of Civil Supplies in the Punjab.

By the President—

Q. Mr. Townsend, you were Director of Civil Supplies in the Punjab?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. When were you appointed to that post?

A. In May 1918. The post was created; it did not exist before.

Q. Was that created in consequence of the difficulties arising out of fluctuation in prices of essential commodities?

A. Not primarily that. We were primarily appointed to assist the railways by informing them as to what articles should have priority independent of civil needs.

Q. I suppose the question of fluctuation of prices has been a serious one during the war in India as much as it had been in England?

A. Very much. We had a very bad monsoon, and the functions of the Director of Civil Supplies then assumed very much more importance than before.

Q. In consequence of the bad monsoon, did the prices of some of the essentials of life rise to a higher figure?

A. Very much so; for instance, wheat went up in price in December 1917 and December 1918 by about 40 per cent. and similar considerations applied to other food grains.

Q. Had the wages of the poorer classes risen in proportion to the rise in price of commodities?

A. I have been studying the question, and I have made some detailed enquiries in this matter. The conclusion I have arrived at is that generally in the province wages of unskilled labour had risen in proportion, in villages particularly so because they generally got, in addition to money wage, one or two meals a day from their employers, and to that extent they have got free food. However, in the towns skilled labour had not had its wages risen to the same extent as the cost of living had risen, and the high prices particularly affected clerks and people on fixed incomes.

Q. So that fluctuation in prices was a cause of uneasiness to a number of people who had to depend for their livelihood on what they earn?

A. Very much so, Sir. My own view is that the trouble in this province is due at least 50 per cent. to economic troubles.

Q. I think in your official capacity, you had to take certain means in order to minimise the trouble?

A. We tried to do so.

Q. Were you successful or not?

A. That is another matter.

Q. The regulation of prices of commodities by fixing maximum and minimum prices is a difficult thing?

A. Universal experience shows it, and our experience is the same.

Q. You attempted to fix prices, I think?

A. We only attempted generally in the province by this acquisition of wheat. Of course Colonel Johnson and I co-operated greatly in the fixing of prices in Lahore, and to some extent in the other towns, where they tried to fix prices; it was exceedingly difficult.

Q. About acquisition of wheat, for a time I think there had been prohibition of exportation from the Punjab and from the Punjab to other provinces and from India as a whole to Europe?

A. That prohibition was put on about October 1918, but we had to export to other provinces of India, otherwise they would have starved.

Q. Then there was never prohibition to other provinces?

A. Never, but the prohibition on export was regulated.

Q. I think there was some curtailment of the outside supplies, from Australia?

A. This province never imports as a rule wheat from Australia.

Q. If there was a curtailment of the supply that India generally was getting from Australia, that would lead to greater exportation from the Punjab than would otherwise take place?

A. I am speaking from memory. I do not think that India imports any wheat. We export wheat far more than we import wheat. Last year on account of exceptional conditions, we did import Australian wheat.

Q. Was it in consequence of the bad monsoon?

A. Quite so.

Q. About the acquisition of wheat, what exactly was done? Was all the wheat in the province acquired by Government?

A. No; the exact figures are given in the statement which I have submitted, of which you may have a copy.

Q. I do not want to go into details. Can you tell me roughly?

A. The total amount of wheat in the province was over 3 million tons and the total quantity that was acquired by Government was 16,600 tons out of 3 millions. That was the total amount of our acquisitions.

Q. What was the object of acquiring that?

A. The object of acquiring wheat was to bring home to the speculators who came very much to the fore during these troublesome times on account of the scarcity of things generally that Government was watching the situation, and that speculation might be dangerous, and there was the possibility of Government taking the wheat at a price perhaps even less than that at which they paid for it; thereby we discouraged and prevented their buying more wheat and tried to keep prices down, at any rate to prevent them going up.

Q. What did Government do with the wheat acquired?

A. It was made over for the requirements of Indian Army, and to some extent cheap grain shops for the poor were opened.

Q. Did you find whether the action of Government was appreciated or misunderstood generally by the people in connection with this matter?

A. It was appreciated by some of the more intelligent gentlemen of the province. On the whole, however, I am inclined to say it was misunderstood, because it did not have the effect which we had hoped of bringing the price of wheat permanently down.

Q. How do you account for that?

A. Because we could not possibly take up as much wheat as was needed to be purchased in this province, not only for the Army but for other provinces. We were taking at Rs. 5-4-0 per maund, and a man from Bombay would come prepared to pay Rs. 10 a maund. We learnt it was obvious that we could not permanently fix the price of wheat. If we had taken the whole wheat that was wanted for export or for military needs that would have changed the situation.

Q. Were there rumours circulated as to the object of the Government in acquiring wheat?

A. So I have been informed.

Q. What were they?

A. That the mere object of the Government in acquiring wheat was to get wheat cheap and the Government had no other motive except benefitting their own pockets. That was the one rumour that was very strongly circulated.

Q. No doubt there is no foundation for that?

A. Not in the least, Sir.

Q. You mention about the fluctuations in price of wheat, but I do not know if you have got a statement of the fluctuations in the essential articles of food, etc.?

A. I have got a statement and I shall be very glad to give you a copy of it. Kerosene oil is a thing which caused as much trouble. There was a world shortage of kerosene oil. Between December 1st, 1914, and December 1st, 1918, it rose 67 per cent. in price. *Ghee* between December 1st, 1914, and December 1st, 1918, went up 86 per cent. in price, but since then it has almost gone up 150 per cent.

I have mentioned about wheat. Wheat flour also went up in price. Iron which is a thing of very common consumption went up 480 per cent; English cloth 275 per cent.; Indian piecegoods about 200 per cent.; country leather 125 per cent.; cotton 400 per cent.; sugar 168 per cent. in price. All these went up very considerably. That caused great suffering to people of fixed incomes.

Q. You say you have got a statement?

A. I will let you have a copy* of it, Sir.

Q. That is briefly the gist of your statement. Owing to the rise in prices, there was a considerable amount of discontent and dissatisfaction?

A. Yes, Sir, but I would qualify that by saying that discontent and dissatisfaction were to a large extent confined to the inhabitants of towns, because the inhabitants of villages, at any rate the larger holders, produced these things which they were able to sell at high prices.

Q. And in particular, may I take it, that in towns particularly it was thought that on the armistice occurring, you would altogether get back the normal prices?

A. That was the general impression.

Q. Was there a considerable amount of unrest in consequence of that hope not being realised?

A. Yes, the prices are even now very much higher than they were any time during the war.

Q. Are you regulating prices just now?

A. We never attempt to regulate them generally. All I do is to facilitate trade as much as possible, and always to dispute wheat and grain being taken away from this province to other provinces of India. No wheat is allowed to leave India at present.

Q. I suppose during the war that railway restrictions of curtailing transport from one province to another would have the same bad effect on trade?

A. Undoubtedly trade and movement inside the province too were very seriously restricted.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rankin—

Q. Apart from the particular statistics of these particular commodities which you are going to give us, have you at any time made a typical family budget to find out by how much per cent. the cost of living has gone up roughly?

A. I have rough figures to that extent. I have got an assistant who kindly worked out for me a comparative statement† of the cost of living for a clerk on Rs. 50 a month with his family. He worked out in detail the increases up to December 1918, that is about a year ago, and they have not changed much since then. The cost of living had increased for such clerks by 62 per cent. or about 60 per cent. I have similar statements, but not in the same detail.

Q. I do not think you said anything about rice. Is that an important commodity in this province?

A. No. It is a staple article for the hill tribes, and largely used by Kashmir pandits of whom we have a certain amount in the towns. Otherwise it is only used for weddings and funerals.

Q. Is there in this province an index of prices kept up from month to month?

A. It is kept by the Director of Statistics. We record our prices, but I cannot say at this moment whether the figures you wish can be obtained. We get them from the Director of Statistics, Calcutta.

Q. There will be such a thing, I suppose?

A. We regularly keep a record of our prices; every fortnight or every month we get it in detail.

Q. No doubt there is an index‡ of prices somewhere maintained, probably by the Director of Statistics, Calcutta?

A. Yes, certainly; it is published in the *Gazette of India.*

Q. And reduced to graph?

A. Yes.

By the Hon'ble Mr. Thomas Smith—

Q. Mr. Townsend, were these high prices of crops, cotton and wheat beneficial to the cultivators in the Punjab?

A. Yes, cultivators of large holdings; it was questionable with regard to cultivators of very small holdings, such as those who had a couple of acres. On the whole cultivators in this province had the benefit of the high prices, specially in the canal colonies where people had large holdings.

Q. I do not suppose they got the full benefit of the increase in prices?

A. No; but they were doing so to an increasing extent from year to year. They are getting more wealthy and at present they have held up a great deal of their grain; they have not sold it; they have not been forced to put it on the market.

Q. They used to sell the crop as soon as it ripened. They are doing so less and less every year, as the state of the *ryots* is much better now?

A. Yes, specially in the canal colonies where you have commercial agriculture.

Q. And co-operative banks have been doing much good?

A. Yes; they have been very successful specially among the Sikh districts and also among the Musalman districts, I think. They have been very successful on the whole.

Q. And I think you did your level best to give as much as possible to Punjab in the way of cloth.

A. Standard cloth was very successful here. We did our best in all these ways; the suggestions, so far as they went, were successful. We were always fighting about kerosene oil. I gave every possible help to import anything they wanted. We had considerable difficulty with regard to salt. The Government of India gave us concession as regards getting salt from the Government mines. We started cheap salt shops which were very useful to the poorer classes.

Q. Of course these high prices obtained all over India. They were not peculiar to the Punjab?

A. That is correct. The cost of living is the same. The price of food grains is much cheaper in this province than in other provinces.

Q. You had them on the spot and therefore they were cheaper here?

A. That is probably as regards grains. Pulses were dearer, and we had to import from Central India, Bhopal. They would not let us have any. As regards wheat, it was thought that it was cheaper here than in other provinces of India.

Q. As against the high prices, there was a great scarcity of the actual crop itself in wheat?

A. The crop of 1918-19 was the worst we have had for 40 years, owing to the bad monsoon.

By Sardar Sahibzada Sultan Ahmad Khan—

Q. Didn't you stop the export of wheat and gram from the Punjab last year?

A. We put restriction on it under the orders of the Government of India. We said we must have restrictions and the only thing that was done was a system of control was put on.

Q. That was of course for the benefit of the people in the Punjab?

A. I would not confine it to them, because if that control had not been put, I think the people of other provinces will suffer too, because prices would have gone even higher than they did. I think on the whole control has been beneficial not only to us, but to the other provinces; they had not realised the extreme trouble caused by bad monsoon and the shortage of grain.

Q. On the whole the conditions in this province compared to other provinces were better decidedly?

A. I do not know about other provinces, so I cannot say. I can only say about the larger holders of this province and they have done very well.

Q. Food grains were cheaper in this province on the whole than they were in the other provinces?

A. Yes.

* *Vide* Statement II, p. 183.
† *Vide* Statement I, p. 182.
‡ *Vide* page 181.

ANNEXURE A.

I send herewith (1) a statement showing the cost of various articles in general use, at Lahore, in 1914, and every year since then. It will be seen that all have risen greatly in price; and (2) the family budget of a clerk in Lahore on Rs. 50 per mensem in (*a*) 1914, and (*b*) 1918. Roughly speaking, the last figures apply also now. Some articles have risen in price since then, but some have fallen. It will be seen that it is estimated that his expenditure has increased by about 60 per cent. To counterbalance this increase, rises in salary have been given, whether as war allowances or otherwise, in the various Government offices in the Punjab during the last five years; but the enquiries I have made show that in the case of no clerks has the increase given in salary been equal to the increased cost of living. Speaking generally, the increases given have been generally about 25 per cent. The obvious result of this has been discontent. My own opinion is that the Punjab troubles of last April were due to the extent of at least 50 per cent. to economic reasons.

Investigations I have made show me that the wages of unskilled labour, whether in villages or towns, have generally risen about 100 per cent. in the last five years, and have kept pace with the increased cost of living. With skilled labourers the rise has been rather less, about 66 per cent., and they are generally discontented. The prevailing high prices have of course helped the producers of those articles, as wheat, *ghi*, *gur*, cotton, and indeed all agricultural produce, in the Punjab. They mostly live in villages; on the other hand high prices have hit very hard those on fixed incomes, as Government clerks, who mostly live in towns. This explains, to some extent, why we had more troubles in towns than in villages. I estimate that about 60 per cent. of the Punjab people have benefitted by our high prices; 25 per cent. have suffered, and the case of the remaining 15 per cent. is doubtful.

C. A. H. TOWNSEND,
Director of Civil Supplies, Punjab.

The 31st December 1919.

Index number of prices on the Punjab for 1919 as compared with previous years.

1900—1909 (pre war)	Index Number, say 100
1919	Index number 175 or 180, as worked out by two experts independently.

(Sd.) C. A. H. TOWNSEND.

4th January 1920.

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND. Annexure A, Statement I.

Comparative statement of cost of living of a clerk on Rs. 50 per mensem with his family in Lahore.
(The family consists of the clerk himself, his wife and two children).

Name of articles.	Daily consumption.	Monthly consumption.	Monthly cost in December 1914.	Monthly cost in December 1918.	Remarks.
			Rs. A. P.	Rs. A. P.	
Atta, at the rate of 4 *chataks* per head per meal.	2 seers	60 seers	7 8 0	10 9 6	For adults the estimate is 6 *chataks* per head per diet. But in view of two children, it is reduced to 4 *chataks* per head per meal.
Ghee at the rate of ¾ *chataks* per head per meal.	3 *chataks*	5½ seers	6 8 0	10 0 0	In the statement herewith wholesale rate is given; cost here is estimated at retail rates.
Rent	...	...	5 0 0	8 0 0	
Dal, Mash and gram (evening meal).	2 *chataks*	5 seers	0 12 0	1 8 0	
Vegetables (morning meal)	...	...	3 0 0	5 0 0	
Spices	...	...	1 0 0	2 0 0	
Oils (including Kerosene oil)	...	Half a tin	1 7 0	2 5 0	This leaves a margin for country oil.
Washing charges	...	...	2 8 0	4 0 0	
Barber	...	...	1 0 0	1 8 0	
Shoes 2 pairs for each child a year, cost Rs. 16 in 1918. 4 pairs for husband and wife, cost Rs. 20 in 1918 total Rs. 36 in 1918. Rs. 24 in 1914.	...	...	2 0 0	3 0 0	
Cloth 3 shirts, 4 pajamas, 2 coats and 2 *turbans* a year for a clerk which cost him Rs. 36 a year in 1918. Approximately the same for his wife. For clothes of 2 children the cost is estimated Rs. 48 a year in 1918. Total cost is Rs. 120 for the whole family in 1918. It comes to Rs. 48 in 1914.	...	...	4 0 0	10 0 0	
Milk at the rate of ½ seer per head daily.	2 seers	60 seers	7 8 0	12 0 0	This leaves margin for curd.
Sugar	2½ *chataks*	5 seers	1 4 0	2 0 0	Retail price of sugar in December, 1918 was 2½ seers per rupee. In December 1914 it was 4 seers per rupee.
Fuel at the rate of 1½ seers per head daily.	6 seers	4½ maunds	2 13 0	4 8 0	
Water charges	...	...	1 2 0	1 2 0	This is water tax of the Municipality for a tap in the house.
Sweeper charges	...	...	0 4 0	0 8 0	
TOTAL	...	...	*47 10 0	78 0 6	Cost of living has increased 62%.

* This does not include anything for such modest luxuries as tobacco, nor for medical charges.

Comparative statement of prices of different articles in the Punjab at Lahore.

Period.	Kerosene Oil Elephant Brand.		Ghee.		Wheat.		Wheat atta.		Iron (Flat).		Cloth (English make) Latha "Key" Brand.		Indian piece goods (Cawnpore Twill No. 3).		Country Leather.		Country cotton unginned.		Cotton ginned.		Gur.	
	Price per tin.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per piece of 40 yards.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per piece of 40 yards.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.	Price per maund.	Percentage of 1914 figure, taking it as 100.
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
	Rs. a. p.		Rs. a.		Rs. a.		Rs. a.		Rs. a.		Rs. a.		Rs. a.		Rs. a.		Rs. a.		Rs. a.		Rs. a.	
1st December 1914 . .	2 13 6	100	35 0	100	4 6	100	5 0	100	6 4	100	10 0	100	7 0	100	40 0	100	4 2	100	11 4	100	4 12	100
Do. 1915 . .	2 11 6	96	38 0	109	4 8	103	5 2	103	11 4	180	13 12	138	10 0	143	40 0	100	8 0	194	19 12	177	8 0	168
Do. 1916 . .	3 6 3	119	50 0	143	4 8	103	5 2	103	25 0	400	18 0	180	12 0	171	40 0	100	10 0	242	28 0	249	6 0	126
Do. 1917 . .	4 0 6	142	55 0	157	4 15	113	5 9	111	29 0	464	25 0	250	16 0	229	55 0	138	12 8	303	38 12	344	6 8	137
Do. 1918 . .	4 10 0	163	65 0	186	6 7	147	7 1	141	30 0	480	27 8	275	14 0	200	50 0	125	23 0	557	46 2	410	8 0	168
Do. 1919 . .	4 11 6	166	105 0	300	6 4	143	6 10	132	23 0	368	32 9	325	19 8	279	50 0	125	14 0	339	38 0	337	10 0	210

PART II

Written Statements accepted by the Committee without Oral Examination.

Mr. J. M. COODE, Director of Telegraph Engineering, Northern Circle.

Chronological Narrative of Events.

The trouble began with the attack by the rioters on the Central Telegraph Office at Amritsar, on 10th April 1919, where the windows of the telephone exchange located in a room built into the verandah, were broken and the room entered. The switchboard and fittings were completely destroyed and the whole telephone system thus rendered unworkable, communication between one subscriber and another, on an exchange system, being possible only through the exchange.

A spare telegraph battery temporarily erected in the verandah, for want of space, was also destroyed. At the same time the quarters of the Telegraph Master were entered, particulars of which incident may be sought in the report of the Postmaster-General, Punjab and North-West Frontier Circle, who controls telegraph offices and staff in his Circle.

Had a rescue party not arrived in time considerably more damage would have been done and telegraph instruments would not have escaped destruction.

The telephones and fittings in the National Bank, the Alliance Bank and the Town Hall were also destroyed and telegraph instruments and fittings were destroyed at the Bhagtanwala railway station and the local combined post and telegraph offices, *viz.*, Golden Temple, Town Hall and Majith Mandi.

Telegraph wires and telephone cables in the town were cut inside Hall Gate, near Hathi and Lohari Gate and the Golden Temple and 1½ miles from the exchange on the waterworks line. The main telegraph wires were cut 1½ miles from the telegraph office, towards Mananwala railway station. Here 27 wires were cut and one post and 50 insulators were broken, interrupting all communication on both departmental and railway wires from Amritsar towards Ambala. Communication with Lahore was interrupted by the cutting of 11 wires near the goods shed. The 11th passed without incident.

On the 12th, the trouble was resumed by the cutting of telegraph wires between Amritsar and Chheharta, between Khasa and Chheharta and Khasa and Gurusar Satlani. On the same day, much damage was done at Kasur, where telegraph instruments were destroyed in the fire at the railway station and at the combined post and telegraph office, and the telegraph line was damaged for half a mile.

Between Harbanspura and Jallo, stations within 3 and 7 miles of Lahore Cantonment respectively, 26 wires were cut, the release of the strain on so many wires resulting in 10 posts being broken and the wires being thrown out of level for 2 miles.

On the same day two wires were cut between Nurmahal and Nakodar in the Jullundur District.

On the 13th April all Government and railway wires were cut near the distant signal, Barara railway station, in the Ambala District, and slight damage was done to the wires in three places near Khemkaran railway station in the Lahore District and in two places between Batala and Gurdaspur railway stations in the Gurdaspur District. All six wires were cut between Batala and Jaintipura on the same day.

On the 14th April serious damage was again done to the telegraph line between Amritsar and Mananwala, 19 wires being cut in several places. Slight damage was done between Gharyala and Kairon, Tarn Taran and Jandoki and between Tarn Taran and Gohlwar on the same day.

On this date beside other slight damage, all instruments and fittings were burnt at the Wagah railway station and 10 wires were cut and some insulators broken between Wagah and Attari railway station.

Serious trouble occurred at Gujranwala the same day, 20 wires being cut and the line damaged for 2½ miles, 450 insulators being smashed. Similar damage occurred at Nizamabad, 1½ miles from Wazirabad railway station towards Gujranwala, where 7 posts and 400 insulators were broken. Telegraph instruments were burnt at Gujranwala railway station and at the combined post and telegraph office.

There was again some slight damage done to telegraph wires in the Gurdaspur District on this date, wires being cut in 3 places and carried away between Dhariwal and Sohal railway stations and near Kunjar and Aliwal villages.

In Delhi District 11 wires were cut and some insulators broken at Shakurpur, 8 miles from Delhi, on this date.

Forty-one telegraph posts were damaged on the 15th April between Wazirabad and Sialkot. 350 insulators were broken and wires cut in 4 places near Wazirabad and Begowala Ghartal railway stations.

On this date, in the fires at Chuharkana, Dhaban Singh and Moman railway stations the telegraph instruments were burnt. All wires were cut at 7 places, posts damaged and about 415 insulators broken between Sangla Hill and Chichoki Mallian. It was on this occasion that Mr. A. E. Wale, an Inspecting Telegraphist, was attacked near Lyallpur by a fanatic Sikh with a *lathi* and sustained injuries on his head. Mr. Wale was obliged to use his revolver and wounded the man.

Slight damage was done in the shape of the cutting of wires and breaking of insulators at miles 1½. 9, 12 and 22 from Wazirabad towards Sangla Hill. All wires were cut and 180 insulators broken near Hafizabad and Sangla Hill Stations.

At Malakwal railway station all wires were cut and a post was damaged near Gohana post office and Rohtak railway station in the Rohtak District on this date. Slight damage again occurred in the Gurdaspur District on this date, wires having been cut and 200 feet carried away.

At Malakwal railway station all wires were cut and about 100 insulators broken on this date. On the same date all wires were cut, some insulators broken and the level of the wires thrown out between Sangla Hill and Salarwala railway stations in the Lyallpur District.

On 16th April 1919, 16 wires were cut and several insulators broken between Jullundur and Cheheru railway stations.

Slight damage occurred again between Valtoha and Gharyala railway stations by the cutting of 2 wires in several places and destruction of some insulators, on this date.

Two wires were cut between Jandiala and Butari railway stations and 30 insulators broken between Sangrana Sahib and Bhagtanwala, 3 and 6 miles from Amritsar towards Tarn Taran, respectively. The telegraph line was damaged, wires cut and insulators broken for ¼ mile between Premnagar and Pattoki, on this date.

Slight damage was again done to the wires on the 17th by pulling them down from the posts in some places between Gharyala and Patti railway stations.

In the Lyallpur District slight damage was done to telegraph posts, wires and insulators between Lyallpur and Gatti railway stations.

One wire was cut between Nakodar and Thabalke railway stations on this date.

One wire was again cut at mile 13/4 between Nakodar and Thabalke railway stations on the 18th April

Mr. J. M. CODE—*concluded*—Mr. G. BURLINGAM.

and 7 insulators were broken between Gatti and Chak Jhumra railway stations.

Two wires were cut between Chhina and Dhariwal railway stations in Gurdaspur District on this date.

On 19th April 1919 the canal wire was cut and 300 feet stolen between Manihala and Valtoha canal telegraph office in the Lahore District.

All wires were cut in 3 places, 120 insulators and 2 posts broken and wires thrown out of level between Janiwala and Toba Tek Singh railway stations in Lyallpur District.

On the same day 2 wires were cut and 1 post broken 13 miles from Pathankot towards Dunera railway station.

There was slight damage done in the Rohtak District again on the 20th April, the canal wire being cut near the Jat School at Rohtak. On this date 2 wires were cut at 7 miles from Pathankot towards Nurpur.

On 21st April slight damage to wire and insulators was done between Sujanpur and Madhopur canal offices.

Classes concerned.

All damage as detailed in section 3 above was done by the general mob. In no instance was any damage caused by servants of this department. In fact there was no reason to suspect anybody being in any way concerned with what happened.

The whole staff, Indian and non-Indian, behaved exceedingly well, going out promptly to restore communication as soon as an interruption occurred.

This may be seen from the long list of men, of all ranks, who have been rewarded by money grants by the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs.

The only cause for anxiety arose from the persistent way in which the Indian telephone operators employed in the Lahore telephone exchange tapped the wires during conversations on the telephones.

This may have been due to mere curiosity to learn how the various phases of the disturbances in Lahore were being viewed and the manner in which it was proposed to deal with them.

Methods adopted by the rioters.

These are detailed in the narrative of events in section 3.

The most serious damage done in any office was the wrecking of the telephone exchange at Amritsar. The telegraph office there would undoubtedly have shared the same fate, had it not been for the arrival of timely relief.

The systematic way in which telegraphic communication was interfered with proves that there was some organization controlling the disturbances and the smashing of hundreds of insulators shows that it possessed intelligence. Numbers of tubular iron posts were broken and many heavy iron rails twisted out of shape. This would result from the cutting of several wires simultaneously and the consequent sudden release of the heavy strain on the posts. Many insulators would break in the process, but the quantities broken show that they were smashed to pieces subsequently.

The following claims were submitted by me and the amounts will no doubt appear in the reports being submitted by your Commissioners :—

Name of District.	Amount of claim.	Presented to	On
	Rs.		
Amritsar . .	22,200	District Magistrate	5th May 1919.
Lahore . .	12,000	Ditto .	Ditto.
Gujranwala . .	17,000	Ditto .	Ditto.
Jullundur . .	1,700	Ditto .	Ditto.
Gurdaspur . .	1,300	Ditto .	Ditto.
Lyallpur . .	3,000	Ditto .	Ditto.
Rohtak . .	100	Ditto .	10th May 1919.
Delhi . . .	150	Ditto .	14th May 1919.

Statement showing number of separate outrages committed on the Telegraph lines, etc., on each date during the recent disturbances in the Punjab. The number given is only approximate as it is not now (29th August) possible to quote accurate figures:—

Date.	*No. of outrages.*
10th April 1919 . . .	9
12th April 1919 . . .	4
13th April 1919 . . .	4
14th April 1919 . . .	12
15th April 1919 . . .	7
16th April 1919 . . .	7
17th April 1919 . . .	3
18th April 1919 . . .	2
19th April 1919 . . .	4
20th April 1919 . . .	1
21st April 1919 . . .	1
TOTAL .	54

Mr. G. BURLINGAM, Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs, North-Western Railway and Oudh-Rohilkhand Railway, on the working of the North-Western Railway Telegraph system during the disturbances in the Punjab in April 1919.

April 10th.—At 14 hours all Railway Telegraph wires near Amritsar were cut, but there was no stoppage to traffic as messages were diverted through other routes. Trains proceeded on caution order over sections where lines were interrupted.

April 11th.—No further reports of wire cutting received during the day, and communication on all wires near Amritsar restored by 18·30 hours.

April 12th.—All railway wires near Kasur cut at 10·30 hours no great delay to messages as they were diverted through other routes. Communication restored same night. Certain signallers at Kasur gave trouble and false information on this day, and also tampered with telegraph instruments. This was personally noticed and reported by the Deputy Superintendent in charge, Lahore Telegraph Office.

April 13th.—Early morning all wires cut between Lahore and Amritsar near Jallo and repaired again by midday, they were again interrupted at midnight.

Deputy Superintendent, Lahore office, on this day had great difficulty in disposing of traffic owing to passive resistance on many circuits, and practice messages, *i.e.*, (conversation on the wires) regarding enquiries as to when Lahore and other stations proposed going out on strike. Many practice messages from stations on line were signalled as originating from Lahore. This information was brought to the notice of the Deputy Superintendent by his office staff. Many stations during the day asked Lahore at what time Lahore staff were going out on strike, and the reply was invariably given that Lahore had no intention of striking. The effect of the Lahore office remaining loyal undoubtedly stopped a general strike amongst the signalling staff at the majority of the stations on the North-Western Railway. It may be here mentioned that during the whole of these disturbances there were no casualties whatsoever amongst the staff of Lahore office which is very marked as the signalling staff employed at that time numbered between 40 and 45.

April 14th.—All wires on the Rawalpindi side Gujranwala cut at 12 hours. The Station Telegraph Office and instruments burnt, also all wires between Sheikhupura and Sangla Hill cut in many places and Telegraph offices and instruments burnt at a few small stations. Telegraph message traffic was not seriously delayed as it was passed through branch lines.

At 9-30 hours telegraph staff of Bhatinda office, with the exception of the Signaller-in-charge, went out on strike, but returned to duty at 20-30 hours the same night. Work was carried on in this office by Signaller-in-charge and Telegraph Inspector, who managed to clear the very important clear line messages. Meanwhile staff had been ordered from Lahore to proceed there, but were stopped at Bhatinda and sent on to Bahawalnagar where the staff had also struck. Traffic at the latter station was not seriously interrupted in consequence.

Telegraph communication between Lahore and Delhi *viâ* Bhatinda was also interrupted at 22 hours.

April 15th.—All lines continued interrupted throughout the day with the exception of the line between Delhi and Lahore *viâ* Bhatinda which were restored at 15 hours.

At 10-30 in the morning the staff of Ambala office went out on strike, but returned to duty later in the day. There were no serious delays to message traffic, as the signaller-in-charge and a certain number of the senior signallers remained on duty throughout the day. At 9 hours in the morning the staff of Khanewal office also went out on strike, but returned to duty at 18 hours, traffic was much dislocated at this station, as no telegraph staff remained loyal.

April 16th.—All lines between Lahore, Karachi and Multan were cut near Changa Manga in the early morning, all other wires remained interrupted throughout the day and message traffic between important stations on the whole railway much dislocated.

April 17th.—Communication on all wires between Lahore, Karachi and Multan restored by midday, all other lines remain interrupted.

April 18th.—Communication on one wire to Rawalpindi restored at 10 hours which greatly facilitated up-country traffic.

April 19th.—Communication restored on all lines forwards Rawalpindi and all lines between Sangla Hill restored by midday.

April 20th.—Communication on all lines between Lahore and Amritsar restored.

During the whole of this period a great bulk of the less important telegraph message traffic was despatched by every available train, thus relieving a great deal of the congestion in the large offices.

Besides the reports of wire cutting mentioned above, several of the less important branch lines were cut at various places, but this did not interfere with the more important main line traffic.

Having given a brief outline of the effect of the disturbances on the Railway Telegraph system, I take the opportunity of bringing to notice several points which may be of interest.

Lahore Railway Telegraph Office.—Lahore is not only the largest and most important Telegraph office on the Railway, but controls the main circuits to all the most distant and important offices on the system, such as Karachi, Ambala, Rawalpindi, etc., and in consequence its influence during the recent disturbances was most marked. This has been brought to light by the numerous and repeated enquiries on the lines from various offices as to when Lahore was going out on strike, and I am convinced that had this office not remained loyal a more or less general strike amongst the signalling staff throughout the Railway would have followed, which might have extended to other branches of the staff, and had this been the case it is more than probable that the strike would have spread further afield. I have evidence of this from my European Inspector on the Oudh and Rohilkhand Railway, who overheard a conversation on the wires on the Northern section of that railway to this effect.

I have in consequence recommended rewards for the whole staff of this office and especially for Mr. Harding, the Deputy Superintendent of this office, as it was in a great measure due to his untiring energy and tact in dealing with his staff that work was carried on in such a successful manner.

I have emphasized the importance of Lahore Office in order to bring to notice the necessity of proper control and supervision over the staff of that office during disturbances of this kind, and the following occurrence during the recent riots will enable me to explain my reasons.

On the night of the 14th the staff living in Lahore City complained that they had been warned by their landlords that if they remained loyal, they would be ejected from their houses in 24 hours' notice. Luckily, this came to nothing through martial law being declared, but the fact remains that staff living in the city were subjected to considerable inconvenience through remaining loyal, and *vice versâ* others of the staff may have remained loyal in order to give information in the city that they had accumulated during their duty by conversation on the wires.

I, therefore, consider that accommodation should be provided for them away from the city so that should a repetition of the recent disturbances occur they may remain unmolested and not be in touch with agitators in the city.

Censorship of private messages.—Censors were appointed to the Lahore office at the commencement of the disturbances and are still employed at the present time. The censorship has proved to be more of a preventive than a detective measure, and it is extremely unlikely that any messages of a seditious nature will be presented by the public for transmission. These censors, however, in no way make the Railway telegraph system a water-tight compartment, in fact, it would be no more so if censors were employed at all the more important stations, as news of a seditious and alarmist nature and false and bogus messages have been, and can always be sent from end to end of the railway by the telegraph staff themselves by means of practice messages and conversations on the wires, and for the stoppage of this I can see no solution. To appreciate this fact I may mention that even the staff at Howrah (Calcutta) during the commencement of the disturbances were in close touch with the strike movement on this railway by means of these practice messages.

Wire cutting by rioters.—The cutting of communications caused great anxiety and dislocation to the train service, as the whereabouts and fate of any mail and passenger trains were unknown, and almost all trains whether ordinary or special were seriously delayed, but the rioters by cutting our main communications temporarily solved the problem of practice messages and conversation over the wires most effectively and prevented any possibility of a further attempt to organise a general strike throughout the Railway during the critical period from the 15th to the 19th of April.

It may appear that I place too much importance on this means of organizing a general strike so I give the following illustration to support my argument.

Information was received from the Railway Board at the commencement of the disturbances that a general strike was being organized throughout the Railway, and that the word "Rowlatt" transmitted by means of practice messages would be the signal for a general strike to commence. This fortunately did not occur, but it brings to light three important points—

(*a*) The value of the Railway Telegraph system for organizing general strike.

(*b*) That the organization could only have succeeded at the commencement of the disturbances, as after the 14th most of our important circuits were interrupted during the remainder of the critical period due to the cutting of communications by the rioters and thus stopping all possibility of organizing a strike in this manner.

(*c*) That during the critical period all communication with Rawalpindi and beyond other than by wireless was severed and this leads me to surmise that subsequent events on the Frontier occurred when they did and not in sequence to the events in the Punjab.

PART III

Written Statements of Witnesses subsequently examined Orally.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN, C.I.E., C.B.E., Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala.

I.—SURVEY OF THE PREDISPOSING CAUSES.

It is difficult for any one in Gujranwala to make a survey of the predisposing causes of the unrest, because they lay elsewhere. This much is certain that there were no economic causes. Gujranwala being a district with two large canals in it has thriven exceedingly during the war owing to the high prices obtainable by agricultural produce, and even during the last year when other districts were suffering for want of rain on unirrigated areas the canal-irrigated crops have been magnificent. Traders have gained concomitantly with the agriculturists and labourers have obtained wages proportionate to the rise of prices. The only persons who have suffered have been Government servants and others on fixed wages. There has been an immense absorption of gold and silver throughout the district. Equally the unrest is in no way connected with the recruiting campaign. If it had been anywhere in the Punjab it would have been visible in Gujranwala where, as it is known, a very intensive campaign took place in a district not previously accustomed to recruiting from November 1917 to the end of the war. The agricultural classes which provided the recruits took no part in the outbreak, except in the neighbourhood of Chuharkana where it happened that the agriculturists had shown great reluctance to recruit. The townspeople did not do their share even in providing men for the subsidiary and less dangerous sections of the army. The unrest, therefore, was entirely political. It was organized from outside. It was confined to the towns on the railway.

II.—IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK.

The immediate causes of the outbreak were the previous outbreaks in Delhi and Amritsar. Mr. Gandhi's campaign of passive resistance was intended to be a challenge to Government and as such it was generally understood by the intelligent classes. In Delhi, when the mob came into conflict with the police, no action was taken against the organizers. Consequently it was decided to push a *hartal* in as many places in the Punjab as possible. The campaign of misrepresentation of the Rowlatt Act was systematically worked up, and local leaders (almost all members of the Bar) concerted the measures for *hartal*. In Gujranwala the barristers and pleaders made arrangements for a public meeting on April 5th. A notice of this meeting, to which some 15 men put their signatures, was hurriedly printed and circulated through the town. The printing, it may be mentioned, was carried out in Lahore, as the Gujranwala presses would not undertake the work. At 1 P.M. on the 5th I sent for leaders of the movement and warned them that if disorder resulted I would hold them responsible as instigators.

The meeting on the evening of 5th was held near the house of one of the pleaders, Lala Amar Nath Uberoi and was fairly well attended; all classes appeared to be represented by the audience but the large majority were Hindus. The speeches were of usual character, denouncing the Rowlatt Bill as a shameful recompense for India's loyalty and support during the war. No attempt was made to explain the Bill but it was summed up as allowing "*Na Dalil, Na Appeal, Na Vakil.*" A particularly objectionable speech was delivered by one Mangal Sen. One Chuni Lal, Manchanda, spoke as an eye-witness of the incidents at Delhi and alleged that the official account was incorrect.

On the 6th, therefore, the shops of the city remained closed. Rumours of the usual nature about the Rowlatt Act were industriously circulated, and it was also published that the closing of shops was itself by Government order; the leaders had realized that extra Police would be posted to prevent any disorder, which would lend colour to this report. In order to introduce the element of fasting, it was also reported that Government had forbidden any fires for cooking that day. The day passed off peacefully as its organizers intended; the shopkeepers accepted it merely as an extra holiday, and the population wandered round idly and was without excitement, fasting and humiliation being conspicuous by their absence.

This description has been introduced to show how unreal the first demonstration was; and it was this very unreality which had the effect of obscuring the real danger which lay behind it. It seems probable as has already been said that the next test of strength against the Government would have been postponed, but the deportation of Kitchlew and Satya Pal stirred up Amritsar to acts of serious nature and Lahore tried to follow suit. Distorted versions of the occurrences in these places were widely manufactured and circulated with the intent of inflaming people's minds against Government. Special efforts were made to stir up the Sikhs by the rumour of damage done to the Golden Temple. This was quite unsuccessful among the educated Sikhs, who have behaved well throughout but took effect among the ignorant Sikh peasants of the neighbourhood of Chuharkana. At the same time it had been noted by the organizers that Government had done nothing against the leaders at Delhi and they thought, as the approver has stated in his evidence, that at most they will be sent to a Hill Station to enjoy a holiday at Government expense. In fact it is clear that none of the internments from that of Lajpat Rai in Rangoon have had any deterrent effect, except the internments inside the gaols. Another factor which is well worthy of notice is that in Gujranwala the Municipal elections were shortly to have taken place, and the candidates felt themselves bound to take a prominent part in what was going forward, in order not to lose the reputation of being leaders.

III.—CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

A description of the main course of events leading up to the first *hartal* in Gujranwala itself has been given in some detail in the section dealing with the immediate causes of the outbreak. It will, however, be convenient to include the whole series of events in this narrative, in order to give a true perspective of the movement. It also seems better to give a continuous account of the occurrences in each place affected, rather than to compile a daily narrative of events in the whole district.

Gujranwala.

5th April.—As the result of informal discussion in the Bar room, it was decided by the local leaders to hold a meeting of protest against the Rowlatt Bill on this evening. Hand bills were hurriedly printed in Lahore and distributed throughout the town. This notice announced that a public meeting of the citizens of Gujranwala would be held at the house of Lala Amar Nath, Pleader,

Continued.] Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

at 5-30 P.M. that day, under the presidency of Lala Hakim Rai, Pleader, to signify displeasure at the passage of the Rowlatt Bill. Members of all religions and communities were invited to attend and lend their support to the meeting. At 1 P.M. I summoned the leaders of this movement and warned them that they would be held responsible for any disturbances. The meeting was held as advertised and the following resolutions were passed :—

(1) That this meeting expresses its strong protest against the Rowlatt Bill and views with consternation and disapproval the manner in which it has been passed in the teeth of unanimous opposition and the considered judgment of the country as a whole.

(2) This meeting expects that the 6th of April be observed as a national protest day and a fast of 24 hours be kept by all, and that all business in the town be suspended for the day.

(3) That this meeting views with alarm the action of the Delhi authorities in firing upon the people of the city, which resulted in the deaths of so many citizens: and urges on the Government the need of enquiring into responsibility for the said occurrence.

(4) That a cable be despatched to the Secretary of State, etc., etc., conveying the purport of the resolutions.

Some of the speeches, as already mentioned, were highly objectionable in character.

6th April.—General *hartal* was observed throughout the city, induced and encouraged by the rumours mentioned in the preceding section. The day passed off peacefully and there were no incidents worthy of record.

7th to 10th April.—No movements were visible and the demonstration appeared to be to an end, although rumours were still afloat and it was evident that a certain amount of excitement prevailed in the city. Late on the night of the 10th news reached Gujranwala of the occurrences at Amritsar and Lahore.

11th April.—In the morning there were meetings of the Executive Committee of the District War League and of the District Board. Referring to the Amritsar incidents I warned the meetings, only in their own interest, to see that no such incident occurred in Gujranwala. In the evening I held a minor Durbar for the distribution of recruiting and other rewards.

12th April.—I left the district in the evening on transfer, handing over officiating charge to Khan Bahadur Mirza Sultan Ahmad, Extra Assistant Commissioner. Other Magistrates and notable people of the district left the same evening or the following morning for Lahore to attend the Durbar on the 14th.

13th April.—In the morning the Assistant Commissioner, with the Naib Tahsildar, left for Eminabad to superintend the annual cattle fair. It appears that the local leaders had held a meeting on the evening of the previous day, but had come to no decision as to measures to be taken. To-day, however, at a further meeting it was definitely decided " to repeat the incidents of Lahore and Amritsar in order to discredit the Government and to show sympathy with the people of these places." The plans decided upon were to interrupt railway and telegraphic communications. These plans, however, were kept well concealed and the only information which reached the Superintendent of Police was that there would probably be a new *hartal* on the 14th.

The American Missionaries received a warning late at night from the Indian Christians that it would be as well for them to leave. They did so during the night on the assurance that the Indian Christians would be safe without them.

14th April.—Early in the morning a calf was killed and hung up by the neck to the Kachchi railway bridge. Rumours were circulated that this was the work of the Police. The calf was discovered and promptly buried by the Police. From early morning crowds collected in the bazars, raising various cries and seeing to the closure of all the shops. When the Up morning train came into the station, large numbers of people were prepared to go by this train to the *Baisakhi* fair at Wazirabad. Certain leaders, however, walked up and down the station platform shouting out that this was no day for holiday making, and that any one who went to Wazirabad should be considered a bastard. Many people thereupon alighted. As the train was starting the guard was also seized and prevented from mounting the train. The train moved on, but came to a standstill short of the distant signal, the crowd meanwhile surrounding it and stoning it, and attempting to damage the engine. Part of the mob then proceeded to set on fire a small bridge over the Railway opposite the Gurukul. Mr. Heron, Superintendent of Police, observed the train at a standstill from his bungalow and after enquiry despatched Mr. Nevill, Assistant Superintendent of Police, to the spot with a small guard, while he himself set off towards Police Lines to collect more men and to warn the station. Mr. Nevill on arrival found two or three sleepers of the bridge burning fiercely with the help of kerosene oil. The crowd, consisting mainly of small boys, ran off on his approach and he set to work to extinguish the fire. The Superintendent of Police after making his other dispositions went to the station to see how matters stood there. He found that the Telegraph wire had been cut on both sides, but as the telephone to Lahore was still open he sent a brief message of what had occurred to the Inspector-General of Police through the Controller. It was found very difficult to keep the station clear as the station staff refused to co-operate.

Up to this time no Magistrate had been present, but the officiating Deputy Commissioner, with Agha Ghulam Hassan Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, now appeared. At 9 P.M., as the Permanent-Way Inspector certified that the bridge was safe, the morning train was sent off to Wazirabad. Shortly after 10 o'clock information was received that the Kachchi bridge on the Lahore side of the railway station had been set on fire. Police were at once sent to extinguish it. All communication to Wazirabad and Lahore had by this time been cut. The crowd in front of the railway station greatly increased in numbers and one or two black flags made their appearance. Two men meanwhile were moving among the crowd distributing *chapatis* and calling out " *langar ki roti.*" The three Magistrates meanwhile were endeavouring to induce the people to go quietly to their homes. One or two pleaders also made a pretence of leading away a portion of the crowd into the city. It was afterwards found that they were led away to listen to further inflammatory speeches. The mob next attacked the Railway near the distant signal on the Lahore side, having secured tools for the purpose from the gang huts. The Superintendent of Police, with Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, and a small force of Police proceeded to the spot and the crowd ran off. The Kachchi bridge was still burning and more constables were deputed to extinguish it. The Superintendent of Police was returning to the station when a large mob came up and commenced to throw stones at him and his Police escort. At this moment Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and Agha Ghulam Hussan Khan arrived from the city with another *posse* of Police. But despite their presence, the mob worked themselves up and made a rush and attempted to seize the Superintendent of Police himself. He had to use his revolver and the Police also fired with buck-shot, so the crowd dispersed in the direction of the city. As the state of affairs was now more really serious Mr. Heron sent off telegrams by special messengers to be despatched from Eminabad and Rahwali to Lahore and Sialkot respectively, requesting military assistance. There was still a large mob in front of the station, all the members of it being by now in a state of great excitement. During this time it appears that access had been gained to the

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN. [*Continued.*

Post Office from the rear and the inner rooms of the Telegraph Office had been set on fire. All water had been removed from the premises and the pumps at the station had been damaged obviously by previous arrangement. It was therefore impossible to save the building. This damage done, the mob cleared off for a time, but returned again in numbers opposite the station. The rioters had been greatly inflamed by the speeches made by mob orators at various meetings and by the stimulus given by the leaders on the arrival of a couple of wounded men into the assemblage. There were in consequence a number of persons wild with excitement.

Later on, news came that two other mobs had crossed the Railway line some way from the station, one mob intending to attack the Tahsil and open the jail, and the other to attack the Kutcheri, Treasury, Mission Compound and Civil bungalows. The Superintendent of Police and Assistant Superintendent of Police both set off to deal with these mobs, but the crowds had already succeeded in setting fire to the Tahsil, Dâk Bungalow and Kutcheri. They were driven off from the Police Lines and the jail, but the guard on the Church failed to prevent the rioters from destroying the building. The crowd was fired on whenever seen, but scattered on the approach of the Police. Meanwhile, during the absence of the Superintendent of Police, the crowd had gained access to the station premises and had set the building on fire and the Casson Industrial School had also been gutted. Subsequently to this another party set fire to the goods shed, and what property was not burnt was looted by the crowd of bad characters who collected on the spot. While this was going on, aeroplanes arrived from Lahore and by dropping bombs drove the crowd to the safety of their own houses. Two of these bombs are known to have fallen into the thick of the rioters. About this time I arrived by motor car from Lahore. The more violent of the rioters had full intention not only of completing their evil work of destroying the Civil Station and its white inhabitants, but of looting the wealthy merchants of the town. The unexpected arrival of the aeroplanes effectually discouraged the rioters who lost five killed and four wounded by one bomb alone outside the railway godown. Whether they would have plucked up courage during the night to make a fresh attack on the small party with women and children which had taken refuge in the Treasury, cannot be said. Fortunately, however, the arrival of troops from Sialkot at 9 P.M. finally quieted the situation.

15th April.—During the morning I went round the city with Mr. Douglas Donald, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, the Superintendent of Police and a party of British soldiers and made some 23 arrests of those who were known to be the leaders, including several barristers and pleaders. Word had been sent out on the 14th evening by special messengers to the various Tahsils giving orders for the prompt suppression of any disorder, for the assemblage of all persons licensed to carry arms and for the institution of a system of civil patrols on the Railway line.

16th April.—Martial Law was proclaimed over the district.

Wazirabad.

6th April.—Efforts were made by various Hindus to force a *hartal* in the town, but this was frustrated by the efforts of prominent Muhammadans.

12th April.—A secret meeting was held at the house of Dial Shah, Municipal Commissioner, where it was first decided to have a *hartal* on the 13th, but at the request of the sweetmeat sellers it was postponed to the 15th, so that they should not lose their profits for the *Baisakhi* fair.

14th April.—The news of the riot at Gujranwala spread quickly to Wazirabad. Local agitators paraded the streets exhorting the people to observe *hartal*. In the afternoon a meeting was convened in the Juma Masjid of Hindus and Muhammadans together, under the presidency of Jamiat Singh Bagga. Speeches were made by him and others denouncing the Rowlatt Act and preaching *hartal*. After dark groups marched through the streets singing inflammatory ballads. No actual violence occurred.

15th April.—A general *hartal* was observed. Led by the local agitators, mobs went round to the schools and forced them to close, and so added a number of schoolboys to their ranks. The crowd then gathered in front of the Tahsil. The Tahsildar called in the most prominent leaders and advised them to disperse. No heed, however, was taken and the crowd split up in several directions. One portion proceeded to the engine shed and attempted to induce a strike of the employees. Another lot went to the Dâk Bungalow where they damaged Telegraph wires and also the compound fencing. A party of cavalry guarding the station proper partially dispersed the mob; the latter, however, returned and pelted them with stones. The Military, considering that they had not sufficient authority to disperse the mob by fire, only fired in the air. A part of this mob moved on to the Palku Railway Bridge. They cut Telegraph wires, damaged the distant signal and set fire to the bridge itself. The mob was dispersed by the Police and driven to the city and the fire extinguished. They re-assembled and did more wire cutting near the civil hospital, but were dispersed by Police near the District Board bungalow. Another mob went towards Nizamabad and were joined by a crowd from that village, where *hartal* had been induced by the Lambardar, Mubarak Ali, and others. They set fire to a gang hut, took the tools and did what damage they could to the Railway bridges and level crossing gates. They then went to the house of the Reverend Grahame Bailey, burnt it and looted it. After this they returned to Wazirabad and gathered before the Post Office with a view to destroying it, but they were prevented by the action of the Police.

Further down the line a few bad characters in the neighbourhood of Ghakhar tried to persuade the people of Ghakhar to attack the line and the railway station. The people, however, refused.

16th April.—I, with Superintendent of Police, visited Wazirabad and superintended the arrest of certain of the leaders. Sufficient troops had by this time arrived to maintain order and the headquarters of the Sialkot Brigade was subsequently moved to Wazirabad.

Hafizabad.

5th April.—The anniversary of the Arya Samaj High School was in progress. Among the speakers was Lala Raja Ram, Professor of the D. A.-V. College, Lahore. A secret meeting of the leading local agitators was held at the house of Ram Sahai, soda-water manufacturer, to discuss measures of passive resistance. A special delegate was sent from here to consult the editor of the *Desh* at Lahore, Dina Nath Pasi, a resident of Hafizabad.

6th April.—A *hartal* was observed, but it was apparently only partial and was not fully organized. In the evening a meeting was held at which speeches were made in opposition to the Rowlatt Bill of the same tenor as in Gujranwala.

12th April.—Another meeting was called to organize *hartal* for the 14th.

14th April.—A *hartal* was carried out as previously arranged. A crowd gathered in front of the Tahsil, but on the Tahsildar's order to disperse, it went away. It re-assembled, however, outside the town and proceeded towards the railway station. Speeches were made in the neighbourhood of the goods shed, openly advising rebellion. While these were going on a passenger train steamed into the station, in a first class carriage of which Lieutenant Tatam, of the Military Farms Department, was travelling with a small boy. The crowd sighted him and rushed towards the station. He scented trouble and shut up the carriage all round, but the crowd made a fierce attack with sticks and stones and broke in the windows. It was only the plucky action of two or three Indians who came to his rescue and the moving off of the train which saved his life and that of the small

Continued.] Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN.

child with him. After this the mob dispersed and nothing further happened that day.

15th April.—*Hartal* was again observed. A mob collected with the intention of destroying a culvert, but dispersed without doing any damage. It then re-assembled, damaged the distant signal and cut wires. One man who climbed the signal was promptly arrested and so was another who came to rescue him. They were taken to the Tahsil, whereupon the mob collected outside and threw stones at the building. The Police from the roof fired in the air and the mob dispersed. Later on the Police Inspector went into the city and dispersed a gathering which he found there, without causing any casualties.

16th April.—Shops were open as usual and no further disturbance occurred.

Akalgarh and Ramnagar.

6th April.—Members of the Diwan family, descendants of Diwan Mulraj, the rebel of Multan fame, with other Hindus went round the bazars of Akalgarh inducing shopkeepers to close their shops. In the evening, a meeting was held under the presidency of Diwan Gopal Lal, the speeches being mostly moderate in tone. At Ramnagar *hartal* was also observed.

14th April.—The shops at Akalgarh opened as usual in the morning. At about 9 A.M., however, rumours began to arrive about the disturbances at Kasur, etc. The leaders thereupon formed a procession and again forced *hartal* by the threat of boycott. The mob collected and proceeded shouting towards the station and the Mandi. They threatened to burn down the factories of those who refused to join in the *hartal*. They then went on to the railway station. A party was sent off to Wazirabad to find out what was happening there and two of these returned at 4-30 and brought news about the riot at Gujranwala. The mob was a half-hearted one and no actual damage was done. At Ramnagar also, apparently, the day was uneventful.

15th April.—A meeting had been arranged to promote Hindu-Musalman unity, but it fell through as leading Musalmans refused to join. The mob was again very half-hearted and contented itself with the consumption and circulation of every kind of rumour. Slight damage was done to telegraph wires, signal lamps were broken and an attempt was made to burn a bridge. One of the Railway staff announced that there would be a Railway strike that evening, but nothing came of it.

At Ramnagar a most serious event occurred. A party of Hindus collected, and proceeded to the banks of the Chenab. They there produced a small rag effigy of the King-Emperor and proceeded to burn it with every species of insult. The ashes were thrown into the water and the crowd then had a bath in token of purification and returned in triumph to the town. The perpetrators of this outrage were apparently exceedingly frightened afterwards at their own rashness and endeavoured to hush the incident up. No further trouble occurred in the town.

Only one more incident remains to be recorded, and that is the burning of the patwari's papers at Aulakh. It appears that two of the Lambardars and other zamindars of the village were deluded into the idea that the power of Government had weakened; and as the Tahsil copies of the village records had been burnt they imagined they would gain some advantage by destroying the patwari's records as well. Accordingly they attacked and burnt the Patwarkhana on April 16th. The act met with prompt retribution for on the 18th the Assistant Superintendent of Police with a party of British soldiers and Police proceeded to the village and arrested all those who were concerned.

IV.—MARTIAL LAW AND OTHER MEASURES ADOPTED FOR SUPPRESSION OF DISTURBANCES.

The Military authorities despatched troops with great promptitude all over the disturbed area. The headquarters of the Sialkot Brigade were moved to Wazirabad, and detachments were sent to Gujranwala, Khanki and Hafizabad. The British troops sent to Gujranwala were utilized in the prompt raid on Aulakh, the one village of the Gujranwala half of the district that misbehaved itself. They were also taken out on escort duty with officers at the beginning and especially were paraded in Akalgarh and the disreputable town of Ramnagar where the effigy of the King-Emperor was burnt.

Under Martial Law the Curfew Law was enforced from 8 P.M. to 5 A.M. in the towns where there were troops. This measure was liked at first, as it prevented indiscriminate stealing by bad characters, who would have taken advantage of the occasion. It was, however, eased off and finally removed at an early date as the heat increased, because it interfered with the movements of carts, and pack animals to market. It was necessary to punish a few individuals at the commencement of curfew, because the people had no idea what discipline meant and that it was necessary to obey orders. Rules were also issued prohibiting the carrying of cudgels. It was necessary at an early date prohibiting the issue of railway tickets, except on passes given by the military authorities, because the railway was made use of by the agents of rebellion to disseminate evil ideas far and wide. Orders were also issued for the inculcation of respect for authority and the schoolboys were ordered to salute the British flag for some days. These orders were, I consider, salutary as the youth of the present day is brought up without respect even for his parents. The troops gave some displays of the use of the Lewis Gun, Machine Gun and six-pounder gun in different places which all had a good effect on the population which had forgotten the troops' existence and had no knowledge of modern arms. No orders issued under Martial Law in this district appear to have been unnecessary or undesirable.

V.—CLASSES PROMINENT.

The majority of the persons who were prominent belonged to the Arya Samaj.

Rural notables and agriculturists not connected with disturbances.

Principal classes:—

(1) Pleaders and their Munshis.
(2) Students and schoolboys.
(3) Traders.
(4) Certain classes of Government servants.

VI.—METHODS ADOPTED BY REBELS AND DISTURBERS OF THE PEACE.

As directed by Mr. Gandhi the rebels organized a test *hartal* on the 6th of April. This was successful everywhere, not only in this district but elsewhere, and its success came as a great surprise. The organization of the evil-doers was complete and the better classes appeared quite unable to do anything except look on. In Wazirabad, however, the presence of a sufficient body of reliable Muhammadans prevented the *hartal* from taking place. The feature of the later days of riot was the employment of a large number of boys and although the crowd got out of hand and older men joined in, it would appear as if the leaders had desired a second test of the organization in which boys and youths only should take part and which could be put down as mere boyish pranks. In the attack on Lieutenant Tatam there was hardly one of the assailants whose age exceeded 20 and in Gujranwala Mr. Heron was undoubtedly hampered in taking energetic action by the fact that all the people in the forefront were boys. A strike of Railway employees was undoubtedly under consideration, though it is probable that it was timed for a much later date and thus never came off at all. The North-Western Railway authorities have taken some punitive action, though perhaps hardly sufficient, considering the sympathy shown by the Railway staff. The first thing that the mob thought of in Gujranwala was to attack the communications. The Telegraph and Telephone wires

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'BRIEN—*concluded*—Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD.

were cut at an early hour. Attempts were made to burn the bridges on both sides of the station. That they did no more damage is probably due to the fact that the rising was premature and the experts who should have assisted them were not available. In Wazirabad as the station was defended by troops the mob could only destroy Telegraph wires on all four sides of the station. In Hafizabad on the 15th of April the cry of the leaders was "See how, although the main line is stopped, troops are able to go round through Hafizabad towards Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi to fight against our brothers. We should stop this line also."

Government buildings were attacked as already described to show contempt to lawful authority.

VII.—PUNITIVE MEASURES.

There were five sentences of whipping passed by the Commissions and four by Summary Courts for minor offences between the 30th March and the date of the proclamation. These were mainly juvenile offenders sentenced to whipping after the manner of school discipline, or persons found guilty of committing theft only, for which whipping is suitable under the ordinary law. There were only 15 sentences of whipping by Summary Courts for offences against Martial Law. One is reported to have been inflicted in public before instructions in this connection had been issued. I cannot go into detail as to each of the cases. The majority, however, were youths, or men who were caught out of their houses during the curfew hours. A very few sentences of this type were sufficient in each of the different places, where Martial Law was in force, to remind the people, unaccustomed to discipline, that orders were orders. Whipping in such cases was distinctly a more suitable punishment than imprisonment. Of the 16 orders only one was of 20 stripes and over, three of 10 stripes, 10 of five stripes and one less than five stripes.

The claims under section 15-A of the Police Act are as under :—

	Rs.	A.	P.
Gujranwala	5,37,494	7	6
Wazirabad	69,276	8	0
Hafizabad	6,525	0	0
Akalgarh	1,001	0	0

The claim of Rs. 8,20,000 put in by the North-Western Railway is under consideration, but probably under section 82 of the Railway Act the claims for the damage done by the act of the King's enemies are not recoverable

The Police staff was very inadequate.

Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala.

(Events before the 14th April.)

Disturbance at Gujranwala on the 14th April last was due to the following reasons in my opinion.

1. On 6th April *hartal* was observed throughout the City. Although I was not at headquarters that day but I was told that it was due to the Rowlatt Bill,

2. False and baseless rumours were widely spread in the city regarding the Rowlatt Bill and even in villages the following was the topic among the inhabitants :—

(*a*) That according to Rowlatt Bill more than 5 or 10 men are prohibited from accompanying a marriage or funeral party without permission.

(*b*) That Government will take half the produce from the zamindars for each harvest.

3. Event of 10th April at Amritsar were spread everywhere through the agency of newspapers and moreover the passengers spread false rumours as well where they happened to stop, as for example "Durbar Sahib has been disgraced and inhabitants of Amritsar are in possession of the fort there." These false rumours deceived the public at large who ultimately got enraged.

Meetings which were convened on the 14th April and in which some two or three thousand of persons were present, were mainly to oppose the Rowlatt Bill. The event of Khushi Ram of Lahore was also related therein.

4. At the same time it was made known through newspapers that Mahatma Gandhi was arrested at Palwal. This news enraged the people very much.

5. On the evening of 13th April some leaflets were seen posted in the city advising the public to help the meetings of Lahore and Amritsar. These are the reasons which led to the *hartal* on 14th April last.

6. As far as I remember on 9th or 10th April last received an official letter at Sharakpur that Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien will make over charge on the 12th April. Thereupon I returned to Gujranwala and took over charge from Colonel O'Brien on the afternoon of 12th April.

7. On the evening of 13th April last I received a letter from the Superintendent of Police informing me that there will be a *hartal* on the 14th April in the city and will last till *hartal* at Lahore ends.

At about 7 A.M. on the 14th April I went towards the city, but in the way I was told that Sialkot train which was late that day and which reached here at 8 A.M. has been stopped by the people and the driver has been threatened not to take the train further. Hearing this I repaired to the Railway Station and saw the train standing at the platform. The passengers seeing the state of affairs alighted and left for their homes.

8. Superintendent of Police along with some constables was standing there at the time. There and then I received information as to the burning of the railway bridge near the Gurukul. Superintendent of Police proceeded towards that direction and I after deputing Agha Ghulam Hassan Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, in the city and Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, at the Railway Station went towards the city. I saw all the shops closed and people going to and fro who were shouting out that they would not accept the Rowlatt Bill. Except this no disturbance was observed in the city. People were hurrying to the place where lectures were to be delivered. I then returned to the Railway Station. There I heard a report of shots being fired and was told that one Girdhari Lal attacked the Superintendent of Police and so it was fired.

That in spite of the people being fired at they were seen standing outside the Railway fencing and shouted out "*hai hai* Rowlatt Bill."

Two men were wounded by these shots. They were carried away by other men to the place where lectures were being delivered. Seeing the enraged condition of the mob and the insufficiency of the police force I sent an urgent telegram to Lahore for military help. As telegraphic communication on both sides of the station was cut off, I sent one man each to Rahwali and Eminabad Railway Stations for despatching these telegrams

Khan Bahadur MIRZA SULTAN AHMAD—*concluded*—Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY.

9. When the mob carried the two wound dmen to the place of meeting they spread false rumours as to many men having been killed. Seeing the men wounded the mob got enraged very much and repaired towards the Railway Station and collected in front of the Railway gates. This mob consisted of the boys of tender age. Superintendent of Police and some of the Police Constables were standing near the Railway Station. The mob was using fiery language and addressed the Superintendent of Police either to fire at them or they will take revenge from him.

10. I and Munshi Taj-ud-Din went towards this dangerous mob and attempted some of them to give ear to us. We advised them not to make a row and told them that if Girdhari Lal had not attacked the Superintendent of Police they would not have been fired at and ultimately persuaded some of the mob to move towards the city whom we carried them to some extent. But there remained still some men standing who were using fiery language at the time.

After a short while when I returned I saw the Post Office ablaze. Some of the men were still devising to burn the Railway Station as well, but owing to the presence of the Superintendent of Police and a sufficient police force they could not succeed in carrying out their intention.

When Police used to threaten the mob by fire they dispersed but boys of tender age still remained to their places. So I thought it inadvisable to fire at them. Some 20 or 25 men succeeded in entering the Railway Station but as the Railway Staff proceeded to check them they were not fired at.

11. Besides the mob which was in front of the Railway Station other small batches were seen moving here and there who were shouting out that they would not accept the Rowlatt Bill.

12. Although some of the men threw stones at Superintendent of Police still he did not give up his courage and avoided to fire at them.

13. It was at 1 P.M. that I was told by a police constable that Dak Bungalow, Tahsil and District Courts are all set on fire. Hearing this I despatched Agha Ghulam Hassan Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner to District Courts and after a short while I and the Superintendent of Police followed him. Before we reached there, District Courts, Tahsil and Dâk Bungalow were all burnt. Before leaving for District Courts I left some 6 or 7 police constables with Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, to guard the Railway Station. When we reached District Courts we heard reports of shots from the direction of the Railway Station. On enquiry I came to know that Station and the Church have also been burnt.

14. At about 3 P.M. Colonel O'Brien arrived here from Lahore. At that time some of the mob in batches were seen moving here and there and the remainder was engaged in looting the Railway Goods shed. After a short while three aeroplanes reached here and began to throw bombs. Light showers of rain also fell at the time and the mob dispersed.

15. On the morning of 15th April military force also arrived. Had it come on the 14th April then there would have been no need of aeroplanes. If the aeroplanes had not arrived that day and were not a danger to the mob, then in my opinion the evil-doers would have committed more blunders in the city as well. It was to the exertion of Colonel O'Brien that nothing happened after the 14th April.

16. On the 15th April I was ordered by the Deputy Commissioner to go to Muridke and arrange for the safety of Railway line and telegraphic communication, as some of the evil-doers had cut the telegraph wire near Muridke. I accordingly reached Muridke on the morning of 16th April.

Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY, M.C., D.F.C., Flight Commander, No. 31 Squadron, Royal Air Force.

At about 14-00 hours on the afternoon of the 14th April 1919 I was given verbal instructions by Lieutenant Colonel F. F. Minchin, Commanding 52nd Wing, Royal Air Force, to proceed to Gujranwala and bomb and machine gun any people I saw causing damage to property, or any large crowds. I was also to reconnoitre the country round Gujranwala and to take offensive action against any parties who may have been coming in from the outlying villages to Gujranwala or returning to the villages.

Colonel Minchin also told me not to drop bombs on the native city unless in my opinion I considered it necessary.

I arrived at Gujranwala at 15-10 hours and found the Railway Station on fire and bales of goods on the platform burning. A passenger train on the up line appeared to be on fire, and the English church and 4 houses in civil lines on the east of the Railway burning.

I was flying at heights varying from 100 to 700 feet when over Gujranwala and neighbouring country and I should like to point out that no action was taken until I had satisfied myself that the target was a justifiable one.

There were large number round the station, on the roads going from the native city to the civil lines, and in the streets in the native city.

I took no action to start with and flew round the neighbouring villages. At about 15-20 I dropped three bombs on a party of natives 150 strong outside a village about 2 miles north-west of Gujranwala. One bomb failed to explode, and the others fell near the party which scattered and ran back to the village. Three casualties were seen. 50 rounds machine gun were fired into the village.

A few minutes later at a village about 1 mile south of the above a party of 50 natives was seen returning from Gujranwala; two bombs were dropped, but only one burst; no casualties were seen. Party disappeared into village, 25 rounds machine gun fired into village.

Coming back to Gujranwala I noticed a party of about 200 natives in a field near a large red building on the north-west outskirts of town. One bomb dropped which burst in the courtyard of a house. Several people appeared to be wounded 30 rounds machine gun fired into party who took cover in the house.

I now noticed that the police held the station and were moving the crowd away into the native city. There was a large crowd of natives near the centre of the city. I dropped two bombs which I did not see burst. These must be the bombs that burst near the station. Only eight bombs were dropped and these were dropped by me. No other machines dropped bombs.

I fired about 150 rounds machine gun into the native city, causing casualties. At 15-50 hours when I left for Lahore no natives could be seen in the streets. No offensive action was taken in civil lines as I did not want to damage civilian property. I should like to point out that my original report was a bombing report, and was confined to statements of where bombs were dropped and machine gun fired.

Captain D. H. M. CARBERRY—*concluded*—Lieutenant L. DODKINS.

ANNEXURE TO CAPTAIN CARBERRY'S STATEMENT.

Copy of aerial reconnaissance report from 15-10 hours, 14th April 1919 to 15-40 hours 14th April 1919.

Time.	Place.	Observations.
15-10	Gujranwala . .	Railway station on fire, bales of goods on platform burning. Passenger train in station, Up Line, on fire. English Church and four houses in the Civil Lines on the East of Railway burning. All these were still burning at 15-30 hours.
15-20	„ . .	Dropped three bombs on party of natives, 150 strong outside village about two miles north-west of Gujranwala. 1 bomb failed to explode. The others fell near party which scattered 3 casualties seen, 50 rounds machine gun fired into village.
15-30	„ . .	Party of 50 natives outside village about 1 mile south of above village, 2 bombs dropped, only one exploded within 10 yards of party. No casualties were seen, 25 rounds machine gun fired into village. Party dispersed into village.
15-36	„ . .	About 200 hundred natives in the Fields near a large red building on north-west outskirts on town. One bomb dropped which burst in courtyard of house; several people appeared to be wounded, 30 rounds machine gun fired into party who took cover in house.
15-40	„ . .	2 bombs, which failed to burst, dropped on large crowd of natives in centre of town. 100 rounds machine guns fired into parties of natives in the streets. At 15-40 when machine left for Lahore no natives could be seen in streets. At 15-40 Station occupied by police.

D. H. M. CARBERRY, *Captain,*
Observer.

Lieutenant L. DODKINS, Observer, Royal Air Force.

Aeroplane Reconnaissance report Lahore to Gujranwala, dated 15th April 1919.

Date.	Place.	Time.	Extract.
	Lahore . . .	07—50	Left aerodrome.
	Gujranwala . .	08—30	Arrived. Found main line railway culvert about 300 yards S. main station partly demolished but under repair. No other damage to railway permanent way noticed between Lahore and 3 miles N. Gujranwala. Much rolling stock in station but no activity. Two trucks of goods train in station detached, one burning. House on main road opposite station almost burnt out, still burning slightly. No large congregations of people.
	Gujranwala . . .	08—55	Gathering of about 20, noticed in field about 1 mile W. of town, scattered with Lewis Gun.
	Gujranwala . .	08—58	Similar gathering outside house in village ½ mile W. of town, on approaching them they entered house. One bomb dropped which hit adjoining house and blew side in.
	Gujranwala . .	09—05	Truck still burning strongly and deadstock on adjoining platform. Main station building demolished. Church and large house near demolished, but no fire. Station occupied by armed Native Police and a few British ranks. Working parties busy on permanent way.
	Gujranwala . .	09—30	Left Gujranwala.
	Lahore . . .	10—10	Arrived at aerodrome.

Captain W. E. GODFREY, I.A.R.O., Gujranwala.

In giving the sequence of events which preceded the riots at Gujranwala on the 14th April 1919, I should like to say that from a personal experience which extended from June 1918 to January 1919 when I was in command of the 71st Punjabis recruiting depôt and therefore in close connection with the recruiting. I am of very strong conviction that these riots had nothing whatever to do with the recruiting and it was not till well into the summer of this year that I ever heard the two things connected, at least as far as Gujranwala was concerned. I am also able if necessary to give one or two experiences of my own in refutation of the connection. During the week which preceded the riots although there were all sorts of rumours floating about the city which subsequently came to our ears through the servants, etc., I noticed nothing untoward until Friday, the 11th, when I had occasion to go to the Railway Station to make arrangements for sending my furniture to Gojra, where I was hoping to move to the following week in order to take up my work as a Missionary of the Church Missionary Society. When I reached the Station platform I noticed a group of men standing talking, this was of course nothing unusual and I should have thought nothing of it were it not for the fact that my coming evidently caused some comment from some one in the group for they all turned and looked at me, and one of them made an action of throat cutting or of the slipping on of a noose at which the others all laughed. The action was so deliberate that I made a step towards the individual to ask him what he meant, but changed my mind and continued my way to the Station Master's office. My change of mind made these men laugh again.

The servants coming in from the bazar that day brought all sorts of rumours. I therefore went to see Mr. Heron, the Superintendent of Police, but he was not able to tell me much more than I myself knew, about the attitude of the towns people.

There was to be a Darbar and a farewell garden party to Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien who was leaving the next day. In view of the rumours that were floating about I discussed with the missionaries the advisability of the ladies not attending the garden party. I also saw Colonel O'Brien in case he decided to put off the Darbar. He decided he would not do so and the missionary ladies decided also that it would be better to attend the garden party as if there was nothing unusual happening. But most of us men decided to go armed. Colonel and Mrs. O'Brien, Mr. Heron and I and my wife all drove down together to the Darbar.

Nothing unusual happened at either the Darbar or the garden party except for the fact of the presence of an unusual number of police about the municipal gardens.

Saturday, April 12th.—The next day Saturday morning I had again to go to the Railway Station about my furniture. I found the station staff in a very rude and independent frame of mind. I quickly noticed this as during my six months recruiting duty when I had much to do with them I always found them very polite and obliging. Two incidents happened at this time which the light of subsequent events emphasises but which at the time did not cause me undue concern. I wished to make arrangements for sending off the children's donkey to Gojra also, but during the talk with the goods clerks about this one of them said "Sir I would not send the donkey by rail if I were you." I asked him why? To which he replied it will be too hot. As it was a hot day I thought he meant it would be climatically so but afterwards I remembered the others laughed at the remark.

Again later in the day having fixed up with bullock carts to convey this furniture to the Station, I went again myself to see it loaded. I left the yard, and went to the passenger platform and was talking to some of the Railway staff outside the Parcel Office when one of them said to me, "Sir, do you think you will see your furniture again"? I replied "Yes of course," why do you ask? He said "Oh there is going to be a very big railway strike." I did not wish to appear alarmed before them so I laughingly said "*Achha Kismat*" at which they all laughed. Next day one of them told me as we were leaving by the Bombay Mail that he was getting my van off that night by a goods train then standing in the station. I don't know whether he did so or not but I gave him Rs. 2 I think.

Later in the day Dr. Charles of Gujranwala came to me and said that all sorts of things were happening in the city and he would be glad to know what the arrangements were for the safety of the Indian Christians in case of trouble. We went to Mr. Heron who advised Dr. Charles, I believe, to arrange for all to go into the Treasury if there was trouble. The question of provision was also discussed. I advised the Missionaries also to make arrangements in this way.

Sunday 13th.—On Sunday morning at about 9 A.M. Mr. Heron, the Superintendent of Police, called to see me. He asked me to come out on to the verandah and there told me he had come to the conclusion that it would be better if I took my wife and family away to Lahore. I was not at first inclined to agree with him, as I was leaving in any case on the following Tuesday or Wednesday but agreed to be ready to go off at short notice.

The American Missionaries were having their Sabbath School at this time so when it was over I called the Rev. Dr. McConnellee over. The Rev. M. McArthur and another also came and we sat and discussed the situation and also the advisability of the ladies of the mission leaving also; while we were talking Dr. Charles, who was passing on his cycle, also joined us and reported to Mr. Heron other things he had heard. Dr. McConnellee told Mr. Heron he would tell the ladies how matters stood. I went with the Doctor to his house and all the missionaries came over. We had prayer before the discussion but the result at the time was that the ladies decided that they could not leave their Indian Christians. About 2 P.M. that afternoon Mr. Heron came again and said he had heard something which compelled him to urge me to take my family by the Bombay Mail that evening. He also promised me any help I needed to get away. We therefore hurried with our packing and were ready to leave by 4-30, but the servants having failed to get tongas I sent a note to Mr. Heron who kindly sent two policemen for us.

When we reached Gujranwala Station Mr. Heron was there with two of his Inspectors and some constables; there was a larger crowd than usual which may have been due to the Baisakhi Fair, but Mr. Heron advised my wife to sit in the waiting room. When I entered the carriage in which I was to travel and sat down a gentleman who was looking out of the window and who I afterwards saw by his luggage was a Colonel in the Indian Army remarked "If I know anything of an Indian crowd there is going to be trouble here before long." His words proved only too true. I promised Mr. Heron that I would try and come over to Gujranwala again the next day as he had expressed a wish to this effect but next morning we learned in Lahore that no trains were running to Gujranwala.

AGHA GHULAM HASSAN, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala.

On the 14th April at 6 A.M., Mirza Sultan Ahmad's *chaprasi* came to my house with his note that he wants me to see him at his house on account of some urgent business. I accordingly hastened to his house along with the *chaprasi*. On my way to Mirza Sultan Ahmad's house I saw Mohan Lal, son of Jowanda Mal, riding a horse bareheaded and talking with eight or nine persons round him in Chauk Kalan. No sooner I reached them they kept silent and I passed off. On reaching Mirza Sahib's house I was told by him that it has been reported

AGHA GHULAM HASSAN—*concluded*—CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL.

that the city is going to observe *hartal* to-day. I was further told that all the Municipal Commissioners had been called out by him last night and asked to use their influence in stopping the *hartal*. I was subsequently ordered to be in charge of the city for this purpose and to remain in the city *thana* till further orders. When I returned from Mirza Sahib's house I found all the shops closed in the bazar. While going towards the Railway Station I saw a mob of about hundred boys most of them appeared to me to be students coming from the Railway Station towards the city and shouting *Hindu-Musalman ki jai*. As I had to wire to the Sessions Judge, Amritsar, about my inability to attend his court in a murder case so I went straight to the Post Office. No sooner after doing so I came out of the Post Office I came to know that Mirza Sahib has come on the Railway Station. I accordingly went into the station and found Mirza Sahib with Sheikh Taj-ud-Din, Superintendent, Vernacular Office, on the platform. In the meantime Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, also reached there and a few minutes later Mr. Heron, Superintendent, Police, also came in and conversed with Mirza Sahib for some minutes and told us that all the Magistrates should not keep themselves in one place but should go to different places. I accordingly hastened to the City Police Station. Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul, Deputy Superintendent, Police, S. Bhag Singh, Court Inspector, Sheikh Jalal-ud-Din, Sub-Inspector and Babu Jang Bahadur, Sub-Inspector, with police guard were also present there. After about half-an-hour we were informed that some boys are pulling down distant signal. On hearing this I with above mentioned Police Officers and some 20 constables ran to the spot outside the city. Superintendent Police, with Rai Bahadur Ganga Ram, Deputy Superintendent, Police, and Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, had also reached there a few minutes before we reached. We all joined together. A mob of young boys was standing outside the Railway wire fencing, we asked them to disperse but useless. The ring-leader of this batch was a young man in white costume and wearing necktie. His name was however afterwards ascertained and found to be Girdhari Lal. He was in great excitement and was the first to come over to us on the Railway line, the others followed him. He came very close to us and made a murderous assault on Mr. Heron but was repulsed. The other men of the mob pelted us with stones. I was hit on shoulder. When the mob refused to disperse and resisted they were fired on. On firing the enraged mob took to its heels out of the wire fencing. It was however made known afterwards that some persons had been injured by the shot and the orderly of Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul who was holding his horse had also received a shot on the fore-head. In the meantime Mirza Sahib with Superintendent, Vernacular Office, Sheikh Taj-ud-Din, also came there. At the same time the Railway bridge on the south of this place was seen on fire and some persons were sent there to extinguish it. At this moment M. Din Muhammad, Pleader, B. B. Bhagat, Bar.-at-Law and Pandit Iqbal Narain, Secretary, Municipal Committee, came on the spot and M. Din Muhammad reported that liquor shop in the city should be closed because the people after taking liquor joined the mob and excited them. On this report Pandit Iqbal Narain was sent to have all the liquor shops closed. B. B. Bhagat was asking the mob to disperse. We then returned to the Railway Station. On our arrival there we came to know that fire has also been set to the Post Office. We all ran to the spot and found it in flames. We cried for the Municipal Water engine but were told that the mob in the city did not allow it to pass. I myself broke into the room of the Post Master and took some of the furniture out and saved. I put one of the constables to work at the adjoining well and began myself to pour water with a bucket on the burning places but as unfortunately heavy wind was blowing and one man could not supply sufficient water against the heavy fire hence all my efforts remained unsuccessful. Then all of us returned to the Railway Station and dispersed the mob from that place. At this stage M. Din Muhammad, Pleader, came in and assisted us in dispersing the mob and took away a great number of men with him into the city. In the meantime we received information that fire has also been set to *Tahsil* buildings. On this report having been received I with Chaudhuri Ghulam Rasul and some constables left for the spot. On my way to *Tahsil* I found the District Board *Dâk* Bungalow also on fire. The doors of the bungalow were closed. I instantly broke open the door of burning bungalow and saved some of the furniture and luggage of junior sub-judge who was putting up there, with great trouble. Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul then returned from the *Tahsil* and asked me to accompany him to the Railway Station where a big mob had gathered together. We came again to the Railway platform and it was reported to us that another mob of boys has gone to the Treasury. As I was in charge of the Treasury I hastened along to the spot and in the way I took Mr. Jacob with me and ran to the Treasury but no mob was there. Treasury Guard was found standing in the upper storey on the alert. Mr. Shaw, District Engineer, was also there. I then ordered the Havildar in charge that in case he finds any one of the mob coming towards the Treasury he should at once fire without hesitation. I then proceeded towards the *Kacheri* buildings which were also found to be in flames. I and Mr. Jacob broke open the door of Head Clerk's room in which the fire had recently taken place, first of all we took the confidential almirah out of the room and saved it in every way and saved some furniture of the Head Clerk's room and then from the adjoining rooms I and Mr. Jacob, Chaudhri Ghulam Rasul, Deputy Superintendent of Police, B. B. Fazal Karim, Head Clerk, Police, Fazal Ilahi, Copyist, Ahmad Din, Daftri, Nawab, Sweeper, and his wife Mussammat Lachhmi began to take out English files from almirah of the burning room. Fazal Ilahi opened the almirah and threw the file down and we took them away. I then alone hastened to the Treasury Office room which had also caught fire and broke open the window and succeeded in saving the most important books especially cash book and daily balance sheet and other current treasury registers and account books and some files with great hardship and risk were also saved. Fazal Ilahi, copyist, assisted gallantly at this place also as the fire was heavily increasing and on account of suffocation we had to leave the Treasury Office room and could not save other. At this time Superintendent of Police also came there. We were then informed that another mob intended to burn the police lines. Superintendent of Police asked me to accompany him which I did. When we reached the Police Lines with police constables, etc., we saw a big mob standing thereby. They were asked to disperse and on refusual fired and turned out of the Police Lines towards the District Board Gardens. We pursued them again and fired at them and turned all of them out of the gardens towards the city. At this time it began to rain and aeroplanes also reached in and bombed the mob at different places and made them to run towards their homes. At this time while returning to the Railway Station I saw the Railway Station and the Goods sheds in flames. At that time it was quite impossible to try to extinguish it without the help of a big fire engine.

None of the Honorary Magistrates, City Zaildar, Jagirdars, Government Grantees, Members of the Municipality were seen there; neither they rendered any service.

CHAUDHRI GHULAM RASUL, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

I am in charge of City Gujranwala since January 1918. On the passing of the Rowlatt Act the educated people of the City and especially the Pleaders began an agitation against the Act. Many wild rumours were afloat that on marriages and deaths taxes will be imposed, and if more than three or four persons would sit together it would be considered an offence. It was also rumoured that the Police will have unlimited powers and that on Police

Continued.] CHAUDHURI GHULAM RASUL.

evidence alone men will be convicted under the Rowlatt Act.

It was with a view to have the Act repealed that a meeting was held at the Gujranwala Bar room on 4th April 1919, in which it was decided that a secret meeting be held on the same evening at the house of Amar Nath, Pleader. In this meeting the four resolutions to be proposed in the public meeting which was to be held on the following evening were drafted, and the names of the movers were selected.

On the evening of the 5th of April as arranged a mass meeting of the citizens of Gujranwala under the Presidentship of Hakim Rai, Pleader, was convened at which strong speeches condemning the Rowlatt Act and advocating a general *hartal* in the City next day were made. The result was that a general *hartal* was observed in the City on the 6th of April.

Then came the news of the arrest of Gandhi, and of Satyapal and Kitchlew, and of the Amritsar and Lahore disturbances. On receipt of this news the leaders at Gujranwala held secret meetings on the 12th and 13th of April, and a fresh *hartal* was decided upon for the 14th. Mr. Heron having come to know of this made the necessary arrangements, and I was put on duty at City Gujranwala for the 14th.

I reached the City Police Station at about 7 A.M. perhaps somewhat earlier. On my way to the *Thana* a Hindu young man met me coming from the opposite direction. He was clad in Khaki and was riding a horse.

Shortly afterwards Lala Hakim Rai, Pleader, accompained by a tall Sikh came from the *Thana* chowk side. They passed in front of the *Thana* and I called Hakim Rai to me. He stopped with me for a short time and then went away.

About the same time Maulvi Nazir Hussain, Honorary Magistrate, told me that he had heard that a she calf was hanging by a girder on the Kachchi railway bridge. I sent Sub-Inspector Ghulam Rasul to go to the spot and ascertain if it was correct. He returned and said that a she calf was hanging there. I hastened to the spot myself, and got it buried without loss of time at a reasonable distance from the place. From there I proceeded straight to Superintendent of Police's bungalow to inform him of the matter. This was not later than 7-45 A.M. On reaching there I saw Mr. Nevill, Assistant Superintendent of Police, falling in men of the Bungalow Guard, and on looking to the west, I saw a crowd of men collected, and a Railway train standing near the Gurukula railway bridge (Wazirabad) side.

Superintendent of Police ordered me to proceed to where the train was with a Police Guard from the Lines which I did. From the place where I was standing at the time I could see the Gurukula Railway bridge on fire. This was at about 8 A.M. On the arrival of this guard the crowd dispersed. The train was moved back to the Railway Station, and the Police Guard went along with it. The train was near the level crossing when Superintendent of Police reached there. He ordered me to proceed to Police Station City Gujranwala with half the guard. I proceeded thither.

When I was at the Thana with Court Inspector Bhag Singh, Sub-Inspector Pars Ram and one Sikandar Lall, a mob came from the Sialkot Gate side of the *Thana* bazar, and went towards the *Thana* chowk past the City Police Station. After a short time information reached me that a mob had gone towards the Sadar Police Station and the Kachchi bridge side. I sent information of this to Superintendent of Police, and proceeded to that side with a Police Guard. When we reached Mandir Sidhan a mob was seen on and around the Kachchi railway bridge which was on fire. When the Police Guard left the Grand Trunk Road from where a way leads to the Kachchi bridge, the mob dispersed.

I had hardly reached this bridge, when Sub-Inspector Ghulam Rasul also arrived there. He had with him a Police Guard and according to the orders of Superintendent of Police was proceeding to Kangnianwala bridge for guarding it. He went on. I posted a guard of one Head Constable and 8 Foot Constables at the bridge. I saw that further on in the Parade, Sub-Inspector Ghulam Rasul was surrounded by a mob. I proceeded thither, and the mob dispersed. I returned to the City Police Station. Shortly after this news reached me that a mob of rioters were going to dismantle rails near the distant signal (Lahore side). I, in company with Khan Ghulam Hussain Khan, Magistrate (who had just arrived), proceeded to the spot and joined Superintendent of Police, Rai Bahadur Ganga Ram, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and Lala Amar Nath, Extra Assistant Commissioner, who had already reached there with a Police Guard. Mr. Brij Bhusan, Bar.-at-law, was also there. The mob was collected at the Grand Trunk Road and near the railway fencing. From there some of the mob came nearer and nearer, and would not disperse although ordered repeatedly to do so. After this they began to throw stones at all of us, and some of them rushed on Superintendent of Police. One of them actually assaulted Superintendent of Police. The Officers hastened to Superintendent of Police's side, and shots were fired. The mob took to their heels, and went back to the Grand Trunk Road. From there they hurled abuses. After sometime we marched to the Railway Station. The men began to hurl stones on all of us. They directed their stones particularly against Superintendent of Police. Superintendent of Police ordered me to act as a rear-guard in company with Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rai Bahadur Lala Ganga Ram. We both faced the crowd with our men, and the rest of the men and Superintendent of Police went on to the Railway Station. We followed when Superintendent of Police had reached there. We were at the Railway Station for some time when one man, well built, height about 5 feet 9 inches came to the platform with a few others, and said that he would kill Superintendent of Police as he had shot his brother. He was turned out, but more men came in, and the guard was fallen in to disperse them by force when it was heard that the Post Office had been set on fire. The Police went there. A mob was collected on the other side of the Grand Trunk Road and outside the Railway gate.

This mob refused to disperse, although repeatedly asked to do so. Some of the mob threw stones at Superintendent of Police. At this time I heard people saying that they would kill Superintendent of Police. We were standing outside the Railway Station when we heard that the *Tahsil* was set on fire. I was ordered to proceed thither with a Police force, but when I reached the *Tehsil*, it was all ablaze, and the incendiaries had already disappeared. The *Dâk* Bungalow and the Honorary Magistrate's Court were also ablaze. I returned to the Railway Station where Superintendent of Police was. There we heard that Treasury and Jail were threatened. I and Mr. Nevill, Assistant Superintendent of Police, both left for these places. I went to Jail which was safe, and Assistant Superintendent of Police returned to the Lines. We had divided the men between ourselves. From Jail I proceeded to the Treasury which was safe. The *Kutcheri* had been set on fire sometime before, and no mob was there. Superintendent of Police arrived a little later at the Treasury, and he ordered me to go to the Mission compound, and guard it against any possible attacks. I went there, but there was no mob there. Nor did any turn up there after this. We were there when aeroplanes arrived, and, I along with Superintendent of Police and the men, went to the city.

Outside Sialkot gate a Sikh was sitting near the corpse of a Muhammadan. He was saying "A poor innocent foreigner Muhammadan has been killed." We asked him to leave the place which he did with great hesitation and reluctance. He requested that the dead body may be given to him, which was made over to him by Superintendent of Police's orders.

After this all was quiet.

In the end I would say that on the 14th of April the rioters began by stopping the train by maltreating the guard and the driver, and setting fire to the Railway bridges and assaulting Superintendent of Police without any provocation whatsoever from the authorities, and the conduct of the people on this day was in my opinion

CHAUDHURI GHULAM RASUL—*concluded*—Mr. V. W. SMITH—Mr. F. K. SHAW—Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE.

anti-Government generally, and *anti*-British specially. This was proved by the mob selecting Mr. Heron for assault, although I and Sub-Inspector Pars Ram were in their midst stopping them from doing mischief.

I am further of opinion that if the firing had been resorted to after the Post Office was burnt, no further damage to Government property had taken place. The District Magistrate, however, did not allow it at the time.

Mr. V. W. SMITH, Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

Owing to the number of vacancies and of raw recruits which amounted on the 13th April to 106 constables out of a sanctioned strength of 569 constables for the whole district, there was a shortage in every police station of 2 or 3 constables and in each of the large towns of 8 or 10 constables. It was therefore impossible to recall men into lines from the police stations and cities, though it was found practicable to call the following strength into head-quarters from punitive police posts, *viz.* :—

2 Sub-Inspectors,
3 Head Constables, and
23 Constables.

Unfortunately the *Baisakhi* fairs at Eminabad and Wazirabad, to which as in previous years, a number of policemen had been deputed still further reduced the reserves at headquarters. On the 14th April the total strength at Gujranwala, including the City and the office staff, was—

1 Inspector,
6 Sub-Inspectors,
22 Head Constables, and
119 Constables (two-thirds of the normal number).

This force was split up into three main guards (Lines, Lines Reserve and City Reserve), consisting of 3 Sub-Inspectors, 10 Head Constables and 59 Constables, and a number of small guards posted at points which required special protection. At the most critical time the total number of men available for the protection of the railway station and Civil Station was only 3 Sub-Inspectors, 10 Head Constables and 61 Constables.

At Wazirabad the total available strength of police could not have been more than 4 Head Constables and 30 Constables, including City, Sadar and Treasury guard.

At Hafizabad, when Lieutenant Tatam was attacked there were only 3 or 4 men in the police station apart from the Treasury guard.

On the Railway line from Shahdara to Sangla there was the following strength of police :—

Sheikhupura.—Thana staff, judicial guards, and prosecuting staff amounting in all to—
2 Sub-Inspectors,
5 Head Constables, and about
20 Constables, half of whom were attached to the police station and not immediately available.

Chuharkana.—Police post of—
1 Head Constable,
4 Constables.

Dhaban Singh.—Nil.

Moman.—Nil.

Sangla.—Staff of one police station, *mostly engaged on miscellaneous rural duties, and not immediately* available for an emergency.

Mr. F. K. SHAW, District Engineer, Gujranwala.

At 6-30 A.M. on the 14th April last Mr. Heron, Superintendent of Police, came to my bungalow and warned me to keep myself in readiness for any emergency as rioting had started in the city and some of the rioters were burning the railway bridge to the north of the station.

He very kindly left five policemen as a guard at my bungalow and told me if matters assumed a serious turn he would send me word, when I was to take my wife and children into the Treasury building. Mr. Heron was then on his way from his bungalow to the scene where rioting was taking place.

About 12 noon, being warned by a messenger from Mr. Heron I took my wife and children to the Treasury, which is a square, walled enclosure, rising about twenty-five feet above the plain, with a bastion at each corner. On entering the enclosure I immediately mounted the bastion to the North-East, a position from which I was enabled to see any one approaching, as also to obtain a good view of the road leading to the Railway Station where rioting was still in progress. The Treasury is a distance of about two hundred and fifty yards from my bungalow, the court house being approximately fifty yards closer.

About five minutes after my arrival at the Treasury some of the rioters came from the direction of the railway station and set fire to the court house. This party would not be greater than twenty or twenty-five boys and men, the latter numbering half a dozen at the outside and the ages of the boys averaging between twelve and fourteen years.

These boys had with them small cans and some were carrying what I took to be short sticks. Within a minute or two after these boys had broken into and set fire to the interior of the court house I saw the flames rising through the clerestory windows a height of about eighteen feet from floor level. I was very impressed by this sight and concluded at the time that the boys must have been carrying some very inflammable liquid in the cans and that the short sticks were squirts used in spraying the furniture and roof with the material in the cans, and to come so prepared and to work as concertedly as they did, implied previous training.

Some time after the court house had been on fire I saw an aeroplane hovering over the treasury buildings. This aeroplane flew towards the Railway Station and firing commenced from its machine gun on the rioters, after which, I take it, all rioting ceased as there was no further shouting. I am firmly convinced, had it not been for the timely arrival of the aeroplanes and the action taken, the whole of the Civil Station would have been destroyed and there is a possiblity that innocent lives would have been taken by the rioters.

Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE, Head Master, Mission High School, and Member, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala.

On the morning of 14th April at about 7, I went over to the School, though it was a holiday, to see certain things, and was told by one of the Chaprasis, who had just come from the city that there was a great noise and uproar in the city. While coming home I met some friends on the road in front of my house who also told me the same, also that the up train from Lahore was stopped by a crowd at the Railway Station by throwing out all fire and coal and letting out all water from the engine. At this time one of my servants who came to call me home being sent by my wife, who was ailing for some time, and was feeling very afraid and nervous, on account of the noise in the city, told me that the Railway bridges up and down, had been set fire to.

Mr. B. C. CHATTERJEE—*concluded*—Captain J. A. S. EWING.

Revd. Jiwan Mal, an Evangelist of the U. P. Mission, who had met me in the way, came with me to my house, and told me that things in the city were assuming a serious aspect and there was fear of trouble. People were shouting "*Hindu Musalman ki ai.*" Some even said, "*Hai Hai George mar gaya hai.*" I advised Revd. Jiwan Mal to bring his wife and children over to the boarding house (which is in the same compound in which my house is) where we could all be together in case of any trouble. On his way home the crowd had increased to such an extent that it was impossible for him to bring his family to the boarding house. (His house being on the other side of the city.)

During the time from 9 A.M. to 11 A.M. I could hear from my house the noise in the city increasing every moment and coming nearer and nearer the Civil Station. At about 11 A.M. a crowd marched towards the Post Office and set fire to it, then the crowd set fire to the Railway Station, which is just opposite to the Post Office. While coming to the Civil Lines it burnt the Casson Industrial School, then the Dâk Bungalow and then the Tahsil, which is just opposite to the former. After this the crowd went back towards the city. In about an hour it again came back to the Civil Lines, proceeded towards the District Court and set fire to it. After this the Station Church was set fire to and then the Goods shed. Just as the Goods shed had been set fire to, the aeroplanes appeared at about half past two or three, when the crowd had not yet dispersed. The aeroplanes brought very great relief to all those who were in a state of dreadful suspense during the time when all these events were happening. Many people of the city have said that if the aeroplanes did not arrive, they were in danger of being plundered.

A few days before the outbreak the feelings of the people seemed excited owing to the misrepresentations made to them of the Rowlatt Act. These misrepresentations were the levying of fees by Government on the birth of children, the death of the persons, on the occasion of a wedding according to the number of persons attending it, and the taking away by Government of half the produce of land.

I may add here that I was in danger zone all the time as my house and the Mission School Boarding House are situated in the centre of the area within which all this happened.

I was in dread of damage and danger, after I was advised by a Hindu friend of mine to apply to the Superintendent of Police for the guarding of my house which was exposed on all sides. From 11 A.M. to 4 P.M. I was some time in my own house and some time in the Boarding House, from the roof of which I could see the mob passing this side and that side, and setting fire to the house with shouts and yells. Hearing a rumour in the evening that the houses of Christians would be burnt during the night I with my wife, who could hardly move on account of sickness, took shelter for the night in the Treasury, which was for the time being converted into a sort of a fort, through the kind permission of Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien, the then Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala, and were sent to Lahore the following day along with a few others, where I stayed for a week and my wife for about twelve days.

Report of Captain J. A. S. EWING, 19th Lancers on operations of Mobile Column in Sialkot Area during the Punjab Disturbances.

April 13th.—Half squadron, 18th Lancers, and half squadron, 19th Lancers, left Sialkot by road for Wazirabad.

April 14th.—Employed on disturbances in Wazirabad.

April 15th.—Employed with the Deputy Commissioner in making arrests in Wazirabad.

April 16th.—Employed on patrols in surrounding country and along railways.

April 17th.—Same as 16th April.

April 18th.—Same as above.

April 19th.—Mobile column composed of half squadron, 19th Lancers, two sections Motor Machine Gun Battery, under command of Major Maloney, left Wazirabad for Lyallpur.

April 20th.—Motor Machine Gun Battery proceeded to Jaranwala to make arrests there, and arrested 12 men. Cavalry was employed on patrols both by night and day to a distance of five miles round Lyallpur.

April 21st.—Cavalry employed on patrols round Lyallpur. Major Maloney handed over command of Mobile Column to Captain Ewing, 19th Lancers.

April 22nd.—Mobile column less horses of 19th Lancers went by rail to Gugera to make arrests. Arrested 10. Returned to Lyallpur by rail.

April 23rd.—Mobile column went to Kiala, Baba Bakala, Chotakiala, Chak No. 27, and made 16 arrests. Distance 38 miles.

April 24th.—Mobile column went to Jahangir, and made six arrests. Distance 34 miles.

April 25th.—Mobile column went to Summar 181, arrested one man and gained information of others who had been damaging telegraphs, which afterwards led to their arrest. Afternoon, April 25th, entrained for Toba Tek Singh, marched to 18th Lancers Farm visiting two small villages *en route* and arrested three men who had been concerned in damaging railway. Camped 18th Farm for night, 8 miles.

April 26th.—Visited three villages in this district and arrested 27 men who had been concerned in cutting telegraph wires and damaging railway; distance 32 miles. Returned to Lyallpur by rail.

April 27th.—Surrounded Lyallpur and arrested 18 men and gained information which enabled the Civil authorities to arrest some others. Evening marched to Rissalewala; camped the night; 17 miles.

April 28th.—Marched to Soeul and made 9 arrests, returned direct to Lyallpur, distance 47 miles.

April 29th.—Motor Machine Gun Battery went to a village 57 miles away to make two arrests, returning same evening, distance 114 miles.

April 30th.—Marched through Lyallpur City. During the whole of this time patrols were found night and day in the vicinity of Lyallpur by the Cavalry. The method employed in arresting villagers was to march to the village by night and surround it before dawn, then have out the Lambardars and make them produce offenders, then hold a 'jirga' and get as much information as possible regarding other miscreants in surrounding villages.

May 1st.—Mobile column went to Sukeke where it picked up one troop of 18th Lancers having left one troop, 19th Lancers, at Lyallpur.

Motor Machine Gun Battery had to go on to Hafizabad to detrain and come back by road. Camped Sukeke for the night.

May 2nd.—Commenced a march 'Showing the Flag'; marched to Chuharkana, interviewed Deputy Commissioner, visiting *en route* village of Khanga Dogran where a small durbar was held, distance 21 miles. Road good, passable for motor transport.

May 3rd.—Marched to Sheikhupura, distance 20 miles, road passable for motor transport, but bad in places. Camped at Sheikhupura.

May 4th.—Held a large durbar at Sheikhupura and gave a demonstration of Motor Machine Guns firing, also Lewis Guns from an armed train.

Raja Fateh Singh of Sheikhupura Quilla gave me great help in getting all surrounding inhabitants to the durbar and making a speech himself. Addresses to the people were read out in Urdu and Punjabi. Raja Fateh Singh

Captain J. A. S. EWING—*concluded*—Captain A. HARWOOD.

was extremely kind to the troops under my command, both British and Indian giving them presents of fruit, mineral water, ice and meat.

May 5th.—Marched in two parties to Harpoki on the Chenab Canal, one party visiting several villages, the largest of which was Santpur. This party (cavalry) moved across country. The other party, Motor Machine Gun; went along banks of canal, visiting village of Chichoki Mallian. Camped at Harpoki the night. Distance 29 miles.

May 6th.—Marched to Gujranwala and camped the night, distance 21 miles.

Received orders to return direct to Wazirabad the following day.

The 7th May.—Marched straight to Wazirabad, distance 20 miles.

The total distance covered by the horses from the time of leaving Sialkot on the night, April 13th, was about 300 miles and every horse finished as sound as he started and accomplished the whole trip.

Particulars of the people arrested are all in the hands of the Civil authorities.

I wish to bring the following Indian Officer to your notice :—

Rissaldar Khwaja Muhammad Pahadur, O.B.E., a Khatak Khel of the 19th Lancers.

At Wazirabad on the 14th April he went personally at his own request into the middle of a large hostile crowd, as he said he thought he could talk them into 'sense and submission.' He was heavily stoned at first, but taking no notice of this he went into the middle of the crowd and eventually after half an hour's talking persuaded them all to return peacefully to their houses.

This same Indian Officer Khwaja Muhammad Pahadur, O.B.E., was invaluable to me throughout the whole operations and by his tact with officials and villagers enabled me to make many arrests of offenders which I could not have effected otherwise. His good horsemastership and energy were mainly responsible for keeping the horses in the good condition they were. He also kept the men cheery under somewhat trying and fatiguing circumstances.

Captain A. HARWOOD, 1st Durham Light Infantry.

I have the honour to report the events that took place during the time I was in command of a detachment 1st Durham Light Infantry on No. 1 Telegraph Repair Special on the occasion of the riots of April 1919. About 12-15 hours, 15th April 1919, I was detailed to command a detachment of 25 Non-Commissioned Officers and men and to proceed to Gujranwala. On arrival at the Railway Station, Rawalpindi, I was met by Mr. Langdon, Superintendent, Telegraphs, and a Brigade Signal Section under command of Lieutenant B. Humphreys, 39th Divisional Signal Company. I entrained my party and proceeded by the Bombay Mail at about 13-00 hours. Owing to the urgency to the move I left Rawalpindi without rations or the men's kit. On arrival at Wazirabad, I transferred my party to a special train and was reinforced by a Detachment of 50 Non-Commissioned Officers and men of the South Lancashire Regiment under command of 2nd-Lieutenant Burghope. Mr. Sims, Railway Engineer, also joined the train with a railway breakdown gang. The mail was then diverted by a loop line to Lahore. I then gave orders to proceed to Gujranwala and arrived there about 20-30 hours. An attempt had been made to burn a bridge on the permanent way, and the whole of the Station, Goods Yard, Post Office and the Church were in flames. The city was absolutely silent. I was met at the station by the station master and a small detachment of police. I then ordered Lieutenant Burghope to take his detachment and to obtain information of the civil population. Lieutenant Burghope returned and reported that all the civil population were in the treasury and that there were 7 women and 9 children, and that everybody was safe. I then accompanied Mr. Langdon to investigate the damage done to the telegraph lines. We walked about 2 miles back along the line till we came to the end of the break and tapped in on the telephone wire and obtained communication with Rawalpindi. I informed Colonel Ward, G.S.O.I., 2nd Division, of the state of affairs at Gujranwala and also asked for troops to be sent to Wazirabad, as I did not like the aspect of affairs on passing through, there being only about half a dozen rifles there under the R. T. O. (Captain Topley). I was informed that 100 cavalry had been ordered there from Sialkot, but I was given orders to the General-Officer Commanding, Sialkot, to send 50 British ranks. As the telegraph lines to Sialkot had been cut, on my return to the station, I detached the engine from my train and sent it back with an escort, with the orders to the R. T. O. at Wazirabad. I also asked for a special train to be sent to me so as to enable me to evacuate the women and children from Gujranwala. This train arrived at Gujranwala at 04-30 hours, 15th April, and my own engine returned at 06-00 hours with the information that the cavalry had arrived at Wazirabad and a rumour that the railway line to Sialkot had been cut. By 08-30 hours the Brigade Signal Section laid two ground lines and bridged the gap in the telegraph lines, which were damaged over 4 miles. An attempt had been made to burn a railway bridge on the Lahore side of Gujranwala. The damage was repaired by 8 A.M. just as an armoured train arrived from Lahore. I then investigated the damage done to the town. The Station, Goods Sheds, Church, Post Office, Law Courts and the Dâk Bungalow had been completely gutted. About 10-30 A.M., I tried to get communication by telephone with Rawalpindi, but failed to do so, as the line had been cut at Wazirabad. The women and children were sent on to Lahore about 09-30 hours. Work was commenced on the telegraph lines at dawn and temporary repairs were completed the next day. About 13-00 hours, 15th April, Colonel O'Brien, Deputy Commissioner, decided to raid Gujranwala City and make arrests. He was escorted by 2nd-Lieutenant Burghope and 25 Non-Commissioned Officers and men. I posted pickets along the railway line which divides the native part of the city and the civil lines with instructions to prevent any person from leaving the city. 22 arrests were made by Colonel O'Brien. These were sent off to Lahore the same afternoon by special train. Railway communication was opened through Gujranwala early on the morning of the 15th. I supplied a number of British Troops with ammunition who were travelling on these trains and in one instance I placed a guard of 6 Non-Commissioned Officers and men on a train running to Lahore, as there were a number of ladies aboard. These men rejoined me early next morning. Mr. Langdon also proceeded to Lahore to obtain telegraphic stores and rations for the men of my detachment. About 00-30 hours on the 16th I received a message from the station master of the next station on the Wazirabad side of Gujranwala by runner, that the whole of the permanent way near Wazirabad was ablaze. I immediately detached the engine and one truck from my train and sent Mr. Sims with the Railway breakdown gang to investigate. I gave them an escort of 10 rifles. They reported late that evening when I arrived at Wazirabad that a determined attempt had been made to burn through the sleepers and to wreck a bridge on the line. The engine was nearly emptied of water to get the fire under control.

Captain A. HARWOOD—*concluded*—Mr. J. B. NEVILL.

About 12-30 hours, 16th April, I was informed by one of my escorts to the Telegraph repair parties that they had been jeered at and shouts of *Gandhi ki jai* had been raised by a crowd of sepoys in a passing train. I ordered the train to be detained in the station and the coach from which the jeering came was examined. I arrested all the occupants of the carriage, they were mostly young Sikh sepoys returning from leave to Sialkot. I handed them over to the local police and reported the case to Colonel O'Brien, who, I believe, disposed of the case a few days later. About 13-30 hours, 16th April, I left Gujranwala to investigate the damage done to the telegraph at Wazirabad. The first big break was just outside the village of Nizamabad and the damage extended over 2 miles; the next break was at Wazirabad, the damage extended for nearly 4 miles. Seeing the extent of the damage done Mr. Langdon decided to push on towards Lala Musa. A few minor breaks were repaired and on arrival at Gujrat we found the telegraph instruments in the railway station had been damaged. I met the Deputy Commissioner of Gujrat District on the station platform and he accompained us to Lala Musa. Leaving Mr. Langdon at Lala Musa, I returned to Wazirabad, and temporary repair were commenced on the lines there that night. I left an escort with the working party and returned to Lala Musa, arriving there at 23-30 hours. The telephone line to Rawalpindi was tapped and I gave a verbal reports to 2nd Divisional Headquarters. About 06-30 hours, 17th April, the telegraphist on duty reported that interruptions were coming on the line. Tests were made and the fault was located at Gujar Khan. Mr. Langdon decided to investigate and the train left Lala Musa at 06-45 hours. On arrival at Gujar Khan we found that a detachment of troops under a British Officer had arrived about 6-30 A.M. The station master reported that an attempt had been made to tamper with the lines. As the men of my detachment had no kits and telegraphic stores were required, the train was run to Rawalpindi. I reported personally at Divisional Headquarters. At 15-30 hours, 17th April, I returned to Lala Musa and there picked up reinforcements of 15 Non-Commissioned Officers and men and 2 Lewis Guns that were ordered to report to me. During the journey the train was detained without apparent cause outside Sarai Alam Gir Station. After waiting for about 15 minutes I ordered the train to draw into the station. I immediately enquired the cause of the delay from the station master and did not get a satisfactory reply. The station master then gave us line clear to the next station. The driver of my train then pointed out that the line clear was not satisfactory, as the duplicate in the book had not been filled in and the station master had not asked for line clear to the next station. I verified this with one of the Government telegraphists with me. I immediately arrested the station master and handed him over to the Officer Commanding Troops at Lala Musa on my arrival there. The case was reported to the Railway Traffic Superintendent. On the morning of the 18th April temporary repairs were commenced near the village of Nazimabad. I posted pickets round the village with orders to prevent anybody from leaving the village as Mr. Langdon wished to see if he could get any information as to who had wrecked the telegraph lines. After a lot of trouble I saw the lambardar of the village and by dint of questioning he gave the information that he knew who was responsible for the damage done. I then enquired if he had informed the authorities as Wazirabad. This he had failed to do, although the damage had been done 4 days previously. I arrested him. A student from Gujranwala was also arrested, as he could not explain his presence in the village and nobody belonging to the village could recognise him as an inhabitant of the village. Just before I left the village I received a report that one of the pickets had been compelled to fire at a man who was attempting to leave the village and would not stop when repeatedly ordered to do so. I immediately went to the scene, but I could not find the man, or get any information regarding him. I reported the case to the Officer Commanding Troops at Wazirabad and by telephone to 2nd Divisional Headquarters, Rawalpindi. That after noon temporary repairs were carried out on the Wazirabad-Sialkot telegraph lines. The line was damaged in a number of places. Temporary repairs were completed at Wazirabad early on the morning of the 19th and repairs were commenced on the Wazirabad-Sangla Hill and Lahore lines. I reported the case of shooting to Colonel O'Brien, Deputy Commissioner, at Sangla Hill that afternoon. The night of the 19th-20th was spent at Lahore, where extra telegraphic stores were obtained. Permanent repairs were carried out at Gujranwala on the 20th April. On arrival at Wazirabad on the 21st I returned the Brigade Signal Section to Rawalpindi, as there was no further use for them. From the 21st to 27th April permanent repairs were carried out on the following lines:—Wazirabad to Shorkot Road, Wazirabad to Sialkot, Wazirabad to Gujranwala, and the breaks round Wazirabad. I assisted the Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur District, to make 9 arrests at the village of Goja about the 23rd April. Escorts were supplied to all working parties on the lines and telephonic reports were frequently made to 2nd Divisional Headquarters, Rawalpindi. Detachment returned to Rawalpindi at 13-00 hours on the 28th April 1919.

Mr. J. B. NEVILL, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Gujranwala.

The agitation in Gujranwala first showed its fruit in a *hartal* on 5th April. Nothing untoward happened nor was great excitement manifest. Another *hartal* was arranged for the 15th, at a private meeting. However the date was suddenly changed on the 13th for the 14th. The Deputy Commissioner left on the 12th. No very great apprehension was felt on the evening of the 13th, as it was hoped that the *hartal* would pass off as on the 5th, but as a precautionary measure, all available police were called into headquarters. The changing of the date to the 14th found the police arrangements incomplete and only about fifty men were available as a striking force after deducting necessary guards, etc. This changing of the date was deliberate on the part of the leaders in order to foil the arrangements of the authorities for preserving order.

Early on the morning of the 14th a calf was found hanging to a railway bridge and excited crowds were wandering round the city. At the railway station attempts were made to prevent people going to Wazirabad and to wreck the early morning train. The train was stopped at the distant signal and damaged. The crowd fired a railway bridge in front of the train. I was ordered to disperse this crowd. With a guard of 1 Head Constable and 6 Foot Constables, I did this and managed to put out the fire with small damage to the bridge. Meanwhile the train was taken back to the station.

The Superintendent of Police had during this time warned all guards at the Treasury, etc., to be on the alert and had taken the reserve to the station. Here he managed to clear the railway premises and line of the crowd. It may be mentioned here that the railway officials gave no assistance at all, showing passive, if not active sympathy with the crowd. A large crowd of Kashmiris had been taken back to the city by Din Muhammad, Pleader, and things seemed to be settling down. The Police then consolidated their position along the railway line. I stayed by my bridge as small portions of the crowd kept coming here obviously intent on mischief. Shortly after, I heard a few shots fired. This was done as the result of an assault on the Superin-

Mr. J. B. NEVILL—*concluded*—PANDIT IQBAL NARAIN,

tendent of Police in which he was badly hurt. I then marched with my guard to the railway station. Here I found the Post Office blazing and a huge mob. They were waving black flags and hurling bricks and epithets at the Police who were keeping them in check. The Superintendent of Police was struck several times and the Police were severely tested. The Deputy Commissioner and the few magistrates present, backed up by one or two pleaders, persuaded the Superintendent of Police not to fire. This state of things went on for about an hour. Suddenly we saw smoke from the Civil Lines. I and the Deputy Superintendent were immediately sent with some of the Police here. We were soon followed by the Superintendent, who had stayed to post a guard at the railway station. The Police now fired at the mob wherever they could catch them, but most of the Government buildings were burnt. The mob had evidently prepared themselves and the actual firing of buildings was carried out inside ten minutes. The mob now fled before the Police to collect again in another place. By great efforts they were forced beyond the railway line. Here they paused, both Police and mob, consolidating their position and re-collecting. The mob at this time was in a most dangerous mood. They were calling out that they would kill all British Officers and burn all Government buildings. The Police were nearly exhausted. At this extremely critical moment aeroplanes arrived and after a reconnaisance began bombing and firing. Luckily this finally dispersed the crowd and the Police were able to take up positions at the city gates.

At this stage Colonel O'Brien arrived. In the evening a party of British troops arrived and this finally restored security. Next day the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, and the Deputy Commissioner with troops went round the city and arrested the ringleaders. This restored partial order to the city. The application of Martial Law on the 16th finally ended all opposition.

Up to the time of proclaiming Martial Law the disorder was rapidly spreading to the villages and in Aulakh a "Patwar Khana" was burnt. On the 18th, I and a party of British troops under Captain Whealty went there and arrested the culprits immediately. The effect of Martial Law was by this time noticeable and no more trouble occurred.

On the 21st, I was sent down to Chuharkana to supervise the investigation in the Sheikhupura Sub-division. Here the centres of the agitation were Sheikhupura, Chuharkana and Sangla. *Hartals* had been held at all these places. The results at Sheikhupura were not very important. But at Chuharkana the Virks and at Dhaban Singh the Kambhos, led by disaffected persons, attacked and did considerable damage to the railway line and premises, telegraph, etc. At Sangla a band of Sikhs practically ruled the country, burnt the station at Moman, cut telegraph wires, assaulted Mr. Wale and rescued a military deserter. Their cry was that even if the British *Raj* returned, the Sikhs ruled to-day. Before my arrival the line had been patrolled by armoured trains, but the population were still truculent and very disturbed. It was obviously only the fear of Martial Law that kept them from resisting. At first investigation was extremely difficult and not unattended with danger, but by the application of Martial Law and trial by Summary Courts soon enabled the local authorities to get the malcontents in hand. The effect of immediate sentence influenced any waverers. With the unruly population of these parts, it was often a question of touch and go until they had been made thoroughly acquainted with the results of resistance under Martial Law. But slowly order was again restored and nothing further occurred.

The small force of available police made it impossible to control the huge mob of Gujranwala. In the early stages the mob's determination was at its nadir, but as the day wore on and success seemed sure it reached its zenith just before the arrival of the aeroplanes. The delay of the police in firing until the mob actually set fire to the Government buildings, insisted on by the Deputy Commissioner undoubtedly led to more trouble in the end. But the bad effects of this were luckily remedied by the timely application of Martial Law and the presence of British troops. This, as I have mentioned above, prevented the contagion of the disorder to the rural population.

PANDIT IQBAL NARAIN, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala.

Recruiting and War Loan.

Recruiting had absolutely nothing to do with the disturbances Recruiting was chiefly confined to mufasil, while disturbances generally took place in towns. Gujranwala had given no recruits. Recruits were chiefly taken from the Zemindar class who had very little to do with disturbances.

Recruiting had ceased long before 14th April, in fact the Durbar in this connection had taken place in the beginning of August last year and people rewarded. The recruits who were brought to Gujranwala and were there found unwilling to join the Army were at once allowed to go back to their homes. This was done every day.

War Loan.

This was given by people quite voluntarily. The people now feel the advantages of thus investing their money. There is not a single case known to me where anybody was obliged to invest money in War Loan.

General attitude of pleaders etc. before the 14th.

(*b*) Bar-room was the only place where politics were freely discussed and great resentment was shown on the actions of the Government. Rowlatt Act was the chief topic although 99 per cent. of them who took part in these discussions had not read it. General attitude of the members of the Bar and especially of those who were afterwards arrested was most defiant. The meeting of the 5th was arranged and organized in the Bar-room.

Meeting of the 5th.

Pleaders were the chief speakers in this meeting. Delhi incidents were narrated before public in a very exaggerated form. The lectures had a very unwholesome effect on the public.

Meeting of 12th and 13th.

Only heard of this, do not know what happened and what was arranged there.

Meeting of the 14th.

Went to railway station early in the morning. The train had not come; there was a crowd of people on the railway platform most of them bare-headed. Came back from the railway station. Kachchi bridge burnt, railway train damaged, wires cut. A crowd of about 500 men surrounded Mr. Heron. Mob was armed with *lathis*, crowbars, hammers, etc. Mob was dispersed and taken towards city by myself and B. Muhammad Din. Mr. Heron went by the railway line to the railway station. Mob throwing stones all the way long. Mob collected before railway station and was joined by the mob from the city; numbering about 5,000—6,000. Post office burnt, Dak Bungalow burnt, Tahsil burnt, District Courts burnt, Church burnt, Railway Goods shed and Station burnt. Mob proceeded to attack and break open the jail, was stopped by M. Din Muhammad, myself and Abbas Ali; aeroplanes arrived, mob dispersed.

People contemplating more mischief had aeroplane not come.

SARDAR SUNDAR SINGH—Mr. S. M. JACOB.

SARDAR SUNDAR SINGH, B.A., LL.B., M.B.E., Honorary Secretary, Central Co-Operative Bank, Gujranwala

Events on the 15th April 1919 at Gujranwala.

On the morning of the 14th April 1919 at about 7-30 A.M. while I was proceeding from my bungalow (on the Gharjakh Road) towards the town, I heard the loud cries of the people from the Arya Samaj Gurukula side. I hastened to the town, and on my way I stopped for a while at the house of Lala Amar Nath, M.B.E., Extra Assistant Commissioner, where somebody conveyed to us the frightful news that the mob had stopped the railway train on the station, and had set fire to the railway bridge near the distant signal on the Wazirabad side. I was further told that the Superintendent of Police was on the station guarding the railway and postal premises. I proceeded immediately to the railway station and put my services at the disposal of Mr. F. A. Heron, Superintendent of Police, who was the only European official in the station, as Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., Deputy Commissioner, had left Gujranwala for Ambala on the evening of 12th April 1919. There was a crowd of people in front of the railway station, and all efforts were used in persuading the mob to return to the city, with the view to check further developments, as more troubles were anticipated. It took good deal of time in persuading the people to return to their homes. But in the meantime, it being a general *hartal* at that day, parties of people were moving in and about the town in a most disorderly state. Superintendent of Police told me that it was better to divide, and survey the situation in other quarters. It was also said that the railway bridge near Kachchi (a little beyond the distant signal on the Lahore side) was in flames, and the Government High School building was about to be attacked by the mob. I left the Railway Station and made a round in the Civil Lines, and after having a look at the District Courts, District Board Office, Tahsil, Honorary Magistrates' Courts and the Veterinary Hospital, which were till then quite safe, I proceeded towards the Government High School. On the way just close to Sardar Mahan Singh's Garden I met a disorderly crowd mixed of boys and grown up people, greatly agitated and howling "Rowlatt Bill *hai hai*, Rowlatt Bill *hai hai*." They were hurriedly proceeding towards the railway station, and all persuasions to retire to the city fell on deaf ears. On proceeding a little further, I saw men climbing up the telegraph posts and cutting the telegraphic wires with iron instruments in their hands, with the result that the communications towards Lahore side were entirely cut off. By this time, the situation had become very grave, and the spirit of rowdyism had reached its climax. The situation had passed practically out of control, as there was only a small force of police in the station. I passed on to the Government High School, and with the help of the head master, who was with me, took proper measures to protect the building in case of assault. Some time after I was told at the school that some of the mob had attacked the Superintendent of Police and he had fired a pistol to rescue himself. I proceeded towards Sidhan ka Asthan and saw Superintendent of Police with a party of police constables and others returning back to the railway station by the rail-road side. There was a big crowd following by the Grand Trunk Road. I took some time there to persuade people to enter the town and desist from following the Superintendent of Police. Some people entered the town by Eminabad Gate, while others in large numbers were seen proceeding in haste towards the railway station. Some time after the Post Office was set on fire by the mob. Later on Railway Station, Church, Tahsil, Dak Bungalow, District Courts, &c., were set on fire by the mob which roamed about in different parties.

Being the Honorary Secretary of the Central Co-operative Bank, Limited, Gujranwala, I closed the business of the Bank and put Lala Sohan Lal, the clerk and accountant of the Bank, in charge of the premises. The mob showed inclination to attack the premises, but the clerk succeeded in saving the situation by persuations, that it was mainly a business concern.

The following points are worthy of notice:—

(1) *Recruitment.*—The present disorders were not the result of recruitment. From my personal knowledge as an Honorary Secretary of the District War League, Gujranwala, and Joint Secretary of the Red Cross Society; I can state with all assurance that the disturbances are in no way connected with the recruitment in the district. I have travelled about 3,000 miles in the district during the Great War in connection with Red Cross, recruitment and other matters allied with War, and can confidently state that recruitment was confined to rural classes and the success in recruitment was due to the excellent organization and whole-hearted co-operation of tribal *panchayats*. The District War League and the Sub-Committees in various Tahsils and Zails stimulated real enthusiasm among the people and secured their whole-hearted support in the cause. The organization worked excellently under the guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., the President of the League. The urban classes did not join the Army, and it was only artisan classes who took up service overseas being mainly induced by higher wages.

(2) *Aeroplanes and Troops.*—In a state of affairs when the public buildings were set on fire, and the goods shed looted, aeroplanes and additional force were a necessity. The aeroplanes arrived between 2 and 3 P.M. and their appearance terrified the mob. Before their appearance, there was a great apprehension of the District jail being broken into and the convicts being set free. The Jail ruffians having joined the mob would have looted the Treasury and burnt all other public buildings saved so far. It was due to the arrival of the aeroplanes that the mob took to heels and fled to their homes with the result that the calm was restored.

The *hartal* continued for a couple of days more and was brought to end on the persuasions of Lala Harnam Dass, Tahsildar, myself and some other respectables of the town.

In the end I may state that the agitation in consequence of the Rowlatt Act was increasing. Many false rumours were afloat as to the repressive nature of the Act, so much so that many a man thought that the police was authorised under the act to arrest any four or five persons who were seen talking together. *Hartal* having thrown many a people out of business afforded an incentive to join the mob. Speeches of some irresponsible persons tended to increase agitation.

The wide circulation of vernacular papers like *Naqqash* in the masses, before the disturbances produced an undesirable effect on the mind of the people.

Mr. S. M. JACOB, I.C.S., Director of Agriculture.

Under instructions from the Punjab Government left Lahore as Civil Officer with a mobile column at 3 A.M. on 20th April 1919 to investigate and punish offenders for cutting the telegraph wires at mile 354 at Kamoke. On arrival there the lambardar, Bhagwan Singh, refused for a long time to budge from his house, whence I had to go and fetch him myself. Even then he was insolent and obstructive, and when I told him to get other lambardars merely smirked. I had to get on with the work of the column and therefore sentenced him to 15 strokes whipping and a fine of Rs. 200. Other villagers then told me the cutting of the wires had taken place at Nangal Sadan, and I proceeded thither. Six hostages were taken here as information as to the persons responsible for the cutting of the wire was not forthcoming. The column then returned to Lahore.

Mr. S. M. JACOB—*concluded*—Mr. A. R. B. ARMSTRONG—MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH.

2. Went with a mobile column under the command of Colonel Smithers from Amritsar on about the 23rd/24th April. Made many enquiries, but found no one with any loot from Amritsar, except at Mari Megha where 5 or 6 men were arrested with loot in their possession. One man, who got on the roof of a house to warn villagers to make away with loot, was given 15 strokes. Three of the arrested men were subsequently convicted by Mr. Keough, Additional District Magistrate, Lahore. A lambardar of Mari Megha, who was very helpful, was recommended by me for a reward of land.

Mr. A. R. B. ARMSTRONG, Executive Engineer, Wazirabad.

In April last the European residents near Wazirabad consisted of the Rev. Grahame Bailey, Mrs. Bailey, and two small children who lived some two miles south of the railway station; Mr. and Mrs. Ward with two small children about one mile south of the railway station, about ten Railway officials and their families all residing in the railway lines close to the station, Mr. and Mrs. Lindsay and my wife and myself who were living at Haripur about one and a half miles north of railway station, also my Assistant Engineer, Mr. Anderton, at Kathala 3 miles further north. There were also two British Officers and about twelve British soldiers residing in the railway lines; these had been stationed for some time at Wazirabad as Railway Military Police during demobilisation. The railway station at Wazirabad lies between the native town and the railway lines.

On the 12th and 13th I observed an insolent demeanour was generally displayed by the crowds which passed my bungalow on their way to and from Wazirabad to the Chenab river during the *Baisakhi mela*.

On the 13th owing to the news from Amritsar and Lahore the Officer Commanding warned all Europeans residing outside Wazirabad to be prepared to rendezvous in the railway lines at short notice. At about 2 P.M. on the following day he called us all in and instructed us to reside in the Railway Rest House; I also received instructions from the Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat, to take steps to safeguard my European staff at Kathala, and called Mr. Anderton to Wazirabad also. The last people to arrive came in about 4 P.M. by which time there were about 24 people including families living in this four-roomed house. The British troops' camp was close to the rest house.

During that afternoon I saw an aeroplane circling close overhead and eventually making a landing in fields about a mile away; crowds from the direction of the native city ran to the spot and a few minutes after they arrived the machine rose again and flew overhead in the direction of Lahore.

That night we were instructed to post armed sentries around the rest house as no troops could be spared from guarding the railway station.

During the night, which passed off quietly, more troops came in till by the following morning there might have been 80 of all ranks of which some 20 were British infantry and rest chiefly Indian Cavalry and Sikh Pioneers. Major Marsh had also arrived from Sialkot and assumed command of the station during the night.

During the whole of the following day (April 15th) attacks were made by crowds from the city on the station, and civilians, other than railway officials were confined to the railway lines. Stones were thrown from the street into the station and an attempt was made to fire the railway oil tanks and to dissuade employees of the Loco. department from working, railway telegraph wires were cut in several places, and one signal entirely pulled down, the Bailey's house was burnt with all their furniture, clothes, etc., and attempts were made to burn railway bridges and permanent way.

The only act of this sort I personally saw was the cutting of wires and burning of sleepers just north of the station, but several people who saw the mob at close quarters including Major Marsh, told me the people were in a dangerous mood, that youths and boys were usually in front of the rioters, that their hostility appeared directed chiefly against Europeans, and that the appearance of a British sentry was the signal for a shower of stones, several of which took effect.

The chief danger apprehended by us civilians was that the station might be rushed and we might be invested by the crowd in the railway lines.

During that day no supplies were available in the bazar and some flour was obtained through the good offices of one of my contractors, Rai Bahadur Ram Ratan, who collected it from some villages some 5 miles away with great difficulty and in small quantities as the villagers suspected it was wanted for Europeans; this gentleman was also instrumental in dissuading the mob from their attempt to fire the railway oil tanks.

That evening more troops including Colonel Burbery arrived, and the latter, on taking over command, issued notices that armed force would be used, if necessary, should further rioting occur.

The night of the 15th-16th passed off quietly and after that no disturbances occurred, though it was necessary to ration us civilians from the military stores at Sialkot owing to the difficulty of obtaining provisions locally, civilians were allowed to proceed to their work during daylight with armed escorts, and the latter were dispensed with after a couple of days.

MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH, Tahsildar, Wazirabad.

Ever since 15th April 1919, the day after the *hartal*, I have been endeavouring to ascertain facts in connection with the recent disturbances. Owing to factions and strikes, in the town of Wazirabad, there is not a single man who could be relied upon. In such circumstances only those facts, which appeared to me to be reliable, are detailed below:—

On the arrival at Wazirabad on the 12th April of certain men of Gujranwala, whose names could not be ascertained, Pritam Das, Badri Nath Phul, Jowanda Mal, Jagan Nath Salocha, nephew of Pritam Das, Master Muhammad Jan, Kesar Singh, Shaikh Inayat Ullah, *alias* Basha, commenced to incite the shopkeepers in the town to observe "*Hartal*."

On 13th April 1919, at the request of the *halwais* (sweet-meat vendors), the leaders of the movement postponed the *hartal* to 14th April 1919, so that the sweets prepared by the *halwais* may be sold and they be put to no loss.

On the 14th evening a meeting was convened in the Juma Masjid under the Presidentship of Jamiat Singh and lectures were given by Sheikh Inayat Ullah, *alias* Basha, Master Muhammad Jan, Pritam Das and Badri Nath Phul, on the subjects of (1) Hindu-Muhammadan unity, (2) Protest against Rowlatt Bill, (3) Observance of *hartal*.

Kesar Singh, Jagan Nath, Saluja, Arur Chand, Municipal Commissioner, and Master Muhammad Hussain were also present in the Jumma Masjid when the lectures were delivered. There were about two thousand persons present at the meeting. On the night of the 14th at about 10 P.M., a clerk arrived with an order from the Deputy Commissioner, and at once the Sub-Inspector of the city and Sadar *thanas* were summoned and

MUNSHI KIRPA SINGH—*concluded*—MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN.

instructed to arrange to put down disturbance and to guard all Government property. In accordance with the order above cited all respectable citizens and license-holders of arms were called on the morning of the 15th April. Chaudhuri Ali Ahmad, Sultan Ahmad, Zaildar, Qazi Baqi Shah, Lala Beli Ram, Coal Merchant, Diwan Sikander Lal, Diwan Badri Das, Chaudhri Sultan Ali, Lala Jagan Nath, Mahant, Kirpal Singh, Municipal Commissioner, Muhammad Khan, Lambardar, Sardul Singh, Lambardar, Sub-Inspector, City *Thana*, Jamiat Singh Bagga, and a few others attended at the Tahsildar's house, which is situated in Tahsil buildings, and the orders of the Deputy Commissioner were communicated to them. Thereafter enquiry was made from them as to who were present at the meeting held in the Jumma Masjid the night previous. All replied that from among them only Jamiat Singh Bagga had attended the meeting. Jamiat Singh admitted this, but conceded that he went on the understanding that it was an ordinary meeting. After this it was decided that all the remaining leaders, who had supported the *hartal* movement, be summoned and advised to desist from doing so. At this juncture a large crowd collected outside the Tahsil building in front of the gate to whom one Abdul Satar was lecturing. Jamiat Singh thereon said that if any other person went to summon the leaders, it would make them angry, and that he would go to bring them. He accordingly went and brought with him (1) Master Muhammad Jan, (2) Pritam Das, (3) Kesar Singh, (4) Sheikh Inayat Ullah, *alias* Basha, (5) Sheikh Abdulla, boot seller. Master Muhammad Jan came bare-headed and tied his turban in our presence. Master Muhammad Hussain, Municipal Commissioner, came to us a little before the abovementioned five men. Master Muhammad Jan and his companions were later addressed by Diwan Sikander Lal, who tried to dissuade them from the movement by emphasising the fact that the Government was all powerful, and that anything done by them against it would be of no avail, and further that the observance of *hartal* would lead to bad results. He advised them to do their best to check the *hartal*. Pritam Das, one of the ringleaders, then spoke and said that the *hartal* could not be stopped, but that the intention was not to create a disturbance. As people have already been moved to observe a *hartal* so it must be observed. It was then explained to the leaders to instruct the mob not to do anything repugnant to law, otherwise they will be fired upon. Arms licensees were ordered to keep themselves in readiness with their arms to assist the Government should peace be disturbed.

At 9 o'clock A.M. all the gentlemen, who were summoned to meet me, were allowed to depart, and the mob that had collected outside the Lohari gate was also dispersed. A part of the mob went towards the railway station and a part towards Nizamabad by the Grand Trunk Road. The mob which went towards Nizamabad included Muhammad Hussain, *alias* Bakra, son of Hafiz Abdul Manan, Basheshar Nath, Abdul Rashid and others. They took with them men from Nizamabad, Viroke, etc., and looted and set fire to the bungalow of Reverend Bailey. The mob that went towards the railway station was accompanied by Master Muhammad Jan, Jowanda Mal, Jagan Nath Saluja and others. This mob subsequently damaged the telegraph wires and posts and railway signals. After the mob had dispersed from by the Lohari Gate I sat armed at the Tahsil to protect the Treasury, etc., as there was danger of the Treasury being attacked.

A meeting was arranged to be held that day at about 2 P.M. in the Mandi. When at this time it was found that a large number of people could not be collected in the Mandi, Jowanda Mal excited the people that Municipal Commissioners and the leaders of the town should be forced to present themselves at the meeting. On hearing this all those present numbering about 5 or 6 hundred went towards the mosque of Sheikh Niaz Ahmad, Member, Committee, which is situate in Bazar Bakrainwala. They met Sheikh Niaz Ahmad and his brother, Sheikh Muhammad Khan, and forced them to join the meeting, but they refused. Sheikh Niaz Ahmad returned the mob, but detained the following persons, *viz.*, Pritam Das, Master Muhammad Jan, Badri Nath Phul and Jagan Nath Saluja, whom he took to the house of Diwan Sikander Lal to advise them. These four men, on reaching Diwan Sikander Lal's house, requested him to attend the meeting, but he turned them out of his house and advised them not to hold any meeting. These men returned to the Mandi and at 4 o'clock in the evening held a meeting, which was presided over by Nand Lal Chopra. The following persons delivered lectures at this meeting :—

(1) Master Muhammad Jan, (2) Jagan Nath Saluja, (3) Bawa Ishar Singh, servant of the liquor licensee, (4) Pritam Das, (5) Brij Lal, student, Mission College, Lahore, and (6) a Maulvi whose name could not be ascertained. In this meeting it was advocated that since the leaders of the town had not participated in the movement the *hartal* should be ended the next day. After this there was no shouting or disturbance of any kind. Between 3 and 4 o'clock P.M., I was informed that the mob intended attacking the Post Office. I immediately, in company with Sultan Ahmad, Zaildar, and both the Police Sub-Inspectors of Wazirabad (Sadar and City) rode towards the Post Office and dispersed the mob. This mob, on entering the city and attending the meeting of the Mandi, realised that nothing more was contemplated. So after the meeting in the Mandi no disturbance took place and quiet was restored in the city and railway station once more. Arrangements, however, were made for guarding the Munsif's Court, the Tahsil and other Government buildings.

MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN, Retired Military Sub-Assistant Surgeon, Wazirabad.

I most respectfully beg to state that I am prepared to appear as a witness before the above Committee to give evidence in respect of affairs at Wazirabad in the Gujranwala District. A brief outline of the evidence that I can give is submitted below :—

I.—RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARTAL IN GENERAL AND DISTURBANCES.

(*a*) On the 13th and 14th April 1919, there was the *Baisakhi* fair at Wazirabad, the bazars and streets of which were consequently thronged with rustic villagers from the several districts, most of whom freely indulged in drinking and on that occasion are popularly believed to have taken a prominent part in the disturbances which are attributed exclusively to the Wazirabad people.

II.—ARRESTS MADE.

A. General.

(*a*) Majority of arrests made in Wazirabad particularly in connection with the case of the *supposed hartal leaders* were unjustified and the evidence produced by the prosecution was a fabrication.

(*b*) Majority of the leaders' cases were got up and arose out of malice and strong party faction mainly due to local Municipal elections, for which I must confess Wazirabad is notorious and which is fully corroborated by public record in the Wazirabad Tahsil and Gujranwala District.

(*c*) The clique that has manufactured the whole evidence for prosecution is headed by Chaudhri Ali Ahmad, who belongs to a Zamindar family.

MUNSHI GHULAM MOHI-UD-DIN—*concluded*—Major C. W. J. SMITH.

(*d*) It is significant that although most of the Zamindars who attended the *Baisakhi* fair are popularly and certainly believed to have participated in the Wazirabad disturbances, yet not a single individual of the whole lot, that was arrested, happened to be a Zamindar, and this was so because the present head of the Zamindar family, *i.e.*, Chaudri Ali Ahmad while feeding his grudge fat and getting respectable bankers, merchants, Municipal Commissioners arrested, cleverly managed to have the Zamindars quite untouched, lest the Zamindar community should turn against him.

B. Particulars.

Master Muhammad Hussain Jolly, Municipal Commissioner—

(*a*) Quite innocent victim to private grudge and deep-seated plot, that dates from the day he stood as a candidate for Municipal Commissionership in January 1919.

(*b*) Chaudri Ali Ahmad, out of the important prosecution witnesses had grudge against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly on account of Chaudri Nabi Bux, who was a rival candidate for Municipal election against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly, but who was defeated in spite of Chaudri Ali Ahmad's support and hard struggle.

(*c*) Malik Inayat Ullah, the chief witness against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly, was also one of the candidates at the Municipal election in January 1919 and owed his success solely to Ali Ahmad's support and help and therefore gave evidence against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly, because he was egged on by Chaudri Ali Ahmad, who also intimidated and warned him that he had only two alternatives, either he must give evidence against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly or allow himself to be arrested.

(*d*) The Municipal record, which was brought to the notice of the trying Magistrate on 9th June 1919, bears an eloquent testimony to the fact that Ali Ahmad and other members of the clique certainly had private grudge against M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly, a fact which was fully corroborated by both the defence and the prosecution witnesses examined by the Court.

(*e*) M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly never preached *hartal*. He did not join any mob at any place and he did not take any part whatsoever in any of the disturbances.

(*f*) The dates on which he is alleged by prosecution were occupied as shown below.

14th April 1919.

1. Between 5 to 8 P.M. M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly and myself were in Munshi Alla Jowaya's Timber Mandi, outside Lohari Gate.

2. We said our evening prayers there at about 7-45 P.M.

3. At about 8 P.M. we heard loud shouts and cries coming from the side of the Tahsil, which seemed to be the cries raised by the young boys.

4. We left the place at once and took our way, not towards the Tahsil from which the shouts came, but *viâ* Trunk Road to the Akalghari Gate.

5. We parted at about 9 P.M. and went to our houses.

15th April 1919.

1. As invited by M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly, I called at his house at about 9 A.M. to attend to his wife who was sick.

2. While I was there, M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly left for Tahsil saying that he as a Municipal Commissioner was sent for by the Tahsildar in connection with the *hartal* in the city.

3. M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly came back within about 15 minutes.

4. I left M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly at about 10 A.M. with the direction that he should tell me the result of the treatment after about two or three hours.

5. M. Mohammad Hussain Jolly came to my house at about 12 A.M. to report the effect of the treatment and returned after staying a few minutes.

6. I again called at his house at about 2 P.M. and found him attending his wife.

7. Some of very important defence witnesses were not at all summoned by the Court, *those who attended the Court at about 9 A.M. were not examined at all.*

C. Martial Law in Wazirabad.

(*a*) Martial Law in Wazirabad introduced after 16th April 1919.

(*b*) The public subjected to indescribable suffering, misery and disgrace.

(*c*) A house-tax at the rate of rupee one was levied and collected during the Martial Law days by Chaudri Ali Ahmad from all the inhabitants *in the name of the Government, though without any legal authority, and when anyone ventured to protest against this illegal and unauthorised tax, he was threatened with arrest.*

Major C. W. J. SMITH, D. S. O., 2-54th Sikhs, F. F. Administrator, Martial Law in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur.

At the commencement of the Punjab riots I was serving with my unit at Rawalpindi and was not concerned with any of the riots which took place in the disturbed areas. On April 17th, I proceeded to Wazirabad under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, and entered on my duties as Administrator of Martial Law under the late Colonel Burbury, then commanding the troops in the Gujranwala District. That same afternoon I proceeded with Colonel Burbury to Gujranwala where Martial Law was proclaimed publicly. The following morning a similar proclamation was made at Wazirabad itself.

Copies of the general proclamation of Martial Law, reassuring well behaved persons and warning possible evil-doers, were sent throughout the district both through Officers Commanding detachments of troops and through the Civil authorities and a further proclamation carrying on the methods of protecting the railways and canals, which had been instituted by the civil authorities was similarly distributed. Certain local orders dealing with the cities of Wazirabad and Gujranwala were also issued, and then under the orders first of Colonel Burbury and afterwards of Brigadier-General Campbell, Commanding the Sialkot Brigade Area, I busied myself creating the machinery for the administration of Martial Law. Area Officers were appointed and certain other officers were given special powers, *i.e.*, Captain Cole, Supply and Transport, and Captain Wheatley. I cannot recall that any other officers were given special powers, who were below the rank of field officers. At the same time I issued a Martial Law Instruction, of which every British officer in the disturbed area was furnished with a copy, in which the powers of officers were laid down, and also a clear direction that those powers were not to be exceeded. Further instructions were issued from time to time as was found necessary by means of Martial Law Instructions. Some time about April 23rd, Gujrat came under Martial Law, and at the end of April or beginning of May, Lyallpur district also came under Martial Law, and both these districts came under my administration. Area Officers were at once appointed and such proclamations, as had already been issued in

Major C. W. J. SMITH—*concluded*—Mr. T. H. NORRIS.

the Gujranwala district, and which were deemed suitable, were made applicable to these districts also. To ensure publicity copies of all Martial Law Instructions and orders were posted in Wazirabad Railway station and copies in English and the vernacular were posted at the Indian troops camp and in six or seven places in the city, including the Tahsil. Orders were issued to all Area Officers and Officers Commanding detachments to take similar measures.

Knowing it was almost impossible to carry on smoothly the administration of Martial Law without the good will and assistance of the civil powers, I con ulted the latter as frequently as possible. I paid several visits to the Deputy Commissioner of Gujranwala and the Superintendent of Police, besides seeing them when they were on tour, visited the Deputy Commissioner of Gujrat twice, if not three times, and the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur once, consulting them freely as to the advisability or necessity of various actions. In my capacity as Area Officer of Wazirabad I worked almost entirely through the Tahsildar and the Municipal Committee of whom one Sardar Sahib Khan was in constant attendance, both he and the Tahsildar rendering me the greatest assistance. I did not know of any action of mine as Administrator of Martial Law to which the Civil authorities took the slightest exception.

I was unfortunately debarred from carrying out anything approaching the amount of touring in the district that I felt was necessary, partly because I was terribly handicapped, especially at first, for want of an adequate office establishment, which necessitated my doing much mechanical clerical work myself: and also because Martial Law being a new procedure to everyone concerned, it was imperative that I should remain chiefly at headquarters, where I could deal promptly with the numerous points on which Area and other officers required orders or advice, and whence I could endeavour to coordinate their methods of procedure into one general system. The administration had begun to work with fair smoothness, and General Campbell had given me an assistant, so as to enable me to tour more freely, when I was ordered to rejoin my unit for Field Service on May 8th, 1919.

I cannot, without reference to the various proclamations, remember the subject matter in them, but amongst others was a proclamation controlling prices, which was issued owing to a distinct rise in prices immediately after the riots, which was leading to hardship and discontent amongst the labouring classes. At the same time the district zamindars were urged through the district authorities to bring supplies to Wazirabad as usual, their non-molestation being guaranteed. Another forbade movement after dark in a proscribed area near Wazirabad Station. This was introduced for the safety of the public to avoid any unfortunate occurrence owing to ignorant persons failing to answer the challenge of sentries. Other proclamations dealt with the restrictions in railway traffic and to the closing of certain stations to passenger booking. Another ordered schoolboys to salute the Union Jack daily as a parade. This was introduced as a disciplinary measure as there was indisputable proof that boys from the schools had played a large part in the recent riots.

During my administration no disturbances occurred in the districts under my control. The prompt appearance of troops in the towns where riots had occurred and the wholesome fear of this new form of law administration seemed to overawe the townsfolk, whilst the villagers in the neighbourhood of Gujrat and Wazirabad appeared indifferent. Wazirabad City was a little sullen at first, and Gujranwala, from what I saw of it, seemed sullen to the end of my administration, but as a whole, once they realised Martial Law affected nobody who behaved in a normal manner, the people of the districts concerned seemed to accept it quite contentedly. I received no complaints against the hardships of Military Law, except against the restrictions in railway travelling, which undoubtedly did inflict considerable hardship, but this was alleviated as far as possible by the granting of railway permits to anyone recommended by the local civil administration, such as Tahsildars, Magistrates, etc. I do not know of any cases of passes having been refused to those having such recommendations.

As regards crimes and punishments, no person was dealt with under Martial Law for an offence prior to the establishment of Martial Law. Offences against Martial Law in the Gujranwala and Gujrat districts were mostly trivial, the offenders being dismissed with a caution, or being punished by a few strokes with a cane, or by a small fine according to circumstances. So far as I remember there were only two cases of imprisonment. One case was tried by me personally, and a careful record of the evidence was placed on the files, the offender—a telegraph clerk—being awarded two years' imprisonment for deliberately tampering with the instruments, thereby putting two lines out of action. The other was the case of a European who was awarded a term of imprisonment for drunkenness, indecent conduct, and disobedience of orders issued under Martial Law. This case was tried by the Area Officer, at Malakwal. I believe the summary of cases tried at Lyallpur by the Area Officer showed several cases of imprisonment or moderately heavy fines, but I cannot now quote from memory.

I only received two complaints against the behaviour of the troops themselves. Some menials, who worked down the river near Wazirabad, reported that the British guard on the Pulkoo Nullah Bridge had been passing familiar remarks with their womenfolk. The Tahsildar and Sardar Sahib Khan did not seem to consider the case of much importance and personally I thought there was very little in it, and as the British guard had already been replaced by an Indian guard, the case was allowed to drop. Another complaint made was that a sepoy had "commandeered" some articles from a shop in Wazirabad city, in the name of Martial Law. This had been anticipated and a bazar was already being formed in the Indian troops camp. The completion of this bazar was hurried on, and the city put strictly out of bounds to all troops and followers.

SRINAGAR: *October 25th, 1919.*

Mr. T. H. NORRIS, Station Master, Wazirabad.

I beg to report that about 100 Indian men and lads between the ages of 16 and 18 years forcibly entered the main platform at about 20-30 hours on 14th April 1919, and I turned them off with the assistance of Mr. Gereson, Inspector of Police, and Muhammad Akram, Assistant Station Master: the men went off and when passing the overbridge they stoned the station building, but fortunately damages were slight.

Then about 8 hours on the 15th April 1919 a mob of about 1,200 men with sticks and stones made their way to the goods shed: I immediately informed the Military authorities, who sent down their cavalry and they dispersed the mobs, and the situation was saved.

At about 9 hours on 15th April 1919 the mobs started cutting the telegraph wires and knocking down the posts near the station and advanced in the direction of Gujrat station.

At about 11-10 hours the same day I noticed from the station that the mobs had knocked down the outer signal. In the meanwhile 2-Down mail left Kathala. I immediately got the Permanent Way Inspector to trolly me down, and we found the mobs had placed a number of large boulders on the line and also placed the outer signal close to the running line.

I stopped the mail beyond the outer signal and removed the boulders with the assistance of the Permanent Way

Mr. T. H. NORRIS—*concluded*—Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH SMITH.

Inspector and personally piloted the mail into the station: had the boulders not been removed, I am sure the mail would have got derailed.

The mobs then made off in the direction of Gujrat.

On arrival of the mail at the station I was informed that a culvert between Wazirabad and D. U. X. was burnt by the mob.

I immediately ordered 2-Down mail to be detained, got a shunting engine and went down and found that the culvert was burnt, but the fire extinguished by the Engineering staff: the Sub-Divisional Officer, Wazirabad, was on the spot, he ordered me to return to Wazirabad, and on arrival of 1-Up at Wazirabad I could start 2-Down, which orders were carried out.

The Railway staff held a meeting on 13th April 1919, beyond the Pulku River, at which it was suggested to strike work, the chief agitator was Babu Mokand Lal, Chief Booking Clerk.

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH, I.C.S., Joint Deputy Commissioner, Sheikhupura .Gujranwala District.

This report deals with disturbances in April in the two Tahsils, Khangah Dogran and Sharaqpur, which are shortly to be formed into a new district.

I.—SURVEY OF PREDISPOSING CAUSES.

The actual scene of disturbances was confined to the Railway between Sheikhupura and Sangla and spread over a period of four days only. The general predisposing causes will be more appropriately dealt with by the Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala.

It is sufficient to state here that for four days the narrow tract of 36 miles along the line was in a state of open rebellion, and the people imagined that the last day of British Rule had come.

The immediate predisposing cause of this extraordinary ignorance and credulity is the fact that Gujranwala District in its unwieldy size and multiplicity of work of all kinds has been probably the worst administered in the Punjab.

These two Tahsils have had even less attention than the other three Tahsils on account of their remoteness from the district headquarters. Despite its vicinity to Lahore, the rural population is extremely backward, very illiterate, ignorant and credulous to a degree, and so it falls a very ready prey to any malicious persons spreading false reports. Apart from this there was no other local predisposing cause. There is of course constant railway communication with Lahore, Amritsar and Delhi.

Ill disposed pleaders at Sheikhupura and seditionists in the markets of Chuharkana and Sangla misrepresented the Rowlatt Bill, and by distorting offences that had happened at Delhi, Amritsar and Lahore persuaded a good number of persons that the *Sarkar* had turned *Be-iman*; that its days were over; that Hindus and Mussulmans should join together and make common cause against the Government; that the native army was ready to help them; that all India was in flames of revolution; and that if the people did their part here, there would be Home Rule with no land revenue to pay and they would have their own army.

Crowds flocked down to meet every train that passed through and the wildest rumours were afloat. The outbreak was immediately preceded by the *Baisakhi* festival. A large number of Sikhs and others went to Amritsar. Some of these were shot or wounded there, and the wildest tales came back of Government oppression, which further inflamed the population, particularly against Europeans.

In this part of the Punjab people are extraordinarily prosperous and are practically unaffected by high prices and the high cost of living. Comparatively few of the neighbouring villages have joined the Indian Army, and those who have done so are thoroughly content with the conditions. No doubt during the year immediately preceding, some executive measures had been taken to induce recruitment, and this was cleverly turned to account by seditious persons at public and private meetings.

II.—IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK.

The immediate causes of the outbreak were the double *hartal* on 6th and 14th at Sheikhupura, carefully organized by the pleaders' community, the two public meetings and the *hartal* at Chuharkana on the 11th and 12th, the three meetings at Sangla with a procession round the town to the railway station accompanied by a black flag, which is an emblem of violence, public bathing of Hindus and Musalmans together at the canal and the *hartal* there on 12th. The disturbances took place on the 14th, 15th and 16th, and, in that time, at Sheikhupura the wires were cut in two places, a riot took place and a signal was pulled down. In the next village of Machhike the wires were cut. Chuharkana Station was burnt, two bridges were pulled up, a crowd of some three or four thousand persons were engaged in open rebellion all day and wires were cut. The railway line was pulled up and the Missionary's Bungalow was looted.

The whole population of Chuharkana market and of the surrounding villages were out for war in the firm belief that the *Sarkar's* days were numbered.

As the train service was suspended, some persons walked towards Dhaban Singh Station. The villagers of Nawan Pind and Mahnianwala turned out in force with beat of drum, marched towards Dhaban Singh Railway Station, burnt it and looted all that was worth stealing. The looting continued without disguise till 6 in the morning of 16th. Certain Sikhs, who attended the meeting at Sangla organized a large party and marched towards Moman Railway Station on the night of 15th, which was similarly looted and destroyed. Baroa villagers, Aryans by caste, destroyed the railway wires. Wires were also cut at Marh Balochan in two places. A *sahib* was attacked in broad daylight at Sangla on the 16th, and a sepoy was rescued from an armed guard of soldiers. Stones were thrown at the Calcutta Mail, which, was diverted that way, and a party of Sikhs was ready to loot the Mission. Wires were also cut at Nangal Sadhan.

All these crimes followed immediately after the meetings at Sheikhupura, Chuharkana and Sangla, and in the immediate vicinity of these places, where a good deal of extra liquor was also consumed from 13th to 16th.

III.—CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

The chronological order is given in rather more details in this section.

Sangla.

The fact that a Brahmachari, probably an Arya in disguise, was allowed for a month to give vent to open sedition in Sangla market is a stain on the community, both high and low, which it will be hard for them to wipe out.

About a month before the series of disturbances at Sangla commencing from the 12th April, a Brahmachari by name Gobind Parshad came to the town and stayed at the Thakardawara (temple); he is said to have come from Delhi and to have professed the Sanatan Dharam creed. His activities were in the beginning confined entirely to recitals and sermons on religious subjects, including the protection of cows, but latterly he formed acquaintance with the local leaders of the *Arya Samaj*. This circumstance has given rise to the belief that he may have been an accredited agent of the *Samaj* sent out in pursuance of a definite policy to preach sedition, but of this there is no definite proof.

The first outward sign of unrest made its appearance on the 11th April when a meeting was convened at the

house of Gyan Chand, Soap Merchant (a *Samajist*) to protest against the Rowlatt Bill and urge *hartal*. The three chief speakers were the Brahmachari, Thakar Dass (manager of the Thakardawara) and Gyan Chand himself. The subject matter of all the speeches was the same—"by the passing of the Bill inconceivable hardships would be imposed on the people, not more than ten persons would be permitted together at birth and death ceremonies without permission, police powers of arrest and detention were to be almost unlimited, etc." On the motion for *hartal* being put to the meeting some difference of opinion was manifested. Accordingly a second meeting was announced to be held the same evening in the *Mandi*. At this meeting the Brahmachari, after touching again on the severity of the Bill and mentioning Mr. Gandhi's arrest, pleaded for unity of Hindus and Mussalmans in opposing Government and forcing the withdrawal of the Bill.

On the morning of the 12th April the whole town, with the exception of three ginning factories and a drug shop observed *hartal*. Nothing was done until about 10 A.M., when a move was made to the canal to hold a meeting and to bathe in token of mourning. Speeches were made exhorting the people to a spirited opposition to Government, and some inflammatory extracts were read from newspapers regarding the events at Lahore and Amritsar. On returning from the canal the crowd dispersed, but reassembled after two hours and formed a procession to march round the town. At the head of the procession were a black flag of mourning, and an effigy of the Rowlatt Bill, a crude figure of a man wearing a white helmet on its head and a snake round its neck—emblems of the origin and nature of the Bill. The *sarai* was reached about 3 P.M. when a halt was made for speeches and a song with the refrain "*hai hai* Rowlatt Bill *maria, hai hai* Rowlatt Bill *saria*" was sung by the people. The crowd then moved over to the railway station and showed their intention of entering, but were prevailed on by the station master to remain outside. Until the arrival of the train from Lahore the crowd amused itself by shouting "*Hindu-Mussalman ki jai, Mr. Gandhi ki jai, Mohammed Ali Shaukat Ali ki jai*", etc. The arrival of the train brought various local members of the Notified Area Committee, returning from Gujranwala, and an American Missionary, at whom it is alleged stones were thrown as he drove away from the station in his car. There is, however, no direct evidence of any stones having been thrown, though there can be no doubt that the crowd gave full vent to its feelings by clapping hands and jeering. From the station the procession returned to the Mandi, where a meeting was held attended by almost all the townsfolk. Speeches of the same seditious nature as before were delivered by the leaders, and telegrams were despatched to His Majesty the King-Emperor and His Excellency the Viceroy.

13th April 1919.—The effect of these meetings on the popular mind was not at once made evident. The 13th April was observed as the *Baisakhi* festival and passed off quietly, but on the 14th April a crowd collected at the station on the arrival of the Calcutta Mail, diverted to avoid the damaged portion of the main line at Gujranwala, and on its departure stoned it as it left the station.

14th—15th April 1919.—On the following night three Sikhs cut the railway telegraph wires between Sangla and Salarwala at a distance of about half a mile from Sangla Station.

16th April 1919.—On the morning of the 16th April a Sikh named Harnam Singh, with the help of three other Sikhs, backed up by a large mob from the town, forcibly released a military prisoner and maltreated his escort on the platform at Sangla Station.

On the evening of the same day Harnam Singh made a murderous attack on Mr. Wale, Telegraph Inspector, at Sangla Post Office and was wounded and captured.

16th—17th April 1919.—And lastly, on the night of the 16th—17th the villagers of Baroa tore down the telegraph wires on the Lahore line near their village.

Numerous arrests were made after a rather belated investigation, but the attitude of the people including those of some local status indicated so clearly that they had no intention of implicating their fellows by making full statements, that it was ultimately decided to prosecute only the leaders.

Moman.

11th April 1919.—On the 11th April Harnam Singh and Banta Singh, two leaders in the attack on Moman Railway Station, were present at a meeting of protest against the passing of the Rowlatt Bill at Sangla *Mandi*. What they heard at the meeting impressed them to such an extent that, on their way to attend the *Kunka* ceremony of a *Bairagi* at village Wara Labh Singh, they did their utmost to incite villagers to take active measures in opposing Government. The *Kunka* ceremony took place on the evening of the 14th April and there were gathered there some sixty or seventy men from neighbouring villages. After passages from the *Granth Sahib* had been read, Harnam Singh rose and addressed the assembly, and, after enumerating the evils that the Rowlatt Bill would bring upon the people, called on all present to come with him and commit some open act against Government. Banta Singh and Mian Singh at once responded, and later the rest of those present followed their example. Headed by these three men the mob proceeded to Moman Railway Station, which they looted, and then, after breaking into the Lamp Room to get oil for fuel, set fire to the station buildings.

Dhaban Singh.

15th—16th April 1919.—On the 15th April at about 9 A.M., Jagat Singh and Gyan Singh, *Kambohs* of village Nawan Pind summoned the villagers to a meeting and told them that the *Darbar Sahib* had been bombarded, many people had been killed at Amritsar and Lahore, and that Hindus and Mussalmans had united to force Government to withdraw the Rowlatt Bill. The villagers were thoroughly roused by these words and were readily induced to go and help to destroy Government property. Accordingly a mob set out under the leadership of the two men above named and having come to the railway bridge 1½ miles from Dhaban Singh Railway Station set to work to wreck the line, tearing up the rails, cutting the telegraph wires and burning the railway bridge. Having done this Jagat Singh and Gyan Singh went off to village Mahnianwala about a mile away where they collected more men and then returned to the bridge. From here the whole crowd proceeded with beating drum to Dhaban Singh Railway Station, which they looted and burnt at about 4 A.M. on the morning of the 16th April.

Chuharkana.

12th April 1919.—Prior to the 11th April there was no sign of unrest at Chuharkana. The trouble started on that date in the Mandi adjoining the railway station, where a meeting attended by all the residents of the Mandi, Hindus and Mussalmans alike, was held at the mosque to protest against the iniquities of the Rowlatt Bill. Speeches were made misrepresenting the provisions of the Bill and it was resolved to hold another meeting on the following day to which villagers from the surrounding countryside should be invited. On the 12th April a complete *hartal* throughout the *mandi* was observed, and during the course of the day the proposed meeting of the villagers and residents of the *mandi* was held. The ground covered by the speeches was much the same as in the meeting of the day before.

13th April 1919.—On the 13th April, the *Baisakhi* fair was held at *Sucha Sauda* (Chuharkana) and was attended by large numbers of villagers; Teja Singh of Chuharkana and Kartar Singh of Jabbar took this opportunity of stirring up the people to overt acts of violence and called upon them to display their feelings against Government by tearing up the railway line. The effect of this was seen next day when crowds assembled at the railway station to meet the trains, and, it is said, to maltreat any European who might be travelling.

Fortunately no victim for assault was found, and the mob dispersed with cheers for Gandhi and Hindu-Moslim unity.

15th April 1919.—The climax was reached on the 15th April. In the morning a party of some fifteen or twenty people from the *mandi* went to the railway bridge and started to tear up the railway lines. At about 11 A.M. a special troop train arrived containing a detachment of the 2-22nd Punjabis (Sikh and Muhammadans) on their way to Hong Kong. The Officer Commanding detrained a portion of his men, some of whom remained to protect the station, while others were sent to the *mandi*. It is said that on being asked by the men of the *mandi* why they, their brothers, had come to prevent them from resisting Government, the sepoys replied urging them to commit further excesses by cutting the telegraph wires and tearing up the line.

At about 2 P.M., after the troop train had departed, a large crowd of villagers and rioters from the *mandi* assembled and set to work to wreck the line between the canal bridge and the station. The arrival of the passenger train from Lahore diverted their attention to the station; the train was attacked and looted and the engine damaged. Following on this the station staff was assaulted and the station looted and burnt. Two bridges were damaged by fire and the telegraph wires cut. The final act occurred after dark when a mob from villages north of the line approached the station with the intention of holding up a train and then going on to loot the Mandi. The first train to arrive was an armoured train which picked up a portion of a crowd with its search light and opened fire with a machine gun. The rioters hastily dispersed, and thereafter there was no more trouble.

Sheikhupura.

6th April 1919.—On the 6th April *hartal* was observed throughout the bazar, the only open objector being a Muhammadan meat vendor, who was ultimately forced to comply by sympathisers of the movement pouring water on his fire. In the evening a mass meeting of protest against the Rowlatt Bill, attended by both Hindus and Muhammadans, was held, in which the local pleaders took the leading part; that nothing violent was said in the course of speeches is properly due to the fact that various Government officials were present taking notes. Nothing further occurred until the 14th April when *hartal* was again observed. About 5 P.M. a small party headed by Santokh Singh, Arora, went to the railway station to meet the train and learn the latest news of events in Lahore and Amritsar, and as a result damaged the signals and tore up the signal wire pegs on their way back. Arriving in the bazar they gathered more men together and proceeded to assault Gurmukh Singh Jhatkai and wreck his shop for his failing to observe *hartal*. After dark Santokh Singh with a few others went out and cut the Post Office telegraph wires, and later on the same night cut the wires between Sheikhupura and Lahore. Prompt measures by the authorities on the spot in having the wires repaired and summoning military aid from Lahore effectively prevented the occurrence of any disturbance.

III.—MARTIAL LAW AND OTHER MEASURES ADOPTED FOR SUPPRESSION OF DISTURBANCES.

Martial Law was proclaimed on the 19th and its effect was instantaneous and electric. On the night of the 15th an armoured train came down the line from Lahore to Chuharkana, taking up with them from Sheikhupura Rai Sahib Sri Ram, Sub-Divisional Officer. The armoured train worked hard in patrolling the line for three days with Sri Ram on board. Machine guns were taken to Chuharkana and even beyond. The effect was excellent and instantaneous. This armoured train undoubtedly saved the market of Chuharkana from being looted, and if it had not come, when it did, looting would certainly have spread further, and possibly Sheikhupura and even Lahore would have been visited by an ill-conditioned mob of ruffians. Similarly on the 16th, the Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur, despatched troops to Sangla with a District Traffic Superintendent and an Extra Assistant Commissioner, and had not the troops come, when they did, Sangla market would have shared the fate of Chuharkana and Station and other Government property would have been wrecked and looted.

On the 19th, Colonel O'Brien, Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala, came down the line with a Special Train and made arrests of pleaders and others at Sheikhupura, Dhaban Singh and Sangla. The people concerned in these atrocities had by this time become thoroughly scared. The markets and the neighbouring villages were practically empty.

On the 21st April, I arrived at Chuharkana and immediately took the statements of the railway staff, and on the following morning held a large identification parade, which was continued for the next three days. Some four thousand villagers were paraded, and fourteen or fifteen of the railway staff passed down separately and independently in the presence of Magistrates for identification. This resulted in the arrest of some three hundred offenders, nearly all of whom have been punished.

On the 24th I proceeded to Dhaban Singh, where similar procedure was undertaken. Till then only some twenty persons were arrested. Two villages of Mahnianwala and Nawan Pind were paraded at length and some hundred more arrests were made, and nearly all of these have been punished.

From Dhaban Singh I went to Moman, where the villagers were similarly collected, but unluckily I had sent before me a Sikh Inspector, Kartar Singh, and a Sikh Extra Assistant Commissioner Sardar Amar Singh. The Superintendent of Police is dealing departmentally with the Inspector, who undoubtedly tried to screen his brother Sikhs. Some hundred Sikhs had attacked the Moman Railway Station but the railway staff was got at by them, and refused to admit that more than three persons had looted the station. Unfortunately very few of these Sikhs have been convicted.

From there I passed on to Sangla, which I reached the same day. Here too there was a conspiracy of silence, as the market people and the neighbouring villages had all agreed not to give each other away. The consequence is that in Sangla and its vicinity very few offenders have been brought to account, and an executive action of another kind has been recommended to deal with the situation here.

There was a considerable delay in deciding whether Mr. Penny, Assistant Commissioner, and myself could use the powers of a Summary Court Martial, and we were not able to start trying the accused till the 6th May. Between 6th and 20th May 477 persons were tried and 294 were convicted. This long delay at such a critical time was a most unfortunate episode, and the keeping of nearly four hundred persons under arrest placed a great strain on the police, and they could not have undertaken these arduous duties without the assistance of the Military, which was fully availed of. Three prison vans were obtained and temporary Havalats were constructed at Chuharkana and Dhaban Singh. Troops arrived promptly on 18th at Chuharkana and Sangla. However, by the time that the troops actually came, the countryside had been thoroughly frightened and all was quiet.

Practically no Martial Law has been enforced in this part of the district and no punishments given under Martial Law. The school boys of Sangla were for a number of days made to parade every morning and salute the Union Jack. The people, as a whole, have been entirely unaffected by Martial Law. They appreciated and enjoyed the importance of having troops and their behaviour has been admirable. People in this part of the country little realized before how efficient and quick the arm of the "*Sarkar*" could be. Repeated visits of Armoured Cars, a display of gun firing at Sangla and elsewhere and the passing of a Mobile Section of Machine Guns on Ford cars and Motor bicycles through

Continued.] Mr. B. N. Bosworth-Smith.

the district attended by cavalry, have been useful in showing how quickly the military can get to any disturbed part of the country. The Military Officers Commanding troops at Sheikhupura, Chuharkana and Sangla have acted with the greatest discretion, and have made themselves popular with the community. These recent disturbances have emphasized to a marked degree the value of armoured cars along railway communications, and of Mobile Machine Gun Sections for other parts of the district. Such an armed force should always be ready for emergencies in the Punjab, where everything depends on quickness. The civil authorities certainly are greatly indebted to the military in this part of the district for their promptness and efficiency in responding to the call.

IV.—Classes prominent in promoting disturbances.

The total number of really disaffected persons in this district was probably under three figures, though some ten thousand persons took part in demonstrations, looting or destroying without really knowing what they were doing.

In tracing the causes of disaffection it is a safe and golden rule to look near home first of all. There is no place where disloyalty is so deep as in Delhi, Lahore and Amritsar. Similarly in this tract, the homes of disloyalty were to be found in Sheikhupura, the headquarters of the Sub-Division, and the two markets at Chuharkana and Sangla. In Sheikhupura, a retired Inspector of Police, whose two sons were convicted and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and half a dozen pleaders and their munshis were prominent. Had there been no pleaders in Sheikhupura, it is safe to say that there would have been no trouble there.

In Chuharkana the chief leader was a discredited Manager of the Khalsa School named Kartar Singh, who gave lectures and embezzled school funds. He has been sentenced to death.

Teja Singh, another Updeshak, who had attended a seditious meeting at Lahore, also gave lectures and inflamed a large number of *Wirks* in the village of Chuharkana, close to Guru Nanak's *Sacha Sauda*. The other ringleaders at Chuharkana consisted of a half-fledged Patwari from the United Provinces, a Pseudo-Maulvi from a neighbouring village and a sprinkling of *Arya Samajists*. The station staff, which toyed with sedition, was ready to strike, but had not the courage to do so. They showed an utter incompetency to deal with the crowds which thronged the station. They encouraged the rioters in private and by attending meetings of sedition in the market.

Proceeding to Sangla we find the "fons et origo mali" to be a Brahmachari, who was hospitably entertained by the Aryas of Sangla for more than a month, and whose utterances were listened to by a sympathetic audience without protest. There can be no doubt that all the leaders at Sangla played a double game. They were only too pleased to see the trouble brewing, but when things came to a head, they took care to be out of the way, and at all events not to do anything. Here too the attitude of the railway staff was not above suspicion. When special trains were expected, information was conveyed to the Bazar and crowds rushed to the station long before the trains were signalled.

Sangla is closer to civilization than any of the other places, and the feeling against the Europeans and the Government was in consequence more bitter. The Bench of Honorary Magistrates and the members of this Notified Area did nothing to prevent disturbances and to help detection of those guilty after the event.

V.—Nature of movement, showing especially how far disloyal anti-Europeans and anti-Christians.

It has already been shown that the would-be serious revolutionists were very few in number, possibly 60 or 80 out of ten thousand, who took part in the work of looting, destructing or demonstration.

After the news from Amritsar came in, there were very unmistakeable anti-European and anti-Christian manifestations. The American Missionary at Chuharkana escaped on the night of the 15th or he would certainly have been murdered. His house and hospital were looted and burnt on the 15th by the villagers, who had enjoyed his hospitality.

The motor car of an American Missionary at Sangla was greeted with abuse. The Roman Catholic father at Sangla found it convenient to immure himself in a barbed wire enclosure with other Europeans at Lyallpur for fifteen days. Mr. Wale, Telegraph Superintendent, was attacked on the 16th at Sangla in broad day light. Any European found between Sheikhupura and Sangla from 15th to 17th would have been murdered. The Native Christians were apprehensive, and would have been attacked, had it not been for the timely arrival of the armoured car, and the Native Christian girls of the American School of Sangla would have been raped but for the timely advent of the troops there.

VI.—Punitive Measures.

The total damage to public and private property was Rs. 27,367-3-9, mostly at the railway stations. Only seven cases were dealt with by the Commissions and substantial sentences were given; over 499 people were dealt with and 323 were convicted. In all 40 whipping sentences were ordered, nearly all in the case of juveniles to save them from going to jail. The whipping was much less severe than that given in jail, and it was not public, though it was administered in the compound of the Canal Bungalows after the court rose. No sentences of whipping were given for any offences committed after the 19th of April.

VII.—Effect of disturbances and the measures taken

The promptitude and complete manner in which Government has dealt with the disturbances, have made a deep and far-reaching impression on the people. They will certainly not be so ready in future to act on the false reports of the ill-disposed persons.

The following general suggestions and remarks are offered for what they are worth:—

The recent occurrences have shown clearly that Gujranwala District is too large for one charge, and possibly at some future time there may be an outbreak in some rural tract. This part of the district has long been undermanned in police personnel, and it needs nearly double the quantity of police stations and police. The police staff was throughout short. What was wanted was a permanent Superintendent of Police, a good native Deputy Superintendent of Police, and two other experienced Sub-Inspectors In future outbreaks, experienced Sub-Inspectors should be sent at once from other districts and also a Deputy Superintendent of Police.

The people are extremely democratic and ill-disciplined, given to crimes and cattle stealing, and their increasing wealth has made them worse rather than better. They have practically no interest outside money-making, drinking and vice, and enjoy very few pleasures. There are no national sports, few social gatherings, no cattle fairs, and little interest is taken in education. There is no pride in the village community in its institutions of its history. There are no bonds of sympathy between village and village. There are no natural leaders of society, and no close and friendly intercourse, as there should be, between Government and the governed. The people want amusement as much as they want encouragement to take an intelligent interest in all round progress and development. They should take a pride in their own Zaildars and leaders, in their own village, Tahsil and district. There is no "esprit de corps" or love for their own country. The more wealthy leaders should be encouraged to associate with each

Mr. B. N. BOSWORTH-SMITH—*concluded*—Rai Sahib SRI RAM SUD.

other. They should also be encouraged to take a pride in the education of their children and train them for Government's service, especially for the Army.

The real secret of preventing disturbances of this kind and more far-reaching outbursts of unrest in the future lies in the early formation of the new district, when closer contact with the people can be ensured. The Summary procedure of Martial Law is admirably adopted for a people of this kind in times of disturbances, and indeed always if properly carried out and supervised. Quick and ready justice without the uncertainties of law, cost of pleaders and the oppression of the police is what is wanted.

No more suitable method could have been devised for dealing with a widespread rebellion of this kind than Regulation No. 4 of Bengal of 1804. Its presence on the Statute Book was an untold blessing, for otherwise temporary anarchy of a widespread and most destructive nature would have resulted.

Loyalty must be insisted on in all Government servants and school masters. Black lists should be maintained of masters whose loyalty is doubtful, and such should be summarily dismissed. If the school masters are made all right, the school boys will have a chance of growing up well disciplined men.

The Educational Department has hitherto largely failed in this direction. It has probably been a problem too difficult to tackle and so has been left. Progress in this direction means a "volte-face" on the part of Government. A frank recognition of the error of the principle originally laid down that Government should not interfere in matters of religion should be made. Education without religion is worthless and harmful, as the great bulk of the Indian rural community feel. In the village schools no less than in town schools or colleges, religion must be taught, and the master or masters should be religious people, whose life's work will be to look after the welfare of that particular school.

The railway staff did not do well on this occasion, and it was hardly to be expected they would, considering the class of station masters and clerks who are enlisted. A good station master at a large station would be a successful man anywhere in any walk of life. A station master at a small wayside station should be a man accustomed to control, to use authority and to act in emergencies. The Railway does not appoint such persons except by accident. It is essential that the Station masters should be loyal, should know their staff, should be in touch with the people amongst whom they live, and able to collect timely aid when needed. The station master at Bhalike, who is a man of fine stature and some courage, unlike his *confreres* at the other stations, called in thirty villagers on the night of 15th with the result that this station was not attacked.

Traders are always a source of danger in bringing in new ideas, and will become increasingly so amongst the fiery and warlike population of the Punjab when places like Delhi are allowed to bring compulsion and pressure to bear on the trading community in the Punjab by refusing credit and the like with the object of securing their own disloyal aims. It should be made a penal offence for any trader to threaten another with stoppage of credit, etc., in order to achieve a political end. There is nothing to prevent Delhi in the future stirring up similar trouble in the Punjab by similar methods. It was Delhi which forced a *hartal* on Ambala Cantonment and bazar, where the people were most loyal and most reluctant to take up such an attitude. A *hartal* is in itself illegal, and an open incitement of violence, which should not be allowed after the present experience in the Punjab.

I have taken the occasion of the past six weeks to see the inhabitants of about sixty villages and to talk with them, and I am convinced that their attitude is all that could be desired, and that they are most loyal. The bulk of the country is entirely unaffected and is probably more loyal than ever it was.

There can be no doubt that a general railway strike was just averted. At Ambala Cantonment on 12th April, all the railway staff struck, and the Commissioner and myself spent the whole day in getting them back. If the strikes at these central stations had been successful, it is certain that all the small stations would have followed suit.

VIII.—GENERAL.

It would seem that the most important lesson to draw from the present experience of Martial Law is that the executive control by the Civil should never be surrendered to the military, otherwise there is a great danger of something being done, which will be misunderstood or cause great trouble.

The summary procedure was admirably adopted to meet the emergency. Nearly 400 persons were punished, and in this way the bulk of them were disposed of within fourteen days. The total imprisonment thus awarded was 465 years with a fine of Rs. 23,150. The policy adopted was in the main to deal with all offenders under the Summary Courts, and they got off much lighter than they would have done if they had been sent up before the Tribunal. The view taken from the start was that the ringleaders only should be severely dealt with and the misguided zamindars and others, though they were guilty of open rebellion, have got off with a year or two years' imprisonment.

The system adopted was simplicity itself. The statements of the railway staff and others, who had seen the occurrences, were first recorded by a magistrate in detail, and then all the inhabitants of suspected villages were paraded and most careful identifications took place in the presence of magistrates. This was only done after measures had been taken to get in the very many absconders as the villages were practically deserted at first. Police investigation and police enquiry were thus reduced to a minimum, and there was practically no opportunity for corruption.

Similarly the question of reward and punishment was kept in my own hands and there was no opportunity for *Safarash*. The investigation and enquiry as well as the trials were all held in public, and the general justice of the sentences and other action taken is universally admitted.

The general effect of these disturbances will be, I take it, that would-be agitators will in future find it very much more difficult to get zamindars and other people to believe their false reports or to act on them. The people here have learnt a bitter lesson. Quick and severe justice has been administered. Those who took part in the riot have been the laughing stock of the country-side and have been abused by their own women folk.

Rai Sahib SRI RAM SUD, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhupura.

I was in charge of the Sharakpur Sub-Division of the Gujranwala District with Headquarters at Sheikupura during the disturbances of April last, and this subdivision was composed of the two tahsils of Sharakpur and Khangah Dogran. Nothing happened in Sharakpur Tahsil except that telephone wires were broken near Muridke on a certain night between 14th and 18th April, an offence which still remains untraced. However, the following events happened at several places of the Khangah Dogran Tahsil.

HAPPENINGS AT SHEIKHUPURA.

On the 6th of April there was an *hartal* at Sheikhupura and a meeting in the evening with a pleader in the chair and both of these functions had been organized

Continued.] Rai Sahib SRI RAM SUD.

by the pleaders in general. Speeches were made at the meeting by three pleaders including the President. The Rowlatt Act was condemned and a resolution passed asking the Secretary of State to cancel it. Nothing untoward happened that day, but there seemed no doubt that the organizers of the *hartal* and the meeting were largely responsible for the atmosphere of hatred against Government that was thereby created, for even illiterate women in the streets of Sheikhupura were heard to say that the British people were intending to interfere with marital and sisterly relations by legislation, preventing husbands and wives, sisters and brothers to come together.

There was outward calm on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th April. I left for Gujranwala on the evening of 10th April to attend a District Darbar and so did most of the influential people at Khangah Dogran Tahsil. The Darbar was held on the 11th and the District Board meeting on the 12th and I took the morning train at Gujranwala on the 13th April for a return journey, but in the meantime the news of the incidents at Amritsar and Lahore on the 10th April had come through. While seated in the train on the morning of 13th April I heard a station Babu, at a wayside station between Gujranwala and Muridke, telling passengers in an audible voice that such of them who hoped to return from Lahore were hoping against hope, and I could well see his point, for I had heard at Gujranwala rumours of a general railway strike materializing at any moment. However we were not stranded on the way and reached Shahdara about 10 A.M. and waited there for the connecting train. Here, as we (that is myself, Mian Khan Dauran, Civil Judge at Sangla, and Jagat Singh, Pleader, at Sheikhupura) were walking on the platform, we were accosted by a Sikh youth. The latter informed us that everybody was on strike at Lahore even including the railway workshop people and that he had come down from there to ascertain our views as we appeared to him to be educated people, but he received no encouraging replies from us and he went away.

I waited for the connecting train at Shahdara which was due at Sheikhupura at 1 P.M., but it was not certain up to 2 P.M. that it would ever arrive. About this time a man named Garib Muhammad of Harn Munara village arrived in the train from the direction of Sheikhupura and gave me the news that the people of Sheikhupura were waiting for my return to close their shops once more, and on hearing this I sent for a tonga and in the company of Sardar Sahib Amar Singh (another Extra Assistant Commissioner at Sheikhupura in those days) hastened back to my headquarters and reached there at 5 P.M. and next day (14th April) Sheikhupura saw a second *hartal* which was organized by two or three pleaders in conjunction with Atma Singh, a man who had recited a prayer at the meeting of 6th April mentioned before, and had actively participated in the *langar* of that day. A free *langar* was also opened on the 14th April by the people of Sheikhupura for the benefit of the hungry people in imitation of the Lahore *langars*. Towards the evening of that day there occurred a riot at a baker's, because the latter had cooked *jhatka* meat and the Muhammadans had objected to it and in this riot the baker was beaten by a mob and his utensils and cooked *rotis* and meat had been thrown in the dust. That same evening after dark both railway telegraphic wires and signals and the postal wires were broken with the result that the Bombay Mail and another troop train that passed through Sheikhupura station that night towards Lahore out of its ordinary route (because the main line between Peshawar and Lahore had been damaged by the mob near Gujranwala) had to be joined and taken forward without any line clear towards the next station of Chichoki Mallian, after being piloted by a station assistant at Sheikhupura going ahead on a trolly. I learnt about the damage done to the wires and the signals above on the morning of 15th April and I saw the spot and had the damage repaired in my presence. The Police Sub-Inspector was also accompanying me when the postal wires were mended after the railway wires, and we were both armed at the time. As soon as the postal wires became in working order (and it was between 10 and 11 A.M.) I sent a telegraphic message to Deputy Commissioner through the Post Office asking for British soldiers' help before it was too late. The railway wires were mended somewhat earlier, but I did not trust my message to them because I did not believe in the integrity of railway people generally in those days. Precautions were taken and nothing more happened at Sheikhupura.

HAPPENINGS AT CHUHARKANA MARKET AND VILLAGE.

The people of Chuharkana market were in close commercial relationship with Lahore and Amritsar. During my absence in Gujranwala, the Hindus and the Muslims of the market held a Union meeting in a mosque on the evening of 11th April after the news from Lahore and Amritsar had reached them and next day (12th April) they held a meeting in the quadrangle of the grain *mandi*, when seditious speeches were made by some of the people of the market and by two Musalmans (a Hakim and a canal patwari) who came from a village some 20 miles away. This meeting was followed by another meeting on the 13th April near Chuharkana village (a distance of one mile from the Chuharkana market) and this last meeting was held in the grounds of *sachcha sauda* (true bargain) temple dedicated to Guru Nanak when the *Vaisakhi fair* was then being held. More sedition was preached at this meeting by two ringleaders—named Teja Singh and Kartar Singh (the former of whom had attended the mob meetings at Lahore and the latter of whom was managing a Khalsa School in Chuharkana market) to a large audience from neighbouring villages that had collected at the fair. Nothing happened on the 14th April. On the morning of the 15th April the people of the Chuharkana market who had probably information about the incidents at Gujranwala and Sheikhupura on the previous day tore up a part of the rail road near the canal bridge in the neighbourhood of Chuharkana village. This damage was soon repaired by a troop train that was passing that way towards Lahore about the time, but as soon as this troop train left Chuharkana station between 2 and 3 P.M. the people of Chuharkana market, of Chuharkana village and of many neighbouring villages (who I heard were also incited by the troop train people, a matter which has already formed the subject of a separate enquiry) combined and tore up the line that had been repaired and much more of it and also pulled out the telegraph posts in the neighbourhood for a considerable distance. This done, they turned their attention to the Chuharkana station which was situated close to the market and looted and burnt it about 4 P.M and further held up a railway train that reached there about the time and looted the goods in the brakevan and smashed the carriage glasses and other furniture and I received a wire from a member of the Chuharkana market notified area about 5 P.M. *re* the incidents above. At 10 P.M. the same evening Mangal Singh, Zaildar of Chuharkana, whose own son was subsequently found to have been concerned in the above riots, came to me at Sheikupura, a distance of 9 miles from Chuharkana market, with the information that a mob of two to three thousand had collected near the broken canal bridge above mentioned on the Sangla side of Chuharkana station and was bent on mischief, that he had noticed people from villages on his way rushing to join the same mob and that he had further heard of rumours that the line far beyond Chuharkana towards Sangla was being broken by other villagers and a guard of the train held up and mentioned before who had trudged on foot from Chuharkana to Sheikhupura confirmed the events he had seen soon after the arrival of the said Mangal Singh.

At 11-55 P.M. that evening an armoured train arrived at Sheikhupura, and I proceeded therein to Chuharkana station. We moved very slowly and on our way near the Chuharkana distant signal towards Sheikhupura we found a pointsman's box placed across the line. This

Rai Sahib SRI RAM SUD—*concluded*—Lieutenant TATAM.

was removed to one side and we went forward, but not far off we discovered some men near the line who were presumably out for more mischief to the line. The fire from the machine gun was opened and at this spot next morning we found the dead body of one man (a *Machhi* by caste) who came from the neighbouring village of Kujar and we also found a coil of broken telegraphic wires near him. We next went forward to Chuharkana station, but the mob mentioned by Mangal Singh, Zaildar, which came, as the report went, from 20 to 30 villages in the neighbourhood and had collected to loot the Chuharkana market, dispersed in the meantime on hearing the gun-shots and at the sight of the flash of the searchlight which could be seen from long distances. However, we were informed at Chuharkana station that some people were hidden in a factory there and we went into it and on forcing open the door of a room which was fastened from inside we found therein a stalwart Jat youth named Mahana Singh who came from the neighbouring village of Nokhar. We also found a brand new chhavi standing against the outer wall of this house and this weapon apparently belonged to the said Mahana Singh who had left it there when he hid himself on hearing of our approach. Some rifle shots were also fired after this, but no one was hurt.

The day now broke and we proceeded on the line and pulled up the train opposite Chuharkana village and supervised the mending of the damage to the telegraph and railway line. As we were there we noticed the movements of the people on the far side of the village and we went into the village and shots were fired from the rifles and the machine gun and they were dispersed and I came to know later that people numbering some five hundred had armed themselves with *kulharis* and sticks and were preparing themselves to attack us before they were dispersed and the above firing had caused three casualties including one death so far as I have come to know. On the morning of the 16th April we were in the fields looking for the bodies of the people who might have been killed near the distant signal when the first shot was fired, when we noticed a man giving a flag signal from the top of the Mission house in that neighbourhood and thinking that the man waving the signal was in distress, the soldiers went up to him and learnt from him that the Mission house, where Revd. Smith was in residence formerly and which was then untenanted because the reverend gentleman had fled for his life to Lahore a day or two previous, had been looted of its valuable contents during the previous night before the arrival of the armoured train.

The armoured train returned to Lahore that evening as it could not proceed beyond Chuharkana on account of the damage done to the line beyond, but it came back to Chuharkana again the next morning—(17th April). That day (17th April) a party of soldiers went to Paddranwala village to effect the arrest of one Ram Singh Thakuria who was wanted, and on their return they informed us that they had been fired upon by two men armed with guns and that they had also fired shots in exchange. The above closes the chapter of events at Chuharkana and its neighbourhood.

EVENTS AT DHABAN SINGH AND MOMAN.

Dhaban Singh and Moman are two railway stations situated on the line between Chuharkana and Sangla and both these stations were burnt and looted by large mobs on the night between 15th and 16th April when the armed car was working at Chuharkana, and the mischief in the case of Dhaban Singh was committed by two whole villages of Mahanianwala and Pucca Dalla who were inhabited by Sikh settlers and not by old settlers as the people of Chuharkana were. On the morning of 18th through communication had been restored and we now proceeded in the armoured train towards Sangla and on our way filled it up opposite the Mahanianwala village and we walked into the said village —a distance of more than one mile and there arrested a village lambardar whose son was actively involved in the Dhaban Singh affair and *en route* for the village we fired upon a crowd that had collected in the distance and dispersed it with one casualty.

EVENTS AT SANGLA.

Thereafter we proceeded to Sangla when after an *hartal* on the 12th April wires had been cut in three places on the night between 15th and 16th April and when a European Telegraph Inspector was hurt with a stick by a religious fanatic of the Kuka fraternity. But at Sangla we learnt that the station of Marh Bilochan, which lay five miles out and had a small market, was in danger and so I took the armoured train there and came away after arranging for the safety of that station. All went well after the 18th April. On the 19th April the Deputy Commissioner (Colonel O'Brien) visited the affected stations and on the 21st April, Mr. Bosworth Smith arrived in the Sub-Division and took charge of it as Joint Deputy Commissioner and I worked under him and supervised the police investigation at Chuharkana and Sheikhupura, and took care that no innocent people were run in.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

To the above narrative of events should also be added the common reports that I received on my arrival in Chuharkana on the night between 15th and 16th April and as well as the information I received from Bhai Buta Singh, Pleader, after his release from prison (and he was one of the four Pleaders arrested at Sheikhupura) and which was to the effect that on the 15th April some people from the neighbouring villages of Sheikhupura had come to him and told him that the people of their villages were prepared to tear up the line even in the neighbourhood of Sheikhupura if he advised that course, and from this and other things that came to my notice during the period commencing from 6th April and ending on 18th April I could not help feeling that the situation was of the gravest on the 15th April, that few people had remained loyal to Government by that date, that had it not been for the timely arrival of the armoured train, the surging mob that had collected at Chuharkana canal bridge would have thoroughly looted the Chuharkana market during the night of 15th and 16th April and then proceeded to loot the Khangah Dogran Tahsil treasury and that thereafter it would have extended its depredations to the villages about, that other people would have joined it in its course and that the situation (which would have otherwise developed into a regular mutiny) was only saved by the firing that took place on the night between 15th and 16th April and the next three days, though it would be readily seen from the few casualties inflicted that this firing was directed with the utmost care. I would also like to add that it was the double *hartal* at Sheikhupura on the 6th and the 14th April and the *hartal* at Chuharkana and Sangla on the 12th April that had largely contributed to the events that had happened, for nothing serious happened in the Sharakpur Tahsil because there was no *hartal* in that part.

Lieutenant TATAM, Military Grass Farm, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division.

On the 14th April I left Lyallpur by 8-16 train on duty for Rawalpindi, and at the time I was looking after a little boy, the son of Mrs. Holland. On arriving near Hafizabad Railway Station, I heard the noise of a large crowd shouting and on nearing the level crossing about 300 yards from the station, I looked out and saw a crowd of about 2 to 300 persons armed with sticks and shouting in a very excited manner and carrying

Lieutenant TATAM—*concluded*—Captain S. P. FLOWERDEW—Rai Sahib AMAR SINGH.

black flags. Thinking there would probably be trouble, I at once closed all the shutters of the windows of the carriage on both sides and bolted the doors on the inside. When the train stopped at the station the same crowd came up on the platform side and tried to open the door with the object of finding out, whether I was in the carriage or not, or any other Europeans. They then moved up to the other first class carriage. Shortly afterwards they returned to my carriage and tried to open the door again. On finding the door would not open, they smashed in the windows with stones and *lathis* and heavy wooden clubs. And on seeing me they got more and more excited making a horrible noise and shouting out, "*Captain Sahib ko maro, Sahib sala andar hai,*" then bombarded me with stones and shoes also, and started prodding at me with long *lathis* and all the time made frenzied efforts to get at me. Their demeanour and conduct were such as to show clearly that they would have killed me if they could have got hold of me. As the situation became more critical, I got up from the further side of the carriage and took the little boy with me into the bath room and shut the doors bolting it from inside so as he would not be hit by the stones coming in. There was only one window in the bath room and that had iron bars and glass panes. This window was on the off side of the train, so the crowd immediately went round to the other side of the carriage getting through the other compartment and smashed in the window by throwing large stones, which nearly caught the little boy on the head. On finding the bath room was not secure as *lathis* and stones were able to reach me easily through the window, I came back into the main carriage again. At this time two Indians came to my assistance. Both these men stood and faced the crowd and prevented them getting into the carriage by using their sticks and urging them to move away. The crowd was very excited and continued abusing and throwing stones and was in every way most aggressive.

A third man whom I recognised as one of the foremost of the gang evidently thought the situation was getting worse changed his attitude and tried to keep the crowd in hand, and came near the window at the top end of the carriage and prevented stones from coming in, and told me to sit down quietly. Thinking that the position was hopeless and the train not starting I went over to the other side of the carriage and sat down facing the crowd and spoke to them, asking, "What had I to do with their *Gandhi tamasha,*" and the only satisfaction I got was a *lathi* thrust at me which only just missed my eye, and another man got me in the ribs, so I at once shifted away. The crowd at this time seemed to me to be increasing and swarmed round both sides of the carriage. I saw the Guard come along to my carriage and I told him to see the Station Master and to get the train moved on, but he came back after a few moments and said, "The Station Master could not be found anywhere, so he was not going to wait any more and had given Line Clear himself." Eventually the train started amidst jeers and shouts of abuse and another bombardment of stones. The attitude of the crowd left no doubt in my mind that they would have killed me and the little boy if they had got their hands on us.

Captain S P. FLOWERDEW, 1-24th North-Western Railway Battalion, Indian Defence Force, Lahore.

As ordered I proceeded with 1 non-commissioned officer and 14 men by special train leaving Lahore at 11-12 hours on the 17th April 1919 and arriving at Chuharkana at about 13-00 hours. I found no civil authorities at the Railway station so pushed on about a mile to Chuharkana village where I met Armoured Train No. 1 (Captain Joscelyne) and the Sub-Divisional Officer (Magistrate) who had with him a Sub-Inspector and few details of civil police.

I was told the man to be arrested had fled from his village (Chuharkana) the day before and was camping at a well about 2 miles further on. We set out with the Sub-Inspector in the direction of the well but were seen by the fugitive from about half a mile and could not overtake the party.

Fire was opened and one of the party was killed in a wheat field. The main body was chased into a village named Padiawala about 3 miles further on and we entered this village from the south, posting four man to stop exit from the north. We took eight men from the village who were all concealed in houses locked from outside and were said by an informant to have been in the mob that burnt Chuharkana station. Among the prisoners was Fauza Singh, Sepoy of 3rd Guides, on leave from Mardan.

Ram Singh had passed through Padiawala and fled, probably on horseback, before we arrived. He is an *ex*-sepoy.

On returning to the line I found Sergeant Davies D. L. I., who had gone off after another party. He reported that in the following up a party of the group from the well he had run into an armed party some of whom were mounted. It seems that two men were armed with rifles and two with guns. Sergeant Davies killed three of this party but their arms were taken away by their servants. He also killed one other man in following them.

Sergeant Davies had taken four prisoners, two of whom were strongly suspected by the police and the other two were released.

The number of others hit is not known but several were seen with wounds.

The Magistrate did not require any further assistance and as there was a party of 100 Gurkhas from Abbottabad at Chuharkana I returned to Lahore with 8 prisoners taken by my party and also 3 handed over by Captain Joscelyne.

The Magistrate informed me that Ram Singh was in the front of the rioters but the most important ringleaders are—

(1) Teja Singh, son of Partap, Chuharkana.
(2) Kartar Singh of Jabba, Manager, Khalsa High School, Chuharkana.
(3) Sohan Singh, son of Bhagwan Singh of Kaloki.
(4) Mehar Din. Blacksmith of Kaloki.
(5) Syed Nahal Shah, Fakir.

Sardar Sahib AMAR SINGH, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Sheikhupura.

In the morning of 6th April 1919 I went to see Rai Sahib Lala Sri Ram, Sud, Sub-Divisional Officer, from my house in the Fort to the town (a distance about ¼ of a mile) where he lived. On my way I saw the shops closed. There was a general *hartal* in the town in compliance with the message of Mr. Gandhi. I talked about the *hartal* with the Sub-Divisional Officer who sent for pleaders one by one who were present in the town on that day and advised them not to hold any meeting and take part in the *hartal*, but they said that they could not help joining the public meeting if there would be any, and that the *hartal* was observed by the public and they could not interfere with this. They also said that as the meeting would not be seditious therefore there was no harm in joining it. On this Sub-Divisional Officer deputed me, S. Din Muhammad, Colony Naib-Tahsildar, and Babu Ali Muhammad, Police Sub-Inspector, to attend the meeting and record

Sardar Rai Sahib AMAR SINGH—*concluded*—Lieutenant Khan ABDUR RAHIM KHAN.

word by word what was said there. Meeting was held in the temple and we three went there, and B. Ali Muhammad was asked to write the speeches made there. Nothing seditious was spoken there, and on return we read it to the Sub-Divisional Officer who, I believe, reported the matter to the Deputy Commissioner. On 10th April 1919 the Sub-Divisional Officer and I went to Gujranwala to attend meeting and join the garden party of Colonel J. A. O'Brien, Deputy Commissioner there, who was transferred to Ambala. We halted there for 11th and 12th. In the morning of 13th April we left for Sheikhupura. Before the departure of the train I heard someone saying "Railway servants are going to make a strike and it is possible that they may leave the train in the way." We were in danger that we might not be left in the way, but this proved wrong; we reached Shahdara safely. There on the station there were different rumours. Some said Hindu Muhammadan regiments have refused to fire on the public, some thousand men have been killed by machine guns at Amritsar, and machine gun has been snatched away by the public, Railway lines have been broken and banks, etc., have been burnt, and so on. We were anxious about our *Ilaqa*. As no train was expected to run towards Lyallpur on account of the breach of the line near Amritsar we left for Sheikhupura by Tongas. On arrival there we learnt that another *hartal* is being arranged. On 14th April there was again *hartal* at Sheikhupura. The public did the following mischief in the Sheikhupura Sub-Division:—

(1) Telegraph wire was cut near the town of Sheikhupura during the night between 14th and 15th April.

(2) Railway wire at Machhike was cut during the night between 17th and 18th April.

(3) On 15th April at Chuharkana Canal Bridge was damaged, Railway line in some places was taken off, wires were cut and Railway Station was burnt and looted by the Mandi men and villagers around the Station.

(4) On the night between 15th and 16th April Dhaban Singh Railway Station was burnt and looted and a canal bridge near it as burnt by beat of drum by the villagers of Manianwala and Nawanpind.

(5) On the same night Moman Station was burnt and lamps, signals, etc., were broken.

(6) On the same night Railway wire was cut near Baroa,—a village two miles from Sangla towards Lahore side.

(7) A Brahmachari, Gobind Parshad, who is said to belong to Gurukul Kangri, has been the cause of all the trouble at Sangla and its neighbourhood. He excited the people, spreading false news, such as (*a*) at the times of marriage or funeral procession not more than 5 persons will be allowed to join under the Rawlatt Act, (*b*) half of the income of every man will be taken by the Government, etc.

At Sangla proper the following things occurred—

(1) On 12th April (*a*) *hartal* was observed; (*b*) prayers were offered by men of every sect at canal bank for the cancellation of the Bill; (*c*) a procession was started and a black *Jhanda* and an effigy of Rowlatt Act was carried with the procession through the Bazaars to the Railway Station, (*d*) this crowd jeered, shouted and threw stones at the motor of Rev. Picken; (*e*) the crowd recited poems and said "Hindu-Mussalman ki jai," "Mahatma Gandhi ki jai," and "Shaukat Ali and Muhammad Ali ki jai" and so forth.

(2) On the night intervening 15th and 16th April Railway wires near Sangla were cut (*a*) at one place on Lyallpur line, (*b*) at other place at Wazirabad line.

(3) Stones at the Mail Train were thrown on 14th April at 6-40 P.M. by some boys.

(4) On 16th April (*a*) one Harnam Singh, Kuka, with three others released a prisoner from a Fauji sepoy while he was sitting in th Station Master's Office and asking help from him at about 8 or 9 A.M.

(*b*) The same Harnam Singh made a brutal attack on Mr. Wale, Telegraph Inspector, on the same evening when the Inspector was working in the Post Office, and Post Office staff and his orderly were present there.

False rumours as given above excited the simple zamindars, and for a day or two they thought that Government has become weak, and the Mail Trains passing through Sangla was thought a proof of it as they thought even Dak could not be carried on main line. It was generally said that a Fauji train passed *viâ* Sangla on 15th April, and wherever these Fauji men got chance they excited the people. This was adding fuel to the fire on the false rumours. The people were excited at once, otherwise there were no ideas against Government before these dates.

As to how the disturbance was suppressed:—

Armoured train reached Sheikhupura Railway Station at about 12 night between 15th and 16th April. The Sub-Divisional Officer and I met the Officer-in-charge in compliance with his wire. He took the Senior Officer with him in the train to Chuharkana, and I was left in charge of Sheikhupura. On 16th and 17th I remained in Sheikhupura, and on 18th April I went to Chichoki Mallian to guard the line from Shahdara to the boundary of Nankana Sahib *viâ* Chichoki Mallian as I was put in charge of this line by the Deputy Commissioner. Everything was alright on this line. The Sub-Divisional Officer can throw full light as to how the disturbance was suppressed in the disturbed area as he was in that part in those days. Up to 20th April I was patrolling this line, and went to Chuharkana on 21st April when there was no disturbance and people were frightened. I think the machine gun had this effect, as it was necessary to adopt harsh measures to suppress the unrest.

As to how the investigation was made:—

I was put in charge of Sangla and Moman and Machhike cases, and I also helped in Chuharkana and Dhaban Singh in writing the statements of witnesses produced before me by the Police and in making identifications. During the investigations I conducted no force was used on any witness, and at the time of writing statements I always asked the witness that he should speak the truth of his own free will. At the time of investigation many men were made to stand in a line, and the witness was asked to point out the man whom he recognized. The list of the men pointed out was made and signatures were affixed on it, handed over to the Police to put on the Police file. The Railway wire cut at Machhike on 17th and 18th was not proved to have been cut due to disturbance, but was cut by one to get his enemy into trouble falsely accusing him of it.

Lieutenant Khan ABDUR RAHIM KHAN of Zaida, Cadet, Indian Army.

I left Lahore at 2 P.M. on the 15th for Lyallpur, and had another Cadet Muhammad Munir Khan with me in the same compartment. We had an uneventful journey till Chuharkana, where we reached at 4 P.M. though on the way at Chichoki Mallian we met a troop train, and I heard some one say that we shall have to come back, as the line at Chuharkana will be damaged. When the train stopped at Chuharkana, I noticed the Mandi people running towards the station, as if expecting to see something happen. I was shortly afterwards

Lieutenan Khán ABDUR RAHIM KHAN—*concluded*—Reverend S. C. PICKEN.

told that the line near the canal bridge was being dismantled and that the engine was being sent forward to prevent the people from doing so, and to repair it. I looked out of the window and saw some 200 to 300 people collected at the spot where the engine had gone to repair the line. During this time many Sikh people were collected in the station, and one mean-looking person, shabbily dressed, was lecturing them to wake up, as now the time for the Khalsas had come to uproot every rule and regain their *Raj*. The man was standing about 9 feet away from my carriage. At this time the engine was brought back, as some more people had started dismantling the line towards Lahore side of the station. Very soon, I saw people running from among the mob at canal towards the station, and started cutting the telegraph wires. By now all the passengers had got down from the train and I also got down. A section of the mob rushed the Station Master's room, and began looting it. Two railway employés, who ran out of the room, were surrounded by two men, with *lathis* and iron rods in their hands and were about to split open their heads when Mr. Iqbal Singh, Pleader, who was in the same train, intervened and saved them. The signal to *loot* was given by an old man, probably Muhammadan, and a very unimportant sort of a person. Iqbal Singh and I went to the *Mandi*, and from thence to a house close by, where Bawa Budh Singh, Executive Engineer, with his family and our luggage, followed us. We closed the doors, and our medium of communications now with the outside people were Jiwan Singh in whose house we were accommodated, and a few other *Mandi* people. Jiwan Singh made arrangements for food, etc., for us, and we were about 20 passengers in the same house. At night we were informed that some people had been looted. I forgot to say that soon after we left the station it was set on fire, and some of the members of the mob enjoyed themselves by blowing the whistle of the engine till about 8 P.M. We closed the doors having brought in as many bricks as possible, to protect ourselves with, in case the mob attacked us. I was sleeping on the roof, when at 1 o'clock on the night of 15-16th, I was awakened by Iqbal Singh and told to get ready as the mob had sent word to either join them and lead them to Lahore, or be prepared for the consequences of not becoming one of them. On enquiry how many they were, I was informed that people from 16 different villages had collected, and were about 2,000 in number. I loaded my small pocket revolver and prepared to meet them. All night shouts and noise was heard all round in the country. Every now and then I was looking at my watch, when exactly at 1-45 A.M. I heard the machine gun firng. The rest of the night we heard it firing now and then. In the morning we went to the armoured train, and were accommodated in it. When we went to see the place where it had first fired on the mob we found one man lying dead, but there were signs of other men having been killed as well. This man was a young Muhammadan *Mochi*, so those people said, and was hit with two bullets on the right groin.

We resumed our forward journey at 10-30, and crossing the bridge we found the telegraph wires and poles were broken and cut to pieces all along the way in front of the Chuharkana village. The small bridge on the canal was burnt, and the line was greatly burned and dismantled. A Sub-Inspector of Police and a policeman were sent to bring in the *lambardars*, but they returned without them. Another armoured train arrived, and after some time we heard its machine gun firing on the village, also some rifle shots were heard being fired inside the village. Some time afterwards the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhupura, was seen bringing in some few villagers under a guard and took them into other train, which soon after left for Lahore.

We spent that night in the train and next evening reached Sangla, and from thence getting into passenger train, I reached Lyallpur at 12 midnight on 17-18th.

Reverend S. C. PICKEN of the American Mission, Sangla Hill, Sheikhupura.

This part of the country did not seem to be affected very much regarding what was going on until about April 10th when some agitators came into stir up the people. Regarding events that had occurred in Delhi and other places there was considerable interest, but I would say that had not outsiders come in things would likely have passsed off quietly.

The 12th of April was the first *hartal* that occurred in Sangla. I happened to have a trip down to the Railway Station to meet a friend, who came to stay the week end with me. On my arrival there I found a very large crowd gathered, which was being addressed by men of the city and by one or two agitators. As I left the station in my car the crowd gathered around jeering and hooting. I did not then know the reason of the meeting or of the treatment I had received. I was told that dirt and stones were thrown at my car, but I did not get hit neither did I see any.

From the 12th or until I left Sangla on the evening of the 15th, I noted a very hostile attitude on the part of the people. Not so much against the Rowlatt Act, but against most everything in general. It was only by the timely arrival of the District Traffic Superintendent, North-Western Railway, and some Indian soldiers that there was no damage done to the Railway property and other buildings. All kinds of rumours were afloat and one could hear most anything. Most of the talk was against the Government and I should say was caused by the agitators setting rumours afloat. The excitement lasted about a week and it was not until investigations were started that the people began to know how badly they had acted.

Regarding the measures that were taken to suppress the disturbances I should say that they were nothing more than ample. No firing was done and no excessive measures were taken. If anything the people got off a bit easy considering how they talked and acted. I do not know how much the police tried to stop them during those days, but from what I heard they did not try to do anything, and had they done so I am afraid that they would have been a bit roughly handled.

The inconvenience and anxiety that we missionaries had to endure during those days and at Lyallpur, I care not to describe, for fear of being misunderstood. With no protection here but the good will of the people and they seemed hostile, it was a bit uncertain to say the least. Having to take flight in the night, because you realized that you were being watched by day was another thing that we had to consider.

In the matter of investigation of cases here several things came to my notice. Those who came to investigate seemed to make it more of a personal matter, and it gave an opportunity for some to wipe out old scores. I mean the guilty party would be shielded as much as possible and the blame placed on some poor fellow who happened to be standing round at the time and yet was not doing anything. In this way it was very difficult to get at the real facts. So what I have heard has been gathered not from one man but many. The Deputy Commissioner had his difficulties along this line when he came. No one seemed willing to tell anything and in this way some men may have been convicted who were really not guilty.

I trust that I have made myself clear and have stated matters rightly.

BAWA BUDH SINGH, Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Provincial Division, Lyallpur.

On the 15th April, I was travelling with my family from Lahore to Lyallpur by 47-Up. We were occupying a second class compartment all to ourselves. The train left Lahore at about 14-00. Rumours were afloat that railway line towards Gujranwala had been destroyed by mob, but I could hardly believe that we would meet a similar fate on our journey, as trains had so far been running safely *viâ* Sangla, and just before we left Lahore, a Troop Special had arrived from Sangla side. At Chichoki Malian another troop train was met. The sepoys in the train informed us that they had passed Chuharkana after repairing the line and that probably we will find the line again dismantled, when we reach there. This was a danger signal and I was rather much apprehensive of the safety of my women and children. Up to Chuharkana we did not notice any unruly crowd. We reached Chuharkana at about 16-30. The train stopped at the railway station. There was no crowd then at the station. The Station Master, however, informed us that railway line at the canal bridge, further beyond, had been destroyed and bridge set on fire. The engine of the train went with some railway staff, I believe, to find out the condition of the permanent-way ahead. In the meantime most of the passengers came out of the train, and many people from the *mandi* also came to the station to see the "*tamasha*:" and in a short time the whole platform was full of men, women and children; passengers and lookers-on.

People were holding conversations in small groups here and there. Newcomers hearing stories from the local men. Everybody was discussing the situation. By the time the engine came back from the bridge, mob had also arrived at the station. Numerically the mob was not very large. It was all mixed up on the platform with the passengers from the train. Only a dozen people with *lathies* could be discerned. About a similar number was on the other side of the train, engaged in cutting wires, etc. The engine was attached to the other end of the train, with the idea of railing the train back to Sheikhupura, this was certainly a capital idea, but attempt to act upon it was rather made too late, I saw some people cutting the telegraph wires and some villagers were seen near the distant signal, Lahore side. I was standing near the engine then. I ran to my carriage and asked the ladies to pull up all window shutters. It was then related to me by my mother and wife that some villagers had been picking up dry grass and fuel and when they passed their carriage and saw them shutting the windows they assured them not to be afraid as no harm would be done to them, they intended to pull down the wires only: some of them had hatchets in their hands.

Later I was listening to some conversations on the platform, between my carriage and station building when I heard from inside the building, sound of heavy strokes and human cries, and gathered that Station Master had been beaten severely. Instantly I found a few places distant, a railway babu crouching on the ground or perhaps seated on something, imploring his assailant, and an old Muhammadan with a raised *lathi* ready to strike him and another young Muhammadan with a crow bar in hand supporting the assailant. The crowd intervened to stop the assailant from striking an innocent babu, and the men left the clerk alone. At the same time, one Kartar Singh told me that it was not safe for us to stay there any longer, and advised us to go to his school building near by, pointing to it at the same time. When I informed him that I had lot of luggage with me and that Lala Todar Mal, who had gone to fetch coolies for us from his kiln, had not then arrived, Kartar Singh volunteered to help us. I therefore ordered my servants to take out my luggage from the compartment, which they did. I left the railway station with my family and servants carrying luggage for the school building. Lot of luggage was left on the platform uncared for. We put our things inside a room of the school, ladies and children were also sent into it and the outer door was chained from outside. I stood guard as the room was not well protected. I sent away my servants to bring back the remaining luggage. They came after some time with Kartar Singh, who was himself carrying some bundles. Kartar Singh told me to bring ladies and children to another part of the school, which was safer than the room occupied. At the same time Lala Todar Mal had also come and he advised us to go into his house, next to the school building, which I preferred, as I knew Todar Mal before; and we all went there. Our luggage continued coming after us. At that place M. Muhammad Munir (?) a cadet from Indore College, also came in with his luggage and servants. When everything had been removed to Todar-Mal's house, Sardar Iqbal Singh, Pleader, came there and asked us to go to another house to which he had taken Khan Abdur Rahim Khan, son of Khan of Zaida, and other cadet from Indore; and informed us that other passengers from train had gone there too. We agreed and left Lala Todar Mal's house. We passed the streets hastily, but did not notice any unruly mob on the way.

Refuge House.

On reaching the house, which I call Refuge House we found there were already about thirty people inside it. To the ladies and children a room of the upper floor was assigned, there was another room occupied by some other women, also passengers; while in a room on the ground floor, the *mandi* people had stored their valuables and put their women inside it. Luggage continued coming in for a long time after us. I wrote out a letter to the Tahsildar, Khangah Dogran, which was signed by the two cadets also, it was then handed over to some one for being sent out to Tahsildar, per some *tumtumwala*. From the house top we noticed the station building was in flames. All disliked these depredations committed by the mob.

We partook of the hospitality offered by Sardar Jiwan Singh, Vice-President, Chuharkana Notified Area Committee. We had taken care to barricade one of the two doors, while the other was left alone for ingress and egress. In order to defend ourselves against every eventuality we had collected brickbats on the house top. We were all in a great consternation during the whole night. Having finished their meals, children and ladies went to bed, but the women could hardly sleep as they were much terrified. There were some stalwart men with *lathis* in hand, patrolling the bazaars, it was said they had come from an adjoining village to protect the town. It was about 11 P.M. that Sardar Jiwan Singh communicated news to Sardar Iqbal Singh, that about two thousand people had collected near the canal bridge, and that they had sent message to the *mandi* leaders to join them, otherwise they would loot the *mandi* the same night. Some similar messages, I was told, continued passing at night. Last of them was that the rioters were marching on the *mandi*. With this information at our disposal we surveyed the whole situation and decided, any prolonged and real defence against such odds was a hopeless task, as we were not well armed. I had a repeating pistol with three rounds in the magazine, while Khan Abdur Rahim Khan had a pocket revolver with lots of ammunition. There were two swords belonging to some Police Inspectors, who were also taking shelter in the house. We could do nothing but sit and wait the arrival of the alleged mob. The condition of the women was indescribable. They had taken off their ornaments to avoid molestation and kept them in various nooks and corners of the room they were occupying. It was about midnight when every body was in the height of excitement, that we heard sudden and cracking sound of machine gun fire. First impression was. "They have come," but a little later the cadets told us it was a machine gun fire. We breathed a sigh of relief and thanked God.

Continued.] BAWA BUDH SINGH.

Our first impression was that armoured cars had come from Lahore by road, but later on as we saw search light moving towards the railway station we were satisfied that it was a train.

After hearing the first shot we imagined we were faced with another danger, that of promiscuous bombardment from armoured cars and that we might suffer along with others. To ward off this danger, so far as possible, we hung a lighted lantern with a written notice, from the house top into the bazar. All women and children were sent downstairs, only few people remained on the top of the house, as flash light was searching all sides of the country side and rifles and guns cracked every now and then. The train moved to the bridge and stopped there, where there was some machine gun firing also. After some time we observed that a party from the train had left, to scare away the mob in an adjoining village. We heard the crack of rifle fire and noticed some moving figures in the brilliant glare of the searchlight, on the other side of the village. This eventful night after all came to an end and signs of twilight on the eastern horizon brought us a message of hope. As soon as it was light we hastily dressed ourselves and went to meet the Commander of the armoured train.

THE ARMOURED TRAIN.

The events of previous night were narrated to the Commander by Sardar Iqbal Singh, Pleader. I found Lala Sri Ram, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sheikhupura, with the train. I requested the Commander to give us shelter in the armoured train, which he permitted. We boarded the train at the bridge and she moved back to the distant singal, Lahore side; where the train stopped and a party went out into the fields in search of the dead bodies shot down the previous night. I did not go far out from the train. Lot of people went to the spot where a dead body was then lying and I heard some arrests were also made. While we were there a noise of drum-beating was heard from the Padri's bungalow and we saw a gentleman waving a white cloth or flag on the top of the bungalow. We thought there was probably a mob attacking the inmates. Train moved nearer the bungalow and a party with loaded rifles left to rescue them. But not a shot was fired as there was no mob to be found. I do not know the identity of the persons who caused all this noise and show Sardar Iqbal Singh who had been to the spot told me it was only a bluff, to see if the armoured train people took prompt action to rescue a party in danger of attack. The inmates of the bungalow had, however, left the place before they could be molested; but in the course of the night the bungalow had been looted. There is a Mission Hospital at Chuharkana, I believe. The train then moved up to the platform where I noticed the station building had been badly burnt and the rolling stock of the train which brought us from Lahore, had been damaged in way of broken glass panes, fans, etc. The engine had also some damage done to its fragile parts. Postal letters and covers were scattered on the platform and near the brake van there were lot of broken cases, etc., which showed that goods in the brake van had been looted.

I hastily brought my family and things from the Refuge House to the train. All other passengers from that house had also come to the train and some from the town also sought accommodation in the armoured train. All were cramped in third class compartment available for the purpose. I must bear testimony to the forbearing temper and regard for the stranded passengers, shown by Captain Scott (India Army Reserve of Officers of North Western Railway), who commanded the train .We no doubt put the railway staff accompanying the train to great inconvenience by overcrowding the few third class compartments.

In the armoured train, in spite of its inconveniences we felt a sort of security. The train stopped at the bridge, repaired it and crossed it. After repairing the line here and there, the train finally stopped near the canal minor bridge beyond Chuharkana village. At this place some people came to see the Sub-Divisional Officer or Commandant. The big gun in the train was ranged on the village, and I think villagers were given a few hours' notice to remove their women and children. The idea probably was to bombard the village, or terrify the people. During this period several people were seen moving out of the village, all avoided the side on which the train was standing. We all eagerly awaited bombardment of the village, but it never occurred from our train, as after the expiry of the period, some one was sent into the village and he returned with some information, which I do not know. While our train was still standing at the bridge the Commander saw through his binoculars a huge crowd moving towards the train. The crowd was some two miles away. The machine guns were ordered to be ranged on the mob, but not to fire until crowd was within 50 yards. The Commandant clearly said that he did not know what was the intention of the crowd. The mob on arriving near the metalled road, melted away.

While we were standing near the bridge, another armoured train arrived from Lahore. She stopped opposite the village Chuharkana and opened fire with machine guns, with what result we do not know. After machine gun fire, a firing party from the train went into the village and we heard several shots fired. When the party returned to the train, I with some other persons went to that train, and found that the party had arrested some people from the village. I cannot say what casualties occurred in the village. The 2nd armoured train then left the place, for Lahore I believe, taking with it the arrested persons.

The repairs-gang of our armoured train was all the time engaged in repairing the line. The male passengers actively helped the railway gang men in their task. Having repaired the line, the train crossed the bridge and travelled to Bahalike, while a truck with a machine gun was detached and left opposite Chuharkana village to keep guard over the line. Up to Bahalike the line was all right, we travelled a few miles beyond the place and near Dhabansingh, a bridge was found burnt down and permanent way torn off. The timbers of the bridge were still smouldering, water was thrown over them to put out fire. Machine gun cracked a volley again. Searchlight flashed and the whole country side was lit up. No mob was found at the place. It was quite dark by this time, we came back to canal bridge at Chuharkana and the train stopped there for the night.

The Commandant, being hopeless of discharging his load of passengers at Sangla, decided to take us (passengers) to Chichoke Mallian and leave us there to catch a train for Lahore or Jarranwala. We agreed but on reaching Chichoki Mallian it was found that all train service to Lahore had already stopped. At that very station, it is said, a telegram was received from Sangla to the effect that the railway station there was on fire. I did not see the telegram. Our train with all its live load moved to Bahalike again, and went beyond it to the bridge, we had visited on the previous evening. Here we noticed another train from Lyallpur, with a military escort and railway repairing staff, had arrived on the scene and repaired the remaining portions of the line up to the place we had left the night before.

Cordial greetings between the two trains and both moved down to Bahalike, where they stood for some time and then our train left for Sangla and the other for Chuharkana. Our train on her way to Sangla repaired telegraph wires wherever they had been smashed. We noticed that stations at Dhabhansingh and Moman had suffered a fate similar to Chuharkana. We reached Sangla at about 5 P.M. and were glad to find the station intact, but it was in military possession. We were ordered to detrain at this place and so all the passengers left the armoured train, after a close on 32 hours sojourn in it.

We all were thankful to the Commandant for the great indulgence shown by him, towards us during all

this tiresome journey when he had to perform the double duty of protecting passengers and the line.

SANGLA TO LYALLPUR.

At Sangla we waited up to about 11 P.M. to catch the Down train. Our anxiety all the time was, whether the train would reach Sangla at all, but she did come and we reached Lyallpur at about 1-30 A.M. on 18th, April. The station was in military possession. We heard there that stacks of Bhusa were on fire. We slept in the small hours of the morning and woke to find that we were in Martial Law area.

Babu DEWAN CHAND, Sub-Permanent Way Inspector, North-Western Railway, Lyallpur.

On the 14th the rioters took away forcibly tools from gang No. 8 near Chuharkana and uprooted the line. This Sub-Way Inspector was near at hand, but had to run away as the mob threatened to burn his trolly and throw the rest into the canal. A troop special bound for Lahore appeared in sight and Dewan Chand forthwith returned and under its protection repaired the line—thus enabling the troop special to continue its journey.

The crowd gathered again late in the evening—a train bound for Lyallpur arrived—rioters having overpowered the Station Master compelled all the passengers to alight. The rioters set fire to the station and attempted to treat the train similarly. The rioters then moved in the direction of Sangla Hill cutting telegraph wires, uprooting the line, setting fire to the bridge timbers, breaking signal wires and discs and platform lamps and firing the stations as they went along Bahalike station.

Khan DURAN KHAN, Honorary Civil Judge and Vice-President, Notified Area Committee, Sangla Hill, Sheikhupura.

In the beginning of March a *Brahmachari* from the Kangri Gurukul came to Sangla. He wore yellow clothes. He preached in the Thakurdwara and the Sanatan Dharm School, which is opposite my house. I often saw him. I asked Girdhari Lal, member of the Committee who was manager of the school who he was; he said he was a religious preacher. Hence I had no suspicion of him. At the end of March it was known that there was to be general *hartal* on the 30th March. Some Hindu and Muhammadan shop-keepers told me that they were being urged to keep the *hartal* and the Secretary of the Arya Samaj, Sohan Lal, was particularly active in urging *hartal*. They said they were going to keep *hartal* as Government was about to pass the Rowlatt Act, in accordance with which permission would have to be obtained from Government for marriages, and not more than five people would be allowed to assemble for a funeral or a marriage, and Government would fix a share of the income and take it from zamindars and shop-keepers. I told them that this was quite wrong. I had a copy of the Rowlatt Act and there was no mention of this in it. I specially urged the Muhammadans not to join the movement. There was no *hartal* on the 30th March despite their efforts.

On 6th April there were again rumours of a *hartal* but it did not take place.

On the 10th I and other Honorary Magistrates and Members went to Gujranwala for the Durbar. On the evening of the 12th news of the *hartal* on that day came from Sangla and we were ordered to return.

I and the Sub-Divisional Officer and others started on the morning of 13th but had to stay in Shahdara as no train went to Sangla that day. In the evening a train came and I reached Sangla at 1 A.M. on the night of the 13th-14th. There were 300 or 400 people crowding the platform crying "*Hindu-Mussulman ki jai.*" One Dr. Amir Chand of Lyallpur, who had come by the same train as I had, went among the crowd and told them that he had come from Amritsar and the European troops had seized the girls of the Kairon girls school and disgraced them. The Hindus and Muhammadans had united there; what were they doing? Sohan Lal told him that Hindus and Muhammadans had united; a few men were opposing but they would come round. Then the people saw me. The train started and Amir Chand got into it. The people went off to the town shouting "*Hindu-Mussalman ki jai,*" "*Gandhi ki jai,*" I went home.

On the 11th about 4 P.M. it was rumoured that the line had been broken at Gujranwala and the Calcutta Mail would come round by Sangla. I went and asked the station master and he said it was so. I told him to let me know when it was arriving. A duststorm sprang up and at that time the station master sent word that the train had come. This was about 6 P.M. When I reached the station the train had left the platform. The station master and some constables told me that people had thrown stones at the train. I asked who had done it; they said it was mostly boys but there were some men among them, but owing to the duststorm they could not identify anyone. There was a large crowd of the towns-people standing outside the railway fencing. I told them that it was wrong to behave thus; they said boys had done it. I told the station master to keep his staff in control and not let out the news if any other train came that way. At 9 P.M. he sent me word that the Bombay Mail was coming that way and I should go to the station. About 10 P.M. the mail arrived. The station was closed and people not allowed in. I was there.

On the morning of the 15th about 8 or 9 A.M. a special came from Lyallpur which was to go to Lahore. It was a troop train, perhaps the 28th Punjabis. On the pretext of giving them water and selling sweetmeats a lot of people came on to the platform. The train stopped more than half an hour there. After the departure of the train it was said that the soldiers had said that the whole world was awake, the people of Sangla were asleep; they should awake and do something. After that the town got excited and people collected in groups of 30 to 50.

On the evening of the 15th the station master sent me a note about 8 P.M. to come quickly to the station as Chuharkana Station had been burnt. I went and took my servants and the men who were with me. I sent my servants and the station staff to make it known in the bazar that if anyone came to the station they would be fired at as Government had given permission. About 11 P.M. I was standing in the station verandah when the station master told me the wires had been cut on the Lyallpur side. About 1 A.M. he said that the wires had been cut on the Wazirabad side also. He said that he could get no answer on the Lahore side though the wire did not seem to have been cut. A shuttle train arrived from Wazirabad. The Hon'ble Mehdi Shah was in it. He was going to Lyallpur by road as the Deputy Commissioner had sent for him. I told him to ask Mr. deMontmorency to send us assistance as none was obtainable from Gujranwala or Lahore.

About 9 A.M. on the 16th a train came from Lyallpur while the station master and I were repairing the wires about a mile on the Lyallpur side of the station. The

Khan DURAN KHAN—*concluded*—MUNSHI ABDUL KADIR—Mr. R. C. CHOPRA.

train stopped by us. Mr. Bhola Nath, Assistant Traffic Superintendent and Mr. DeSouza, Railway Sub-Divisional Officer asked for news. I told them that there was danger and that 30 or 40 soldiers would suffice. They left the train there and returned on the engine to Lyallpur. About 3 P.M. Mr. August arrived in a special with 30 soldiers. Mr. Wale Telegraph Master and others were with him. Guards were set. I got leave to go home to say my prayers. About 15 minutes later there was an uproar. A woman on the road said a Sikh had killed a European. I ran back and saw a Sikh had hold of Mr. Wale by the arm. Mr. Wale was dragging him towards the station from the post office and he was hitting Mr. Wale on the head with a stick from behind. They got to a wire and Mr. Wale jumped it and the Sikh remained behind. Mr. Wale drew a pistol and fired three shots. The Sikh fell. Mr. Wale was bleeding and all his clothes were stained with blood. Mr. August and the soldiers ran up and took Mr. Wale and told me to catch the *badmash* who ran off wounded to the bazar. I followed him and found him lying down on a *charpoy* and a large crowd of 300 or 400 around. He said he was done for but he had done for one of them (*mera kam hogaya lekin ek ka kam mainne bhi kardiya*). The police came and he was taken to hospital.

I stayed the night at the station. It was proclaimed that no one should come to the side of the station or they would be fired on. About 1-30 A.M. 175 Gurkhas arrived by special from Wazirabad side; they were for Bahalike and Chuharkana. They stopped the night at Sangla as Mr. August said the line was broken.

After this there was no further disturbance.

On my return from Gujranwala I had heard that the car of Mr. Picken the missionary had been stoned.

The people were much excited and if the troops had not arrived things would have been beyond control.

MUNSHI ABDUL KADIR, Permanent-Way Inspector, North-Western Railway, Lyallpur.

I was Permanent Way Inspector in charge of section Lyallpur to Churharkana *vid* Sangla on 15th April 1919. I received a telegram at about 3 P.M. from my Assistant B. Dewan Chand, Sub-Permanent Way Inspector, that a mob was uprooting the line and burning bridges. I left Lyallpur by the passenger train leaving about 4 P.M. with instructions from Mr. August, Deputy Traffic Superintendent, that the passenger train should not proceed beyond Sangla Hill Station without my being sure that the line was safe. On arrival at Sangla Hill, I asked the help of Railway and District Police, but could not have any. I requested the Honorary Magistrate, Khan Duran Khan, for any sort of armed help, but he also had none and supplied me two men unarmed. I took those men and my other Assistant, Mohammad Jamil, on my trolly and started for Moman Station. At about 8 P.M. on arrival there I reported by wire that the line up to Moman was safe and trollied on to Dhaban Singh, giving instructions to my gangmen to hide their tools so that the people may not snatch them from them and damage the line with them. On arrival at Dhaban Singh I found everything in tact and wired the same to my officers, but the Station Master told me that telegraph instruments on both sides were not working, therefore he was not able to send through my message when ready to start for Bhaliki. I found a big flame of light on one of the bridges. The passengers who got down at Chuharkana by Lahore passenger train came walking and informed me that I should not proceed any further as the people were uprooting the line and burning bridges, and that they have also burnt the Chuharkana Station and damaged the train standing there. I did not go any further but sent my Jemadar to go in the disguise of a foot passenger and see what was being done. On his return he corroborated the statement of foot passengers, and told me that the mob was coming this side. Being unarmed I could take no precaution to stop them. When I actually heard their noise quite close to station (Dhaban Singh) I trollied back to Moman, and found that station was in flames. On my questioning the Station Master he told me that after I had just passed the station a mob of about 60—70 men came and burned the station, and they have gone to Sangla to attack that station. After hiding my trolly I with others walked on the line and found many marks on line, *i.e.*, sleepers hatched with axe, gradient and mile-posts broken. I found the Telegraph wire also cut near Baroa village. On arrival at Sangla in the morning of the 16th, I found that the station had not been attacked, but the telegraph wires from all three sides were cut. I trollied to Salarwala Station and wired my report to Lyallpur and returned to Sangla with the Wazirabad train. Sub-Divisional Officer No. 1 Railway, Mr. F. J. DeSouza and Lala Bhola Nath, Assistant District Traffic Superintendent, also came by the same train and we all had a council of war as to what should be done to protect Sangla, as the feelings of the people were very much excited, and we expected the station to be attacked at any moment. We agreed that the situation could only be controlled if we got an armed force for which Assistant District Traffic Superintendent wired to Lyallpur District Traffic Superintendent. Mr. August, Mr. Pushkar Lal, Executive Engineer, with Mr. Wale, Telegraph Inspector, and 30 Indian troops came by special train and were posted by Mr. August District Traffic Superintendent, where he thought fit. Mr. Wale, Telegraph Inspector, went to Post Office to see the telegraph instruments there and was attacked by a Sikh with a stick and came running on to station, with all his face and hand wounded. The local doctor was at once called, and with the help of Mr. August, Mr. Pushkar Lal and Mr. DeSouza the wound was dressed and he was sent to Lyallpur in charge of Mr. Pushkar Lal, Executive Engineer, in his reserved carriage by the evening Wazirabad train. Up to about 1 o'clock at night the situation on Sangla Hill Station was very critical, as we had only a handful of troops, but at about 1 A.M. on the 17th morning a Gurkha troops special came from Rawalpindi side and eased the situation. On the 17th morning Gurkha train was started for Chuharkana and under their protection we repaired the line up to the bridge beyond Dhaban Singh, and the line beyond that was repaired by the armoured train which came from Lahore side. The villagers did not come near us, nor interfered when we were repairing the line under protection of Gurkha troops.

After restoring communication I went back to my headquarters at Lyallpur, which I reached there in the afternoon of 18th April 1919.

Mr. R. C. CHOPRA, Hafizabad.

Before proceeding to the main issue, a little personal explanation may not be out of place. I am an Oxford man and have resided in Europe, mostly in England, for over 13 years. At the outbreak of the war in 1914 I offered my services in the war. Later on I became a member of the Indian Ambulance Corps and was among the City of London men who volunteered to make small arms ammunition at the Royal Arsenal, Woolwich, on week-ends. On my return to India at the end of 1915, I have resided at various places including Hafizabad.

Mr. R. C. CHOPRA. [*Continued.*

My relations hold a good deal of landed and other property in Hafizabad Tahsil, thus, though having no *locus standi*, I may be said to belong to Hafizabad. So far I have taken no part in politics or meetings and my reasons to come forward as a witness now are :—

1. People seem to be demoralized and terror-struck by the martial law regime. (2) They seem to be sullen. (3) A strong feeling of injustice rankles in the hearts of many persons. (4) A cruel wrong has been done and (5) People may be afraid to come forward and tell truth.

For the first two years or so of the war, Gujranwala district supplied a comparatively smaller number of recruits as the then Deputy Commissioner, Mr. W. S. Hamilton, I.C.S., would not use forcible methods to obtain recruits. But with the advent of Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien as Deputy Commissioner, press gang methods were adopted on his first public appearance at Hafizabad. Colonel O'Brien used the words "*main lunga, main lunga, main lunga*" (I will take, I will take, I will take, *viz.*, recruits.) In his time rigorous methods were employed to get recruits and war loans; people were bullied, beaten and coerced, consequently malpractices followed; thus it came to pass that recruits could be purchased like cattle and indeed things came to such a pass that complaints against the high-handed actions of the local Tahsildar with reference to recruiting and war loan found their way into "*Naqqash*"—a defunct Calcutta paper. But the Punjab Government stopped the entry of the paper into the Punjab on the report of Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien.

The Rowlatt Act agitation led to disturbances in Hafizabad also but the one here was confined to breaking of the glass panes of the Tahsil, breaking of railway signal and signal wires of the local station, and a cowardly attack on Lieutenant Tatam, a railway passenger, by the mob composed, if I am correctly informed, of riff-raff. But no serious injury seems to have been done to Lieutenant Tatam.

Hafizabad was quiet and calm after the 15th of April but martial law was suddenly declared on the evening of 19th April, *i.e.*, 4 days after any disturbances. Even after the declaration of martial law, things were not very bad. On the 30th of April, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien paid Hafizabad a visit, and ushered in such a reign of terror as only a person who was present in those days at Hafizabad can realize the stern reality of the thing, but I hope to give some idea of it.

(1) L. Mathra Das, one of the best Tehsildars Hafizabad has had for many a long day, was asked by the Deputy Commissioner to take leave and subsequently transferred.

(2) The local Munsiff also was transferred.

(3) L. Srinath, Zaildar, was relieved of his position.

(4) The officiating Inspector of Police was transferred and the charge of investigations given to Muhammad Khan assisted by a new Sub-Inspector of Police.

(5) Not contented with the superior officials, Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien sent for minor officials, such as the *Moharrirs* to his bungalow and is reported to have used various threats to induce them to give evidence in spite of the plea and prayer of these persons that they were inside the Tahsil on April 15th and consequently could not see what was happening outside.

On the other hand Colonel O'Brien, in company with Lieutenant Tatam visited *mandis* and *Bazars* and arrested a number of persons whom Lieutenant Tatam suspected of being implicated in attack upon him.

2. On the evening of April 30th between 9 and 10 P.M., a proclamation was issued by beat of drum to the following effect :—*Deputy Commissioner ka hukm hai jo paghbandh hai subah sat baje tehsil ki samne hazar hove, jo hazar na hoga goli se mara javega.*" [By order of Deputy Commissioner, every turban-wearer—*i.e.*, adult male—should present himself (to-morrow) morning in front of the Tehsil. If anybody absents himself, he will be shot (or killed) by the bullet.] Henceforth proclamations by beat of drum became a regular feature.

3. On May 1st, a number of respectable persons including Vakils and Chowdhries of *mandi* were arrested. The Deputy Commisssioner left Hafizabad on May 1st or 2nd.

(1) The new Inspector and Sub-Inspectors of Police began their work of collecting evidence and the methods adopted by them to secure evidence, baffle description and a few examples may be cited, (*a*) they would invite people and make them sit all day long in the open and ask them to come again next morning. This process continued almost to the end of martial law days and was repeated now with the people of *mandi* and then with the people of *Bazars* and so on, (*b*) filthy abuse was hurled against the people in addition to threats.

(2) The new military officer at the head of a number of sowars (cavalry) began his bi-daily patrols on *bazars*, roads, etc., and all persons had to salute, standing up, all officers, civil or military.

(3) School children, even of the lowest classes, were required to be present twice a day (8 A.M. and 5 P.M.) at the roll call by this new military officer.

4. I propose to give a short analysis of the nature of evidence obtained to secure convictions. Take first of all the case of the Tehsil staff (*amla*) such as moharrirs on the 15th of April; when assault on the Tehsil was taking place, all moharrirs were ordered by the tehsildar to stand round the treasurer who had some cash with him. As the treasury is *inside* the tehsil and the doors of the Tehsil were bolted, it was physically impossible for these *moharrirs* to see what was happening outside the Tehsil, yet one and all of them have given evidence of what happened outside the Tehsil at that time.

(2) Gobinda and Vaishno swore before the Summary Court that they saw Beliram Kapur (fined Rs. 1,000) inciting people near the railway station on the morning (at about 8 or 9 A.M.) of April 15th. As a matter of fact, Beliram was absent from Hafizabad at that time having gone to Lyallpur. I have taken this case as an example, because in this case the Deputy Commissioner must have noted down particulars of evidence as the accused put in defence a post card written by himself from Lyallpur and bearing postmarks of Lyallpur and Hafizabad of April 14th and 15th respectively; and the public prosecutor L. Bhagirath Mall put the suggestion to the accused "you can get a post card postmarked for 2 or 4 annas" and the answer of the accused was "I will give you Rs. 1,000 if you will get one for me similarly postmarked."

(3) Prosecution witness Ladha Singh retracted his police version before the Summary Court, because he said he was coerced by the police into giving false evidence. He was immediately handcuffed by the order of the Deputy Commissioner and thrown in *hawalat* (Jail). He was taken several times before the Deputy Commissioner who pressed him to keep to his police version, but he stuck to his guns. After remaining in *hawalat* he was released next morning at about 5 A.M.

(4) Dhobi (washerman) another prosecution witness who after giving evidence against several persons stopped at the name of L. Arud Chand and said that not the Chowdhri Arud Chand but another person by name of Arud Chand was meant by him in his police version, was also arrested by the order of the Deputy Commissioner and thrown into *hawalat* but released next day.

5. For two or three days L. Gopal Dass Ahluwalia was pressed by the police to give evidence against the Vakils (L. Gurdas Ram and L. Shiv Ram) but he refused to be a party to false witness. He was arrested on May 16th on the evidence of Gobinda and Kushalya Gosain and was subsequently fined Rs. 1,000 by the Summary Court.

6. The accused were kept ignorant of the charges against them and could not properly defend themselves. Some of them (*e.g.*, Beliram) do not even now know the guilt for which they were punished.

Now a few examples of a different kind may be given to show the electric condition of the atmosphere in martial law days.

Mr. R. C. CHOPRA—*concluded*—Mr. V. W. SMITH.

1. Karam Singh; after his acquittal by the Martial Law Commission at Lahore, betook himself to Hardwar or Jammu as he considered himself free after acquittal. During his absence another charge was brought against him; his property along with the property of his widowed mother and minor brothers was locked up by the authorities; subsequently he was fined Rs. 150.

2. Bhagwan Singh Khanna and had the list of their property taken in anticipation of forfeiture before they were sent up before the Martial Law Commission at Lahore. Both of them were subsequently acquitted.

3. Hiranand Kapur was arrested on June 8th and taken to Wazirabad by the next day train and placed before the Deputy Commissioner who was at Wazirabad on that day. The Deputy Commissioner made Hiranand write his resignation of the post of *moharrir*, Judicial, whilst both hands were handcuffed. He was then released without any evidence (Prosecution or Defence) being taken.

4. Humiliation of the people, especially by the Deputy Commissioner.

5. Colonel O'Brien issued an order through the local Tehsil that the land revenue (mamla) must be paid within a certain date, otherwise proceedings will be taken under martial law.

Thus from the account given above, which can be easily corroborated, it follows that there must have been some ulterior motive in the declaration of martial law at Hafizabad if we bear in mind that it was declared more than four days after any disturbance and that its rigorous use was not enforced till 11 days later. The consequences have been serious; estrangement between the rulers and the people, loss in British sense of justice, have been some of the obvious consequences. Moreover, some quite innocent persons have been punished, thus though it is a public property at Hafizabad that Karam Chand and Hari Singh were *not* present at Hafizabad on the 14th and 15th of April, yet one was sentenced to death and the other to transportation for life, whilst about Summary Courts the least said the better.

Mr. V. W. SMITH, Superintendent of Police, Lyallpur.

Was transferred to Lyallpur on the 1st April 1919. Had previous experience of the district, having worked there as Assistant Superintendent of Police and officiating Superintendent of Police for about 18 months. A district liable to be affected by political movements, as its colonists are drawn from almost every district in the province (*e.g.*, the unrest of 1907 and the Rikabganj agitation of 1913). District Congress Committee formed early in 1919 began to agitate over the Rowlatt Act and thereby largely increased its membership. Organised a public meeting on the 5th April which resulted in a *hartal* on the following day. *Hartal* completely successful. Another public meeting in the evening. Proceedings orderly on both occasions, though some of the speeches were strongly worded. No further open agitation until the 12th, when the question of a renewed *hartal* was taken up by the Congress Committee. Active propaganda and misrepresentation. *Hartal* arranged for the 13th, a Sunday and the Baisakhi day. Crowds begin to collect in the *bazars* and by evening the demeanour of the people distinctly restless and unruly. Much fraternisation of Hindus and Muhammadans. Proposal for another meeting unfavourably received by the Deputy Commissioner. Patrolled town with Deputy Commissioner in the evening and met with a hostile reception. Objectionable notices found posted up. Mobs collected and coerced shopkeepers, who had opened their shops. Some minor damage done. Police and Magistrate induce crowds to disperse. Excitement subsided by 10 P.M. Deputy Commissioner sent out to neighbouring cavalry farms for assistance and decided to utilise for night patrols camel sarwans mobilised at Lyallpur. Well disposed zamindars also requested to bring in mounted patrols for same purpose. Orders issued for protection of railway line by voluntary *thikri pahra*. Arrangements made to have a more open show of police. Armed guard posted at centre of town on following morning. All liquor shops closed. Some pleaders and petition-writers go on strike. Sedulous efforts made to cause a strike in civil offices. Sikh public agitated by false rumours imported from Amritsar. Attempts made to hold another public meeting frustrated. Idgah finally selected for the purpose. Meeting attended by all sects and classes. Violent speeches expected, but action taken by Deputy Commissioner resulted in orderly proceedings. European residents concentrated and prepared to place themselves in a state of defence. Continued *hartal* on the 15th, but shops began to open in the evening. Excitement, however, not abated and more objectionable and seditious notices posted up. Temporary collapse of *hartal*, but the situation became worse when the news arrived of the outrage at Chuharkana and the spreading of the infection down the line. Military assistance arrived, but was partially diverted to save Sangla. This was the turning point: had Sangla been burnt serious damage would have been done in the Lyallpur District and the restoration of normal conditions would have been correspondingly more difficult. Meanwhile situation acute at Lyallpur. Exits of town strongly picketted by police on following morning. Renewed *hartal* and much excitement. More objectionable notices. Military reinforcements arrived. *Badmash* element, encouraged by the successes of the mobs at Chuharkana, etc., emerged from the City and did damage further up the line. Telegraph wires cut. Stacks of *bhusa* burnt at night by incendiaries. Voluntary patrols sent out as additional protection. *Hartal* definitely abandoned on following day. Moveable column arrived.

Agitation not confined to Lyallpur. All the important grain-markets affected in greater or less degree. No serious agitation at Jaranwala until the 13th April. Public meeting followed by *hartal* on the 14th. Muhammadan asked to preside at the meeting, which was held in a Hindu place of worship. Some features of the *hartal* openly seditious. At Gojra agitation was successfully combated until the 14th, when a Hindu meeting was followed by a joint Hindu-Muhammadan gathering in the Idgah, presided over by a Muhammadan Municipal Commissioner. *Hartal* decided on. Missionary compelled by ugly rumours to leave Gojra. Complete and coercive *hartal* on the two following days.

Crowd unruly and decidedly *anti*-British. Demonstrations with black flag. Toba Tek Singh, Tandlianwala and Dijkot also affected by the agitation.

Since the beginning of the agitation the most alarming rumours had been current in the villages, particularly in the neighbourhood of Lyallpur. Distorted ideas of the intentions of the new Act, most of them agrarian and social in their application. Partly the result of the agitation in Lyallpur itself, partly imported by colonists returning from other districts. Excitement and disaffection particularly marked in Amritsar Sikh villages. Unlawful assembly of Sikh villagers at Kiala Kalan on the 17th April. Intention to prepare plans for an attack on Lyallpur. Canal wire cut at Jahangir, another Amritsar Sikh village. Conspiracy at Chak 150 G. B. on the 18th results in an unsuccessful attempt to dismantle the railway line. Culprits followed to their village by police and arrested.

The original intention of the promoters of the *hartal* was apparently to defeat, and thereby discredit, Government. So far there was a common and united purpose, and a widespread organization. The movement was in its inception *anti*-official and *anti*-Government, but not *anti*-British. The atmosphere thereby created, however, was favourable to the growth of racial hatred, which

Mr. V. W. SMITH—*concluded*—PANDIT AVATAR KISHEN KAUL—Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

immediately made its appearance when news arrived of the riots and murders at Lahore and Amritsar, and the further excesses at Kasur. From the 13th onward the feeling in the *bazars* was one of hatred of the white man.

The pleader community, which formed the majority of the Congress Committee, was most active in organising the *hartal* and in misrepresenting the Rowlatt Act, but it was the petty shopkeeper and the lower class Hindu who were carried away with themselves and indulged in excesses. The movement in its more undesirable aspects was almost entirely Hindu Only a few Muhammadans allowed themselves to be involved. Most of the promoters were Arya Samajists or Hindus and Sikh with Arya leanings.

Proclamation of Martial Law was a precautionary measure. It gave the power to deal promptly with any further trouble which might arise, and ensured a speedy return to normal conditions. It was only enforced at headquarters and did not interfere with the liberties of the general public except in the matter of travelling by rail.

PANDIT AVATAR KISHEN KAUL, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Lyallpur.

1. *Hartal* and agitation against the Rowlatt Act started by the District Congress Committee.

2. *Hartal* was used to force the hands of Government to repeal the Act.

3. *Hartal* did not appear entirely voluntary: undue influence and coercion—

(*a*) Some shopkeepers expressed fear of boycotting and ill-treatment if they did not join and continue in the strike.

(*b*) Shops were being opened one evening when crowds turned out and commenced looting and making matters unpleasant. This resulted in the closing of such shops at once.

(*c*) Witnesses from Gojra stated they were threatened by the mob and had to close their shops.

(*d*) Heard Amira, *halvai*, was forced to close his shop

4. After the 13th April, the people were told all kinds of rumours. The city was restless—

(*a*) Prohibitory order about Gandhi, Amritsar riots, firing at Delhi and Lahore, Jallianwala shooting made Lyallpur excited.

(*b*) Kairon girls' story and the bombing of the Golden Temple were mainly used to incite the people—so I was told.

(*c*) Other rumours circulated were: Mutiny of a regiment; of another regiment having gone to Amritsar; railway strike at Khanewal and all over the line.

5. People were after this *anti*-British and wanted to embarrass the Government—

(*a*) Attack on Wale, Inspector, Telegraphs, at Sangla without any provocation.

(*b*) Poster to outrage European women in revenge of the Kairon girls.

(*c*) Insult offered to Messrs. deMontmorency and Smith.

(*d*) Cutting of communications.

(*e*) Damage to Government property—

(*i*) fire set to Government *bhusa*.

(*ii*) damage to Sangla Hill military station—people removed all goods from the railway goods shed.

6. Loss of official influence over the people—

(*a*) Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police insulted.

(*b*) Leaders supposed to be siding with Government were not listened to.

(*c*) Contradiction of rumours *re* arrest of Gandhi in *Civil and Military Gazette* not believed, as it was considered a Government organ.

(*d*) Holding of 'Idgah meeting in defiance of Deputy Commissioner's orders and especially when permission had been taken for the meeting of the 6th April.

7. Was in charge of War Loan, Lyallpur town. No complaints made about compulsion.

8. Patrolling considered necessary at night by Deputy Commissioner.

9. Troops sent to Sangla to save the station.

10. No complaints made about recruiting to me.

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat.

1.

The predisposing causes of the unrest are hard to trace, because they do not appear to be local. There are no prominent political organisations in the district. The most important is the Arya Samaj which has branches in the district, but except at Jalalpur-Jattan it has not shown itself active in the district as a body. Some of its members have been concerned individually. The Musalman organisations have done nothing. The district has no history of political organisation and there is no one in the district (except Muhammad Habib, interned at Jalalpur-Jattan) who has hitherto been classed as an agitator. There is no newspaper in the district, except the *Sufi* which up to recently has not written about politics. But the eastern half of the district is a congested tract of small holdings, and a very large number of men from the district are in Government service of various kinds and in private service. The men of the district are adventurous. Many go to Hong Kong and the East in the Police. A large number travel to Australia and other places as traders. A large number trade regularly in Central India as pedlars. In Gujrat City there is a small number of men who have trade relations in cloth, sugar, etc., with Bombay and Karachi.

In all these ways the men of the district are in touch with affairs elsewhere, but looking back at the disturbances it cannot be said that political influence has been brought to bear through any of these channels. It is fairly certain, though it cannot be proved, that some traders were influenced by a threat of boycott which has been found elsewhere, and some pleaders were influenced by their friends elsewhere, particularly in Gujranwala and Sialkot, who urged active participation in the movement. Ordinarily the Bar at Gujrat as a whole has not shown any political activity or been guilty of any objectionable conduct, though as in other places they take more interest than the rest of the town in politics.

2.

With regard to the immediate causes no trace of political agitation is seen in Gujrat before the 6th April. On or about that day it is alleged that a shopkeeper received messages from friends in Amritsar urging him and his friends to have shops closed and threatening to boycott them if they would not. However, these efforts failed and no *hartal* was observed. Between the 6th and 14th April the apathy of Gujrat in the passive resistance movement began to be the subject of comment.

A pleader visited Sialkot and came back with an account of the bitter reproaches he had suffered from the members of the Sialkot Bar. On the 11th or 12th a barrister returned from Lahore and gave a highly coloured account of happenings there to certain members of the bar, including an account of the Badshahi mosque affair at which he implied that he was present.

Early on the morning of the 14th April two inflammatory notices were found posted in the city, possibly written by students, saying they were seven men from Amritsar. The notices said there would be a mutiny at 8 in the evening on the 15th April, in which English and Christians would be killed: Musalmans and Hindus should unite as in Amritsar: the English should look to themselves.

3.

NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

The following account shows what disturbances took place at various places in the Gujrat District:—

Gujrat.

The following quotation from a report sent in at the time by the Superintendent of Police shows what happened. "The very first incident was the discovery of two manuscript notices in the *bazar* inciting to mutiny, but these were seen by few people and apparently caused no excitement. At about 2 A.M. on the morning of 14th April a band of Baisakhi revellers returned from Wazirabad shouting "Gandhi ki jai, Muhammad Ali ki jai, Shaukat Ali ki jai," but they immediately dispersed to their homes.

There was no disturbance or general excitement of any kind up to 10 o'clock on the morning of 14th April. On that morning I saw several of the leading men at the request of the Deputy Commissioner who was in camp, and they all assured me that there was no likelihood of any closing of shops or other demonstrations in Gujrat. About 10 A.M. the shops suddenly began to close without warning and in a very short time practically every shop was closed. On hearing this I issued orders for an armed guard of 20 Constables and two Head Constables to be sent to the City Police Station and after a brief consultation with the senior sub-judge and Shahzada Muhammad Yusaf, Honorary Magistrate, I proceeded with the latter to the *bazar*. I addressed a crowd of shopkeepers in the Shishanwala Bazar, telling them that I should afford protection from any intimidation and advised them not to be coerced by any one into closing their shops. I also asked various Honorary and stipendiary Magistrates to use their influence to check the *hartal*. About 3 P.M. I received a report that a procession had been formed. I ordered another guard of 10 men to the city and one of two Head Constables and 20 Foot Constables to be ready for use in the Civil Lines while I proceeded to the City. At this time a thunderstorm came on with heavy rain and by the time I reached the city the ardour of the crowd was cooling. They were standing in the Chauk with a black flag and presently they broke up. At 5 P.M. the Deputy Commissioner returned by train and shortly after he and I went through the City and found another crowd collected, consisting mostly of boys and loafers uttering cries of lamentations. The Deputy Commissioner spoke a few words to them about the Rowlatt Bill to which they listened, but they did not disperse. We decided to send for some troops as a precautionary measure and at 4 A.M. next morning two platoons of the 37th Dogras, consisting of 70 rank and file, arrived from Jhelum under a British officer.

The Deputy Commissioner ordered all Municipal Commissioners to arrange for *thikri pahra* in their wards and the night passed quietly. Next morning, 15th April, the shops were still closed and at about 7-30 A.M., a crowd, mostly youths, collected at the Shishanwala Gate with a black flag and a picture of Gandhi. The crowd was more excitable than that of the previous day.

The Police were now distributed according to the local alarm orders, *i.e.*, a piquet of 20 men at the Jail, and 20 in the Superintendent of Police's compound ready to take up its position between his bungalow and the Mission houses, 20 in the Lines and remainder (some 15 rank and file) in the City Thana as a mobile force.

At 10 A.M. a conference was held by the Deputy Commissioner with the Magistrates and leading men of the City, and it was decided that efforts should at present be directed towards bringing the crowd to reason and getting shops open, trying to find out who were the ring-leaders and preventing schoolboys, through their masters and parents, from joining the crowd. Half an hour later the crowd went to the Mission High School and compelled it to close. They threw brick-bats, breaking some windows and doors and damaging some furniture. They also assaulted one or two of the masters. They then went to the Zamindara School and the Government High School, but these closed before their arrival and no disturbance occurred. Subsequently the crowd disappeared.

At about 4 P.M. it was observed emerging from the Kabuli Gate from where it proceeded to the Shrine of Shah Hussain near by and halted. Presently it moved off in the direction of the railway station. On receiving intimation the Senior Sub-Judge and the Deputy Superintendent followed it up and accompanied it, ordering the mobile force from the City Police Station to follow. On reaching the railway station the crowd immediately swarmed into it and began destroying the telegraph and telephone instruments and furniture and setting fire to records. The senior sub-judge gave the order to fire and the Police opened independent fire, the crowd being too scattered to admit of a volley. A few shots were sufficient to disperse them and seven arrests were made on the spot. The Police and the Magistrates promptly extinguished the fire which had been started among the records in the Booking Office. On receiving the news in the Civil Station the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police proceeded to the station, ordering the troops, which were quartered in the Zail Sarai between the Civil Station and the City, to follow. By the time the troops arrived everything was quiet, but they were marched through the City by way of a demonstration. A Police guard was placed on the station and sentries were posted in the Civil Station from the picquet there. One hundred more troops were wired for and at midnight three platoons, comprising 120 men and three British officers, arrived from Lala Musa. The night passed quietly, *thikri pahra* being carried out as before, strengthened by a small force of Military pensioners from the surrounding villages.

On the morning of the 16th notices were issued under the Police Act prohibiting meetings and processions without licence in connection with the Rowlatt Bill and the restriction of Gandhi. The Police being now relieved of Military duties were strongly posted unarmed in the City to enforce order and practically all shops opened, confidence being largely restored.

Jalalpur Jattan.

A meeting to arrange for a *hartal* or closing of shops was held on the evening of 14th and shops began to close on the 15th and a crowd paraded through the town with the usual shouts about Gandhi and the Rowlatt Bill.

The crowd made other shopkeepers close, but committed no acts of violence. They were watched by the Police of the Police Station, and two Magistrates who had been sent from Gujrat and 10 sowars lent by the Commandant of the Temporary Remount Depôt at Gujrat also arrived under the command of Lieutenant Batchelor, Assistant Commandant, and patrolled the town. But this evening the most serious offence com-

mitted at Jalalpur occurred, as two men cut the telegraph wire at two places.

On the 16th April, the crowd gathered again and shops were again closed. Some members of the Municipal Committee and other leading men gathered at the Municipal Hall to discuss how to stop the trouble, but the crowd entered the Hall and made a disturbance. They insisted on the members of the Municipal Committee mourning with them by knocking off their *pagris* forcibly and damaged the furniture of the Hall (but the cost of the damage is reported to be only Rs. 18). The crowd then proceeded to break some windows of the Mission School and went on further, taking the funeral of the local Sanitary Inspector who had not joined them to the house of the headmaster of the Mission School and also made some Police Constables take off their *pagris*. The Sub-Inspector called back his Police force and picketted it at suitable places. Meanwhile, the two Magistrates and respectable people had been making efforts to quieten the crowd and thanks to these and to the firm attitude taken by Dr. H. M. Newton of the Church of Scotland Mission Hospital, the crowd made no further disturbance, though the bolder spirits are reported to have said they ought to have attacked the Police Station and Dr. Newton's bungalow. Meantime news had arrived that the crowd at Gujrat had been fired on, and this helped to make the crowd disperse.

On the 17th the shops gradually opened and the crowd did not collect again. The sowars were replaced by an additional force of Police and later by a guard of Dogras and there was no further disturbance in the town, though two men from Jalalpur were subsequently found to be making seditious speeches at Suk and Gujrat.

Malakwal.

The predisposing causes here are different because Malakwal is a large railway junction in a thinly populated agricultural tract. Malakwal itself is a fairly large village about a mile from the railway station and the men are Musalman Khokar. Round the railway station has sprung up a *bazar* largely depended on the railway staff for its prosperity. In this *bazar* and on the railway premises is a large colony of railway employees of all departments—traffic, locomotive and engineering. For some time past the railway staff has been discontented and a strike was being arranged. Moreover, the signallers had been getting news on their instruments of events in other places. It cannot be said on the material available here whether the political agitators had any hand in the railway strike. After a meeting it was decided to hold a meeting next day in the large mosque and to make a *hartal* in the *bazar*, and that the railway strike should be brought to a head by stopping work. Accordingly a number of people, mostly railway employees, came to the station to call off the men on duty ; this was because some of the men off duty did not want the odium of refusing to go on duty when their turn came. When the crowd got to the station they were turned back by the troops who had already arrived and up to that stage their proceedings did not constitute a riot. As the crowd was going away a messenger boy came to inform a guard living in one of the quarters that it was his turn for duty ; the crowd tore up the call book. The boy went and fetched another and the crowd this time burnt the book and assaulted the boy. The crowd then dispersed or at any rate made no definite disturbance, though the European and Eurasian staff were much alarmed at the demeanour of the crowd, and had collected in one house. It appears that some of the men did strike by leaving their duty.

Next day, the 16th April, a meeting was held in the mosque at which Hindus also attended, but no definite result was attained, because the shopkeepers complained that though they had closed their shops the railway staff had not carried out their strike. At this meeting one Raja Ram, a goldsmith by caste and an *ex*-student of the D. A. V. College at Lahore had been speaking. He had also spoken at the meeting at the dharmsala on the previous evening. He had seen Sarwar at the meeting and thought him a likely man to join in some definite action and during the day Raja Ram busied himself in arranging the definite step of cutting the telegraph wires, and taking up a section of the rails. The volunteers he got were partly his own friends and relations, partly some of the locomotive people who were inclined for mischief, and partly the Maulvi of the mosque who offered the services of his four students. It is not proved that the suggestion of this crime was made at either of the two meetings, but it seems that Raja Ram had got the idea from knowledge of what had been done elsewhere. It is also not clear whether any other had been asked to join and had refused. However, in the evening one party under Raja Ram went out first, took the burners off the distant signal, and cut all the telegraph wires about 21·0 hours. Finding that the other party who had promised to take up the rails had not come, they started back, but on the way heard a whistle which informed them that the other party was coming. This other party was headed by Sarwar who had brought ten men, but six of them turned back on learning what they were to do. The rest with Sarwar and Raja Ram's party then took up a section of rail (24 feet long), sleepers and all, and pushed it down the embankment out of sight of a coming train. Ten men were concerned in this deliberate crime, and later experiment has proved that this number was enough to remove the rails. On the way back they were challenged by a British officer and a sentry, but said they were looking for a lost buffalo and were allowed to pass. The interruption in the telegraph was known to one of the signallers in the Malakwal station at 21·30 and he sent a message to the linesman, but did not inform the Assistant Station Master on duty or the signaller who relieved him, otherwise the action might have been taken in time. Next morning, 17th April, at 6-50 A.M. 34-Down train, which had been detained some time at Haria, was allowed to proceed at caution without line clear, and it was derailed at the gap. Damage was done to stock and two lives were lost.

The European and Eurasian staff were alarmed on 15th April and gathered at the house of the Sub-Divisional Officer, but as a force of 60 Indian infantry and one British officer arrived that evening they were adequately protected. It was, however, considered advisable to remove a party of 12 women and three children who left Malakwal on the evening of the 16th April for Jhelum and returned on the evening of the 22nd April.

Kunjah.

In Kunjah on the 15th April there was the beginning of a *hartal*. A drunken mistri succeeded in getting some shopkeepers to close, but some members of the Municipal Committee soon succeeded in getting them open again. The man was convicted and sentenced under section 25 of the Defence of India Rules. The incident shows the difficulty of dealing with political agitation when any respectable man can so readily act at the bidding of such a man.

Rasul.

There was some indiscipline on the 15th and 16th April among the students of the Engineering College. They refused to attend lectures and marched round the head-works of the Canal 1½ miles away as a demonstration, but there was no disturbance. On the 16th there was a meeting of Canal officials in the mosque at which Hindus also attended and prayers were offered for unity and for the repeal of the Rowlatt Act. On these days the Principal of the Engineering College was away, but on his return he took disciplinary action by expelling some students, and when the College re-opened he took further precautions against trouble. A force of 20 troops was sent here on the 15th April.

Continued.] M.. H. S. WILLIAMSON.

It is therefore seen that disturbances took place at Gujrat, Jalalpur and Malakwal on the 15th and 16th April. (The cutting of wires and removal of rails at Malakwal was done on the night of the 16th, though the derailment took place on the morning of the 17th). Beyond this, cases were found of the spread of seditious rumours. Three men of Daulatnagar and two of Mangat were punished under the Martial Law proclamation for spreading false rumours.

4.

MILITARY AND CIVIL MEASURES ADOPTED FOR SUPPRESSION OF DISTURBANCES.

On the 14th April the General Officer Commanding, Jhelum, received orders from the General Officer Commanding, 2nd Rawalpindi Division, to send one company with a Lewis gun to Lala Musa, and two platoons with a Lewis gun to Gujrat for the protection of Europeans and Government property. These troops were despatched from Jhelum at 1-21 on the 15th. A force was also sent to Rasul. In the meantime I had returned from tour on the 14th and after consulting with the Superintendent of Police and the Magistrates thought it advisable to ask for troops. Therefore, about 9 P.M., I sent a wire asking for 50 troops to support the Police, and received a reply "sending," Before my arrival on the 14th the Superintendent of Police had wired to the Chief Secretary asking that the General Officer Commanding, Jhelum or Sialkot, might be instructed to send troops on requisition as troubie was feared.

A force of 70 men of the 37th Dogras under a British officer arrived in the early morning of the 15th. They were put in the *zailghar* in reserve as there seemed no immediate need for using them. Moreover, the men had no rations and it took some time before food could be supplied, because the shops were closed. In fact, it was almost midday when they got their food. The troops were then kept where they were, because of the strong representation of the officer in command that he wished to keep his men together. Otherwise it is now clear after the event that it would have been better to relieve the Police by armed troops at once and let the Police perform their ordinary duties unarmed. When the Mission School was damaged by the crowd the troops were called out and marched towards the place, but as the Superintendent of Police and I saw that the crowd had disappeared and at the Government High School were informed that no disturbance had taken place we sent the troops back to have their food. Later we were told the crowd had scattered to get its own food.

At 5-0 P.M. news was brought that the crowd had reformed and had gone towards the railway station followed by a police guard of 20 armed men, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Magistrates who had been appointed to watch the crowd.

Shortly afterwards another message was brought that the crowd had attacked the railway station. I went off with the Superintendent of Police, calling on the troops on the way, but found that the Police had fired under the orders of the senior Magistrate, and dispersed the crowd, of which no trace could be seen. The troops therefore were not needed for action, but were marched through the city and returned to quarters.

As a precaution I wired asking for 100 more troops, and during the night of the 15-16th 120 more troops under two British officers arrived. With this large force now available in addition to the police the city and railway station and Government offices and the civil station were all protected. Later on the force at Gujrat supplied guards at Kathala railway station, the railway bridge over the Bhimbar, and at Jalalpur Jattan. These guards were gradually reduced when it was seen that no further disturbance was to be feared, and at present (the end of June) there is a force of 50 men and two British officers at Gujrat.

The force sent to Lala Musa was originally one company with a Lewis gun under three British officers. The number varied later. On the 25th April it consisted of 50 men and a mobile column of eight sabres and a platoon of infantry. On the 11th May it consisted of a mobile column of 50 infantry and eight cavalry with one British and one Indian officer and 36 infantry at the railway station. A detachment of 14 men at Dinga was also supplied from here. The mobile column was withdrawn at the beginning of June. The troops were not at any time needed to quell disturbances as nothing happened here. A report that disturbances were likely turned out to be nothing more than the noisy exit from the railway station of men returning from the Baisakhi festival.

The force at Malakwal which arrived on the evening of the 15th April consisted of one British officer and two platoons, but was later increased. I have not got details, but at the end of April there were six or seven British officers under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, V.C On the 11th May there were about 150 men and a detachment of 15 men for the Mona Remount Depôt was, I think, supplied from here. The troops at Malakwal were not used at any time to quell actual disturbance. They were at the railway station when the telegraph wires were cut and the section of rails taken up, but this crime was committed by a small gang of men who could not be watched by the troops. The presence of the troops was an adequate precaution against rioting and against further crimes. There is still a small force there.

A force of one Indian officer and 20 men was sent to Rasul on the 15th April on the receipt of news that the students of the Engineering College were threatening to give trouble. The force stayed till the beginning of June.

On the 15th April it was considered advisable to send a force to Jalalpur Jattan, and I borrowed ten horsemen from Lieutenant-Colonel Wikeley, Commandant of the Temporary Remount Depôt at Gujrat. They stayed two days. From the 21st April 12 men under a havildar were kept at Jalalpur. A mobile column of 50 infantry and a few cavalry under a British officer visited Jalalpur on the 20th April and marched through the town to impress the inhabitants. It also visited Kunjah on the 21st. A column also went to Dinga and Pindi Baha-ud-din, but it was not so necessary there as there were detachments already at the railway stations. The General Officer Commanding was prepared to send the mobile column to other places, but I thought it unnecessary as no disturbances were being reported.

Extra civil measures were also adopted for the prevention of disturbance. In Gujrat City, on the night of the 14th April and for some subsequent nights, the ward members were instructed to arrange patrol by house-holders and they were helped by military pensioners from neighbouring villages. On the 16th April I issued orders through Tahsildars that all railway lines should be patrolled by villagers. On the 17th I received a telegram from Government saying that efforts should be made to organise patrols for the protection of railways. I issued orders that every culvert and bridge should have men posted on it according to its size, and that the line between should be patrolled. On the 26th I gave orders similar to those in the Shahpur district that there should be three men to two miles in the day time and to one mile at night, including culverts, but that larger bridges should be guarded separately as before. The men were provided with tickets showing their authority and with *khaki* armlets which were ready under the internal security scheme. These armlets are better than the white flags adopted in Gujranwala as they cannot readily be imitated. The patrols were later reduced to two men in each section, and finally taken off on the 24th May. The villagers did the work of patrol without complaint and without friction, and deserve credit. Supervision was entrusted to a few Police, and the zaildars and *sufedposhes*, under the orders of the Tahsildars and Naib-Tahsildars, and Magistrates and Honorary Magistrates. The Police

Mr. H. S. WILLIAMSON—*concluded*—Sardar ASAD JAN.

employed on railway patrolling duty were one Sub-Inspector, eight Head Constables and 30 Constables. When the arrival of troops relieved the Police, extra guards were also sent to the tahsil treasuries. Use was made of the Shahpur armed reserve of one Sub-Inspector, two Head Constables and 25 Constables, which had been ordered here in connection with the Sikh Conference at Dinga, and stayed from the 18th April till the 8th May.

The measures taken appear to have been adequate and successful. After the crime at Malakwal on the 16th which resulted in the derailment on the 17th no further disturbance took place. On the night of the 19th April, a telegram from Government informed me that Martial Law had been extended to Gujrat on the same lines as to Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala. Regulations for its enforcement were issued in a Proclamation by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd Rawalpindi Division, dated 20th April. This was followed by Martial Law Notice No. 9, dated 24th April, signed by Brigadier-General Campbell, Commanding Sialkot Brigade Military Area, announcing that he had been appointed to administer Martial Law in the Gujrat District. Notice No. 10 of the same date provided for the civil patrol of the railway line. I was informed that for the time being other notices would not be issued. On the 25th April, Lieutenant-Colonel L. S. Browne of the 37th Dogras, arrived from Jhelum as administrator of Martial Law. On the 27th, the Commissioner came to discuss matters, and apparently after consulting him the General Officer Commanding, 2nd Rawalpindi Division, informed the General Officer Commanding at Wazirabad, that the Gujrat Area should be dealt with more leniently than in the case of the Lyallpur and Gujranwala Districts, but measures similar to those adopted in other towns should continue to be taken in the towns of Gujrat Lala Musa, Jalalpur and Malakwal. Subsequently other Martial Law notices and instructions were made applicable to the district by Lieutenant-Colonel Browne or by the General Officer Commanding at Wazirabad. I was not consulted in all cases. It was arranged that it was not necessary to publish the notices everywhere, but only in the four towns named. The General Officer Commanding's original proclamation was sent to all Railway and Police stations.

Offences against the proclamation and notices were tried by the Military offices at Gujrat, Lala Musa and Malakwal. The total, as shown in section 9 of this report, comes to 13 persons tried, 11 convicted. Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, on going on service, was relieved by Major Monk on the 8th May.

5.

(*a*) *Instigation.*—Pleaders, traders and cloth merchants were prominent among the promoters of the shop closing. Sarafs both in this and the disturbances.

(*b*) The rioters themselves were composed of the scum of the town, kanjars, loafers and petty shopkeepers, though with a sprinkling of students and better class shopkeepers. The persons sent up for trial in the Gujrat cases were:—13 petty shopkeepers, five big shopkeepers, four students, three tum-tum drivers, two teachers, two members of the Bar, and three miscellaneous. The Arya Samaj did not take a prominent part in the disturbances in Gujrat.

In Jalalpur the leaders were the Arya Samaj and the teacher and manager of the Islamia School.

In Malakwal the ring-leaders were a goldsmith and a Railway engine shed hand.

The rural population was not implicated. They were chiefly concerned with the harvest and showed no signs of sympathy with the movement, except to ask what it was all about. They helped willingly in patrolling the railway line.

Returned emigrants were not found to be taking any share at all.

6.

The movement in this district was disloyal and *anti*-Government, but there were no manifestations of *anti*-British or *anti*-Christian action.

At Suk Kalan, Abdul Rashid and Ahsan Ali of Jalalpur are alleged to have called on the schoolboys to repeat after them a scurrilous couplet to the effect that the King was dead and had '.pawned' his daughter. This only came to light after the original enquiry, and it was not thought advisable to collect evidence about so unseemly a saying. Hence it did not appear on the record of the case.

Though no *anti*-British action was seen, there are two instances of *anti*-British spirit in the wording of the anonymous notices found at Gujrat on the morning of the 14th April, and in the words of Abdul Aziz, accused in the Jalalpur riot, who spoke of an attack on Dr. Newton's house.

It is of course possible that if the unrest had not been checked it would have ended in being *anti*-British. The supervising railway staff at Malakwal were alarmed, and it was thought advisable to send away 12 women and three children for some days, but I cannot find that the crowd at any time was preparing a definite attack on Europeans there or elsewhere.

Sardar ASAD JAN, Senior Sub-Judge, Gujrat.

A.—CAUSES OF THE DISTURBANCES.

In my opinion the speeches in the Council to a great extent were responsible for the late disturbances. The said speeches were reproduced in papers of different provinces and through those the educated community came to know what had happened and through them the masses were informed of the protest of the members of the Council as to the enactment of the Rowlatt Act. Subsequently through mischief-makers and sedition-mongers the object of the introduction of the Bill was interpreted to the public in a different light and such false rumours, which would suit the taste of the masses and which would create panic among them, were spread. The educated community, especially the lawyer class as a whole, became averse to the introduction of the Bill and they through different agencies, say through their agents, Sahukars and other people of importance, tried to agitate against the Bill. They called meetings, decided on organising *hartals*, and on organising open demonstrations against the Bill. The Government instead of nipping the evil in the bud, watched all the activities silently, which emboldened the people more with the result that they came down to unconstitutional methods of agitation. To a certain extent the disturbances can be called the result of organised efforts, but I am not prepared to say that each and every lawyer or Sahukar was concerned in it. The disturbances, in my opinion, were due to a great extent to copying the adjoining districts where something had happened rather than to any actual cause of grievance.

B.—NARRATIVE OF EVENTS AT GUJRAT.

When the news of the *hartals* and demonstrations in Amritsar, Lahore, Gujranwala and Wazirabad towns were spread in this town through letters of traders, through messengers and through some of the members of the Bar of this place, on the morning of the 14th April the *hartal* started from the Station bazar, and in a short time it was extended to the city of Gujrat. A party,

SARDAR ASAD JAN—*concluded*—Sayad FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH.

which consisted of some young *sahukars* of this place, was formed and they went about in the Bazar and asked the shopkeepers to close their shops. The Deputy Commissioner, on the 14th, was out in camp. On hearing this news I went to the city to see things for myself and found that the Bazar was practically closed, except a few bakers' or cobblers' shops. After a short time, there was formed a mob which started going through the Bazar and main streets of Gujrat making the usual lamentations and shouting different sorts of cries. Then, in consultation with the Superintendent of Police, the police were armed and the reserve police were called. As the police were found insufficient to cope with the situations, Military were also requisitioned. This mob went round the city for some time and then a sharp shower of rain dispersed them. After the rain stopped they again collected and started the same sort of demonstrations. The Deputy Commissioner on getting information arrived from camp and he, accompanied by the Superintendent of Police, visited the town and meeting the mob he gave them some advice, but some of the members of the mob remonstrated with him and they would not listen to what he said. About evening the mob dispersed. Suitable arrangements were made for the night which passed off without any occurrence. The following morning the mob collected and it had then grown in number as well as importance on account of the presence of men of better position and of more grown up people than those who had taken part on the previous day. About 8-0 the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police again visited the town and Deputy Commissioner tried to soothe the agitation, but the mob evidently appeared to be more exasperated than the day before. At about 10-0 a meeting of the officials and *raises* of the town was called by the Deputy Commissioner at his house to consider how the situation should be met, and it was there that the news of the attack on the mission school was brought. The meeting then dispersed and we returned to the city. The mob was then found near the Government school, and was proceeding towards the civil lines. Through the persuasions and entreaties of some of those present they however decided to return to the city. They thus kept roaming about till 12-0 and then they dispersed, to collect again in the afternoon. About 4-0 again there was formed a mob superior in its importance and numerical strength to the previous mobs, and it started its usual lamentations. They then started on the circular road and near the place where the road branches off towards the railway station they started on that road. After going for some distance they showed signs of rowdyism and some trouble was apprehended. At this juncture the reserve police guard, which was stationed near the city police station out of the view of the mob for fear of their provocation, was ordered to follow us to the railway station. The mob as soon as it arrived at the railway station rushed inside the building and began to break doors, glass panes, windows, and other furniture. They tried to set fire to the building and actually set fire to the bundle of papers lying in the booking office. They were ordered to desist and disperse, and when they did not do so I ordered the police to fire. As soon as a few shots were fired the mob bolted away in different directions. Some arrests were made and the fire was extinguished. After this occurrence no mob collected again and everything remained quiet in the city.

Except the above occurrence nothing further happened in the city proper and in Gujrat comparatively less mischief was wrought than in the other towns. Considering the condition of Gujrat itself introduction of martial law cannot be considered as an indispensable measure, but having in view the occurrences of neighbouring districts it was a wise step to extend it to this place. It was given as an extra tool in the hands of authorities to use it in time of need. Its introduction no doubt deadened the zeal of mischievous people, and restricted their activities, and curbed some restive lawyers who, before its introduction, did not hesitate in giving vent to their feelings openly.

Sayad FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gujrat.

CAUSES OF DISTURBANCE.

1. *Satyagraha* movements and Gandhi's message, which was widely published in all the vernacular and English newspapers and were read up with great interest to show resentment against the Rowlatt Act, was the general cause in the Province.

2. The cause of disturbance in the Gujrat district was due to the following :—

(*a*) The traders of the Gujrat town had trade relations in cloth, sugar, etc., with Bombay, Karachi, Amritsar and Lahore. They were urged by the Amritsar traders to have their and their friends' shops closed with the threat to boycott them if they would not.

(*b*) Between the 6th and 14th April the feelings of Gujrat in the passive resistance movement began to be the subject of comment.

(*c*) Lala Kirpa Ram, Pleader, visited Sialkot and came back with an account of the bitter reproaches he had suffered from the members of the Sialkot Bar.

(*d*) Mr. Hargopal, Barrister, on 11th or 12th returned from Lahore and gave a highly coloured account of the Shahi mosque affair at Lahore at which he implied that he was present.

(*e*) On 13th April many people went from Gujrat to Wazirabad for Baisakhi festival. Some of them returned by a night train and went from the station to the city shouting "Gandhi ki jai" "Muhammad Ali Shaukat Ali ki jai."

(*f*) On the morning of 14th two inflammatory notices were found posted in the city Bazar. The notices said there would be a mutiny at 8 P.M. on the 15th April in which English and Christians would be killed. Musalmans and Hindus should unite as in Amritsar. The English should look to themselves.

3. Efforts were made by a few traders to effect *hartal* on the 6th April, but with no success.

INCIDENTS.

4. (1) The closing of shops started in the Station Bazar first by the traders on the morning of 14th April and soon after all the shops of the city Bazar were closed or made to close. Consequently it was a regular *hartal* all round in the city.

(2) A little after noon a disorderly mob was formed in the main Bazar and began to parade in the city streets, some of them were wearing black badges and shouting "Rowlatt Bill namanzur," "Gandhi ki jai" till later in the night.

(3) On the morning of 15th mob was again formed and started with black flag and Gandhi's picture at 7 A.M., and artificial funeral was arranged and was taken along with the mob on a *charpai* shouting the words "Ashaq ka janaza zara dhum se nikle." The mob then went to the Mission School and compelled the Head Master to close the school between 10 and 11 A.M. On being refused they threw brickbats breaking some windows, doors and damaging some furniture and also assaulted one or two of the masters. The mob then went towards the Zamindara and Government High Schools, but both of them were closed before their arrival. The mob then returned back to the Shishanwala gate where one Niranjan Das, Pansari, delivered a lecture to present a bold front

Sayad FAIZUL HASSAN SHAH—*concluded*—Mr. V. H. BOALTH.

against the Rowlatt Act and on the Unity of Hindus and Muhammadans, etc.

The report of this incident was brought to the notice of Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police at the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow where all the officers and the leading men of the city were present to hold a conference to devise some suitable prompt preventive measures.

The mob in the meantime began to disperse to their respective houses to have their meals.

The mob in the afternoon again assembled and reached the Shah Hussain shrine where they all unanimously drank the water from the well and at once moved towards the Railway Station, and on reaching there rushed into the Station Master's Office and Booking Offices and began to smash the telephone and furniture and set fire the records and parcels.

MEASURES TAKEN BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE.

5. On the morning of 14th the Superintendent of Police interviewed the non-officials and leading pleaders of the town and explained to them that they should take keen interest, that there should be no '*hartal*' and unrest in the town.

The Deputy Commissioner also held the officers and the leading gentry of the town responsible to patrol at night and also try to induce relatives of the boys and men of the mob not to join the mob.

The Superintendent of Police deputed armed pickets at the Treasury guard and all kutcheri and Post Offices buildings.

The strength available in the Lines on the 14th including officers orderlies was—

Inspector	1
Sub-Inspectors	3
Head Constables	19
Foot Constables	79

When the mob was smashing the Railway Station furniture and setting fire, I with the Senior Magistrate and the armed Reserve Guard at once reached the Station and the Reserve Guard began to open independent firing under the orders of the Senior Magistrate. The mob soon dispersed and seven men were arrested on the spot, but no one was injured and the fire was extinguished. Had this measure not been taken at once it would have caused a serious loss to the Station building and breach of peace. In spite of the prompt action taken by the Police at the headquarters the nearest town, Jalalpur, was not left unaffected.

Owing to the shortage of the available men in the Line it was deemed necessary to obtain Military assistance. A telegram was accordingly sent by the Deputy Commissioner and a small detachment of 70 men of 37th Dogras arrived, of which 10 Sowars and Resaldar and a Lieutenant were sent to Jalalpur on the same evening 15th, where the *hatal* was started. Although the Military Guard had reached there yet the telegraph wires were cut and damaged on the same evening and other damage to property was done in the Mission School and Municipal Committee Office on the morning of the following day, and inflammatory lectures were delivered. Meanwhile the Malakwal incident (breaking of the lines) was reported on the 17th, which was very serious. Consequently more Military men were asked by wire. 120 men arrived. The Police Guard were then relieved by the Military from the continuous day and nights duties.

Under the circumstances while the Police strength was inadequate and the towns were disturbed, it was absolutely essential to seek the help of the Military and apply for the enforcement of the Martial Laws.

One Head Constable and ten foot constables were despatched to Jalalpur Jattan where the arrests were made and investigation was started.

The Police did very well in discharging their duties throughout in connection with the patrolling at night and looking after the Treasury, Courts, Offices, Post Office and the bungalows of the Civil Station, and especially dispersing the mob at the Railway Station.

Had the Police and Military Guards would have not reached in time to the spots it would have caused serious consequences, and it was the enforcement of Martial Laws which stopped all the future troubles.

Mr. V. H. BOALTH, C.B.E., Traffic Manager, North-Western Railway.

The disturbances started at Delhi on 30th March and a week afterwards spread to the centre of the Punjab where Amritsar seemed to be the focus of the troubles. From Amritsar the trouble spread outwards in all directions, but was checked at the Jhelum and Sutlej rivers.

From April 10th to April 18th the disturbed areas were in a state of riot and rebellion and areas outside this may be said to be restive awaiting results.

The Civil Authorities, with the help of the Military, had by this time the situation well in hand; as far as the Railway was concerned the outrages were diminishing daily and communication increasing—after the 21st April no further trouble was experienced.

The main object seems to have been to—

(*i*) cut the telegraph lines,
(*ii*) destroy Railway communication,
(*iii*) paralyse the Railway by means of a general strike.

As regards (*i*), at first this was successful, but the Telegraph Department rapidly restored the communication, and although the telegraph wire were cut every night at various places, so far as the Railway was concerned the results did not cause much interference with the running of trains.

As regards (*ii*), the attempts at train wrecking (such as dismantling the tracks, burning of bridges) were frustrated by the liberal use of armoured and armed trains. I attach a special note on the use of these trains —see Annexure A.

As regards (*iii*), a general strike was abortive for several reasons, chiefly that on the whole the staff did not want to strike, the exception being the small Station Masters and Signallers. Strong attempts were made to get the workshop employees to go out on strike, but this was also abortive. Martial Law was proclaimed on the 15th and this had a great steadying effect on the whole of the Railway. Claims for damages have been submitted to the Civil authorities.

The interruption to traffic working was as follows:—

On the 10th owing to telegraphic interruption goods trains were delayed at junctions, but passenger trains were run through. On the 11th goods trains delayed at Ludhiana and Lahore were ordered to get through. On the morning of the 13th No. 3 Up Goods Special from Amritsar was reported to have been derailed, due to a rail having been taken out. This was the first intimation of actual mischief as regards derailments, and after this precautions were taken to guard passenger trains and to restrict goods trains during night. Military guards were put on passenger trains on Sunday, 13th, and a particularly strong guard on No. 4 Down Mail, as intimation had been received that trouble was expected near Attari. As a matter of fact this train did not get through on the night of the 13th, as the armoured train patrolling the line got derailed and Wagha station was burnt, the Military did not consider it safe for the Mail to go out. From this date up to the 19th passenger trains were practically restricted in the Lahore area to the two Mails and one day train to Pathankot. On the Bhatinda side after the Kasur incident on the 12th passenger trains

Continued.] Mr. V. H. BOALTH.

were greatly disorganized, and we practically only ran the Mail by daylight from Lahore to Delhi, no night running being allowed. From the 13th we advised all Railways to stop booking through the affected areas and goods booking was not generally resumed till 25th. On the 20th the full services of passenger trains were run between Lahore and Multan as there was least trouble experienced on this section. From the 21st to the 23rd restrictions on passenger trains were gradually withdrawn till a restricted normal service was set up about the 25th. Goods and parcels restrictions were gradually withdrawn till the end of the month. Free night running of Mails and passenger trains was not fully opened till the 28th. Goods and parcel restrictions were gradually removed till the 6th of May, when restrictions had to be imposed owing to concentration having been ordered on the 6th.

The actual restrictions and control of passenger booking were ordered from time to time under instructions from the Military and Permits were supplied by them up to about the 28th. These Permits were very rigid at first, but were gradually made easier. At no time were Military passengers in uniform, Government servants on duty, and servants of European 1st and 2nd class passengers restricted.

LAHORE: F. J. HARVEY,
The 1st July 1919. *Agent, North-Western Railway.*

ACCOUNT OF THE DISTURBANCES IN THE PUNJAB SO FAR AS THEY HAVE AFFECTED THE NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

The first overt act occurred on the 30th March. A large mob attacked Delhi Station, broke the windows of the Railway Offices and beat the Railway staff and the Railway Police. After this nothing open occurred on the Railway at this Station; but there were conditions in that neighbourhood which encouraged those who were disloyal to strike and, in some cases, almost forced loyal members of the staff into the conspiracy.

The strike at Shakurpur, for instance, seems directly caused by the continued *hartal* in Delhi and consequently the inability of the local staff to get food.

At Delhi itself the passive resisters were, during this period, said to be offering food at below market rates to the Railway staff on condition that they would strike.

There seems to have been also, at various centres, seditious talking at meetings connected with the *Baisakhi Mela*, during this period.

Thursday, 10th April.

There was considerable tension on April the 6th at many places, but nothing occurred till April the 10th. On this day, at Amritsar, a part of the mob advancing towards the civil station was turned back at the Railway by the Military and diverted into the station yard. The mob burned the goods shed, brutally murdered Guard Robinson who was defending Government property, beat Mr. Bennett, Station Superintendent, and did considerable damage to the station and telegraph wires. Fortunately a troop train for Rawalpindi arrived at the crisis, containing a detachment of Gurkhas. These were detrained at the insistent demand of the Station Superintendent and this undoubtedly saved the situation at Amritsar. The main body of the mob went into the city. After having looted and burned the banks, the mob moved on to Bhagtanwala station, looted and burned the station building, looted the goods shed and a wagon, and broke the pointslocks. This occurred at about half past three in the afternoon. The same evening at about 8 o'clock, a mob collected near Chheharta station; they discussed the Amritsar riot, and decided to loot Chheharta Station Arriving there they found a goods train (88-Down), broke the seals of four wagons, removed piece-goods to the value of Rs. 8,000—sugar, cotton seeds, etc. Included in all these acts of violence was the cutting of telegraph wires. Meanwhile, the mob in Lahore had been dispersed by the Police and the Military; and armoured trains Nos. 1 and 3 were held ready at Moghalpura.

Friday, 11th April.

This was a day of suspense; very little occurred.

At the Loco. Workshops, Moghalpura, a commotion was started by half a dozen students from Lahore during the breakfast hour. The result was that 20 per cent. of the men absented themselves in the afternoon.

Bhagtanwala station was inspected by the Executive Engineer who spiked over facing points, crossed out signals and closed the station.

Armoured train No. 1 left Lahore for Amritsar in the morning; armoured train No. 3 was still waiting at Moghalpura.

Saturday, 12th April

On this day things began to move again. At 10 A.M. a mob looted Kasur station, held up two trains (14-Down and 61-Up), killed two British soldiers, badly wounded another, assaulted the fourth and was only restrained from killing Mr. Sherbourn, Interlocking Inspector, and his family by the active loyalty of Mr. Khair Din, Inspector of Accounts. This riot was over within an hour. A relief troop train left Ferozepur at 14-5 hours, arriving at Kasur 15-5. Armoured train No. 3 picked up a military guard at Lahore Cantonment West at 17 hours, arriving at Kasur at 20 hours. Nothing further occurred at Kasur.

Khemkaran station was looted at 15-45 hours by the same mob that wrecked Kasur.

On the same day Patti station was attacked, the goods office doors broken, points locks taken away, signals damaged.

At Lahore Loco. and Carriage and Wagon Workshops the greatest difficulty was experienced by the men going to work. Bands of men with sticks tried to prevent them by force and threats. Only 59 per cent. of the Loco. Shops attended in the morning and 5 per cent. in the afternoon. The attendance at the Carriage and Wagon Shops was good, as it was pay day. Orders were received to armour another engine at 15 hours. The European staff, helped by a few loyal Indians, worked all through the night and completed this by 9 o'clock next morning—Sunday.

At Multan 40 men of the Loco. Workshops stayed away from work, but there was no subsequent trouble there.

Armoured train No. 3 arrived at Kasur, received a message from Khemkaran, arrived there at 23-40 hours, found the station looted and unoccupied, as reported above.

During this afternoon there were seditious meetings convened by the most influential people of the neighbourhoods at Ambala, Wagah and possibly other centres.

There was during the night a good deal of talking over the telegraph wires by the station signallers.

Sunday, 13th April.

In the early morning armoured train No. 3 patrolling between Kasur and Amritsar, found telegraph and signal wires cut at Patti, Tarn Taran and Gohlwar Varpal.

At Ludhiana there was a three hours' *hartal*, hastily abandoned on the arrival of a military guard from Ambala.

At 2-30 hours a rail-length of track was removed from both up and down lines, between Chheharta and Khasa near Amritsar. The engine and eight vehicles of 3-Up Special Goods were derailed. The train was badly looted, 3 wagons of furniture, sacks of barley, sugar sacks, etc., were broken open. At this place a lambardar incited the people.

At Wagah two lambardars and a disloyal Indian soldier convened a secret meeting of several villages at which it was agreed to burn three stations, Jallo, Wagah and Attari.

During the evening a meeting was held at Bahawalnagar at which it was decided to strike at 10-30 A.M. next day.

At Shakurpur at midnight the Loco., the Carriage and Wagon, and the Traffic staff struck work.

This was the day on which the prohibited meeting of 6,000 people at Amritsar was dispersed, with heavy casualties, by Indian troops.

A minor incident of this day was the throwing of a stone at 7-Up Mail passing through Kot Radha Kishen. A first class passenger was injured.

After dark, probably well on into the night, the Wagha mob went to the station to loot it; and as they approached, armoured train No. 1 went through with searchlights. As soon as the train had passed, the mob looted the station, broke the telegraph instruments, collected and burned the furniture and Government property, turned away the station staff with their private property, cut wires and so on. When the armoured train returned they hid themselves. When it had again passed on they went to the permanent-way huts, stole tools, and began to wreck the permanent way. They completed the wrecking between the trips of the armoured train. The armoured train was derailed with a great noise. The rioters proceeded to Jallo, delighted with their work, but for some reason did not more damage on the Railway.

Monday, 14th April.

The chief events of this day were the disturbances at Gujranwala and Bahawalnagar.

At Gujranwala in the morning—exact time uncertain—a local mob attacked the Civil station, burnt the Church and other public buildings, proceeding to the railway station, burnt and looted it, set on fire the railway overbridge, burnt the timbers of two more small railway bridges, burnt the staff quarters and the goods shed and one covered goods wagon standing in the yard. The damage at Gujranwala was stopped at 3-30 P.M. by an aeroplane from Lahore.

At Bahawalnagar a strike occurred at 10-30 hours, as arranged the day before. The signal for the strike was the arrival of 29-Up. After some discussion the strikers allowed the incoming engine to be detached; but they, helped by a mob of city people, refused to allow the outgoing engine to be attached. The strike at this station was passive rather than active because the situation was taken in hand very promptly by Captain Watson of the H. L. I., a passenger of 29-Up, helped by his Sergeant, the Traffic Inspector, the Permanent-Way Inspector, the Station Master and the Loco. Foreman. The whole of the Traffic staff went on strike at once. The other Departments were slow in following them, but were finally overpursuaded at a meeting at 14 hours at which the chief speaker was a Sikh, whose brother had returned from Canada by the "Komagata Maru." He incited the strikers and the mob to assault Europeans. A message from Gandhi was read at this meeting by another speaker. The station staff, however, hesitated to attack Europeans. By 21 hours the Loco. running staff had joined the strike in spirit; they actively joined at 9 o'clock next morning. The strike was heartily supported by the citizens of Bahawalnagar. In the early afternoon a party went by trolly and cut the Telegraph wires. It is reported that, leader of the strike at this station was the Loco. Department School Master. There was another meeting of strikers at 10 o'clock in the Loco. quarters at which it was proposed to cut the track. This proposal was, however, not carried out, possibly because the ardour of the strikers had been damped by the arrival of the Assistant Traffic Superintendent with an armoured guard and extra arms at 20-15 hours.

At Lahore a large party of workmen assembled on the workmen's train platform, but was too excited to get into the train. The train platform was eventually cleared by a party of North-Western Railway Rifles (I. D. F.) with fixed bayonets, but on arrival at Moghalpura the men did not go to work, and a large number returned to Lahore in the "empty" train. The majority of men in the Coach appeared willing to work but feared the strike-leaders and waited to see what would happen.

At Shakurpur where the strike started at midnight of 13th-14th, the Station Master and the Yard Master proceeded to Delhi, returned by 13-Up to Shakurpur with armoured police, re-opened the station and passed the train without the aid of strikers. The telegraph wires were cut, but telephones were working. At 15-30 hours the strikers resumed duty.

At Bahadurgarh there was an attempt to tamper with a bridge and the permanent-way at mile 383. The leader of this attempt is reported to have been the Station Master, a local head of the Arya Samaj.

The strike at Shakurpur spread to Delhi Kishengunj. The menial staff only struck, apparently for a very short time. The damage to the telegraph wires in this neighbourhood was done by the station staff, helped by certain Great Indian Peninsula Railway employees.

At Gujrat *hartal* started on this date.

Minor damages and destructions occurred between Bahadurgarh and Geora, at Okara, Hafizabad, Akalgarh and Mansurwali.

At Hafizabad also, a mob of 300 people threw stones at 35-Up, assaulted Captain Tatam and a small boy with him who were passengers in that train. Armoured train No. 3 proceeded in the early morning on this date to Wagha and helped armoured train No. 1 derailed there. It then patrolled the section, Amritsar—Lahore Cantonment East.

On this date restrictions on booking of Intermediate and 3rd class passengers were put into force.

At Chuharkana the Railway Sub-Divisional Officer returning to Lyallpur in the evening noticed excitement at Qila Sheikhupura and an uproarious crowd on the platform at Chuharkana. He saw the crowd at Chuharkana dispersed by heavy rain and so contented himself with reporting the incident to the Executive Engineer and ordering the Permanent-Way Inspector, Lyallpur, to patrol his section day and night.

During the night of the 14th-15th a mob began to attack Wazirabad. Signals towards Kathala were broken down. There were troops at this station which had come across country from Sialkot.

During the night troops were sent by a special train from Jhelum at the request of the District Officers, Rawalpindi, to protect Lala Musa and Gujrat where trouble was expected.

Tuesday, 15th April.

At Lahore Martial Law was declared. Further restrictions on the booking of passengers were ordered. The attendance of the Loco. Workshops was about 60 per cent.

Gujranwala was visited again by an aeroplane from Lahore. Repairs to the bridges were taken in hand. The station was occupied by armoured Indian and British Forces.

At Gujrat there was a disturbance and during the temporary absence of armed forces the station was somewhat damaged.

The mob at Wazirabad, encouraged by the inaction of the troops, did a good deal of damage in the station, removed the rails and burned the sleepers of a bridge near the station, then cut across country to the Sialkot line. They had stolen the tools from gang-huts to damage the line near Sialkot. They left these tools behind when they cut across country, and so did very little damage afterwards.

There was an extensive cutting of telegraph wires all over the Railway on this date.

Minor disturbances occurred at Kundian, Lala Musa, Qila Sheikhupura and Bahalike.

The train service was disorganized at Narwana, Dhamthan and Tohana by false reports and the lack of enterprise exhibited by a European Driver.

At Jakhal there was a strike of all the staff, except the Station Master, for a few hours. This strike was sympathetic, caused by the confusion at Narwana.

At Bahawalnagar there was an appeal to the strikers to resume duty in the morning. A meeting was held by them at 2 o'clock to consider it. At about 17 hours

troops arrived at Ferozepur by a special train under the command of Captain W. W. Maud of the Queen's Regiment. Considerable damage had been done to the station and railway property. Captain Maud took over charge from Captain Watson and gave the Loco. strikers an hour to resume duty. They gave in. He made the same offer to the Traffic running staff, who refused. Telegraphic communication was partly restored to Bhatinda at 19-40 hours. The first train that left the station since the strike began was 21-Up mixed at 22-41 starting to time. 30-Down delayed started at 23 hours. It was reported that the people of Bahawalnagar threatened to fire at any train leaving the station: Captain Maud took measures to prevent this and sent a letter by Captain Watson who left by the first train to the Political Agent, Bahawalpur State, complaining of the attitude of the State people. It is reported that during the day B. Banwari Lal, Overseer, and a Guard had taken a prominent part in preventing food being brought to Europeans; that they stopped servants coming from the Bazar and forcibly took away their purchases; and that they tried to pursuade the Refreshment Room Manager from cooking food for Europeans.

At Ambala there was a short strike of the Traffic staff. The Sub-Divisional Officer had suggested to the Station Master that he might ask for Military signallers. He had refused to do so. At 7 hours in the morning rumours of the strike again reached the Sub-Divisional Officer who went to the station and questioned the Station Master. The Station Master, however, denied that there was any knowledge of a possible strike. At 8 o'clock the strike occurred, the reliefs did not come on duty, and all the strikers went to the Bazar. This strike lasted more or less till the evening when it was settled locally in a rather unsatisfactory manner.

At Sialkot after dark a 3rd class carriage was found to be burning in the station yard. This damage was certainly done by the crowd which arrived in 25-Up as 19-15 hours from the *Baisakhi* festival at Wazirabad. This crowd was excited, swarming all over the outside of the train and the engine during the journey, and shouting "Mahatma Gandhi ki jai."

A similar train of people returning from the Wazirabad festival threatened trouble at Lala Musa, but the station staff there were armed.

The most serious event of the day was the destruction of Chuharkana station. The excited mob which had been seen by the Sub-Divisional Officer the evening before began to take action in the early morning of the 15th, forcibly took tools from a gang hut at Chuharkana and up rooted the line. The Sub-Way Inspector saw this done. He proceeded towards Lahore, met a troop special and returned with it to repair the line. The troop special proceeded over the repaired line through Chuharkana and onwards. The mob had temporarily dispersed rather late in the evening; they re-assembled at the station and found a train there. The Station Master was overpowered; the passengers were made to get out; the station building was fired with kerosene; an attempt was made to burn the train; the train was looted and damaged; the rails in a bridge approach were removed; the canal bridge timbers were burned; another bridge was burned and rails in its approach removed; the station cash safe was rifled; tickets and racks were destroyed and wires cut. Having done this damage the mob, late at night, moved off in the direction of Sangla Hill.

During this night a rail was removed at Kala, just north of Jhelum, and 19-Up passenger train was derailed. The intention was obviously to derail a down special troop train containing 20 motor lorries and much ammunition. This train would have been almost at the end of a long 1 in 100 grade down, but 19-Up passenger train fortunately entered the section first, and its speed was probably only about 15 miles an hour.

Wednesday, 16th April.

The mob from Chuharkana proceeded on its way towards Sangla Hill, missed Bahalike but burned and looted Dhaban Singh and Moman stations. It fired the canal bridge about 2 miles beyond Dhaban Singh. Mr. DeSouza, Sub-Divisional Officer, saw this mob at Sangla Hill early in the morning: he returned to Lyallpur and reported to the Executive Engineer, who, with the District Traffic Superintendent, went to Sangla Hill with 30 troops. There was a collision with the mob in which Mr. Waite,* I. T. M, was injured. The unexpected arrival of the 3-11th Gurkhas that evening prevented any further damage being done by this mob from Chuharkana.

No. 3 armoured train visited Chuharkana at 1-30 A.M. came into contact with the rioters, arrested a number of prisoners, repaired damages to permanent way, and patrolled towards Bahalike.

No. 1 armoured train arrived from Lahore a little later. The Officer Commanding sent for the headmen, Municipal Commissioners, arrested some met the Officer Commanding, armoured train No. 3, and took over his consignment of prisoners for Lahore.

At Kundian the strike, which was started the day before ended at 12 noon.

At Bahawalnagar the Trafic staff returned to work at 9 hours, but were turned away by Captain Maud as they would not give the names of the strikers who cut the wires. The Tahsildar also came to see Captain Maud at 9 hours. He promised a guard of responsible persons over the station by the afternoon. At 12-30 hours telegraphic communication to Samata was restored. The Traffic staff, having given the names required from them, were allowed to resume duty. The Tahsildar's guard arrived at 16-40 hours. At about 18 hours the President, Council of Regency, arrived from Bahawalpur. At 18-30 hours Captain Maud left the station under Sergeant Linton and a mixed armed guard, taking with him to Ferozepur the women and children, and the prisoners.

There were six armoured trains on various sections on this date.

On the Rawalpindi District, Military guards were placed on all bridges and tunnels on the main line as far as the Indus, and an armoured train started the work of patrolling the District and rationing the armed guards. This train worked daily till the end of the riots.

Thursday, 17th April.

At Delhi, where no effective restrictions seem to have been imposed, pressure was brought on the staff to demand *atta* at a still cheaper rate. It had already been supplied below market rate.

At Lyallpur some baled *bhoosa* was burnt at 19-45 hours.

At Malakwal a train was wrecked by the removal of a pair of rails 1 mile to the east of the station, the engine and a loaded wagon of the passenger train overturned; 2 killed and 2 injured.

To Chuharkana a special train was sent to capture the rioters. A special train under Captain Flowerdew left Lahore at 11-42 hours, arrived Chuharkana at 13 hours the rioters were chased and fired on; the chase was kept up as far as Padawala and many rioters were arrested.

The Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) was present. A party of 100 Gurkhas arrived from the Ralwalpindi Division and the special train returned.

Telegraph wires were cut at a considerable number of places on this date.

At Moga the Station Master anticipated danger from the rioters. The General Officer Commanding, Ferozepur, wired the Station Master to tell the influential residents that he would send armoured cars if there were trouble. This threat had the desired effect.

Friday, 18th April.

By this time the large-scale organisation of the disturbances appeared absolutely to have broken down. Things were much quieter.

* Mr. Wale.

During the night 17th-18th Sidhwan station was burned, possibly by the Station Master himself; the station building was merely a sleeper hut.

At 8 o'clock in the morning crowds rushed through Kaithal station, damaged it, and there was a *hartal* in the city. A body of cavalry was despatched from Ambala and there seems to have been no further trouble.

At Karnal the troops were increased to 100 ranks.

There were a few instances of telegraph wires being cut at various places.

At night obstructions were placed on the line between Ladhuka and Bahmniwala.

On this date the armoured trains were handed over to the Military.

Saturday, 19th April.

Beyond one or two cases of wire cutting no incident of importance occurred.

Sunday, 20th April.

No incident.

Telegraphic communication was improving rapidly as is evident from the receipt of telegraphic reports of disturbances which had occurred within the last few days.

Monday, 21st April.

There was one successful attempt to cut wires and one unsuccessful.

A request was received from the Jullundur Brigade for two armoured trains to work on the Hoshiarpur-Lohian Khas lines.

After this date there was no incident worth reporting and the disturbances may be said to have finished.

Classes prominent in promoting disturbances.

The only class of railway servants which can be singled out as especially involved is the Assistant Station Master and Signaller class, Traffic Department. Exceptions can be quoted, but it is generally correct to say that the labouring classes, skilled and unskilled, were either forced into the movement against their will, or resisted the agitators altogether.

It would be easy to supply the names of individual Railway servants who promoted disturbances, but these names do not easily arrange themselves into classes.

It should be especially noted that one Department of the railway was so far as can be seen, absolutely untouched by the disaffection, and took no part whatever in the outbreak—the Permanent-Way (Engineering) staff and men.

Nature of movement.

The movement was political in nature, not industrial or commercial: the North-Western Railway system was attacked generally as an important instrument of executive Government, and more especially as means of communication and transport of troops. Railway servants took part in the movement, but they were acting as disloyal citizens, not as disaffected railway servants.

There is no doubt that a general strike of the Railway staff had been planned and was attempted; but the agitation was external not internal. At one or two centres the railway strikers stated their grievances; the absurd character of their grievances is the best possible indication of the radical difference of these April disturbances from genuine labour troubles.

So far as the Railway has been concerned it has not appeared that the movement was *anti*-Christian; that it was *anti*-European is shown by the murders and attempted murders of isolated European passengers at Kasur and Hafizabad, and the attempt at Bahawalnagar to cut off supplies of food to the European staff, passenger and military guard. It is hardly necessary to advance the murder of Guard Robinson and the murderous assault on Mr. Bennett, the Station Superintendent, as proofs of the anti-European nature of the outbreak at Amritsar.

The effect of the disturbance was to paralyse the railway as a commercial system for the period 10th to (say) 21st April. As an instrument of Government administration and transport the railway was not paralysed: the outbreak, in that particular, signally failed.

On certain districts, Rawalpindi and Quetta, for instance, there was not much local disturbance; but owing to the trouble at the centre, Lahore, commercial traffic was impossible.

Coaching Restrictions.

THE train services were very much upset and trains were running considerably out of time to the telegraphic interruptions, but no general restrictions on booking were issued from the Traffic Manager's office till the 14th April. On this date it became obvious that we could not move passenger traffic offering over the disturbed area and restrictions were absolutely necessary and these had to be imposed. All bookings of inter and 3rd class passengers were suspended to and from stations, Ludhiana to Lala Musa. Similarly, bookings of these classes of passengers were also stopped from all Foreign Railways.

15th April.—On this date the District Traffic Superintendent, Bhatinda, stopped all coaching booking between Bhatinda and Samasatta owing to the troubles at Bahawalnagar. These restrictions were cancelled on the 16th April.

On the same date under Martial Law Ordinance No. 4, Station Masters, Lahore Cantonment, East and West, Badami Bagh and Lahore were ordered to stop booking of 3rd and inter class passengers from the morning of the 16th.

On the 16th April all Foreign Railways were wired to stop booking of inter and third class passenger traffic to this Railway.

On the same date District Traffic Superintendent, Rawalpindi, also issued orders stopping booking of all Indian 3rd, inter and 2nd class passengers in his district, after consultation I understand, with the Civil and Military authorities. The District Traffic Superintendent, Saharanpur, also stopped booking of parcels traffic *viâ* Ludhiana and Ambala upwards.

On 18th April all District Officers were ordered to stop booking of coaching traffic to stations on foreign lines and on the same date Foreign Railways were wired to stop coaching traffic to stations over the North-Western Railway. On this date all District Traffic Superintendents were ordered to stop booking of 3rd and inter class passenger traffic to and from stations between Lahore-Ferozepore, Lahore-Montgomery and Lahore-Shorkot Road *viâ* Chichoki and *viâ* Sangla Hill.

On 19th April bookings of all inter and 3rd class passengerns from Amritsar, Gujranwala and Kasur were stopped under Martial Law Ordinance issued under Railway Restriction Order No. 1. Also District Traffic Superintendent, Kundian, at the request of the Officer Commanding, Troops, Malakwal, stopped booking on Kundian-Lala Musa Section of all 3rd, inter and 2nd class Indian passengers. All District Traffic Superintendents were also told to stop booking from and to Malakwal-Shorkot Road, Lala Musa-Kundian Section.

On the 20th April similar restrictions in booking of 3rd and inter class passengers on the Wazirabad-Sangla Section were enforced.

On 21st April booking of all coaching traffic including inter and 3rd class passengers was resumed to all Foreign Railways with the exception of the following sections:

Lala Musa to Ludhiana (exclusive).
Lahore to Ferozepore Cantonment.
Lahore to Montgomery.
Lahore to Shorkot Road *viâ* Chichoki Malian.
Lahore to Shorkot Road *viâ* Sangla Hill and Lyallpur.
Amritsar to Kasur *viâ* Patti.
Malakwal to Shorkot Road.
Lala Musa to Kundian.
Wazirabad to Sangla Hill (inclusive).

Continued.] Mr. V. H. BOALTH.

On 22nd April booking from Foreign Railways was resumed with the exception of booking to the above sections.

On 23rd April all restrictions from Foreign Railways were withdrawn and Railway Restriction Order No. 1 revised issued which show the position of restrictions on that date. On the same date Malakwal to Kundian and Malakwal to Sargodha was opened up and the section Ludhiana to Jullundur City was also opened up.

On 30th April coaching traffic was resumed on the Amritsar-Patti-Kasur Railway to Kasur, Tarn Taran, Patti, Waltoha and Amritsar.

On 5th May all restrictions in force were completely removed, except that passengers travelling by mail trains were subject to Military examination at certain examining stations.

Booking of all passengers from Gujranwala, Eminabad, Kamoke, Rahwali and Ghakkar was stopped from 5th May to 18th May under Martial Law, but booking was permitted to individuals on Military permits.

During these restrictions Military passengers, Government servants on duty and 1st and 2nd class passengers were not restricted, nor was urgent Military or Government parcels traffic interfered with. Necessaries of life, such as fresh vegetables, etc., were also booked and carried whenever possible except when paricular restrictions were imposed by the Military authorities.

Railway Restriction Notices Nos. 5 and 6 clearly show the nature of the permits and the system on which passengers were allowed to book when restrictions were in force.

From the 6th May owing to the Afghan war all the train services from Lahore northwards over the Rawalpindi Ditrict were restricted to one passenger, one Mail and one Public Goods train, the rest of the accommodation being utilised by troop and military trains.

Restrictions on booking of all classes of passengers had to be imposed as notified under Special Notice No. 8. These restrictions remained in force more or less throughout the Afghan war, but as Military operations lessened greater latitude was allowed to the movement of non-Military passengers going northward.

Shortly after concentration started orders were received from the Commander-in-Chief that all Military traffic must have precedence over civil traffic going to the various fronts and this order necessitated closely restricting civil traffic.

Notices issued on the subject of the restrictions are appended.

V. H. BOALTH,
Traffic Manager, North-Western Railway.

Special Notices of Restriction of Booking.

(These, which were eight in number, have not been reproduced in printing. Their effect is summarized above).

RESTRICTIONS ON GOODS TRAFFIC.

NARRATION of events that occurred on the Railway during the time of the troubles has been stated in Agent's note. I give briefly a note on the restrictions in goods traffic which were in force during this time.

The train running at this period was very uncertain as telegraphic communication was frequently being interrupted and trains had to proceed with the greatest caution and there was much delay. In consequence there was a congestion of goods traffic at stations and junctions particularly coming on to the disturbed area.

On Monday, April 14th, District Traffic Superintendents were ordered to stop loading and booking of all goods traffic to and *viâ* the Lahore District in local and foreign booking. Foreign Railways were also asked to stop booking from their lines to and over the Lahore District area. Local and foreign bookings also stopped on the Bhatinda, Forezepore and Saharanpore Districts.

On this date District Traffic Superintendent, Bhatinda, had to suspend goods trains completely on the Bhatinda-Samasatta Section and this remained more or less closed up to the 18th April.

On Friday, 18th, all District Traffic Superintendents concerned were ordered to run one regular goods train over their districts during the hours of daylight to clear urgent goods traffic.

On Monday, the 21st, the number was increased to 2 goods trains and on this date we resumed booking from Delhi *viâ* the Southern Punjab Railway towards Samasatta.

From this date restrictions were gradually relaxed and on Thursday, the 24th, all District Traffic Superintendents and Foreign Railways were advised to resume goods bookings as were in force previous to the 14th April.

There were exceptions in regard to bookings to Amritsar, Gujranwala, Kasur and Bhagtanwala and also the Amritsar, Patti-Kasur, line. Kasur was opened for all booking on 30th. Amritsar was completely reopened for all bookings on the 15th May, Bhagtanwala on the 13th of May and the A. P. K. Railway was opened up on the 30th April. Gujranwala restrictions continued and remained on, due to the bad state of accommodation and the restriction owing to the Afghan war.

As soon as general restrictions were removed on the 24th or earlier unrestricted bookings of food-stuffs, kerosene oil, fuel, etc., were allowed to Amritsar, Gujranwala, Kasur, etc., and other restricted areas.

During all these restrictions booking of urgent Military traffic was kept open.

On the 8th of May all goods traffic about Lahore was restricted with the exception of food-stuffs, etc., owing to the Afghan war. These restrictions remained in force more or less during the war, but were gradually withdrawn as traffic permitted and the Military traffic got less.

V. H. BOALTH,
15th November 1919. *Traffic Manager, North-Western Railway.*

Annexure to statement of Mr. V. H. Boalth, Traffic Manager, North-Western Railway, prepared by Mr. E. Chisholm, Assistant Inspector-General, Railway Police and accepted by the Committee without oral evidence.

SYNOPSIS.

A.—A chronological list of all the offences reported in the Punjab during the disturbances is submitted. The offences range from murder and arson to wire cutting and strikes.

B.—Restrictions on travelling were imposed by Martial Laws and a system of Martial Law permits was introduced. From April 22nd to May 3rd the Railway Police issued such passes to about 3,000 persons (1,800 permits). In addition to this the Traffic Manager considerably reduced the number of trains running between Lahore and Peshawar.

C.—On 19th April the Railway Police were asked to establish certain checking stations to supervise the traffic of suspicious persons in the Martial Law Area. On May 5th Administrator of Martial Law directed that inspection at checking stations should be held on in-coming trains only, and that inter and 3rd class passengers would have to alight at those stations. These posts were abolished with Martial Law in the Areas. Martial Law was still maintained on railway lines, but checking ceased with the general withdrawal of Martial Law.

D.—On 12th May 1919 orders were received to prevent certain gentlemen entering the Martial Law Area. As a result of this the Rev. Mr. Andrews was turned back at Amritsar.

E.—At the beginning of 1918, Railway employees agitated for an increase of pay. This was granted and for some time matters quieted down. The movement

was in no way political. In the first four months of 1919 the agitation was renewed and took a more aggressive form. Inflammatory notices were pasted and disturbances took place.

NOTE ON RESTRICTIONS ON RAILWAY TRAVELLING.

The restrictions on railway travelling imposed during the summer of 1919 were originally the outcome of the disturbances. They were subsequently renewed over an extended area as the result of the Afghan War and consequent mobilisation which created a military demand which the railways could not meet without a curtailment of civilian passenger traffic.

The restrictions necessitated by the disturbances were imposed under Martial Law Orders issued at an early stage of Martial Law administration. Regulation No. 8 in the Martial Law proclamations issued by the Divisional Commanders of the Lahore and Rawalpindi Divisions in its amended form merely laid down that where orders had issued regarding the control of travelling no person should enter or leave the Martial Law Area in contravention thereof. The actual imposition of restrictions was thus left to the Martial Law authorities in the various areas. For Lahore Civil Area and Amritsar District orders were issued prohibiting the issue of intermediate or third class tickets. In the Sialkot Brigade Area, comprising the districts of Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur, an order was issued requiring all travellers by rail, other than military employees travelling on warrant, Europeans, Anglo-Indians, servants accompanying them, and Government servants on duty to obtain a pass. In Kasur it would appear from Martial Law Order 15 that Regulation 8 in the Divisional Commander's Proclamation had been interpreted as requiring in itself that no person should travel without a pass and that no formal order issued locally. The general effect of the orders issued was to stop all unofficial travelling by intermediate and third class passengers to, from and within the areas under Martial Law except on permit. The permit system was in force throughout the Martial Law areas in the 16th Division and up to Gujrat and Lala Musa (see orders of 23rd April 1919 by Traffic Manager). The original justification for the restrictions thus imposed was the necessity of preventing communication bweeen disaffected persons in the disturbed areas under Martial Law and agitators elsewhere. This argument in favour of restriction was, however, strongly re-inforced at an early stage by the necessity for effectually guarding against the cutting of telegraph wires by the side of railway lines. Government was authoritatively informed by Superintendent, Telegraphs, on 18th April that as long as unrestricted travelling by rail continued it would be impossible to stop this form of outrage, as bad characters were in the habit of alighting at wayside stations and slipping away in the dark to cut the line at some unguarded point.

Government was throughout anxious that the restrictions imposed should cause as little inconvenience as possible to the general public and an elaborate system for the grant of permits was worked out in conjunction with the Martial Law authorities, a system which imposed much additional labour on the civil administration. The rapid disappearance of disorder under the operation of Martial Law rendered it possible on May 5th to propose a general withdrawal of all the restrictions imposed, but it appears that the local Martial Law Administrators in some areas found themselves unable to give effect to the proposal. In all areas, however, the restrictions imposed under Martial Law automatically ceased on withdrawal thereof. Meanwhile on 22nd May the Punjab Government announced that the demands on railway accommodation for purposes of mobilisation had necessitated the stoppage of all booking of intermediate and third class non-military passengers to stations between Lahore and Peshawar. This action was not taken under Martial Law, or at the instance of the Punjab Government. It was an executive act dictated by military necessities, and having no connection with the disturbances. The part played by the Punjab Government in regard to the stoppage of booking was confined to the inception of measures designed to prevent unnecessary hardship to the public resulting therefrom. On the order coming into force it was arranged that tickets for stations on the prohibited area should be issued to persons producing orders from Deputy Commissioners, Political Agents, Superintendents of Police and Military Commanding Officers, and more than one representation in the interests of the travelling public was brought to the notice of the Railway authorities. Government is advised that in practice travelling was restricted not so much by the necessity for obtaining an order, which was seldom refused, but by the difficulty experienced by 3rd class passengers in possession of orders in finding a place in over-crowded trains. In its extreme form, however, this difficulty arose only when mobilisation—and subsequently demobilisation—were in full swing.

On the 1st of September, the Punjab Government inquired from the Agent North-Western Railway, whether any modification in the restrictions was possible and received a reply in the negative. So far as Government is aware, they are still in force.

OFFENCES, ETC., ON THE RAILWAY.

1. *The 30th March 1919.*—A large mob invaded Delhi Station, broke glasses of various Railway Offices on the station and beat some members of the Railway Police and Station Staff.

2. *The 6th April 1919.*—Station Master, Palwal, reported that a first class passenger, Captain Hog, by 16-Up Express had stated that a revolver was fired at his carriage on 6th April 1919 between Assauti and Palwal. Since reported to be a cracker thrown by a sling.

3. *The 10th April 1919.*—A large and rowdy mob at Amritsar Station set fire to the Goods Shed, smashed the Cabin Point Lever and killed one European Guard, Mr. Robinson

4. *The 10th April 1919.*—The mob looted and burnt Bhagtanwala Station; furniture, tickets, books and other property was looted and burnt.

5. *The 11th April 1919.*—A large mob looted and burnt Kasur Station, damaged wires, killed two Europeans, injured one European and made efforts to release a prisoner from the custody of a Police Constable.

6. *The 12th April 1919.*—Station Patti was attacked, Goods Office doors were broken, both level crossing gates, four points discs, two point locks and other things taken away. Telegraph wire between Posts Nos. 227-7 and 236-13 between Patti and Gharyala connection, one outer signal burner and wire seriously damaged.

7. *The 12th April 1919.*—Station Master, Nur Mahal, reported that the telegraph wire had been cut at Telegraph Post No. 4, Railway mile No. 13, towards Nakodar.

8. *The 12th April 1919.*—Station Master, Khem Karan reported that the station was attacked by a mob and Government property destroyed.

9. *The 13th April 1919.*—Station Superintendent, Amritsar, wired that about 2-30 on 13th April 1919 at mile No. 310-5 between Chheharta and Khasa one rail length complete with sleepers removed from both up and down lines. Engine and 8 vehicles of 3-Up Special Goods derailed. Both lines blocked. Station Master, Khasa, accident wire reported train badly looted.

10. *The 13th April 1919.*—Telegraph wires beyond Barara Station at mile 133-22 were found cut on 13th April 1919.

11. *The 13th April 1919.*—District Traffic Superintendent, Karachi, wired from Raewind that a stone was thrown at Refreshment Car 7-Up Mail on 13th April 1919 at Kot Radha Kishen facing points when going out from the platform; window of Car broken, passenger slightly injured on head.

12. *The 13th April 1919.*—Lahore. Guard train of No. 48 reports wires cut and posts uprooted at mile 27 between Harbanspura and Jallo.

13. *The 13th April 1919.*—Amritsar. Derailed wagon No. 2151 and robbed contents at Chheharta.

Continued.] Mr. V. H. BOALTH.

14. *The 13th April 1919.*—Amritsar. Crowd set fire to Canal bridge at mile 290-19 near Amritsar.

15. *The 14th April 1919.*—Station Master, Gujranwala, wired that all wires beyond Gujranwala were cut on 14th April 1919 and trains wrecked ; Station Bridge set on fire, Driver, Guard and Fireman mobbed and beaten and train was being robbed. Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police wired that two Railway bridges on both sides of the Station burnt by mob.

16. *The 14th April 1919.*—Wagah Station was burnt on 14th April 1919.

17. *The 14th April 1919.*—Sub-Divisional Officer, Delhi, wired that rails and Parnala Bridge, mile No. 385, between Bahadurgarh and Gheora dismantled, have since been repaired.

18. *The 14th April 1919.*—Sub-Divisional Officer, IV wired that the telegraph wires at mile 397-8 between Delhi, Kishengunj and Shakurpore had been cut.

19. *The 14th April 1919.*—Some 300 men threw stones at the 35-Up at Hafizabad and broke several windows. Case reported by Lieutenant Tatam of Grass Farm, Lyallpur, 1st class passenger in train.

20. *The 14th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Lala Musa, wired that an attempt to burn the ticket almirah had been made at Jhelum at 20 hours on 14th April 1919.

21. *The 14th April 1919.*—Sub-Divisional Officer, S. S. Bishen Singh, reported that the Armoured Train had been derailed at Wagah in the early hours of 14th April 1919.

22. *The 14th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Bahawalnagar, wired that Telegraph wires were interrupted and that the whole railway staff, Loco Engineering and Traffic struck work at 10-30 on 14th April 1919.

23. *The 14th April 1919.*—Montgomery. Wire cut at mile 674-23 and 24.

24. *The 14th April 1919.*—Railway employees put a trolly on the line at Bahawalnagar to stop train No. 29. The train was stopped.

25. *The 14th April 1919.*—Wire cut near Chheru, Police Station, Jullundur.

26. *The 14th April 1919.*—Railway employees stole a trolly and placed it on the line at Bahawalnagar.

27. *The 15th April 1919.*—Permanent Way Inspector, Okara, wired that two loose shackles of carriage couplings had been placed on the line at mile 676-24.

28. *The 15th April 1919*—Traffic Inspector, Qilla Sheikhupura, from Chichoki Mallian, wired that the wires of telegraph posts 19-5, 6, 7, and 8 between Chichoki Mallian and Qilla Sheikhupura were cut on the night of the 14-15th, and an outer signal of Up side of Qilla Sheikhpura damaged slightly.

29. *The 15th April 1919.*—Sub-Way Inspector and Railway Police wired from Chuharkana that outer signal wires and glasses were broken on 15th April 1919, Canal Bridge at mile No. 30-1 set on fire, line between Bahalike and Chuharkana dismantled to Telegraph Posts. Station Master of Chuharkana wired that telegraph wires were cut off and station looted and burnt. Head Constable, Chuharkana, wired that parcels from 17-Up mixed looted, carriage and engine damaged, Station Master seriously injured.

30. *The 15th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Lyallpur, wired that line was damaged between Qila Sheikhupura and Bahilike on 15th April 1919.

31. *The 15th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Telegraph, reported to District Traffic Superintendent, that wires between Jantipur, Batala, Chhina, Sohal, Dhariwal and Dinanagar had been cut. A military party, which patrolled in a light engine up to Gurdaspur, subsequently reported that the wires were found damaged.

32. *The 15th April 1919.*—Station Master, Pattoki and Railway Police, Montgomery, wired that wires between Changa, Manga, and Pattoke at mile 708-11 and 12 were cut on 15th April 1919, and that heavy pieces of wood were placed on the line.

33. *The 15th April 1919.*—Station Master, Kot Radha Kishen, wired that he had been informed that three telegraph wires and one copper wire were cut at mile No. 730 post 4 between Raewind and Kot Radha Kishen on 15th April 1919.

34. *The 15th April 1919.*—Station Master, Sangla Hill, wired that about 4 hours on 15th April 1919, dacoits suddenly came from Bahalike side and burnt and looted everything at the Moman Station. Telegraph instruments, signal and lamps burnt and broken.

35. *The 15th April 1919.*—Station House Officer, Railway Police, Jind, wired that on 15th April 1919 telegraph wires were cut between Rohtak and Samargopalpur, mile No. 367.

36. *The 15th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Wazirabad, reported that a riot had taken place at Gujarat on 15th April 1919. The rioters first broke the clock in the Station Master's office and cut the telegraph wires. They then broke all the station lamps, windows on the platform and afterwards set fire to all articles in the 1st and 2nd class booking offices.

37. *The 15th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Akalgarh, informed Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Wazirabad, that on the night of 14th-15th April 1919 the telegraph wires between Wazirabad and Akalgarh had been cut at various places.

38. *The 15th April 1919.*—Montgomery. Stones thrown at Mail Train No. 8-Down near Kot Radha Kishen. Two shots fired from train.

39. *The 15th April 1919.*—Lyallpur. Crowd puts stones on line and broke glasses of signals and cut wires.

40. *The 15th April 1919.*—Wires cut by rioters between Wazirabad and Sodhra at mile 1-3 and 13. Distant signals thrown down. Bridge at Nizamabad burnt.

41. *The 15th April 1919.*—Crowd detraining from train No. 25 at Sialkot raised crises of "*Mahatma Gandhi ki jai*" and burnt a 3rd class carriage.

42. *The 15th April 1919.*—Wires cut between Sodoke and Muridki.

43. *The 16th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Sangrur, reported that the telegraph had been imperfect since 21 hours on 15th April 1919 between Barnala and Hadâya.

44. *The 16th April 1919.*—Station Master, Shankar, wired that station was robbed by thieves on 16th April 1919. Heavy losses.

45. *The 16th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Jaitu, reported that 4 insulators at mile 78-4 were broken on 16th April 1919.

46. *The 16th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Sialkot, informed that between miles 24-16 and 17 two joints of railway lines were opened by rioters on 16th April 1919. One plate and 3 bolts of one joint and 2 bolts of 2nd one have been taken away. At mile 23-14 and 15 telegraphic wires cut near Sialkot.

47. *The 16th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Jaranwala, wired that Dhaban Singh Station was looted and burnt on 16th April 1919.

48. *The 16th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Jhelum, reported that the engine of 19-Up, with three carriages was overturned on 16th April 1919. The accident was due to one rail having been uprooted at mile 442-5 between Kala and Dina Stations.

49. *The 16th April 1919.*—Montgomery. Wires cut at mile 870-4.

50. *The 16th April 1919.*—Montgomery. Wires cut at mile 803.

51. *The 16th April 1919.*—Wires cut between mile 249 and 252 near Tarn Taran.

52. *The 17th April 1919.*—The Railway Police, Lyallpur, reported that a telegraph post near mile 108-4 between Lyallpur and Gatti had been cut.

53. *The 17th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Daud Khel, wired that all wires between Masan and Doud Khel had been cut.

54. *The 17th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Jullundur City, wired that the wire between Nakodar and Shankar had been cut at mile 18-2.

55. *The 17th April 1919.*—Railway Police, Malakwal, wired that 34-Down mixed train worked by couple engines was wrecked between Harriah and Malakwal near canal bridge on 17th April 1919. Both engines derailed. Front brake and a 3rd class bogie smashed.

Accident due to removal of one set of rails with sleepers from track. Telegraph wires cut and communication interrupted between Harriah, Malakwal and Lala Musa. One Fireman and passenger killed. One Gurkha Sepoy injured.

56. *The 17th April 1919.*—Station Master, Lyallpur, wired that 4 stacks baled *bhusa* belonging to Military Grass Farm caught fire on 17th April 1919. Cause unknown.

57. *The 17th April 1919.*—About 15 men at Railway Station Chak Jhumra delivered seditious speeches.

58. *The 18th April 1919.*—Government Railway Police, Kaithal, wired that a crowd of about 100 boys and men rushed on to the platform at 8 hours on 18th April 1919, but did no damage. Again at 8-30 hours another group came and broke street lamps and window glasses. *Hartal* in City.

59. *The 18th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Bhatinda, wired that telegraph wire had been cut between Roman and Shergarh at mile 170-14-15.

60. *The 18th April 1919.*—Station House Officer, Jullundur, wired that an armed group of men plundered Railway Station, Sidhwan, on 18th April 1919.

61. *The 18th April 1919.*—Sub-Divisional Officer at Amritsar reports that wire of outer signal at Bilga was cut on 18th April 1919.

62. *The 18th April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Bhatinda, wired that an attempt was made to cut wire at Telegraph Posts 219-18 between Katarsinghwala and Bhatinda on 21st April 1919.

63. *The 18th April 1919.*—Jullundur. A mile plate and a description board broken.

64. *The 18th April 1919.*—Lala Musa. Officer Commanding, Railway Station, reported that one Hira Singh was in possession of seditious literature. Hira Singh arrested, as he could give no satisfactory answers.

65. *The 18th April 1919.*—Ferozepore. At mile 50-10 a telegraph post was placed across the line and bolts were also removed at mile 50-10. Gates at mile 49-16 removed.

66. *The 19th April 1919.*—Station Master, Toba Tek Singh, wired that telegraph wire cut by dacoits at mile 61-1 and between Toba Tek Singh and Janiwala on the night of 18-19th April 1919 and communication interrupted.

67. *The 19th April 1919.*—A stack of reeds set fire to at Sargodha Station.

68. *The 21st April 1919.*—Sub-Inspector, Railway Police, Jullundur; wired that a telegraph wire was cut between Dasuya and Tanda Urmar on the night of 20-21st April 1919.

69. *The 1st May 1919.*—Sub-Divisional Officer, Multan, wired that one telegraph wire had been cut at mile 141-21 on 1st May 1919, between MacLeod Gunj and Minchinabad and a mile piece of the post length is missing.

B—RAILWAY PERMITS.

Railway permits.—On April 15th, 1919, Martial Law Notice No. 4 prohibited the issue of 3rd or Inter Class Tickets at all stations in the Lahore Civil Command, except in the case of servants travelling with their European masters or servants or others in the employ of Government.

On April 22nd, 1919, the following Martial Law Notice was issued :—" Notice is hereby given that permits to obtain 3rd and Inter Class Railway tickets at the stations in this area, *viz.*, Lahore Junction and Badami Bagh, can only be obtained on personal application to the Assistant Inspector-General, Railway Police, near Lahore Junction Station or at Command Head-Quarters, Punjab Club, between 10·00 and 17·00 daily."

Between April 22nd and May 3rd (inclusive) 1,800 passes were issued by the Assistant Inspector-General. The urgency of the application was decided by the Assistant Inspector-General. There was no real difficulty in obtaining passes. Passengers with through tickets, who broke journey at Lahore because there were no night trains running, did not require permits to proceed. On April 30th the Officer Commanding, Lahore (Civil) Area, decided that people leaving Lahore for a few days might be given passes to their destination and back. From May 5th Martial Law permits were abolished.

Traffic Travelling Restrictions.—On May 12th, owing to the reduction on train service on the Section Lahore to Peshwar, the booking of Inter and 3rd class passengers from stations on the North Western Railway to all stations on the Section Lahore to Peshawar and *via* that Section (Lahore exclusive) was stopped by the Traffic Manager.

The restriction did not apply to—

(*a*) Government servants on duty.
(*b*) Military and sepoys returning from furlough.
(*c*) Servants (limited to two) of 1st and 2nd class passengers.

The restriction also did not apply to booking from Lahore to stations in the Lyallpur District and *vice versâ* in through trains *via* Shahdara only.

Complaints.—After the abolition of the permit system on May 5th complaints were received of its re-introduction, but such complaints were generally false and, where true, were due to the Railway authorities demanding permits for the issue of 3rd and Inter class tickets for Mail Trains. On May 15th the Traffic Manager stopped this practice. No truth was found in complaints that sepoys and students were being harrassed and prevented from travelling. The only real trouble experienced by the public was the restriction of the train service, and in this respect British and Indians suffered alike.

C.—CHECKING STATIONS.

On April 19th, 1919, Military orders were received verbally through the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, that persons holding Inter and 3rd class tickets were forbidden to enter by rail the districts of Lahore and Amritsar. The following exceptions were made :—

(*a*) Servants of European passengers.
(*b*) Rank and File of the Indian Army holding warrants.
(*c*) Government servants travelling on duty and in possession of written authority.

All passengers not coming within these exceptions were ordered to be detrained and not allowed to proceed.

Orders were issued that tickets should be checked, but not that persons should be searched.

Checking stations were established by the Assistant Inspector-General, Railway Police, at Kaiser-i-Hind, Montgomery and Jullundur under the supervision of European Sergeants. A checking station was also formed at Beas by the Superintendent of Police, Amritsar, under Military orders. After the issue of these orders instructions were issued later on April 19th that they were only to be enforced against suspicious characters,—*vide* W. A. 195 Ordinance. The checking posts were accordingly notified at once. On April 19th the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, directed that suspects should be detained and orders applied for under Defence of India Act, Rule 3. On April 20th the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, informed that Assistant Inspector-General Railway Police, that 1st and 2nd class Indian passengers should be detained if suspicious.

No suspects were ever detected by the Police at any of the checking stations. No complaints about searches were ever made by the public with the solitary exception of a complaint by the President, *Ahmadiyya-Anjuman-Ishaat-Islam*, on 10th May to the Chief Secretary to Government, Punjab, that some ladies related to him had been searched at Amritsar and Beas. An enquiry held by Sirdar Bishen Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police,

posted at Amritsar, showed that the report was ill-founded, and that the ladies' baggage only and not their persons had been searched.

On April 24th and 26th checking posts were established at Lala Musa and Wazirabad, respectively, by the Assistant Inspector-General, Railway Police, under the supervision of European Sergeants, on the request of the Military authorities, and orders were issued to the posts to detrain suspicious characters and produce them before the military.

From May 5th Colonel Money, Administrator, Martial Law, 16th (Indian) Division, directed that inspections at checking posts should be held on in-coming mail trains only, and that Inter and 3rd class passengers would have to alight at those places and undergo inspection. The same date an order was issued by Colonel Money that a strict watch should be kept at Lala Musa for Frontier Emissaries of the Maulvi, Haji and Talib-ul-Ilm type. Khan Bahadur Abdul Hakim, Deputy Superintendent of Police, was put in charge of this work and engaged 3 informers. No complaints of oppression by the Police were received, and no further inspection orders were issued. The checking posts were abolished with Martial Law.

D.—PERSONS DEBARRED FROM ENTERING THE MARTIAL LAW AREA.

Under orders from the Military authorities communicated through the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, on 12th May 1919, Mr. Eardley Norton, Mr. C. F. Andrews, Mr. Langford James, L. N. Roy and Saiyad-ul-Hassan (editor of the *Independent*) were prohibited from entering the Martial Law Area. If seen trying to enter that area by train, they were to be asked to turn back, and if they refused, they were to be produced before the Military authorities. On 16th May 1919, similar orders were passed concerning Moti Lal Nehru, Walter Gregory and C. R. Dass.

On May 14th, a proclamation was issued by Major-General C. M. Dobell, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, that legal practitioners, whose ordinary place of business was outside the Punjab, would not be allowed to enter the Martial Law Area included in the limits of the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division without the permission of the Administrator of Martial Law.

No. trouble ever took place between the Police, and the persons debarred from entering the Martial Law Area. Mr. Andrews, on one occasion, managed to get as far as Amritsar where he was detected and asked not to continue his journey. He returned to Delhi directly the Martial Law orders were read out to him.

E.—RAILWAY EMPLOYEES.

Meetings of employees of various Railway Departments were held in February and March 1918 to propose an increase of pay through their superior officers. They represented that everything was dear and demanded an increase of pay. They also urged shorter working hours, as they said that they had to work longer than before without any increase of wages. They sent memorials which were favourably considered, and which ended the whole affair. There was no fear of a strike, and there was no political motive behind the meetings which were purely economical in origin.

The North Western Railway employees, however, as a result of their success in 1918, began another similar campaign in January, February, March and April 1919. This started on the evening of 14th January 1919, when notices were found in the train carrying Railway workmen to the shops. The Loco and Carriage and Wagon workmen consulted and started a nominal strike. The Loco men, however, thinking that the Carriage and Wagon had deserted them, threw stones at them, which caused slight injuries to some of the European staff. To satisfy the Loco men that they were on their side the Carriage and Wagon workmen in the evening looted a few neighbouring shops.

This time the Railway employees asked for cheap grain to be supplied to them as well as an increase of pay. Considering the high prices cheap grain shops were opened by the Railway, and adequate steps were taken to see to the grievances of the men who had sent memorials to the Governor-General and Local Government and Railway authorities. Copies of some of these are attached.

Translation of a notice pasted by the Workshop men in carriages on 14th January 1919.

Second Notice.—Brothers of the Loco and Carriage Departments, listen ! There is a great famine, the rate of flour is nearly 4 seers per rupee and cloth and other things are dear. What can the poor man do ? You people should arrange. It was given us to understand that from 1st January 1919 every man would be given one anna increase, but the English do not keep their word. You people must arrange. If the English were our true Rulers, they should have taken care of their subjects, but they are not worthy to rule over us. You people must attack them, and thus we shall receive an increment. They do not give an increase to anyone. From the time this bastard King has succeeded to the throne the subjects have been in trouble. It would have been better had the Empress been on the throne, for the world would have received better comfort. We should be replied to by the 20th January 1919 or we will give great trouble to you, as those who are greatly troubled are obliged to fight. The English say that they treat us kindly, but if they do not, God knows what will happen.

Translation of a vernacular notice pasted by workmen on 15th January 1919.

My dearly beloved brethren, Sikh and Muhammadan, you should unite together, as the rate of flour has risen considerably and you should also take steps to secure increments.

Hundred curses on Carriage men.

It is desired to strike work on 16th January 1919 at 12 hours and the oath of the cow is given to sikhs and that of the pig to Muhammadans if they go into the Carriage works at 12 hours on that day. He will be a bastard who goes into the workshops.

Translation of a vernacular notice pasted by workmen on 15th January 1919.

You have done a very bad thing in that you looted the poor shopkeeper and did not touch the other fellow named Nathu. This is not an act of good men but of bastards.

Both Hindus and Muhammadans are ordered to loot the other shopkeeper, Nathu, by 11-20 in the morning. If this is not done, you will be considered scoundrels. All are ordered to loot Nathu, shopkeeper ; he who does not do so will be a bastard.

This shopkeeper (Nathu) supplied different stuff to Babus and Mistris to that supplied to workmen. How is it that he was not looted ?

You are again hereby directed that Nathu, shopkeeper, must be looted.

Translation of a notice pasted by workshop men in the carriage on 14th January 1919.

I beg to state before every gentlemen that there is a great famine in these days. All the creation of God is dying from hunger ; the rate of flour is 5 seers per rupee and Dal is 2 seers per rupee. If officers of the workshop do not remedy this, we all should go to Government House before His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab.

The Hon'ble Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN, M.A., Bar-at-Law, Member, Punjab Legislative Council.

Herewith notes of the points on which I can give evidence if required to do so :—

1. POSITION AND STATUS IN LIFE.

I am a Barrister of 18 years standing, President of the High Court Bar Association, Member of the Punjab Legislative Council (representing the Punjab University), a Fellow and a Syndicate of the Punjab University Secretary of the Law Faculty and the Law College Committee, Secretary Provincial Muslim League, Member, Congress Committee, etc., etc., I am a member of an agricultural tribe, and a land owner.

II.—CAUSES OF THE DISTURBANCES.

I. Remote and in common with other parts of India—

(*a*) Ferment in Political thought due to the principles enunciated by Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd George.

(*b*) Economic Conditions.

(*c*) War and War strain.

2. Remote and peculiar to the Punjab.

(*a*) *Special war strain.*—Recruitment and war loans and charities; and circumstances attending upon these were such as to undermine the faith of the people in British India. Conscription and war taxation would have been less irksome and less harmful than the so-called voluntary recruitment and voluntary contributions;

(*b*) attitude of the Local Government towards the Reforms Scheme, Political movements in general, the Press and the Indian Leaders. Then again, the people felt that Local Government had renounced British principles and ideals, and was for repression and abuse of the Defence of India Act after the Russian methods;

(*c*) the educated classes were being put back, and by means of Jagirs and grants of lands a Rais class was being created to counterpoise the influence of the educated class.

3. Immediate causes.

(*a*) Rowlatt Bill legislation and all the agitation which attended upon it;

(*b*) Local Government's policy of repression further strengthened to meet this agitation;

(*c*) Amritsar deportations;

(*d*) Gandhi's exclusion from the Punjab and from Delhi. This again demonstrated to the people that the authorities had no regard for law and justice, and were unnecessarily excluding respected and revered leaders, on pretexts which failed to convince the people;

4. The disorders in the Punjab were not the results of any conspiracy. At Amritsar, deportations caused excitment, and the mob instead of being tactfully soothed, were fired upon, again showing disregard for British principles of dealing with crowds and mobs. This act of lawlessness and tactlessness rendered the ignorant mob wild, and then the mob committed acts of violence. Exaggerated reports and rumours about Amritsar affairs spread to Kasur and caused excitement which the ignorant were not capable of controlling.

In Lahore also there was great excitement but as the people were not quite ignorant, they were able to control themselves and committed no deeds of violence, and were fired upon. Again exaggerated reports and rumours spread to Gujranwala and other places and caused disturbances there.

In each case one mistake led to another and the situation got worse.

III.—WAS THERE ANY NEED FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF MARTIAL LAW ?

(*a*) *Amritsar.*—On the 11th and 12th the Police and the Military were in full control of the city, and on the 13th in an un-British way the people were fired upon. On the 14th everything there had settled down. There was no occasion to introduce Martial Law on the 14th.

(*b*) *Lahore.*—There was no justification for it. On the 14th everything was quiet, and European ladies were walking and cycling about as usual, yet on the 15th Martial Law was introduced. Continuance of *Hartal* was due to successive mistakes of the authorities, and the unpopularity of the Head of the Province.

(*c*) The same holds true of other places.

Why Martial Law introduced ?

1. Martial Law appears to have been introduced not to suppress revolt, rebellion or even disorders, but to punish the political workers suspected of having directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously contributed towards the creation of an atmosphere which was favourable to disturbances. In almost every case Martial Law was introduced after the restoration of order.

2. To minimise the unwarranted and ruthless slaughter at the Jullianwala Bagh and to justify it subsequently.

IV.—WAS THERE ANY JUSTIFCATION FOR CONTINUING THE MARTIAL LAW DURING THE WHOLE OF APRIL AND ALSO DURING MAY AND JUNE ?

None whatsoever.

V.—ADMINISTRATION OF MARTIAL LAW.

This again was calculated not to restore peace and order, but "to strike the imagination of the Indians," to humiliate and disgrace them *e. g.* :—

1. *Night Passes.*—Required on the basis of nationality. An Indian Judge of the High Court, an Additional Secretary to the Punjab Government and pro-Government men like Mr. Shafi and Sir Zulfikar Ali all required Night Passes.

2. *Passes for Travelling.*—As a rule issued only on the recommendation of a non-Indian, an Indian could get a pass if recommended by his Anglo-Indian Chauffeur or Butler, but not on his own representation. Mr. Shafi (now member of the Executive Council of the Viceroy) and Sir Zulfikar Ali and Mr. Shah Nawaz can support this allegation.

3. Martial Law Regulations made to punish those who had been taking leading part in Political movements *e.g.*, placarding the gate posts and walls of the residences of such men. This distinction was conferred on me also though on account of my absence from Lahore, no fault could otherwise be found with me. The explanation that the posters and placards is incorrect, as in one small lane no less than three houses were selected, while there were many lanes where no posters were put up.

4. Members of the Legal profession were subjected to greater annoyances and indignities than others.

5. Students were subjected to great indignities and humiliation, in some Colleges parades were called four times a day in the hot sun, and the Military arrangements for roll call under the shadow of bayonets and Machine guns were obviously made to humiliate them and touch their imaginations rather than secure peace and good order.

6. Incidents as to compulsory *salaaming* by respectable people have occurred in Lahore (Mr. Shah Nawaz, B.A., L.L.B., Bar.-at -law, Lahore, can give instances) and Mr. Bashir Ahmad, B.A. (Punjab and Oxon), Barrister-at-Law, son of the late Mr. Justice Shah Din and son-in-Law of the Hon'ble Mian Mohammad Shafi was one of the victims.

VI. *Police.*—In Lahore, the higher C. I. D. officials are not known to have done anything improper, though the police in general and others personating as police officials appear to have made great harvest.

In Amritsar, it is said, vast sums were collected by the Police as bribes.

VII. It was the news of the application of Martial Law in Lahore and Amritsar and other places that gave false alarm to other places and possibly to Afghanistan, and thus helped in bringing about Afghan War.

The Hon'ble Bahadur Khan Bahadur Mian FAZL-I-HUSSAIN—*concluded*—Mr. H. K. TREVASKIS—Mr. R. C. BOLSTER.

VIII.—EFFECT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF MARTIAL LAW AND ITS CONTINUANCE FOR MORE THAN TWO MONTHS, AND ITS ADMINISTRATION.

1. Faith of the people in British Justice and Rule of law has been undermined. It has whitewashed Ahmad Shahs and Nadar Shahs whom in our school days taught to dread as inhuman tyrants.

The very foundations on which the British Empire in India is based have been shaken and in consequence the cause of peace and good order cannot be said to have been served.

2. Coming as it has done within a year of the end of the World War, it has shown that the authorities in India responsible for it have yet to be converted to the doctrine that Right is Might.

Mr. H. K. TREVASKIS, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gurgaon.

The circumstances of the Gurgaon District are exceptional, for, while the district is so very quiet, it is very close to the disturbed area of Delhi. Though the Delhi propaganda failed in its intentions, and found Gurgaon an unsatisfactory breeding ground, the latter district was not entirely without predisposing causes of unrest, which primarily affected the Municipal Areas and only secondarily and through them the villages.

Investigation has conclusively proved that the unrest in Gurgaon was almost entirely originated from Delhi. Pressure was exercised by the Delhi *Banias* on local *Banias* to start *hartal* by refusing *hundis*, threatening to break off marriage and other connections, and other forms of pressure, commercial and otherwise, which rich men can exercise over poor clients.

The *zamindars* of this district are in the hands of the *Banias* to an extent which can hardly be believed and the *Banias* here put pressure on the *zamindars* to join in demonstrations in favour of *hartal*.

Apart from commercial pressure, a number of emissaries were sent from Delhi to stir up the people.

Mr. R. C. BOLSTER, Deputy Commissioner, Rohtak.

I.—PREDISPOSING CAUSES OF THE UNREST.

A. Political.

The main predisposing cause was undoubtedly the doctrines of the Arya Samaj working upon the political ambition of the Jats, who are the dominant community in the District. Those officers who have been absent from the District in recent years would probably find it hard to realize how active and how avid of power the Jats have become. In past years it was perhaps the fashion to regard a Jat as a simple bucolic person with few ideas beyond husbandry and very slightly amenable to religious influences. With the advent of the Arya Samaj, some quarter of a century ago, and the extension of education all this has changed. The Arya Samaj has had a complete success among Jats (though there are of course some who still adhere to the tenets of the Sanatan Dharam), the reason being that it admits a claim of the Jat to be Rajput and thereby uplifts him in the social scale. The Jat is intensely clannish by nature and, however, prone to faction (Khap) within his own community, is always ready to make common cause against another race or creed. It is thus easy to see what an accretion of strength the conversion of Jats on a large scale has meant to the Arya Samaj and how suitable Arya doctrines of Swaraj are to the Jat appetite for political power.

Among every sect and race there are young hot-bloods reared on modern education who are impatiently awaiting the advent of the Political millenium. These restless spirits cherish a very vivid sense of their rights without keeping before them a corresponding view of their obligations. The *Satyagraha—Hartal* movement was pre-eminently a young man's movement

The Indian National Congress has recently been very active. Last year was the first occasion on which converts in any numbers was made from the rural population.

The trading and business classes, though they cannot have failed to profit from the War, still cherish resentment against the Land Alienation and Co-operative Society Acts and dislike adequate taxation in the form of the Income and Excess Profits Taxes.

It is possible that after over four years of War the District and Provincial Administration had become too closely fashioned to the immediate needs of the War and took too little account of other contingencies and dangers. It is certainly a fact that the District Intelligence System proved singularly inadequate to the needs of the unrest, little or no information reaching the authorities in time to enable them to deal with particular situations.

The international situation and the permeation of the world by Bolshevist doctrines is also not to be forgotten.

B. Economic.

The prominent predisposing economic cause was certainly the effect of the War in raising prices. The trading classes seized the opportunity for profiteering and acquired an added sense of their political power. People on small fixed incomes, and particularly petty Government servants, felt the pinch and began to swell the discontented classes.

The very high mortality from Influenza at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919 shook and weakened the social structure, depriving many families of their bread-winners and many others of the moderate counsels of the older men.

As to the classes which were chiefly affected these certainly were the persons on small fixed incomes above referred to rather than the essentially agricultural and urban classes, both of whom profited by high prices while the former reaped the advantage of military pay and pensions.

The methods used to exploit existing discontent, other than the now classic ones of *Satyagraha* and *hartal*, were numerous. Newspapers like the "Vijaya" and "Congress" were widely circulated and eagerly read. The leaders of the movement at Delhi at the end of March and beginning of April started a well thought-out system of propaganda in adjoining districts; special emissaries like Maulvi Bashir Ahmad of Delhi and Pandit Tota Ram of Aligarh appeared in the Rohtak District; mass meetings were held and inflammatory speeches were made. A very successful oral "Publicity" scheme was started, the object of which was to circulate lying rumours of a kind most damaging to Government and the fact that it was exclusively oral made it most difficult to combat. The trading classes in centres of sedition brought financial pressure, such as the dishonouring of bills, to bear on persons and places which stood out against the movement. Finally, there was the Hindu-Muhammadan rapprochement, with its ban on cow-killing and its insistence on commensality and the ability of the two religions, if united, to settle their differences without the assistance of Government. While both religions were united in opposition to the Rowlatt Act the cordiality of the Muhammadan support given to the Hindu was certainly promoted by the desire of the pan-

Islamists for Hindu aid when the time should come to work up an agitation about the woes of Turkey.

Delhi became the centre of attraction for the rural population, and especially the Jats, of the Rohtak District, who in large numbers used a convenient train service to spend the day in Delhi and feed upon the local excitement there, with accounts of which they returned to regale those who had stayed behind in Rohtak, the evening gatherings in Rohtak Mandi, after the arrival of the evening train from Delhi being for long a special feature of an anxious period.

About the campaign of misrepresentation against the Rowlatt Act a great deal need not be said. It will be sufficient to note its essentially artificial nature; Indian politicians who were lawyers by profession, ended by saying that after study, they had convinced themselves that the Act was not as dangerous as they had first supposed; yet these were the men who had had every opportunity in both Imperial and Provincial Legislative Councils of informing themselves at every stage of the development of the Act and it is remarkable that their conversion dates from the time the folly and wickedness of their opposition had been proved by the actual result of rioting and disorder. The opposition to the Rowlatt Act was of course a means to an end and not an end in itself, and one of its most prominent features was the fact that the movement was so strong and so far-reaching that no single private person in the Rohtak District was able to stand out against it.

II.—Chronological Narrative of Events.

3rd April.—Deputy Superintendent, Police, who had been sent to tour on the Delhi border, reported that a big meeting had been held at Delhi, the object of which was to arrange visits by emissaries from Delhi to work up the *hartal* in all adjoining districts.

5th April.—Meeting held at a Bahadurgarh; lecture by Pandit Tota Ram of Aligarh.

6th April.—Rohtak.—Hartal held during day, followed by a meeting in the evening. Refusal to make a bier and dig a grave for the Reverend Carlyon, who had died that morning.

Bahadurgarh.—Meeting in evening with address by Pandit Tota Ram of Aligarh.

Sonepat.—Hartal during day, followed by public meeting in City Mandi.

11th April.—Rohtak.—Mass meeting at Gaukaran Tank, at which sale of proscribed literature was advocated. Formation of a Joint Hindu and Muhammadan Committee.

Bahadurgarh.—Hartal held.

Jhajjar.—Hartal held.

12th April.—Hartal held at Bari after pressure from Delhi.

14th April.—Rohtak.—Offer of enrolment as Special Constables made by Deputy Commissioner to members of Joint Hindu and Muhammadan Committee and refused by them. Hon'ble Chaudhri Lal Chand confesses his inability either to get any residents of Rohtak to join him in a loyal manifesto or to issue one over his own name only.

Bahadurgarh.—Attempt by a joint mob of rioters from the Mandi and Railway Staff to damage a Railway Bridge and wreck a Mail train.

15th April.—Rohtak.—Seditious notice found posted on Delhi Gate Railway Telegraph wires cut at mile 357. Arrival of Troops.

Sonepat.—Mass meeting held at *Imambara.*

Ganaur.—Meeting of Kasias, held under threat of injury from Hindus to stop cow-killing.

Gohana.—Postal telegraph wire damaged.

16th April.—Rohtak.—Lying story circulated about rape of a weaver woman by soldiers.

17th April.—Rohtak.—Leaders of Joint Hindu and Muhammadan Committee summoned and warned by Deputy Commissioner.

18th April.—Sonepat.—Mass meeting fixed for this day abandoned owing to action taken to warn leaders.

20th April.—Canal wire cut near Jat High School, Rohtak.

24th April.—Signs of resistance to *Thikri Pahra* shown by Arya villages.

27th April.—Bahadurgarh.—Mass meeting fixed for this day abandoned, owing to action taken to warn leaders.

28th April.—Rohtak.— Arrest under Defence of India Rules of Tek Ram Jat, a man of violent character and a likely leader of a Jat mob.

Measures for protection of life and property.

Thikri Pahra under Punjab Act No. VIII of 1918 was introduced at the middle of April for the protection of the permanent-way and telegraphs of all Railways, of Postal-telegraph wires and of the Canal telegraph wire and is still in force.

A special scheme for guarding Railway Bridges was also introduced (not under Punjab Act No. VIII of 1918) for all the three Railways in the District; this was withdrawn in the case of the East Indian Railway on the 9th current.

The Canal wire was cut near the Jat High School on the 20th April; I gave the School the chance (since the case could not be proved against them) of showing their loyalty by guarding the wire for a distance of a mile on either side of the school.

It would be out of place here to detail those measures which were taken in accordance with the accepted principles of internal security schemes; I mention, however, the following which were of a rather special nature, *viz.*:—

(*i*) preparation by Deputy Commissioner in consultation with a Military Officer of Local Defence Schemes for Tahsils, it having been found that few Tahsildars, or Thanedars had thought out what ought to be done in case of attack on a Tahsil;

(*ii*) A sixteen-seater motor bus was obtained temporarily to ensure the mobility of the Troops at Rohtak and to enable the Deputy Commissioner to proceed promptly to the scene of any local disturbance.

The Armoured Train got together by the General Officer Commanding, Delhi Brigade, was, by permission of that officer, obtained and used for a journey to Bahadurgarh, where its appearance probably had a salutary effect. By arrangement with the same officer an aeroplane visited as a demonstration on the 22nd April Rohtak, Sampla, Bahadurgath, Sonepat and Ganaur.

Most of the local pleaders were implicated in the *Satyagraha—Hartal* movement, though to varying extent.

A Canal telegraph wire was cut near the Jat High School. There was no actual proof that the students or staff were responsible, but there remained a very strong suspicion to that effect. Otherwise schoolboys took no known part in the disturbances.

Traders were especially prominent at the three places in the District at which there are *mandis*, *viz.*, Rohtak, Sonepat and Bahadurgarh. In the mob that attempted to wreck the Bahadurgarh Railway bridge traders formed the very large majority. There are a close corporation and have their own leaders and their own representatives on Municipal Committees. A Vaish sectarian High School has lately been started in Rohtak. The traders of the larger centres, and particularly those of places on the Delhi border, exerted pressure on their caste fellows in other places.

Among Government servants the only known offenders were the Railway Staff at Bahadurgarh Station and one School Master. The District Inspector of Schools has been asked to keep his eyes open in future, as a number of school masters have been mentioned to me as men of doubtful loyalty.

In the little actual open disorder that occurred the rural population held aloof, but the statement requires some further qualification, thus, there are three main elements, *viz.* Jats, Muhammadan Rajputs and Gaur

Mr. R. C. BOLSTER—*concluded*—Mr. R. B. WHITEHEAD

Brahmans. Out of these no blame can be laid at the door of Gaur Brahmans and Ranghars (Muhammadan Rajputs), but it would not, I think, have taken much more to make the Jats ready to go in. A leading Jat (and not an Arya) once said to me " If anyone could lead us astray, it would be a Jat like ourselves," and the neo-Jats are all Aryas and they have no lack of Jat leaders.

III.—NATURE OF THE MOVEMENT, HOW FAR DISLOYAL, ANTI-EUROPEAN OR ANTI-CHRISTIAN.

I have remarked above that the movement had all the above three elements. Native Christians resident in and near Gohana and Sonepat were very much alarmed and thought they were on the brink of another Mutiny. Throughout the *hartal* of the 6th at Rohtak, there was strong opposition to the idea of allowing the last duties to be paid to the body of the Reverend Mr. Carlyon, an aged Missionary, who was in the course of 25 years' self-denying ministration in Rohtak had never offended the religious sentiment of any Indian community by an undue zeal in proselytizing. The cry of the mob, mostly composed of traders from the *mandi*, that made the attempt on the Bahadurgarh Railway bridge was " Break up the bridge ; the rule of the English has disappeared." The meeting held on the 11th at Rohtak had the openly revolutionary object of selling proscribed literature in accordance with Gandhi's recent campaign, and it was the point at which Hindu and Muhammadan unity took its start.

The attempt to wreck No. 4 Down Mail at Bahadurgarh appears to have been made because that train was known to be carrying a company of European wireless men from Karachi.

IV.—METHODS ADOPTED BY REBELS AND DISTURBERS OF THE PEACE.

Organisation of strikes.—This method was most in evidence at Bahadurgarh, the station nearest to Delhi, though efforts were made on Sonepat. Here the principle that disorder breeds disorder was very much in evidence; for the rioters used a story that Shakurpur Station had been looted and the Station and Yard-Masters injured as an inducement to people at Bahadurgarh to break out. A private wire urging all Railway employés to strike appears to have been circulated on the 13th April, the day before the attempt was made on the bridge near Bahadurgarh.

Attacks on communications.—Of these there were, as already stated, four in the District, though only the one at Bahadurgarh was really serious in character. It is noticeable that a single plan seems to have inspired many of these attacks : thus the train wrecking mob at Bahadurgarh was preceded, as in the Gumanpura (Amritsar) case, by Railway gangmen.

Mr. R. B. WHITEHEAD, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Ambala.

Apparently the 30th March 1919 was first fixed by Mr. Gandhi for the *hartal* and the date seems to have been changed at the last moment to the 6th April. The leading pleaders in Ambala City were in touch with Delhi and Lahore and meetings were held on the 2nd and 3rd April at which it was decided to hold a *hartal* in Ambala City on the 6th April. Leaders in the public eye were Lalas Tara Chand and Nand Kishore (Arya Samaj) and Muhammad Hanif, Pleaders, but others were in the background. However the intellectuals do not appear to have much influence in Ambala City and on the 5th April the impression gained ground that the *hartal* fixed for the next day would be a fiasco as the citizens of influential old established families were holding aloof. Many shops opened on the morning of the 6th April but the *hartal* managers displayed much energy in getting shops to close and in organising a procession. Money-lenders and *sarrafs* identified themselves conspicuously with the *hartal* party. Some Muhammadan shops closed but many influential and respectable Muhammadans were unaffected. By midday possibly more than half the shops closed, but the demonstration was very lifeless and shops opened again in the afternoon. A meeting of protest against the Rowlatt Act was held on the evening of April 6th.

Nothing further happened till the news of Mr. Gandhi's arrest arrived on the 11th April.

The first thing that happened during my brief but eventful reign was the receipt of a cypher wire on the evening of the 11th April informing me of the serious disturbances in Amritsar and Lahore. In Ambala City the *hartal* party tried to close shops without success and held a meeting on the evening of 11th April.

On the afternoon of April 12th I called an informal meeting of some 14 or 15 influential representatives of the Bar, the Municipality and the City, and put the matter to them as plainly and reasonably as I could. Representatives of the Bar included Lalas Tara Chand and Nand Kishore. The tone of the meeting was quite good and each individual member promised his aid in *the maintenance of confidence and tranquility. I am glad to say that the members have played up and there has been no further organised attempt in Ambala City since the 11th April to disturb the peace.*

On the 13th April there was a complete *hartal* in Ambala Cantonment Sadar Bazar which is said to have been chiefly due to threats of boycott by the wholesalers of Delhi and Lahore. Apparently the latter have not got the same hold on Ambala City. At any rate when the Superintendent of Police and I rode through the City that morning, business was going on just as usual. Railway running was quite disorganised on that and the next day or two. That afternoon a large public meeting was held in Ambala Cantonment Sadar Bazar at which one or two very objectionable resolutions were passed. Just about this time telegraph wires were cut on the North Western Railway near Barara Station. This has been the only instance of wire cutting in this District.

Prompt action was taken by the General Officer Commanding, Ambala Cantonments, and military guards were posted in the civil station at the Police Lines and also at the Treasury by written orders of the 13th April.

The publicity campaign may be said to have started from the middle of April and I did my best to see that pamphlets and papers were sent to people who would not only read them but also explain the contents to others.

The main lines of both the North Western and East Indian Railways traverse parts of the District and a complete village patrol system was organised on the 15th April and following days. Special arrangements were made after consultation with the railway authorities, the military and the Commissioner for the protection of important railway bridges.

About the middle of April a delegation of Delhi butchers came and endeavoured to stop cow-killing in Ambala City without success. Just about this time too an emissary of the Swami Sharddhanand arrived but received so cold a reception that he left again by the next train.

At the end of April the tone of the City was so good that I obtained permission for the annual *Panlah Mela* to be held as usual. It lasted three days and was attended by thousands of people, but no untoward incidents were reported beyond the posting up of three or four inflammatory appeals which were at once torn down when discovered. A month later similar posters *were again found one morning. On each occasion they were only three or four in number, were written in an unformed hand on inferior foolscape paper and consisted of the crudest anti-British propaganda. They were torn* down as soon as discovered in one or two cases by the people themselves.

Mr. R. B. WHITEHEAD—*concluded*—Mr. L. L. TOMKINS.

On the 20th to 23rd April there were one or two cases of undoubted incendiarism in the Pioneer Lines at Ambala Cantonment.

There can be no doubt that seditious emissaries have visited various parts of the district but nothing came of their efforts. I deprecate overconfidence but think that if anything was or is going on underground I should have had at least an inkling of it. I have now been in the district nearly five years and have personally visited every village in four of the five Tahsils, so people are not backward in visiting me.

One or two reasons why the recent movement made so little an impression here can at once be set down. First of all the District is essentially rural. The so-caled Ambala City though the largest town after Ambala Cantonment only contains 26,000 inhabitants; Jagadhri comes next with 11,000. Then the peasants of the three southern Tahsils are poor spirited and backward—for an expression of opinion see Mr. Kensington's Ambala Tahsil Assessment Report, paragraph 11. The Rupar Sub-Division is more efficient and progressive, but the District takes little or no interest in politics and modern problems of the day. Ambala is quite a different world from the Central Punjab. The people are leaderless, they still dislike and distrust the Jagirdars who are the only prominent figureheads. The Jagirdars themselves with a few honourable exceptions are sunk in a life of indolence and self-indulgence and have no influence.

The Arya Samajists have seized upon the *Satyagraha* movement as a means of embarrassing Government, but it happens that the leaders of that community in Ambala City are moderate men.

Mr. L. L. TOMKINS, C.I.E., Deputy Inspector-General of Police.

1. The duty assigned to me was—

(*a*) to secure the conviction of the promoters and leaders in the disturbances, and

(*b*) to explore the organization underlying the disturbances.

In order not dislocate the existing organization of the Criminal Investigation Department, it was agreed that I should conduct the enquiries in conjunction with Mr. Cocks, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, and utilize the staff of that department as it stood, instead of constituting a separate and impromptu bureau for the special purpose of the investigation. This arrangement worked smoothly and time was saved by avoiding a preparatory organization. In order to facilitate the enquiries, the disturbed area was divided into three sections as follows:—

(*a*) Amritsar and country south of Lahore, including Kasur and Khem Karn, etc.,

(*b*) Lahore headquarters, and

(*c*) Gujranwala and places north of Lahore.

The staff of the Criminal Investigation Department was then similarly divided into three equal sections. To (*a*) were deputed Mr. Howell, Superintendent of Police, Criminal Branch, and Sardar Bahadur Sukha Singh, Deputy Superintendent, with one-third of the staff of Inspectors, Sub-inspectors and subordinates of the Criminal Investigation Department. To (*b*) were deputed Mr. Bowring, Superintendent of Police, Political Branch, and Khan Sahib Abdul Aziz, Deputy Superintendent, with a similar staff and to (*c*) was detailed M. Ikram-ul-Haq, Deputy Superintendent, with a similar staff. Mr. Isemonger was originally selected to be in charge of section (*c*) but his services were required elsewhere almost immediately.

Instructions were issued at the same time to the Superintendents of Police of the districts concerned, informing them of the arrangements made and requesting them to assist the Criminal Investigation Department officers by deputing specially selected local officers to co-operate in the enquiries. This arrangement worked well throughout and the co-operation by the local police with the officers of the Criminal Investigation Department, was all that could be desired.

2. In the meantime, two Special Commissions, consisting of three Judges each, were constituted by Government to try cases sent by me to the Legal Remembrancer, as Convening Officer, and by him to these Courts for trial. With the assistance of the Inspector-General of Police each of these courts was provided with a specially selected Court Inspector and Court Sub-Inspector, while clerks and orderlies were obtained from the Superintendent of Police, Lahore. Later on, as the work increased, a third court and then a fourth court was created and court staffs similarly provided for them also. The following are the officers selected for duty at these special Courts:—

These officers performed their duties satisfactorily throughout and the work of the courts proceeded smoothly with their assistance.

3. Having thus briefly outlined the broad organization of the police employed in dealing with the cases, I will now touch on the cases themselves, the manner of dealing with them, and the organization underlying the disturbances. In the first instance, in order to relieve the congested state of the lock-ups and at the same time to enable the courts to start work, orders were issued for all cases, in which evidence was readily available to be completed and sent in for trial without delay; cases requiring further investigation were to be sent in later as they were completed. Instructions were issued at the same time explaining the new procedure to be adopted and the method of preparing the precis of evidence. Each case with its precis of evidence was to be accompanied to the office of the Criminal Investigation Department, by an officer of police, who had taken part in the investigation and by the accused persons. The presence of the investigating officer proved in practice to be very necessary for, owing to the brevity of the precis of evidence, both the Convening Officer and I required much more information than it afforded before either I could pass the cases as fit for trial by a Commission, or the Convening Officer could frame the charges and convene the courts to try them. Viewing the cases, as a whole, and the preparation of them in accordance with a procedure unfamiliar to the police, I was much impressed by the high standard of intelligence shown by our officers and the apparent ease with which they were able to adapt themselves to the unusual circumstances arising out of the disturbances. I was also very favourably impressed by the keen, loyal and cheerful spirit shown by all the officers who came before me and whom I invariably subjected to a close examination, not only in regard to the particular case under review, but also in regard to the organization behind it. In only three instances had I to return cases for radical defects or omission in procedure to be rectified but, throughout the investigation, officers constantly came to consult me regarding procedure or to obtain advice on the best course to follow in view of the facts of cases.

4. One of the chief difficulties encountered in dealing with these cases lay in their magnitude, and in placing them before the courts in a form that would not lead to confusion of the masses of detail. It was speedily apparent that the trials, although termed Summary General Court-Martial, would be very thoroughly conducted by the Tribunals and that the case exercised by the Judges would be no wit less than in the ordinary courts of law. It, therefore, became necessary to reduce each case to the simplest possible form and to split up, as far as possible, the continuous excesses of riotous mobs into isolated acts of violence. In some of the more important cases, as in Lahore and Amritsar, where specific acts of violence were attributed to distinct sets of individuals, this was not difficult to accomplish, but there were other cases, as at Gujranwala, Wagah, Kasur and elsewhere where it was merely sought to prove that the accused were members of unlawful assemblies which had perpetrated deeds of violence. In these it was very

Mr. L. L. TOMKINS—*concluded.*—The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND.

difficult to reduce the dimensions of the cases to any extent and, as the evidence consisted mainly identification on the one side and *alibis* on the other, they were never very satisfactory either from the point of view of the police or the courts. When the work of the courts increased, such cases of rioting, where no serious overt act was committed, were returned for trial by Summary Court-Martial before the local officers of the areas, it being considered that two years' rigorous imprisonment was sufficient punishment for the unimportant men and youths who figured as the accused.

5. The most important of the cases sent for trial were the three main cases from Lahore, Amritsar and Gujranwala, respectively. The local police and the officers of the Criminal Investigation Department very rightly concentrated their special attention on these three cases against the instigators and leaders of the disturbances. The evidence against the accused in these cases was of varied nature, presenting in this respect a welcome diversion from the inevitable stream of identification witnesses in the other cases. They were all well worked out and great credit is due to the investigating officers who worked night and day for many weeks. At the advice of the Convening Officer, the number of the accused in the Amritsar Case was cut down considerably before it was put in court, the smaller men being otherwise dealt with.

The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND, I.C.S., Director of Civil Supplies in the Punjab.

Cheap grain and salt shops can be disposed of in a few words. The former was started in most of the larger Municipalities of the Province at various times during the last four years, whenever a Municipal Committee thought it proper to do so, on account of the rising price of grain. In some these shops are still being continued; in many municipalities, however, they have been closed. Many municipalities received help in financing them from the Imperial Relief Fund. They were nothing new; such shops have frequently been started before in the Province, in previous eras of high prices.

Cheap salt shops were started in most municipalities of the Province, with the help of Government, which gave them certain facilities in the way of getting their salt early from Khewra, in the autumn and winter of 1916, when the bazar price of salt went very high. They were undoubtedly of great benefit to the poorer classes. They have generally been continued up to the present, but are now being generally discontinued by order of the Government of India.

I do not think that the institution of these two kinds of cheap shops caused any real discontent to the trading classes, which were, generally speaking, making lots of money in other directions. Their institution was also in accordance with Oriental traditions.

Trade has been hampered in the last four years by restrictions on railway bookings by goods train. Up till October 1918 these restrictions were imposed by the Railway authorities themselves, partly on account of the press of Military traffic, partly on account of the ever-increasing shortage of rolling stock, on account of the war. But such restrictions were no new thing in the province; at no time in the last 12 years, since the development of the Canal Colonies, and the construction of many branch lines of rail all over the Province, has the North-Western Railway had as many wagons as it really needed to cope with the traffic in the busier seasons of the year. But during the war these restrictions were certainly severer than they had been before, and gradually increased. Thus during the winter and spring of 1917-18, it was almost impossible to move any of our important and valuable cotton crop to the Bombay and Ahmedabad Mills, which were crying out for it. The Punjab Government wrote frequently on this matter to the Railway Board, representing the loss thus caused to the trade of the province, and, partly at any rate as a result of our outcries, the appointment of Directors of Civil Supply was made in all provinces of India in May 1918. I think the appointment of these officers has been of use to trade generally. To give only one case, we got the cotton crop moved by rail this year much quicker than in the year before. The Punjab Government never imposed any restrictions whatever on the movement by rail of anything but foodgrains and fodder (of them I speak later). Indeed, it did all in its power to facilitate the movements of all articles not food grains or fodder.

As regards fodder, the general failure of the monsoon all through India in 1918, and the large demands by the Military Department, rendered the appointment of a special officer, the Fodder Controller, necessary, who co-ordinated the Military and Civil demands, and distributed them over districts which have spare fodder. But the only restriction he imposed on the movement of fodder by rail was that its export from the Punjab, save on military account, by rail, was prohibited. He also seized, under Ordinance 9 of 1914, a few hundred tons of fodder, where the owners were charging exorbitant prices, not for military needs, but for the needy districts of the province. The price given by him was below what the owners asked, but much above the ordinary price. This fodder was seized not in towns, but generally from village owners. The total amount seized, nearly all in the Lyallpur District, was very small compared with the amount that changed hands in the ordinary way.

As regards food grains. The position as regards them was rendered very acute by the failure of the monsoon of 1918, the worst failure for India as a whole, that has occurred for 47 years. It was necessary to conserve the spare food supplies of this, as of other provinces, and to ensure that they went to those parts of India where they were really needed. Further, it was necessary to see that the best use possible was made of the railway wagons available. Accordingly, in October 1918, it was ordered that no grain should leave this province (except on military account) for other provinces unless on certificates issued, under the orders of the Government of India, by the Director of Civil Supplies of the importing province, and countersigned by me, as Director of Civil Supplies of the exporting province. Prior to October 1918 no restrictions at all on the movement of foodgrains existed. On movements of foodgrains inside the Province the restrictions imposed were, with one exception, trifling. Since last February, when the position was becoming daily more acute, with rising prices, no grain was allowed to leave the more important towns of the province—Lahore, Amritsar, Ambala, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Multan and Ludhiana—save on certificates given by me. This was done in order to prevent the sudden export of large quantities of grain from these towns, and depletion of stocks in consequence, with the possibility of food-riots. Nor was grain allowed to be moved, save on certificates, to Punjab stations within about 50 miles of the borders of the United Provinces and Delhi Province; this was to prevent large amounts of grain passing into those provinces by road. I have said above that there was one exception to the general trifling character of these restrictions. For three weeks in February last, when the position as regards foodgrains was very acute, and also, more particularly, when wheat was being acquired under Ordinance 9 of 1914 in various parts of the Province, it was considered advisable to prohibit the movement of foodgrains by rail at all inside the province, save on certificates. This was really done in order to make these acquisition proceedings at any rate less ineffective than would have been otherwise the case. This restriction was, however, never meant to be otherwise than temporary, and was removed in three weeks. No other restrictions on the movements by rail of foodgrains, other than these, have been imposed, and many of them, particularly on movements inside the

province, have been removed during the past months, as thought advisable. The guiding principle that lead to their imposition, especially within the province, was the wish that prices should be kept at as low a level as reasonably possible.

I have discussed with more than one Indian gentleman interested in trade the effect these various restrictions have had in adding to the discontent felt by the trading classes with Government. All have agreed in replying they have had practically no effect in that direction. Restrictions on goods bookings are, as already said, nothing new in this province. Many traders appreciated the help Government was giving them, *e.g.*, in getting their cotton moved. The position last winter as regards goods bookings in the province was certainly easier than in the winter of 1917-18. Certificates for the movements of foodgrains have always been freely given, when really necessary. And the richer members of the trading classes were generally making so much money in the last few years, whether as Army contractors, suppliers of grain to other provinces, or as profiteers, pure and simple, that they did not attach as much weight as they might perhaps otherwise have done, to these various restrictions, just enumerated, that were imposed on trade movements.

There remains for mention the important matter of acquisition of wheat, under Ordinance 9 of 1914, during the winter of 1918-19. It is necessary to say a little as explanation as to why these acquisition proceedings were instituted. The failure of the monsoon of 1918 has been already emphasized. As a result of it, all foodgrains, but especially wheat and gram, rose greatly in price in this province between May and September 1918. On May 15th, the price of wheat at Lahore was Rs. 4-1-6 per maund; of gram, Rs. 3-1-3. On September 15th the corresponding figures were Rs. 5-8-3 and Rs. 4-5-3. Similar rises were reported from all over the province. And they were nearly all due to the activities of speculators, who started buying up grain all over the province, in the hopes of a large demand from other parts of India later. It was imperatively necessary to do something to stop these speculative activities; otherwise grain might at one have gone to most dangerous heights. Various lines of action were considered, and eventually it was decided to make use, though on a limited scale, of Ordinance 9 of 1914, which was designed to meet emergencies such as this. Accordingly in November 1914 the Deputy Commissioners of the three important wheat districts of Lyallpur, Amritsar and Ferozepore, were instructed by Government to each take up under that Ordinance 100 tons of wheat, at such price as they thought reasonable. They did so, at an average price of Rs. 5-4-0 per maund; the market price was then about one rupee higher.* The wheat acquired was made over to cheap grain shops for the use of the poor; the wheat seized in the rich town of Lyallpur, which had no cheap shops, was sent to Lahore, for those shops. The effect of these acquisitions, which were strictly limited in amount, was, on the whole, favourable. Though prices did not go down, their upward tendency was for the time being stopped, and Ralli Brothers who were purchasing wheat for the Army, found much more grain coming into the market after them than before.

But the effect on prices was only momentary, and they continued on their upward tendency. So the Foodstuffs Commissioner, Mr. Gubbay, after discussing the case with the Punjab Government advised us to acquire under the Ordinance considerably larger amounts of wheat, at lower than the prevailing price, in order to affect the general price of wheat in a downward direction. As the military department were purchasing considerable quantities of wheat in the province for the requirements of the Indian Army, it was decided to make the wheat so acquired over to that department. I would emphasise the fact that the saving of money to Government in this transaction had no effect whatever in inducing us to embark on it; this saving was an entirely incidental result of it. It was decided on entirely and only with the hope that the general price of wheat in the province might be thereby affected in a downward direction. A certain amount of the wheat acquired, however, was made available for cheap grain shops. In this matter Deputy Commissioners, who did the actual acquisition were given a free hand, and were at liberty to acquire as much as they wished for cheap grain shops.

The amounts acquired were as follows; practically all in the months of February and March 1919—

In district.	For military needs.	For cheap shops.
	Tons.	Tons.
Ferozepore	2,932	37
Lyallpur	4,075	..
Rawalpindi	..	106
Muzaffargarh	..	903
Ludhiana	804	..
Amritsar	1,500	500
Dera Ghazi Khan	..	55
Shahpur	881	..
Rohtak	700	..
Karnal	660	..
Montgomery	751	124
Jhang	226	6
Lahore	1,050	..
Multan	1,270	39
TOTAL	14,849	1,770
GRAND TOTAL	16,619 tons.	

The heading "Lahore" above is slightly misleading. As a matter of fact, no grain whatever was acquired in Lahore City itself; what was acquired in that district was acquired in the markets of Pattoke and Kasur. The price at which the wheat was acquired varied from district to district, according to the circumstances of each. It varied between Rs. 5 and Rs. 5-8-0 per maund. The market price was between Rs. 6-6-0 and Rs. 6-10-0. The principle on which it was given was that noted in the margin* substituting February for November. Appeals were filed, under the provisions of the Ordinance, against the price at which acquisitions were made in respect of about 5,000 tons of the wheat acquired. As a result, about 8 annas per maund more were generally given by the appellate tribunals, which, however, also generally found that the acquisitions were justified, so rampant was speculation in wheat. In a few cases, where the wheat had been acquired not from speculators, but from persons who genuinely required it for their own consumption, they were awarded the full amount they had paid for it.

It may at once be said that the desired effect of these acquisitions, that of bringing down the general price of wheat, was not attained. Many reasons contributed to this. The principal one was that during the whole time they were made the demand for wheat from the Punjab by other provinces of India was exceedingly keen, and purchasers from these provinces did not really mind how much they paid for wheat, so long as they got it. When a dealer from, say, Bombay was giving up to Rs. 6-8-0 per maund in Lyallpur, it will be understood that acquisitions by Government at Rs. 5 per mensem had practically no effect on the ordinary price of wheat

Speaking from memory, I think that the Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur was the only District officer who specifically, in his report on the late disturbances, mentions these wheat acquisitions as being one of the causes of the discontent of the trading classes with our administration. More wheat was acquired in that one district than in any other. There is no doubt but that the acquisitions were very unpopular with the trading classes. But I am of opinion that the recent troubles would certainly have occurred even if no acquisitions had been made: though they certainly added, especially in the districts where made, to the trading classes' dis

* The figure they adopted represented the market price at harvest time, the preceding May plus the *usual* difference between that price and that prevailing in November as a rule.

Concluded.] The Hon'ble Mr. C. A. H. TOWNSEND.

content with Government. Considerable quantities of grain were acquired in the Ferozepore, Ludhiana, Shahpur and Montgomery districts. None, or only slight, disorders occurred in those districts. On the other hand, Lahore City and Gujranwala District gave much trouble. No grain was acquired in them.

The total amount of wheat acquired in the province, less than 17,000 tons, was small, whether compared with the total provincial outturn of wheat in the spring of 1918, which was well over three million tons, or with the total amount of wheat the province exported in the financial year 1918-19, 620,000 tons. Very large profits were made by dealers on the greater part of the latter amount.

Indian gentlemen have, however, told me that these acquisitions were generally misunderstood in the province, especially as they were unsuccessful in their object of bringing down the price of grain generally. Agitators told the ignorant mob that Government was merely getting its grain cheap. The poorer classes also resented the continued export of grain from this province to other provinces of India, not realising that their inhabitants might have starved if they had not got it, that the Punjab Government was fully alive to the needs of their own province, and was ever pressing its views in this matter on the Government of India, which, however, overruled it in this matter, and ordered the export of grain from this province to continue.

A certain amount of discontent was also felt among the poorer classes in the fact that no Australian wheat, which came to India in fairly large quantities last spring was imported by Government into the Punjab. Agitators made full use of this handle. It was not realised that had this Australian wheat not come, the Punjab would probably have been called upon to export even more wheat to the provinces to which it went, than was actually the case.

I have been impressed by the fact that practically all Indian gentlemen with whom I have discussed the matter attribute a great deal of the discontent the trading classes undoubtedly feel with Government to the recent tightening up of the income-tax administration, and, to some extent, to its uneven administration between district and district. This, however, is a matter of which I have no personal knowledge. Some of my friends have said that this discontent owes its origin to the passing of the Alienation of Land Act, nearly 20 years ago.

The 23rd October 1919.

PART IV

Martial Law Notices and Instructions issued in the Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur Districts.

WAZIRABAD AREA (GUJRANWALA DISTRICT).

WHEREAS the Government of India has for good reasons proclaimed Martial Law in the district of Gujranwala and WHEREAS I am appointed to command the troops and administer the said Martial Law in that portion of the said district known as ( ) I make known to the inhabitants of ( ):

1. That I am so appointed to enforce Law and Order and to guard the public safety.

2. That loyal and law-abiding persons have nothing to fear from the exercise of the aforesaid Martial Law.

3. That certain restrictions have been placed on the inhabitants of Gujranwala, Wazirabad, etc., by the officers appointed by me to command the troops and administer Martial Law therein.

4. That as against the inhabitants of any places which have been law-abiding and of good behaviour, similar instructions have not been issued, but such concession is dependent on the future good conduct of the inhabitants of such towns and villages.

5. That I forbid any meetings or processions or unlawful assemblies to be held (in) without my permission. Any meetings, processions or unlawful assembly held in contravention of this order will be dispersed by force without warning.

6. That any person contravening the Martial Law Regulations or any of the above orders or any further orders I may issue from time to time shall be arrested and tried (by a first class Magistrate) and be liable to be punished with fine, whipping, imprisonment, or death according to the circumstances of the case.

F. W. BURBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Commanding Gujranwala District.

GUJRANWALA:
April 18th, 1919.

No. 1.

THE following orders will be strictly enforced by me until further notice in the Area of the Wazirabad Municipality and the Railway Line running through it:—

1. From and after the date of this order it shall be illegal for any male person to carry, or be in possession of an instrument known as a "Lathi" except that bullock drivers may pass through the Grand Trunk Road with their sticks.

2. In order to protect the lives of His Majesty's soldiers and police under my command I make known that if any firearm is discharged or bomb thrown at them or any weapon of offence raised against them the most drastic reprisals will instantly be made against the property in the neighbourhood of the outrage. Therefore it behoves all loyal citizens to see to it that no evil disposed agitator is allowed on their premises.

3. I prohibit all processions, meeting or gatherings of more than 10 persons without written authority, and any such meeting, gatherings or processions held in disobedience of this order will be broken up by force without warning.

4. I forbid any person to offer violence to or cause obstruction to any person desirous of opening his shop or conducting his business or proceeding to his work or business. Any person contravening this order will be arrested, tried by a Summary Court and liable to be shot.

5. Shop-keepers who close their shops on the approach of soldiers or police desirous of purchasing goods or who refuse to sell goods to such soldiers or police at a fair and reasonable price will be arrested and will be liable to be flogged and to have their goods forfeited.

6. Although at the present time it is not in my opinion necessary to extend to Wazirabad the order now in force at Gujranwala that no person shall leave his or her house or compound or the building in which he or she may be at 20.00 hours until 05.00 hours the following day except with my written permission, I hereby warn the inhabitants of Wazirabad that this exemption depends upon their continued good conduct. Moreover, this restriction will shortly be introduced in all circumstances over an area to be described hereafter in the immediate neighbourhood of Wazirabad Railway Station and the Railway Line.

F. W. BURBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:
April 18th, 1919.

No. 2.

WHEREAS from information received by me it would appear that certain shop-keepers in the Municipality of Gujranwala have been closing their shops on the approach of soldiers and police desirous of purchasing goods or have refused to sell goods to such soldiers and police at a fair and reasonable price, notice is now given that from the date of this order any shop-keeper acting in this manner will be arrested and be liable to be flogged and to have his goods forfeited.

F. W. BURBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:
April 18th, 1919.

No. 3.

SECOND-LIEUTENANT P. R. CHANIN, 2-41st Dogras, is appointed Assistant Provost Marshal in the Cantonment and Municipality of Wazirabad.

2. The Assistant Provost Marshal is hereby authorized to sign and issue military passes on my behalf in the Cantonment and Municipality of Wazirabad.

With reference to paragraph 5 of Notice under Martial Law No. 1, dated 18th April 1919, the area referred to is bounded as follows:—

On the East	.	by the West section of the City Circular Road (inclusive).
On the North	.	by the Pulkhoo Nalla.
On the West	.	by the North-Western Railway main line.
On the South	.	by the Sheru Mohalla of the City.

Commencing on the 20th April 1919, a bugle call will be sounded from the Railway Station at 20.00 hours daily and from that signal until 05.00 hours on the following day no person other than a European or a soldier or a policeman on duty or a person in possession of a military pass will be permitted to leave his or her house or compound or other building in which he or she may be at 20.00 hours. During these prohibited hours no person

other than those exempted will be permitted to use the streets or roads.

Any person found disobeying this order will be arrested; if any attempt is made to escape or resist will be liable to be shot.

Persons permitted by pass to use the streets and roads during prohibited hours will move in parties of not more than two persons, and every such party will carry a light.

F. W. BURBURY, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:
April 19th, 1919.

No. 4.

WHEREAS I, Brigadier-General L. W. Y. Campbell, C.M.G., Commanding the Sialkot Brigade, have assumed command of the Gujranwala District with effect from the morning of April 20th, 1919, *vice* Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Burbury, relieved, I hereby make known that I am empowered to issue orders under Martial Law throughout the District of Gujranwala.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:
April 20th, 1919.

No. 5.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to ensure the safety of all railways and telegraphs in the Gujranwala District, I hereby issue the following Orders:—

1. The Civil railway patrols already instituted by the Civil power will continue until further notice.

2. Each patrol will be furnished with a pass signed by the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, gazetted Police Officer, Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent of Police, or a Magistrate, on which shall be stated in English and Urdu the number of persons in the patrol and the village or town from which furnished. Each Civil patrol will display a white flag.

3. On sighting any troops or police the headman of a Civil patrol will report to the Commander and produce the patrol pass for inspection.

4. In the event of any damage or attempted damage to any railway or telegraph in the Gujranwala District the nearest or any other town or village or towns or villages in the neighbourhood as may be selected by me will be visited forthwith by an armed force, and severe reprisals will be inflicted on persons and property of such town or village or towns or villages.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:
April 20th, 1919.

No. 6.

I HEREBY give notice that all traffic in the Wazirabad Cantonment other than military traffic will cease daily from 20.00 hours one day until 05.00 hours the following day on that section of Grand Trunk Road which extends from the bridge-of-boats over the Pulkhoo Nalla on the north to the level crossing over the North-Western Railway main line on the south. Any unauthorised person who approaches the abovementioned bridge-of-boats or level crossing without due authority from me is liable to be fired on without warning.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:
April 21st, 1919.

No. 7.

WHEREAS it has come to my notice that certain inhabitants of the Gujranwala District are habitually exhibiting a lack of respect for Gazetted or Commissioned European Civil and Military Officers of His Majesty's Services, thereby failing to maintain the dignity of that Government, I hereby order that the inhabitants of the Gujranwala District shall accord to all such officers, whenever met, the salutation usually accorded to Indian gentlemen of high social position in accordance with the customs of India. That is to say, persons riding on animals or on or in wheeled conveyance will alight, persons carrying opened and raised umbrellas shall lower them, and all persons shall salute or "Salam" with the hand.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:
April 22nd, 1919

No. 8.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that the Nirakh rates of food in the Municipality of Wazirabad show a tendency to excessive increase, having due consideration to the supplies available, I therefore order that from the date of this order until the last day of April 1919, the Nirakh rates fixed by the Civil powers on April 7th, 1919, shall be the maximum rate at which any article of food shall be sold to the public.

Any shop-keeper who shall demand a higher rate than as laid down in that Nirakh-nama or who shall refuse to sell at that rate articles of food in his possession for the purpose of trading shall be deemed guilty of an offence under Martial Law, be arrested and punished accordingly.

The Civil authorities of Wazirabad will take steps to make public the Nirakh-nama abovementioned.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,
Commanding Gujranwala District Area.

WAZIRABAD:
April 22nd, 1919.

No. 9.

WHEREAS the Government of India has proclaimed Martial Law in the District of Gujrat and WHEREAS I have been appointed by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, to administer the said Martial Law in that district. I make known to the inhabitants of the Gujrat District:—

1. That I am so appointed to enforce Law and Order and to guard the public safety.

2. The loyal and law-abiding persons have nothing to fear from exercise of the said Martial Law.

3. That the Regulations laid down in the proclamation, dated 20th April 1919, by Major-General C. M. Dobell, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, will be enforced by me and any offence against those regulations will be dealt with and punished under Martial Law.

4. That all orders which may from time to time be issued by me under Martial Law must be obeyed during the period of such Martial Law and that any omission or neglect to obey such orders will be punished under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Military Area.

WAZIRABAD:
April 24th, 1919.

No. 10.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to ensure the safety of all railway telegraphs in the Gujrat District, I hereby issue the following orders :—

1. The Civil Railway patrols already instituted by the Civil Power will continue until further notice.

2. Each patrol will be furnished with a pass signed by the Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, Gazetted Police Officer, Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent of Police, or a Magistrate, on which shall be stated in English and Urdu the number of persons in the patrol and the village or town from which furnished. Each Civil patrol will display a khaki armlet.

3. On sighting any troops or police the headman of a Civil patrol will report to the Commander and produce the patrol pass for inspection.

4. In the event of any damage or attempted damage to any railway or telegraph in the Gujrat District the nearest or any other town or village or towns or villages in the neighbourhood as may be selected by me will be visited forthwith by an armed force, and severe reprisals will be inflicted on persons and property of such town or village or towns or villages.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Gujrat District Area.

WAZIRABAD :
April 24th, 1919.

No. 11.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to regulate and control all classes of coaching traffic in the districts of Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur, I hereby issue the following Orders under Martial Law :—

1. All persons desirous of travelling by rail will first obtain a military pass under Martial Law unless they are—

(*a*) Military passengers on warrants, leave passes, etc.
(*b*) Europeans or Anglo-Indians.
(*c*) Servants of 1st class and 2nd class European or Anglo-Indian passengers when actually accompanying their masters.
(*d*) Government employees on duty.

2. Military passes under Martial Law may be obtained from the Civil or Military authorities at the following stations only :—

Gujranwala.	Chuhar Kana.
Wazirabad.	Lyallpur.
Gujrat.	Sangla Hill.
Lalamusa.	Hafizabad.
Malakwal.	Shorkot Road.

3. Any person found travelling in contravention of this Notice will be liable to punishment under Martial Law.

4. Any person issuing a Railway ticket to a person not authorised to travel by this Notice, will be liable to punishment under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade
Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD :
April 25th, 1919.

No. 12.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient for the sake of the people themselves that they should not be exposed to the risk of disobeying my Orders through ignorance as to where they—my Orders—can be ascertained :

NOW THEREFORE I give notice that copies of all Orders and Notices issued by me under Martial Law will be exhibited at the following places, houses or premises :—

1. House of Doctor Dina Nath, Kutcheri Bazar.
2. Shop of Harsa Singh, Rail Bazar.
3. House of Khushabi Ram, Douglaspura.
4. Shop of Hakim Nur Din, Bhawana Bazar.
5. City Police Station.
6. Clock Tower.
7. Office of Mr. Ram Das, Chhakra, Kutcheri Bazar.
8. Office of Sant Singh, Pleader, Kutcheri Bazar.
9. Sadar Police Station.
10. Kutcheri Bazar—Entrance to Kutcheri.
11. Old Grain Market.
12. New Grain Market.
13. Railway Station.

G. C. HODGSON, *Lieut.-Col.,*
for *General Officer Commanding Sialkot*
Military Area and Gujrat.

LYALLPUR :
May, 7th, 1919.

No. 13.

WHEREAS the Government of India have proclaimed Martial Law in the District of Lyallpur and WHEREAS I have been appointed by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, to administer the said Martial Law in that district, I make known to the inhabitants of the Lyallpur District—

1. That I am so appointed to enforce Law and Order and to guard the public safety.

2. That loyal and law-abiding persons have nothing to fear from exercise of the said Martial Law.

3. That the regulations laid down in the proclamation, dated 20th April 1919, by Major-General C. M. Dobell, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, will be enforced by me, and any offence against those regulations will be dealt with and punished under Martial Law.

4. That all orders which may from time to time be issued by me under Martial Law must be obeyed during the period of such Martial Law, and that any omission or neglect to obey such orders will be punished under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade
Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD :
April 25th, 1919.

No. 14.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient to ensure the safety of all canals, railways and telegraphs in the Lyallpur District, I hereby issue the following Orders :—

1. The Civil Railway patrols already instituted by the Civil power will continue until further notice.

2. In the event of any damage or attempted damage to any canal, railway and telegraph in the Lyallpur District the nearest or any other town or village or towns or villages in the neighbourhood as may be selected by me will be visited forthwith by an armed force, and severe reprisals will be inflicted on persons and property of such town or village or towns or villages.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD :
April 25th, 1919.

No. 15.

BY VIRTUE of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I hereby direct that the proclamation, dated the 20th April 1919, issued by Major-General Sir Charles M. Dobell, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the 2nd

Continued.] MARTIAL LAW NOTICES.

(Rawalpindi) Division, shall be applied to the Civil District of Lyallpur.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD :
April 25th, 1919.

No. 16.

WHEREAS by Notice "B," dated 18th April 1919, and Notice 3, dated 19th April 1919, issued under Martial Law, I forbid the inhabitants of the Municipality of Gujranwala and of certain portions of the Municipality of Wazirabad to leave the houses or buildings or compounds in which they then were between the hours of 20.00 hours one day and 05.00 the next day : and WHEREAS since the promulgation of those orders the behaviour of the inhabitants of those Municipalities has been satisfactory, I hereby give notice that the above restrictions shall now be relaxed so far that they shall commence at 22·00 hours instead of at 20.00 hours as heretofore. This order will come into force from the evening of the 29th April 1919. Should any further misconduct arise in either Municipality the former restrictions will be re-imposed in that Municipality.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD :
April 29th, 1919.

No. 17.

WHEREAS it has been represented by the Deputy Commissioner of the Lyallpur District that it is in the interest of Government and of the inhabitants of the famine areas of the Bombay Presidency that persons connected with the grain traffic should be permitted special facilities for travel, I hereby give notice that military passes under Martial Law will be issued at the following stations in the Lyallpur District in addition to those laid down in notice under Martial Law No. 11, dated 25th April 1919 :—

Chak Jhumra.	Toba Tek Singh.
Risalawala,	Jarranwala.
Gojra.	Tandlianwala.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD :
April 30th, 1919.

No. 18.

WHEREAS it has been proved to my satisfaction that school boys formed a large portion of the crowds which committed offences on the 15th and 16th of April 1919 in Gujrat : and WHEREAS it is necessary to control the movement of these and other school boys, therefore I hereby order the Area Officer, Gujrat Area, to hold roll-calls of the masters and boys of such schools in the Gujrat area at such times as he shall deem necessary.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD :
April 30th, 1919.

No. 19.

WHEREAS it has come to my notice that the inhabitants of the Lyallpur District habitually exhibit a lack of respect for Gazetted and Commissioned Civil and Military Officers, I therefore now direct that Notice under Martial Law No. 7, dated the 25th day of April 1919, be also made applicable to the Lyallpur District.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD :
April 30th, 1919.

No. 20.

Cancelled.

No. 21.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient, I order, that as long as Martial Law is in force in the Lyallpur District, the undermentioned persons will not move outside the boundaries of their villages without a permit from the Superintendent of Police :—

1. Teja Singh, son of Lal Singh, Chak No. 75 R. B.
2. Kishan Singh, son of Mangal Singh, Chak No. 103 R. B.
3. Gurbachan Singh, son of Hira Singh, Chak No. 95 R. B.
4. Mihan Singh, son of Hira Singh, Chak No. 95 R. B.
5. Chanda Singh, son of Jawahar Singh, Chak No. 99 R. B.
6. Maghar Singh, son of Boota Singh, Chak No. 71 R. B.
7. Pir Bakhsh, son of Jodha, Chak No. 136 G. B.
8. Bela Singh, son of Amar Singh, Chak No. 44. G. B.
9. Sarmukh Singh, son of Ram Singh, Chak No. 257 R. B.
10. Prem Singh, son of Pal Singh, Chak No. 75 R. B.
11. Munsha Singh, son of Ishar Singh, Chak No. 14 U. C. C.
12. Sewa Singh, son of Hazara Singh, Chak No. 200.

G. C. HODGSON, *Lieut.-Col.,*
Commanding Lyallpur Area.

LYALLPUR :
April 26th, 1919.

No. 22.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient in the interests of the administration of Martial Law that my Notices under Martial Law Nos. 1 and 7 shall be made applicable to the Civil District of Gujrat ; therefore I now direct that the orders contained in these Notices shall be applied to and enforced in the Gujrat District subject to such variations as may be necessitated by local circumstances and approved of by the Area Officers of that District.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD :
May 2nd, 1919.

No. 23.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient for the better administration of Martial Law that Area Officers shall be appointed throughout the districts of Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur, therefore I now divide the said districts into the following areas to be controlled by the Officer named against each :—

Gujrat District.

Gujrat Area, comprising the Tahsils of Gujrat and Kharian : Area Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel L. A. Browne, 37th Dogras.

Malakwal Area, comprising the Tahsil of Phalia : Area Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Grat, V.C., 3-11th Gurkha Rifles,

Gujranwala District.

Gujranwala Area, comprising the Gujranwala Tahsil: Area Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala District.

Chuhar Kana Area, comprising the Tahsils of Khangah Dogran and Sharakpur: Area Officer, Mr. B. N. Bosworth-Smith, I.C.S., Joint Deputy Commissioner, Gujranwala District.

Hafizabad Area, comprising the Hafizabad Tahsil: Area Officer, Captain W. J. Cole, Supply and Transport Corps.

Wazirabad Area, comprising the Wazirabad Tahsil: Area Officer, Major C. W. J. Smith, D. S. O., 2-54th Sikhs F. F.

Lyallpur District.

Lyallpur Area, comprising the whole Civil District of Lyallpur: Area Officers, Mr. G. F. deMontmorency, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur District, and Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Hodgson, D.S.O., 3-34th Sikh Pioneers.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 2nd, 1919.

No. 24.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that the rates for food-stuffs in Khanki are excessive and that the shop-keepers are in the habit of adulterating such food-suffs I hereby direct that the Officer Commanding the troops at Khanki shall once a week fix the rates of all food-stuffs in consultation with the local Civil authorities, and that any shop-keeper who shall demand prices in excess of these rates or who shall refuse to sell at these rates, or who may be found to have adulterated any articles of food-stuffs will be punished for an offence under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 5th, 1919.

No. 25.

WHEREAS I deem it expedient I hereby order that Zafar Ali Khan, Jat Janjuah, son of Saraj Din, of the village of Karamabad, situated in Wazirabad Tahsil, Gujranwala District, shall not move outside the boundary of the village of Karamabad so long as Martial Law shall exist in the Gujranwala District without a permit from me or from a person authorised by me to issue the same.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 5th, 1919.

No. 26.

WHEREAS it has been proved to my satisfaction that the destruction of Government and private property in Gujranwala, Gujrat and Lyallpur Districts during the present disturbances has been largely the work of school boys, and WHEREAS I deem such action on their part to be due to a lack of instruction in discipline and respect for authority, I hereby direct that at all places in these districts where there are Area Officers or Officer Commanding Troops, school boys together with their masters shall be paraded once daily or more often as such Officers consider desirable for the purpose of inculcating discipline and respect for authority.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 5th, 1919.

Martial Law Instruction Roll.

With reference to Notice under Martial Law No. 26 the General Officer Commanding Sialkot Brigade directs that whenever a Union Jack is obtainable it should be erected at a suitable spot and the school boys together with their Masters should be made to Salaam it at every parade with a view to inculcating a sense of respect for the British Flag as an emblem of the King-Emperor. The General Officer Commanding specially directs that School masters and school boys be instructed that it is the privilege of persons in the Army, Navy and Police only to salute, all other persons showing their respect by raising their hats or salaaming according to their nationality. It is probable that a Union Jack will be forthcoming on command from any town.

T. P. WHEATLY,
for *Major Commanding Sialkot Military Area; &c., Gujrat.*

WAZIRABAD:
May 6th, 1919.

No. 27.

WHEREAS it has been shown to my satisfaction that the attitude of the inhabitants of Gujranwala towards Europeans has decreased in respect, and WHEREAS this is in contravention of my Notice under Martial Law No. 7, dated 22nd April 1919, I now order that as a punishment the restrictions regarding booking of passengers from Gujranwala and from the stations of Eminabad and Kamoki to the South and Rahwali and Ghakkar on the North, which were relaxed to-day, the 5th instant, shall be again imposed on these stations for a further period of 14 days from this date.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 8th, 1919.

No. 28.

WHEREAS I understand that a large number of people concerned in the riots at Gujranwala have left the City and are hiding themselves elsewhere: it is notified for information that if such persons do not return immediately their property or the property of their fathers or their nearest relations will be considered confiscated.

A. J. O'BRIEN, *Lieut.-Col.,*
Area Officer.

No. 29.

WHEREAS I understand that a large number of people concerned in the riots at Wazirabad and Hafizabad have left those Cities and are hiding themselves elsewhere, it is now notified for information that if such persons do not return immediately, their property or the property of their fathers or of their nearest relations will be liable to confiscation.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 8th, 1919.

Continued.] MARTIAL LAW NOTICES.

No. 30.

WHEREAS it has come to my notice that certain persons act prejudicially to good Government by refusing to sell goods to persons who tender notes in payment, and further that certain persons are deducting a certain discount from the face value of Currency Notes which are legal tender to the full value inscribed on them: Now therefore, I order—

1. That Notes are legal tender and their value is the value printed on the faces of the Notes.
2. That no person shall deduct discount from any Note when cashing it.
3. That no person shall refuse to accept in notes the value of goods bought.

Any one found contravening these orders shall be liable to be punished under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 8th, 1919.

No. 31.

WHEREAS it has come to my knowledge that in certain districts of this Area merchants are selling their existing stock and not replenishing it; and that other merchants are hiding their stock or holding it in hopes of rise in price: Now therefore I order for the public welfare that merchants shall not allow their stock to be depleted but shall replenish it in all cases and continue selling as usual nor shall they hide nor withhold their stock. Any one contravening this Order will be arrested and punished under Martial Law.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 9th, 1919.

No. 32.

UNTIL further orders no *Sadhu* will be permitted to leave Gujrat City without the permission of the Superintendent of Police, Gujrat.

L. S. BROWNE, *Lieut.-Col.,*
Area Officer, Gujrat.

GUJRAT:
May 2nd, 1919.

No. 33.

WHEREAS it has been proved to my satisfaction that School boys formed a large portion of the crowds which committed offences on 15th and 16th April 1919 in the Gujrat Area, and WHEREAS I consider it expedient to control the movements of these school boys, I therefore order that the students of the following schools shall attend roll-calls as noted below, with their School-masters:—

Gujrat.

Government High School.
Zamindara High School.
Kidar Nath High School.
Sanatan Dharm High School.

(1) Roll-calls will be held at 06.30, 12.00, 18.30 hours daily on the District Board fair ground.
(2) 1st Roll-call will be held at 06.30 hours on 6th May 1919.
(3) If any boy is absent without proper cause his father will attend in his place.
(4) Only those school boys living in the Gujrat City and within ½ mile thereof will attend the roll-call at 18.30 hours.

Those living further away are exempt.

All School-masters will attend.

(5) Lists of School-masters and school boys will be submitted to Area Officer, Gujrat, before 19.00 hours, 5th instant.

Jalalpur Jattan.

Arya Samaj School.

The same rules hold for this School as for Gujrat with the following exceptions:—

(1) List of School-masters and school boys will reach Area Officer by 19.00 hours on 6th instant.
(2) The first roll-call will be held at 12.00 hours 10th May 1919, at the Thana.
(3) In the absence of a British Officer the roll-calls will be taken by the President of the Municipal Committee.

L. S. BROWNE, *Lieut.-Col.,*
Area Officer, Gujrat.

GUJRAT:
May 3rd, 1919.

No. 34.

WHEREAS it has been brought to my notice that the Nirakh rates of Sugar, Meat and Milk in the Municipality of Gujrat have greatly risen, and having due consideration to the supplies available I therefore order that from 1st May 1919 till further orders the Nirakh rates shall be those prevalent on 13th April 1919 or as may be decided from time to time.

Any shop-keeper who shall demand a higher rate than as laid down or who shall refuse to sell at those rates, articles of food in his possession for the purpose of trading shall be deemed guilty of an offence under Martial Law, be arrested and punished accordingly.

The Civil authorities of Gujrat will take steps to make public the Nirakh-nama abovementioned.

L. S. BROWNE, *Lieut.-Col.,*
Area Officer, Gujrat.

GUJRAT:
May 1st, 1919.

No. 35.

WHEREAS it is now considered desirable that bullock carts and animals with their drivers be allowed to travel by night to bring produce into cities to replenish lowering food-stock, with regard to the hot weather and inability to travel in the day time, now therefore, Notice under Martial Law No. 16 is allowed to lapse, but will, should any misbehaviour be noted on the part of citizens or towns-people, be immediately re-enforced in the cities and towns in which it is now enforced.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.,*
Officer Commanding Sialkot Brigade
Martial Law Area.

GUJRAT:
May 15th, 1919.

No. 36.

WHEREAS for the furtherance of the public safety the Lieutenant-Governor concurs that the movements of legal practitioners be restricted; Now, therefore, I order that no legal practitioner whose ordinary place of business is outside the Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area and Gujrat will enter that Area without the permission of the Administrator, Martial Law, Lahore Divisional Area.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.,*
Officer Commanding Sialkot Brigade
Martial Law Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:
May 16th, 1919.

No. 37.

WHEREAS it has been proved to my satisfaction that the inhabitants of the Silakot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat have shown themselves with few exceptions (and these have been punished accordingly) amenable to Martial Law; Now, therefore, I, by the powers vested in me by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, do cancel Notices under Martial Law referring to—

1. Nirakh Rates.
2. Night Passes.
3. Two men walking abreast.
4. Notice No. 6.
5. Notice No. 7.
6. Notice No. 11.
7. Notice No. 18.
8. Notice No. 24.
9. Notice No. 26.
10. Notice No. 27.

The aforesaid inhabitants must not consider this step as a weakening of Martial Law but only as a relaxing, and should clearly understand that should misbehaviour on their part be again noted these restrictions will be again still more strictly imposed than hitherto.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 18th, 1919.

No. 38.

As a complete list of occupiers or owners of all buildings in the Municipal Area of Gujranwala under my Command is to be prepared:

NOW THEREFORE, by virture of the powers vested in me by Martial Law, I issue the following Orders:—

1. The entire area has been divided into 7 Blocks.
2. Each block has been put in charge of a Patwari (separate) to prepare the required list.
3. It will be the duty of the Patwari to give 24 hours' previous General Notice to the occupiers and owners of the particular part or locality of his block which he proposes to do each day.
4. It will be the duty of each occupier or owner of the house or area in the locality about which a General Notice has been issued to be present in person or by proxy at his place and cause to be furnished to the Patwari on his arrival the following information:—

(*i*) His name, occupation and full address.
(*ii*) Annual rent of the house or part of the house or of the area occupied by him.
(*iii*) If a house or part of a house or area is occupied by the owner or is occupied free of rent he will state the annual rental value of the same, having regard to the cost of the building and the rent prevailing in the locality.
(*iv*) Furnish any other information necessary for the correct preparation of the required list.

I WARN ALL CONCERNED that failure to comply with this Order or to furnish wrong information will result in severe punishment under Martial Law.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 18th, 1919.

No. 39.

WHEREAS I have noticed to my satisfaction that "Thikri Pahras" on railways have done their duty thoroughly and WHEREAS I consider the weather to be unsuitable for Civil patrols; Now therefore do I cancel Notice under Martial Law No. 10. Patrols are no longer required to be furnished by villages, towns and cities adjacent to the railways and canals, but still should any damage be done in future to railways or canals I will hold the neighbouring villages, towns or cities responsible, and will punish their inhabitants under the powers vested in me by Martial Law.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 19th, 1919.

No. 40.

WHEREAS it has been represented to me that the good behaviour of the citizens of Gujrat warrants a relaxing of Martial Law; Now, therefore, do I cancel Martial Law No. 22, but with the assurance that should the said citizens be again guilty of misbehaviour more stringent Notices will be enforced.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 19th, 1919.

No. 41.

WHEREAS two students of over 14 years of age failed to salam to me on 16th instant, thereby contravening "Notice under Martial Law No. 7," and WHEREAS it now transpires that they gave me their wrong names and addresses, I hereby direct that all students of over 14 years of age of the—

(1) Municipal Board School, Lyallpur,
(2) Arya School, Lyallpur,
(3) Sanatan Dharm School, Lyallpur,
(4) Government High School, Lyallpur,

shall parade in front of my office in the Public Library at 08-00 (eight) hours daily until the two offenders are given up, or failing this until such time as I consider necessary. They will be accompanied by a School-master from each school, and will march past a Union Jack, which will be erected in front of my office, and salam to it as they pass, under the supervision of an officer appointed by me.

The School-master, accompanying the boys of each school, will bring with him daily a nominal roll of all the boys of over 14 years of age at his school, signed as correct by the Head-master, and showing, against the name of each absentee from the parade, the reason for his absence. These parades will commence from Monday, 19th instant.

G. C. HODGSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Commanding Lyallpur Area.

No. 42.

IN continuation of Notice under Martial Law No. 37, Notice under Martial Law No. 10 is hereby cancelled.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 22nd, 1919.

No. 43.

WHEREAS the grass on roadsides and in plantations, public gardens and public places in the Civil Stations of Lyallpur is required for the use of cavalry horses;

Continued.] MARTIAL LAW NOTICES AND INSTRUCTIONS.

I hereby direct that no person may cut grass or graze cattle, sheep or goats within this limit of the Civil station on the areas mentioned above. Any person disobeying order will be dealt with under Martial Law.

G. F. HODGSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Commanding Lyallpur Area.

LYALLPUR:
May 22nd, 1919.

No. 44.

WHEREAS it has come to my notice that many Afghans have been taught that orders under Martial Law cannot be lightly disobeyed, I am pleased to discontinue the parade at my office of the school boys of certain schools (Order under Martial Law Notice No. 41) with effect from Sunday, 25th instant.

G. F. HODGSON, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Commanding Lyallpur Area.

LYALLPUR:
May 23rd, 1919.

No. 45.

WHEREAS it has come to my Notice that many Afghans are at present in the Tahsil of Hafizabad; and WHEREAS I deem it necessary for the furtherance of public safety that their movements be controlled; Now therefore, I order that all Afghans must report at once to the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Hafizabad, and without permission from the Officer Commanding Troops, and Assistant Superintendent of Police, they will not leave that District.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Commanding Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:
May 26th, 1919.

No. 46.

WHEREAS the Government of India has proclaimed Martial Law at an end in Wazirabad, Gujranwala and Lyallpur, with the exception of the railways: therefore I now order that the proclamation dated the 20th April 1919 be withdrawn, and that all Notices issued under Martial Law and posted in the City be taken down.

J. T. CORLETT, *Lieut.-Col.*,
Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade Martial Law Area.

WAZIRABAD:
June 10th, 1919.

Martial Law Instructions issued in the Sialkot Brigade Area and Gujrat District.

Instructions for guidance of officers administering Martial Law.

The Form 5 Martial Law issued to all concerned is to be adhered to and a return to be sent in every time an offence is tried under Martial Law, so as to reach the Administrator of Martial Law, care of Brigade Headquarters, Wazirabad, as soon as possible. Column 6, statement of witnesses and of accused need not be filled up.

All persons arrested must be dealt with as follows:—

1. By summary court, Form 5, for offences not deserving of death.

The punishments to be inflicted are—

(*a*) Rigorous Imprisonment up to two years.
(*b*) Fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000.
(*c*) Whipping not exceeding 30 lashes.

Any sentence may be combined.

In all cases immediate action should be taken and punishment inflicted on the spot.

In cases of imprisonment the offender or offenders are to be handed over to the nearest jail or lock-up with the prescribed order of committal, Form 3.

2. By Special Tribunal Court for offences deserving of greater punishment that those empowered by 1.

Attention is drawn to Martial Law Instruction No. 2, dated 21st April 1919.

C. W. J. SMITH, *Major*,
Administrator of Martial Law, Gujranwala District.

April 21st, 1919.

SIALKOT BRIGADE AREA AND GUJRAT.

Martial Law Instruction No. 2.

Memorandum to Officers Commanding Units and Detachments, Police Officers and Magistrates.

(1) In order to prevent the occurrence of regrettable incidents, it must be clearly understood that the existence of Martial Law neither necessitates nor justifies the committal of excesses either in—

(*a*) The maintenance of order.
(*b*) In enforcing obedience to Martial Law Regulations.
(*c*) In the infliction of punishment.

(2) The guiding principle to be borne in mind is that the force required in (*a*) and (*b*) and the ensuing punishment should never exceed the necessities of the case.

(3) The punishment of whipping in particular, whilst probably the most efficacious and convenient method of summarily dealing with most minor breaches of Martial Law Regulations, requires tact and commonsense in its infliction. Under no circumstances should an old or feeble man be flogged, and the social status of the offender also needs consideration.

(4) It cannot be too clearly impressed upon all ranks that the temporary supersession of the ordinary process of Civil Law by the introduction of Martial Law does not mean that justice ceases to be administered; on the contrary, the suspension of the usual safeguards makes it doubly imperative that all concerned should bear in mind that it is incumbent on them to see that justice, and not irresponsible violence, is administered.

(5) When in any case Officers or Magistrates acting on my behalf are doubtful as to the suitable punishment to be inflicted, the case can always be remanded and the question referred to me by express telegram or telephone.

(6) Nothing in the above is to be read as weakening the hands of those responsible for strictly maintaining good order and enforcing Martial Law Regulations.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General*,
Commanding, Gujranwala District.

WAZIRABAD:
April 21st, 1919.

SIALKOT BRIGADE MILITARY AREA AND GUJRAT DISTRICT.

Martial Law Instruction No. 3.

I am directed by the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, to issue the following instructions for the guidance of all officers, Civil and Military, in the Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur Districts.

1. With reference to the Proclamation, dated 20th April 1919, by the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, paragraph 18, the following have been given powers by the Local Government to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law:—

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., D.C., Gujranwala.

MARTIAL LAW INSTRUCTIONS. [*Continued.*

Mr. B. N. Bosworth-Smith, Joint D.C., Gujranwala.
Mr. F. B. Wace, Assistant Commissioner, Gujranwala.
Mr. H. S. Williamson, D.C., Gujrat.

2. The following military officers have been given the above powers by the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade:—

Captain J. S. L. Ewing, M.C., 19th Lancers.
Captain T. P. Wheatly, 1st Garrison Bn., Yorkshire Regiment.
Captain W. J. Cole, Supply and Transport Corps.

3. The General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, hereby appoints the following as Area Officers under paragraph 18 of the proclamation referred to:—

Gujranwala District—

Gujranwala Area—Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., D.C., Gujranwala.
Chuharkana—Mr. B. N. Bosworth-Smith, Joint D. C., Gujranwala District.
Sangla Hill—Captain W. J. Cole, Supply and Transport Corps.
Wazirabad—Major C. W. J. Smith, D.S.O., Administrator, Martial Law, Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujranwala District.

Gujrat District—

Gujrat—Colonel L. S. Brown, 37th Dogras.
Lala Musa—Major W. E. Beazley, 37th Dogras.
Malakwal—Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Grant, V.C., 3-11th Gurkha Rifles.

4. The normal procedure will be that all offences against Martial Law will be referred to and disposed of by Area Officers who will either try offenders by Summary Court or remand them for trial by Special Tribunal Courts.

Summary powers should be used freely, and offenders remanded for trial by Special Tribunal Courts only in the most serious cases. Such cases will be handed over to the Civil or Police authorities for further investigation and this action noted in Form 5 and submitted to his Office.

5. Should it be deemed impracticable in the interests of Martial Law to bring offenders before an Area Officer, they may be disposed of by any of the officers mentioned in paragraph 18 of the above mentioned proclamation, but Officers other than Field Officers, Area Officers, or officers specially nominated to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law will use their summary powers only after reference to a Field Officer, Area Officer or officers so nominated.

6. The officers appointed as Area Officers and officers nominated as having special powers to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law in the Lyallpur District will be notified hereafter.

7. No officers other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs or who may hereafter be nominated by the Local Government or the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, have summary powers to deal with offences under Martial Law.

8. Officers authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law can only inflict the punishments laid down in paragraph 16 of the above mentioned Proclamation. If a heavier punishment is deemed necessary, the offenders must be remanded for trial by a Special Tribunal Court.

9. All ranks are justified in using such force as is necessary, including the taking of life, to quell disorder or to protect Government or private property, but once such necessity has passed, *i.e.*, when offenders have been arrested, they can only be tried and punished by Summary Courts or Special Tribunal Courts.

10. The special attention of officers authorised to dispose of offences summarily under Martial Law is invited to "Martial Law Instruction No. 2," dated April 21st, 1919, from the General Officer Commanding Gujranwala District.

11. The following Martial Law Forms will be used:—

(*a*) Form 3 A for committal to imprisonment to jail after sentence.
(*b*) Form 4 A for temporary committal prior to trial.
(*c*) Form 5 for record of trials.

An offender need not be committed temporarily to jail prior to trial if he can be retained with a Military guard.

In Form 3 A the words "imprisonment with hard labour" will be deleted and the words "Rigorous Imprisonment" substituted.

Form 5 will be submitted to this Office as soon as a case has been disposed of by a Summary Court.

The counterfoil of Forms 3 A and 4 A will be submitted to this Office when no longer required.

All the above Forms have been or will shortly be issued to Area and other officers mentioned in this instruction. Any further copies required may be had on application to this Office.

12. Officers holding Summary Court will take the oath laid down for Summary Courts Martial, and, if necessary, the interpreter's oath. Evidence will be taken on oath or affirmation and a very brief precis of evidence and accused's statement will be submitted on or with a Form 5.

C. W. J. SMITH, *Major*,
Administrator of Martial Law, Sialkot Brigade, Military Area and Gujrat District.

April 25th, 1919.

SIALKOT BRIGADE MILITARY AREA AND GUJRAT.

Martial Law Instruction No. 4.

With reference to Martial Law Notice No. 11, dated the 25th April 1919, the following instructions are issued for the better control of all classes of coaching traffic in the Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur Districts:—

1. The following persons only are permitted to book by 1st, 2nd, inter, or 3rd class from stations in the above Districts:—

(*a*) Military passengers on warrants, leave passes, etc.
(*b*) Europeans and Anglo-Indians.
(*c*) Servants of 1st and 2nd class European and Anglo-Indian passengers when actually accompanying their masters.
(*d*) Government Employees on Duty.
(*e*) Persons having Military Railway Passes.

2. Application for Military Passes under Martial Law will be made to the Civil and Military authorities at the following stations only:—

Gujranwala.	Chuharkana.
Wazirabad.	Lyallpur.
Gujrat.	Shorkot Road.
Lala Musa.	Sangla Hill.
Malakwal.	Hafizabad.

And any stations that may be published hereafter.

3. The authorities mentioned in paragraph 2 above will normally issue passes for bookings from the above stations only, but they may at their discretion issue passes permitting the holder to book from an intermediate station; their discretion should however be used sparingly.

4. The issue of a pass does not guarantee the holder a ticket or seat on a train. These matters are controlled by the Railway Authorities in accordance with the accommodation available.

5. Booking clerks will record—

(*a*) Date and number of all tickets issued.
(*b*) The number of the Military Pass on which issued.
(*c*) The name of persons to whom issued.

This record will be checked from time to time by the authority issuing passes at that station.

6. A person found travelling from a station in the Districts named and contrary to the orders contained in paragraph 1 of this instruction will be detained, his case investigated, after which he will be permitted to proceed or will be dealt with under Martial Law according to

Continued.] MARTIAL LAW INSTRUCTIONS.

circumstances. Persons travelling without tickets will be similarly dealt with.

7. When a person is found travelling contrary to the orders contained in paragraph 1 of this instruction, his name, the date of his railway ticket, if any, and the name of the station from which issued will be forwarded to this office at once for investigation.

8. Any booking clerk or other person found issuing tickets to travellers other than those mentioned in paragraph 1 of this instruction will be punished for an offence against Martial Law Regulations.

C. W. J. SMITH, *Major*,

Administrator, Martial Law,
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:
April 25th, 1919.

Martial Law Instruction No. 5.

1. With reference to Martial Law Instruction No. 3, paragraph 6, the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, hereby appoints the following to be Area Officers in the Lyallpur Civil District:—

Mr. G. F. deMontmorency, I.C.S., D. C., Lyallpur District.
Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Hodgson, D.S.O., 3-34th Sikh Pioneers.

2. With reference to Martial Law Instruction No. 3, paragraph 1, Major W. E. Beazley, 37th Dogras, having left the Gujrat District, the Lala Musa Area ceases to exist. Lala Musa will henceforward be included in the Gujrat Area.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain*,

for *Major, Administrator, Martial Law,*
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:
April 30th, 1919.

Martial Law Instruction No. 6.

1. The following instructions are issued for the guidance of officers issuing railway passes, but are not to be read as tying the hands of such officers. Each case must be judged on its merits.

2. The following may be regarded as suspicious characters:—

(*a*) Sadhus.
(*b*) Fakirs.
(*c*) Arya Samaj School-masters.

3. Pleaders should be regarded as suspicious characters unless they can prove that they are travelling to attend a case in court the date of which is actually fixed.

4. Residents of disturbed areas need not be regarded as suspicious characters unless there are qualifying circumstances.

5. In order to restrict the numbers of travellers to the accommodation available, the fewer the trains that are running the stricter should be the standard of qualification for railway passes.

6. It is at present undesirable to have more movement than is necessary in affected areas. Applications for railway passes should only be considered when good reasons are given.

7. The chief object of the restriction is to prevent the movement of suspicious characters.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain*,

for *Major, Administrator, Martial Law,*
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:
April 30th, 1919.

Martial Law Instruction No. 7.

(Ref. Martial Law Instruction No. 3.)

Under orders from Punjab Government it is necessary to lay down the boundaries of areas. Paragraph No. 3 of the above instruction is therefore cancelled and the following substituted.

3. The General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, hereby appoints the following as Area Officers under paragraph 18 of the proclamation referred to:—

Gujranwala District—

Gujranwala Tahsil—Lieutenant-Colonel A. J., O'Brien, C.I.E., C.B.E., D. C., Gujranwala.
Khangah Dogran, Sharakpur Tahsils—Mr. B. N. Bosworth-Smith, I.C.S., Joint D. C., Gujranwala.
Hafizabad Tahsil—Captain W. J. Cole, Supply and Transport Corps.
Wazirabad Tahsil—Major C. W. J. Smith, D.S.O., 2-54th Sikhs (F. F.)

Gujrat District—

Gujrat and Kharian Tahsils—Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, 37th Dogras.
Phalia Tahsil—Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Grant, V.C., 3-11th Gurkha Rifles.

Lyallpur District—

Joint Area Officers for whole Civil Area, Lyallpur—Lieutenant-Colonel G. C. Hodgson, D.S.O., 3-34th Sikh Pioneers.—Mr. G. F. deMontmorency, I.C.S., D. C., Lyallpur.

Add the following to paragraph 4, sub-paragraph 1:—

"An exception is made to this in the case of Captain J. W. Cole, Supply and Transport Corps, and Captain J. S. L. Ewing, M.C., 19th Lancers, who will similarly dispose of cases in any area through which they may be travelling, without reference to the Area Officer concerned. Paragraph No. 6 is now cancelled.

C. W. J. SMITH, *Major*,

Administrator, Martial Law,
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

2nd May 1919.

Martial Law Instruction No. 8.

1. Considerable uncertainty still appears to exist regarding the restrictions on coaching traffic. This appears to be due to the fact that the restrictions laid down in North-Western Railway booking restrictions Notice No. 1 (revised) and No. 3 apply to intermediate and 3rd class passengers only, whereas Martial Law Instruction No. 4, dated 20th April 1919, applies to 1st and 2nd class Indian passengers in addition, but can only be enforced in the Gujrat, Gujranwala and Lyallpur districts which comprise the area under the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, for the Administration of Martial Law.

2. The restrictions laid down operate as follows:—

1st and 2nd class bookings—

(*a*) Indian passengers may book from any station outside the three districts named in paragraph 1, through or into those districts without first obtaining a permit, but at the first checking station inside any of those districts they will be provided with a railway pass to their destination in or through those districts, or will be returned back.

(*b*) Passengers desiring to book from a station inside the districts named in paragraph 1 to any station inside or outside those districts must first obtain a railway pass.

Inter. and 3rd class bookings—

(*a*) Passengers may book from any station on the North-Western Railway not Railway Special Notice No. 1 (revised) through the restricted

areas named in that Notice to any station beyond those restricted areas without first obtaining a railway pass but on reaching the first checking station in any of the areas so named they must be given a railway pass to carry them through the areas, or be turned back.

(*b*) Passengers wishing to book from any station on the North-Western Railway to any station in the above areas must first obtain a railway pass before a ticket can be issued at the starting station.

(*c*) Passengers booking from foreign railways into or through the areas so named will be given a railway pass at the first checking station inside those areas, or be turned back.

(*d*) Passengers wishing to book from a station in any of the above areas to any station on the North-Western Railway or to a foreign railway must first obtain a railway pass.

3. These restrictions do not apply to persons exempted under the railway notices and Martial Law Instruction referred to in paragraph 1 or to pensioned Indian officers when travelling in uniform.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*
for *Major, Administrator, Martial Law,*
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:
May 3rd, 1919.

Martial Law Instruction No. 9.

Please note that Notice under Martial Law No. 20 is now cancelled.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*
for *Major, Administrator, Martial Law,*
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:
May 3rd, 1919.

Martial Law Instruction No. 10.

1. In confirmation of this office wire No. 136-M. L., dated 4th May 1919, Notice is hereby given that on and from 5th May 1919 all classes of railway tickets may be issued without restriction. Military passes under Martial Law are no longer required.

2. For the present Mail trains will continue to be examined at Lala Musa and Wazirabad for suspicious characters, who will be dealt with at the discretion of examining officers. Passenger trains other than mails will be examined occasionally at the discretion of examining officers.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*
for *Major, Administrator, Martial Law,*
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:
May 4th, 1919.

Martial Law Instruction No. 11.

With reference to Notice under Martial Law No. 26, the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, directs that whenever a Union Jack is obtainable it should be erected at a suitable spot and the school-boys together with their masters should be made to salaam it at every parade with a view to inculcating a sense of respect for the British Flag as an emblem of the King-Emperor. The General Officer Commanding especially directs that school-masters and school-boys be instructed that it is the privilege of persons in the Army, Navy and Police only to salute, all other persons showing their respect by raising their hats or salaaming according to their nationality. It is probable that a Union Jack will be forthcoming on demand from any town.

L. W. Y. CAMPBELL, *Brigadier-General,*
Commanding, Sialkot Brigade.

WAZIRABAD:
May 5th, 1919.

Martial Law Instruction No. 12.

It is reported by the Punjab Government that rumours are being spread to the effect that under Martial Law payment of money orders has been suspended. Area Officers and Officer Commanding Troops, will do their best to refute this story and will satisfy themselves by enquiries that money orders are being paid promptly and action under Martial Law will be taken against any postal officials who in any way lend colour to this falsehood.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*
for *Major, Administrator, Martial Law,*
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:
May 7th, 1919.

Martial Law Instruction No. 13.

I am directed by the General Officer Commanding, Sialkot Brigade, to inform you that should a man accused of infringing a Martial Law Order be sentenced to imprisonment and flogging, the flogging will be administered at the commencement of the imprisonment.

Also I am to inform you that there are no appeals against sentences given by Summary Courts.

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*
for *Major, Administrator, Martial Law,*
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:
May 9th, 1919.

Martial Law Instruction No. 14.

Reference Notice under Martial Law No. 26. Please delete the word "Lyallpur."

T. P. WHEATLY, *Captain,*
for *Major, Administrator, Martial Law,*
Sialkot Brigade Military Area and Gujrat.

WAZIRABAD:
May 9th, 1919.

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